The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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TO GEORGE HAY |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
TO GEORGE HAY
Dear Sir I have received your letter of the 11th,
with the Newspapers containing your remarks on
the present mode of electing a President, and your
proposed remedy for its defects. I am glad to find
you have not abandoned your attention to great
Constitutional topics.
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process
for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government
such as that of the U. S. was deeply felt by the Convention;
and as the final arrangement of it took
place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not
exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence produced
by fatigue and impatience in all such Bodies,
tho' the degree was much less than usually prevails
on them.[52]
The part of the arrangement which casts the
eventual appointment on the House of Reps. voting by
States, was, as you presume, an accommodation to
the anxiety of the smaller States for their sovereign
the cumulative functions of the Senate. The agency
of the H. of Reps. was thought safer also than that of
the Senate, on account of the greater number of its
would turn on one or two States having one or two
Reps. only; but even in that case, the representations
of most of the States being numerous, the House
the Senate with its paucity of Members. It may
be observed also, that altho' for a certain period the
evil of State votes given by one or two individuals,
would be extended by the introduction of new States,
it would be rapidly diminished by growing populations
within extensive territories. At the present
period, the evil is at its maximum. Another Census
will leave none of the States existing or in Embryo,
in the numerical rank of R. I. & Del, nor is it impossible,
that the progressive assimilation of local
Institutions, laws & manners, may overcome the
prejudices of those particular States against an
incorporation with their neighbours.
But with all possible abatements, the present
rule of voting for President by the H. of Reps. is so
great a departure from the Republican principle of
numerical equality, and even from the federal rule
which qualifies the numerical by a State equality,
and is so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency
in practice, that an amendment of the Constitution
on this point is justly called for by all its considerate
& best friends.
I agree entirely with you in thinking that the
election of Presidential Electors by districts, is an
amendment very proper to be brought forward at
the same time with that relating to the eventual
choice of President by the H. of Reps. The district
mode was mostly, if not exclusively in view when
the Constitution was framed and adopted; & was
exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative
of the particular States which had set the example.
A constitutional establishment of that mode will
doubtless aid in reconciling the smaller States to
the other changes which they will regard as a concession
on their part. And it may not be without
a value in another important respect. The States
when voting for President by general tickets or by
their Legislatures, are a string of beads; when they
make their elections by districts, some of these differing
in sentiment from others, and sympathizing with
that of districts in other States, they are so knit
together as to break the force of those geographical
and other noxious parties which might render the
repulsive too strong for the cohesive tendencies
within the Political System.
It may be worthy of consideration whether in
requiring elections by districts, a discretion might
not be conveniently left with the States to allot
two members to a single district. It would manifestly
be an important proviso, that no new arrangement
of districts should be made within a certain
period previous to an ensuring election of President.
Of the different remedies you propose for the
failure of a majority of Electoral votes for any one
Candidate, I like best that which refers the final
choice, to a joint vote of the two Houses of Congress,
restricted to the two highest names on the
Electoral lists. It might be a question, whether
the three instead of the two highest names
might not
be put within the choice of Congress, inasmuch as it
on the list of votes would in a question with either
of the two first outvote him, and, consequently be
the real preference of the voters. But this advantage
of opening a wider door & a better chance
to merit, may be outweighed by an increased difficulty
in obtaining a prompt & quiet decision by
Congress with three candidates before them, supported
by three parties, no one of them making
a majority of the whole.
The mode which you seem to approve, of making
a plurality of Electoral votes a definitive appointment
would have the merit of avoiding the Legislative
agency in appointing the Executive; but
might it not, by multiplying hopes and chances,
stimulate intrigue & exertion, as well as incur too
great a risk of success to a very inferior candidate?
Next to the propriety of having a President the
real choice of a majority of his Constituents, it is
desirable that he should inspire respect & acquiescence
by qualifications not suffering too much by
comparision.
I cannot but think also that there is a strong
objection to undistinguishing votes for President
& Vice President; the highest number appointing
the former the next the latter. To say nothing of
the different services (except in a rare contingency)
which are to be performed by them, occasional
transpositions would take place, violating equally
the mutual consciousness of the individuals, & the
public estimate of their comparative fitness.
Having thus made the remarks to which your
communication led, with a frankness which I am
sure you will not disapprove, whatever errors you
may find in them, I will sketch for your consideration
a substitute which has occurred to myself for the
faulty part of the Constitution in question
"The Electors to be chosen in districts, not more
than two in any one district, and the arrangement of
the districts not to be alterable within the period
of———previous to the election of President.
Each Elector to give two votes, one naming his first
choice, the other his next choice. If there be a
majority of all the votes on the first list for the same
person, he of course to be President; if not, and there
be a majority, (which may well happen) on the other
list for the same person, he then to be the final
choice; if there be no such majority on either list,
then a choice to be made by joint ballot of the two
Houses of Congress, from the two names having the
greatest number of votes on the two lists taken
together." Such a process would avoid the inconvenience
of a second resort to the Electors; and
furnish a double chance of avoiding an eventual
resort to Congress. The same process might be
observed in electing the Vice President.
Your letter found me under some engagements
which have retarded a compliance with its request,
and may have also rendered my view of the subject
presented in it more superficial than I have been
aware. This consideration alone would justify my
wish not to be brought into the public discussion.
to view everything, however abstract from
the Presidential election in prospect, thro' a medium
connecting it with that question; a propensity the
less to be excused as no previous change of the
Constitution can be contemplated, and the more
to be regretted, as opinions and commitments formed
under its influence, may become settled obstacles
at a practicable season.
Be pleased to accept the expression of my esteem
and my friendly respects.
On January 3, 1824, Madison wrote to George McDuffie who had
introduced a joint resolution in Congress December 22 (Annals
of Cong., 18 Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. I, p. 851) for amending the provision
of the Constitution relative to the election of President and
Vice President:
"I agree equally with them in preferring an eventual choice of Presidt.
& V. Presidt. by a joint ballot of the two Houses of Congress,
to the existing provision for such a choice by the H. of Reps. voting
by States. The Committee appear to me to be very right also in
the amendments together, as a compromise between States
may mutually regard them as concessions.
"In the amendment relating to District elections of representatives
it is provided that the Districts shall not be alterable previous to
another Census, and the 'Joint Resolution' extends the prohibition
to the Electoral Districts. As the return of a Census may not be
within less than ten years, the regulation may become very inconvenient
& dissatisfactory especially in new States, within different
parts of which the population will increase at such unequal rates.
It would be a better provision that no change of Districts should take
place within a period of preceding elections next in view; and
to apply the rule to cases where Congress may have a right to interfere,
as well as to the ordinary exercise of the power by the States.
"The power given by the 'Joint Resolution' to the Electors of
P. & V. P. to fill up their own vacancies, & to appoint the two additional
Electors, is liable to the Remark, that where there may be but
a single Elector, casualities to him might deprive his State of its two
additional Electors; and that a single Elector with a right to appoint
two others, would have in effect three votes; a situation exposing
him in a particular manner, to temptations of which the Constitution
is jealous. The objection to such an augmented power applies,
generally, with a force proportioned to the powers of Electors allotted
to a State. There may be some difficulty in finding a satisfactory
remedy for the case. In States entitled to but one Representative,
the single district might choose the three Electors. In States having
two Reps., each of its two Districts, by choosing two Electors, would
furnish the quota of four. In all other States the difficulty would
occur. And as uniformity is so justly an object, it would seem best
to let the State Legislatures appoint or provide for the appointment
of the two additional Electors, and for filling the Electoral vacancies;
limiting the time within which the appointment must be made.
"Would it not be better to retain the word 'immediately' in requiring
the two Houses to proceed to the choice of P. & V. P., than
to change it into 'without separating.' If the change could quicken
and ensure a final ballot, it would certainly be a good one. But as it
might give rise to disputes as to the validity of an Election, after an
adjournment and separation forced by a repetition of abortive ballotings,
the existing term might perhaps as well remain & take its chance
of answering its purpose. The distinction between a regulation
which is directory only, and one a departure from which would have
a viciating effect, is not always obvious; and in the delicate affair
of electing a Chief Magistrate it will be best to hazard as little as
possible a discussion of it.
"In the appeal to the second meeting of Electors, their choice is
limited to the two names having the highest number of votes given
at the first meeting. As there may be an equality of votes among
several highest on the list, the option ought to be enlarged accordingly,
as well with a view to obviate uncertainty, as to deal equally with
equal pretensions.
"The expedient of resorting to a second meeting of the Presidential
Electors, in order to diminish the risk of a final resort to Congress, has
certainly much to recommend it. But the evil to be guarded as it
would lose not a little of its formidable aspect, by the substitution
of a joint ballot of the members of Congress, for a vote by States in
the Representative branch: which the prolonged period during which
the Electors must be in appointment before their final votes would be
given, relinquishes the contemplated advantage of functions to be
so quickly commenced and closed as to preclude extraneous management
& intrigue. The increased trouble and expence are of minor
consideration, tho' not to be entirely disregarded. It may be more
important to remark, that in cases where from an equality of votes
in the Electoral List, more than two names might be sent back to the
Electors, very serious embarrassments & delays might happen from
miscalculations or perverse dispositions in some of so many distinct
meetings, and that after all, no perfect security would exist agst. an
ultimate devolution of the choice on Congress. Still it may be a fair
question whether a second meeting of Electors, with its prospect of
preventing an election by the members of the Legislature, would not
be preferable to a single meeting with the greater probability of a
resort to them."—Copy kindly loaned by W. H. Gibbes, Esq. of
Columbia, S. C.
On January 30, 1826, he wrote to Robert Taylor, concerning the
proposed amendment to the Constitution introduced in the Senate Dec.
15, 1825.
"It seems to be generally agreed that some change in the mode of
electing the Executive Magistrate is desirable, that would produce
more uniformity & equality, with a better security for concentrating
the major will of the nation, and less risk of an eventual decision in
the national Legislature.
"The amendment reported by the Committee of the Senate is very
ably prepared & recommended. But I think there are advantages
in the intervention of Electors, and inconveniences in a direct vote
by the people, which are not sufficiently adverted to in the Report.
"One advantage of Electors is, that as Candidates, & still more as
competitors personally known in the Districts, they will call forth
the greater attention of the people: another advantage is, that altho'
generally the mere mouths of their Constituents, they may be intentionally
left sometimes to their own judgment, guided by further
information that may be acquired by them: and finally, what is of
material importance, they will be able, when ascertaining, which
may not be till a late hour, that the first choice of their constituents
is utterly hopeless, to substitute in the electoral vote the name known
to be their second choice.
"If the election be referred immediately to the people, however they
may be liable to an excess of excitement on particular occasions, they
will on ordinary occasions and where the candidates are least known
feel too little; yielding too much to the consideration that in a question
depending on millions of votes individual ones are not worth
the trouble of giving them. There would be great encouragement
therefore for active partizans to push up their favorites to the upper
places on the list and by that means force a choice between candidates,
to either of whom others lower on the list would be preferred. Experience
gives sufficient warning of such results.
"An election by Districts, instead of general tickets, & State Legislatures,
and an avoidance of a decision by the House of Representatives
voting by States, would certainly be changes much for the
better: and a combination of them may be made perhaps acceptable
both to the large and to the small States. I subjoin the sketch of an
elective process which occurred to me some years ago, but which has
never been so thoroughly scrutinized as to detect all the flaws that
may lurk in it."—Chic. Hist. Soc. MSS.
| The writings of James Madison, | |