The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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 | TO JOHN M. PATTON. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
TO JOHN M. PATTON.
(Confidential.)
Dear Sir,—I have duly recd. the copy of your
speech on the "Virginia Resolutions." Tho' not permitting
myself to enter into a discussion of the several
topics embraced by them, for which indeed my present
condition would unfit me, I will not deny myself
the pleasure, of saying that you have done great
justice to your views of them. I must say at the
same time that the warmth of your feelings has done
infinitely more than justice to any merits that can
be claimed for your friend.
Should the controversy on removals from office,
end in the establishment of a share in the power,
as claimed for the Senate, it would materially vary
the relations among the component parts of the
balances as now understood to exist. If the right
of the Senate be, or be made a constitutional one,
it will enable that branch of the Govt. to force on the
Executive Department a continuance in office, even
of the Cabinet officers, notwithstanding a change
from a personal & political harmony with the President,
to a state of open hostility towards him. If
the right of the Senate be made to depend on the
Legislature, it would still be grantable in that extent;
and even with the exception of the Heads of Departments
and a few other officers, the augmentation of
the Senatorial patronage, and the new relation between
the Senate directly, and the Legislature indirectly,
with the Chief Magistrate, would be felt deeply
in the general administration of the Government.
The innovation, however modified would more than
double the danger of throwing the Executive machinery
out of gear, and thus arresting the march of
the Govt. altogether.
The Legislative power is of an elastic & Protean
character, but too imperfectly susceptible of definitions
& landmarks. In its application to tenures of
office, a law passed a few years ago, declaring a large
class of offices, vacant at the end of every four years
and of course to be filled by new appointments. Was
not this as much a removal as if made individually
& in detail? The limitation might have been 3, 2,
or 1 year; or even from session to session of Congs.
which would have been equivalent to a tenure at
the pleasure of the Senate.
The light in which the large States would regard
any innovation increasing the weight of the Senate,
constructed and endowed as it is may be inferred from
the difficulty of reconciling them to that part of the
Constitution when it was adopted.
The Constitution of the U. S. may doubtless disclose
from time to time faults which call for the pruning
or the ingrafting hand. But remedies ought to be
applied not in the paroxysms of party & popular excitements:
but with the more leisure & reflection, as
the Great Departments of Power according to experience
may be successively and alternately in,
and out of public favour; and as changes hastily
accommodated to these vicissitudes would destroy
the symmetry & the stability aimed at in our political
system. I am making observations however
very superfluous when addressed to you, and I quit
them with a tender of the cordial regards & salutations
wch. I pray you to accept.
| The writings of James Madison, | |