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The writings of James Madison,

comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed.
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SPEECH IN THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SPEECH IN THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.[109]

Although the actual posture of the subject before the
Committee might admit a full survey of it, it is not my purpose,
in rising, to enter into the wide field of discussion, which
has called forth a display of intellectual resources and varied
powers of eloquence, that any country might be proud of,


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and which I have witnessed with the highest gratification.
Having been, for a very long period, withdrawn from any
participation in proceedings of deliberative bodies, and under
other disqualifications now of which I am deeply sensible,
though perhaps less sensible than others may perceive that
I ought to be, I shall not attempt more than a few observations,

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which may suggest the views I have taken of the subject, and
which will consume but little of the time of the Committee,
become precious. It is sufficiently obvious, that persons now
and property are the two great subjects on which Governments
are to act; and that the rights of persons, and the
rights of property, are the objects, for the protection of which
Government was instituted. These rights cannot well be

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separated. The personal right to acquire property, which is a
natural right, gives to property, when acquired, a right to
protection, as a social right. The essence of Government
is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human hands,
will ever be liable to abuse. In monarchies, the interests and
happiness of all may be sacrificed to the caprice and passions
of a despot. In aristocracies, the rights and welfare of the
many may be sacrificed to the pride and cupidity of the few.
In republics, the great danger is, that the majority may not
sufficiently respect the rights of the minority. Some gentlemen,
consulting the purity and generosity of their own minds,
without adverting to the lessons of experience, would find a
security against that danger, in our social feelings; in a respect
for character; in the dictates of the monitor within; in the
interests of individuals; in the aggregate interests of the
community. But man is known to be a selfish, as well as a
social being. Respect for character, though often a salutary
restraint, is but too often overruled by other motives. When
numbers of men act in a body, respect for character is often
lost, just in proportion as it is necessary to control what
is not right. We all know that conscience is not a sufficient
safe-guard; and besides, that conscience itself may be deluded;
may be misled, by an unconscious bias, into acts which an
enlightened conscience would forbid. As to the permanent
interest of individuals in the aggregate interests of the community,
and in the proverbial maxim, that honesty is the best
policy, present temptation is often found to be an overmatch
for those considerations. These favourable attributes
of the human character are all valuable, as auxiliaries; but
they will not serve as a substitute for the coercive provision
belonging to Government and Law. They will always, in
proportion as they prevail, be favourable to a mild administration
of both: but they can never be relied on as a guaranty
of the rights of the minority against a majority disposed to
take unjust advantage of its power. The only effectual safeguard
to the rights of the minority, must be laid in such a
basis and structure of the Government itself, as may afford,

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in a certain degree, directly or indirectly, a defensive authority
in behalf of a minority having right on its side.

To come more nearly to the subject before the Committee,
viz.: that peculiar feature in our community, which calls for
a peculiar division in the basis of our government, I mean the
coloured part of our population. It is apprehended, if the
power of the Commonwealth shall be in the hands of a majority,
who have no interest in this species of property, that, from
the facility with which it may be oppressed by excessive
taxation, injustice may be done to its owners. It would seem,
therefore, if we can incorporate that interest into the basis
of our system, it will be the most apposite and effectual security
that can be devised. Such an arrangement is recommended
to me by many very important considerations. It is due to
justice; due to humanity; due to truth; to the sympathies of
our nature; in fine, to our character as a people, both abroad
and at home, that they should be considered, as much as possible,
in the light of human beings, and not as mere property.
As such, they are acted upon by our laws, and have an interest
in our laws. They may be considered as making a part,
though a degraded part, of the families to which they belong.

If they had the complexion of the Serfs in the North of
Europe, or of the Villeins formerly in England; in other terms,
if they were of our own complexion, much of the difficulty
would be removed. But the mere circumstance of complexion
cannot deprive them of the character of men. The Federal
number, as it is called, is particularly recommended to attention
in forming a basis of Representation, by its simplicity,
its certainty, its stability, and its permanency. Other expedients
for securing justice in the case of taxation, while they
amount in pecuniary effect, to the same thing, have been
found liable to great objections: and I do not believe that a
majority of this Convention is disposed to adopt them, it
they can find a substitute they can approve. Nor is it a small
recommendation of the Federal number, in my view, that it
is in conformity to the ratio recognized in the Federal Constitution.
The cases, it is true, are not precisely the same,


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but there is more of analogy than might at first be supposed.
If the coloured population were equally diffused through
the State, the analogy would fail; but existing as it does, in
large masses, in particular parts of it, the distinction between
the different parts of the State, resembles that between the
slave-holding and non-slave-holding States: and, if we reject
a doctrine in our own State, whilst we claim the benefit of it
in our relations to other States, other disagreeable consequences
may be added to the charge of inconsistency, which
will be brought against us. If the example of our sister States
is to have weight, we find that in Georgia, the Federal number
is made the basis of Representation in both branches of their
Legislature; and I do not learn, that any dissatisfaction or
inconvenience has flowed from its adoption. I wish we could
know more of the manner in which particular organizations
of Government operate in other parts of the United States.
There would be less danger of being misled into error, and
we should have the advantage of their experience, as well
as our own. In the case I mention, there can, I believe, be
no error.

Whether, therefore, we be fixing a basis of Representation,
for the one branch or the other of our Legislature, or for both,
in a combination with other principles, the Federal ratio is a
favourite resource with me. It entered into my earliest
views of the subject, before this Convention was assembled:
and though I have kept my mind open, have listened to every
proposition which has been advanced, and given to them all
a candid consideration, I must say, that in my judgment, we
shall act wisely in preferring it to others, which have been
brought before us. Should the Federal number be made to
enter into the basis in one branch of the Legislature, and not
into the other, such an arrangement might prove favourable
to the slaves themselves. It may be, and I think it has been
suggested, that those who have themselves no interest in this
species of property, are apt to sympathise with the slaves,
more than may be the case with their masters; and would,
therefore, be disposed, when they had the ascendancy, to


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protect them from laws of an oppressive character, whilst the
masters, who have a common interest with the slaves, against
undue taxation, which must be paid out of their labour, will
be their protectors when they have the ascendancy.

The Convention is now arrived at a point, where we must
agree on some common ground, all sides relaxing in their
opinions, not changing, but mutually surrendering a part
of them. In framing a Constitution, great difficulties are
necessarily to be overcome; and nothing can ever overcome
them, but a spirit of compromise. Other nations are surprised
at nothing so much as our having been able to form Constitutions
in the manner which has been exemplified in this country.
Even the union of so many States, is, in the eyes of the world,
a wonder; the harmonious establishment of a common Government
over them all, a miracle. I cannot but flatter myself,
that without a miracle, we shall be able to arrange all difficulties.
I never have despaired, notwithstanding all the
threatening appearances we have passed through. I have
now more than a hope—a consoling confidence, that we shall
at last find, that our labours have not been in vain.

 
[109]

From Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention
of 1829–30
. Richmond, 1830. In 1827–28 the people of the State
voted in favor of holding a State convention to revise the constitution
and Madison accepted service as a delegate, this being his
last public employment. He made but one speech, although he
offered several motions. The question before the convention was
the qualification for suffrage. The report says: "Mr. Madison now
rose and addressed the Chair: The members rushed from their seats,
and crowded around him."

He made the following memorandum suggested by the question.
(See also ante, Vol. IV., pp. 120, 121, n.)

NOTE DURING THE CONVENTION FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA.

The right of suffrage being of vital importance, and approving an
extension of it to House keepers & heads of families, I will suggest a
few considerations which govern my judgment on the subject.

Were the Constitution on hand to be adapted to the present circumstances
of our Country, without taking into view the changes which
time is rapidly producing, an unlimited extension of the right wd
probably vary little the character of our public councils or measures.
But as we are to prepare a system of Govt. for a period which it
is hoped will be a long one, we must look to the prospective changes
in the condition and composition of the society on which it is to act.

It is a law of nature, now well understood, that the earth under a
civilized cultivation is capable of yielding subsistence for a large
surplus of consumers, beyond those having an immediate interest in
the soil; a surplus which must increase with the increasing improvements
in agriculture, and the labor-saving arts applied to it. And
it is a lot of humanity that of this surplus a large proportion is necessarily
reduced by a competition for employment to wages which afford
them the bare necessaries of life. That proportion being without property,
or the hope of acquiring it, can not be expected to sympathize
sufficiently with its rights, to be safe depositories of power over them.

What is to be done with this unfavored class of the community?
If it be, on one hand, unsafe to admit them to a full share of political
power, it must be recollected, on the other, that it cannot be expedient
to rest a Republican Govt. on a portion of the society having a numerical
& physical force excluded from, and liable to be turned against
it; and which would lead to a standing military force, dangerous to
all parties & to liberty itself.

This view of the subject makes it proper to embrace in the partnership
of power, every description of citizens having a sufficient stake
in the public order, and the stable administration of the laws; and
particularly the House keepers & Heads of families; most of whom
"having given hostages to fortune," will have given them to their
Country also.

This portion of the community, added to those, who although not
possessed of a share of the soil, are deeply interested in other species
of property, and both of them added to the territorial proprietors,
who in a certain sense may be regarded as the owners of the Country
itself, form the safest basis of free Government. To the security for
such a Govt. afforded by these combined numbers, may be further
added, the political & moral influence emanating from the actual
possession of authority and a just & beneficial exercise of it.

It would be happy if a State of Society could be found or framed,
in which an equal voice in making the laws might be allowed to every
individual bound to obey them. But this is a Theory, which like most
Theories, confessedly requires limitations & modifications, and the only
question to be decided in this as in other cases, turns on the particular
degree of departure, in practice, required by the essence & object of the
Theory itself.

It must not be supposed that a crowded state of population, of which
we have no example here, and which we know only by the image
reflected from examples elsewhere, is too remote to claim attention.

The ratio of increase in the U. S. shows that the present

       
12 Millions will in  25 years be  24 Mils. 
24 Millions will in  50 years be  48 Mils. 
48 Millions will in  75 years be  96 Mils. 
96 Millions will in  100 years be  192 Mils. 

There may be a gradual decrease of the rate of increase: but it will
be small as long as agriculture shall yield its abundance. G. Britain
has doubled her population in the last 50 years; notwithstanding its
amount in proportion to its territory at the commencement of that
period, and Ireland is a much stronger proof of the effect of an increasing
product of food, in multiplying the consumers.

How far this view of the subject will be affected by the Republican
laws of descent and distribution, in equalizing the property of the citizens
and in reducing to the minimum mutual surplusses for mutual supplies,
cannot be inferred from any direct and adequate experiment. One
result would seem to be a deficiency of the capital for the expensive
establishments which facilitate labour and cheapen its products on one
hand, and, on the other, of the capacity to purchase the costly and
ornamental articles consumed by the wealthy alone, who must cease
to be idlers and become labourers. Another the increased mass of
labourers added to the production of necessaries by the withdrawal
for this object, of a part of those now employed in producing luxuries,
and the addition to the labourers from the class of present consumers
of luxuries. To the effect of these changes, intellectual, moral, and
social, the institutions and laws of the Country must be adapted,
and it will require for the task all the wisdom of the wisest patriots.

Supposing the estimate of the growing population of the U. S.
to be nearly correct, and the extent of their territory to be 8 or 9
hundred Mils of acres, and one fourth of it to consist of inarable
surface, there will in a century or a little more, be nearly as crowded a
population in the U. S. as in G. Britain or France, and if the present
Constitution (of Virginia) with all its flaws, lasted more than half a
century, it is not an unreasonable hope that an amended one will
last more than a century.

If these observations be just, every mind will be able to develop &
apply them.—Mad. MSS.