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The writings of James Madison,

comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed.
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TO JAMES HILLHOUSE.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TO JAMES HILLHOUSE.

MAD. MSS.

Dear Sir—I have received your letter of the
10th inst: with the pamphlet containing the proposed
amendments of the Constitution of the U. States,
on which you request my opinion & remarks.[112]

Whatever pleasure might be felt in a fuller compliance
with your request, I must avail myself of the
pleas of the age I have reached, and of the controul of
other engagements, for not venturing on more than
the few observations suggested by a perusal of what
you have submitted to the public.

I readily acknowledge the ingenuity which devised
the plan you recommend, and the strength of reasoning


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with which you support it. I cannot however
but regard it as liable to the following remarks:

    1.

  • The first that occurs is, that the large States
    would not exchange the proportional agency they
    now have in the appointment of the Chief Magistrate,
    for a mode placing the largest & smallest States on
    a perfect equality in that cardinal transaction. N.
    York has in it, even now more than 13 times the
    weight of several of the States, and other States according
    to their magnitudes wd. decide on the
    change with correspondent calculations & feelings.

    The difficulty of reconciling the larger States to the
    equality in the Senate is known to have been the
    most threatning that was encountered in framing
    the Constitution. It is known also that the powers
    committed to that body, comprehending, as they do,
    Legislative, Ex. & Judicial functions, was among the
    most serious objections, with many, to the adoption
    of the Constitution.

  • 2.

  • As the President elect would generally be
    without any previous evidence of national confidence,
    and have been in responsible relations only to a
    particular State, there might be danger of State
    partialities, and a certainty of injurious suspicions
    of them.
  • 3.

  • Considering the ordinary composition of the
    Senate, and the number (in a little time nearly 50)
    out of which a single one was to be taken by pure
    chance; it must often happen, that the winner of the
    prize would want some of the qualities necessary
    to command the respect of the nation, and possibly be

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    Page 368
    marked with some of an opposite tendency. On
    a review of the composition of that Body thro' the
    successive periods of its existence, (antecedent to
    the present which may be an exception) how often
    will names present themselves, which would be
    seen with mortified feelings at the head of the
    nation. It might happen, it is true, that, in the
    choice of Senators, an eventual elevation to that
    important trust might produce more circumspection
    in the State Legislatures. But so remote a contingency
    could not be expected to have any great
    influence; besides that there might be States not
    furnishing at the time, characters which would
    satisfy the pride and inspire the confidence of the
    States & of the People.
  • 4.

  • A President not appointed by the nation and
    without the weight derived from its selection &
    confidence, could not afford the advantage expected
    from the qualified negative on the act of the Legislative
    branch of the Govt. He might either shrink
    from the delicacy of such an interposition, or it
    might be overruled with too little hesitation by the
    body checked in its career.
  • 5.

  • In the vicissitudes of party, adverse views &
    feelings will exist between the Senate & President.
    Under the amendments proposed, a spirit of opposition
    in the former to the latter would probably be
    more frequent than heretofore. In such a state of
    things, how apt might the Senate be to embarrass the
    President, by refusing to concur in the removal of
    an obnoxious officer; how prone would be a refractory

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    Page 369
    officer, having powerful friends in the Senate,
    to take shelter under that authority, & bid defiance
    to the President; and, with such discord and anarchy
    in the Ex. Department, how impaired would
    be the security for a due execution of the Laws!
  • 6.

  • On the supposition that the above objection
    would be overbalanced by the advantage of reducing
    the power and the patronage now attached
    to the Presidential office; it has generally been
    admitted, that the Heads of Depts. at least who
    are at once the associates & the organs of the
    Chief Magistrate, ought to be well disposed towards
    him, and not independent of him. What would
    be the situation of the President, and what might
    be the effect on the Executive business, if those
    immediately around him, and in daily consultation
    with him, could, however adverse to him in their
    feelings & their views, be fastened upon him, by a
    Senate disposed to take side with them? The
    harmony so expedient between the P. & Heads of
    Departments, and among the latter themselves, has
    been too liable to interruption under an organization
    apparently so well providing against it.

I am aware that some of these objections might
be mitigated, if not removed; but not I suspect in a
degree to render the proposed modification of the
Executive Department an eligible substitute for the
one existing. At the same time, I am duly sensible
of the evils incident to the existing one, and
that a solid improvement of it is a desideratum that
ought to be welcomed by all enlightened patriots.


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In the mean time, I cannot feel all the alarm you
express at the prospect for the future as reflected from
the mirror of the past. It will be a rare case that the
Presidential contest will not issue in a choice that
will not discredit the station, and not be acquiesced
in by the unsuccessful party, foreseeing, as it must
do, the appeal to be again made at no very distant
day to the will of the nation. As long as the country
shall be exempt from a military force powerful in
itself and combined with a powerful faction, liberty
& peace will find safeguards in the elective resource
and the spirit of the people. The dangers which
threaten our political system least remote are
perhaps of other sorts and from other sources.

I will only add to these remarks, what is indeed
sufficiently evident, that they are too hasty & too
crude for any other than a private, and that an
indulgent eye.

Mrs. M. is highly gratified by your kind expressions
towards her, & begs you to be assured that she still
feels for you that affectionate friendship with which
you impressed her many years ago. Permit me
to join her in best wishes for your health & every
other happiness.

 
[112]

The pamphlet was; Propositions for amending the Constitution of
the United States, providing for the election of President and Vice-President,
and guarding against the undue exercise of Executive influence,
patronage and power
. Washington, 1830. It was a revival of Hillhouse's
proposed amendments to the constitution offered in the Senate
in 1808.