3. CHAPTER III.
The character of Mr. Square the philosopher, and of Mr. Thwackum the
divine; with a dispute concerning-
The name of this gentleman, who had then resided some time at Mr.
Allworthy's house, was Mr. Square. His natural parts were not of the
first rate, but he had greatly improved them by a learned education.
He was deeply read in the antients, and a profest master of all the
works of Plato and Aristotle. Upon which great models he had
principally formed himself; sometimes according with the opinion of
the one, and sometimes with that of the other. In morals he was a
profest Platonist, and in religion he inclined to be an Aristotelian.
But though he had, as we have said, formed his morals on the
Platonic model, yet he perfectly agreed with the opinion of Aristotle,
in considering that great man rather in the quality of a philosopher
or a speculatist, than as a legislator. This sentiment he carried a
great way; indeed, so far, as to regard all virtue as matter of theory
only. This, it is true, he never affirmed, as I have heard, to any
one; and yet upon the least attention to his conduct, I cannot help
thinking it was his real opinion, as it will perfectly reconcile
some contradictions which might otherwise appear in his character.
This gentleman and Mr. Thwackum scarce ever met without a
disputation; for their tenets were indeed diametrically opposite to
each other. Square held human nature to be the perfection of all
virtue, and that vice was a deviation from our nature, in the same
manner as deformity of body is. Thwackum, on the contrary,
maintained that the human mind, since the fall, was nothing but a sink
of iniquity, till purified and redeemed by grace. In one point only
they agreed, which was, in all their discourses on morality never to
mention the word goodness. The favourite phrase of the former, was the
natural beauty of virtue; that of the latter, was the divine power
of grace. The former measured all actions by the unalterable rule of
right, and the eternal fitness of things; the latter decided all
matters by authority; but in doing this, he always used the scriptures
and their commentators, as the lawyer doth his Coke upon Lyttleton,
where the comment is of equal authority with the text.
After this short introduction, the reader will be pleased to
remember, that the parson had concluded his speech with a triumphant
question, to which he had apprehended no answer; viz., Can any
honour exist independent of religion?
To this Square answered; that it was impossible to discourse
philosophically concerning words, till their meaning was first
established: that there were scarce any two words of a more vague
and uncertain signification, than the two he had mentioned; for that
there were almost as many different opinions concerning honour, as
concerning religion. "But," says he, "if by honour you mean the true
natural beauty of virtue, I will maintain it may exist independent
of any religion whatever. Nay," added he, "you yourself will allow
it may exist independent of all but one: so will a Mahometan, a Jew,
and all the maintainers of all the different sects in the world."
Thwackum replied, this was arguing with the usual malice of all
the enemies to the true Church. He said, he doubted not but that all
the infidels and hereticks in the world would, if they could,
confine honour to their own absurd errors and damnable deceptions;
"but honour," says he, "is not therefore manifold, because there are
many absurd opinions about it; nor is religion manifold, because there
are various sects and heresies in the world. When I mention
religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian
religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant
religion, but the Church of England. And when I mention honour, I mean
that mode of Divine grace which is not only consistent with, but
dependent upon, this religion; and is consistent with and dependent
upon no other. Now to say that the honour I here mean, and which
was, I thought, all the honour I could be supposed to mean, will
uphold, must less dictate an untruth, is to assert an absurdity too
shocking to be conceived."
"I purposely avoided," says Square, "drawing a conclusion which I
thought evident from what I have said; but if you perceived it, I am
sure you have not attempted to answer it. However, to drop the article
of religion, I think it is plain, from what you have said, that we
have different ideas of honour; or why do we not agree in the same
terms of its explanation? I have asserted, that true honour and true
virtue are almost synonymous terms, and they are both founded on the
unalterable rule of right, and the eternal fitness of things; to which
an untruth being absolutely repugnant and contrary, it is certain that
true honour cannot support an untruth. In this, therefore, I think
we are agreed; but that this honour can be said to be founded on
religion, to which it is antecedent, if by religion be meant any
positive law--"
"I agree," answered Thwackum, with great warmth, "with a man who
asserts honour to be antecedent to religion! Mr. Allworthy, did I
agree--?"
He was proceeding when Mr. Allworthy interposed, telling them very
coldly, they had both mistaken his meaning; for that he had said
nothing of true honour.- It is possible, however, he would not have
easily quieted the disputants, who were growing equally warm, had
not another matter now fallen out, which put a final end to the
conversation at present.