The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
 |
|
TO HENRY WHEATON. |
|
|
|
|
|
 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
TO HENRY WHEATON.
Dr. Sir Since I answered your letter of—it has
occurred that I should not shew a respect for your wishes if
I failed to fulfil them by suggesting for your consideration
the following topics, as far as they may fall within the range
of your enlarged edition of the "Life of Mr. Pinkney."
Without discussing the general character of the Treaty
with G. B. in 1794, or wishing to revive animosities which
the great merits claimed for the Treaty were the indemnity for
spoliations on our commerce, and the privilege of trading
with British India.
On the first plea of merit, it may be remarked that such
was the structure of the article stipulating indemnity, that
but for the powerful exertions of our commissioners particularly
Mr. Pinkney, and finally, the turn of the die that gave
them the choice of the Umpire, the Treaty would have failed
on that great point. It may be said therefore to have provided
for one half only of what was obtained, the chance
being equal of losing or gaining the whole.
On the other plea it is to be remarked that the value of the
privileged trade depended very materially on its being open
to indirect as well as direct voyages to India. Yet in a case
turning on this point, which was carried before the Court
of King's Bench, the Chief Justice although he decided in our
favour, declared at the same time his belief that the real
intention of the negociators was otherwise, and his regret that
the article happened to be so worded that the legal rules of
interpretation constrained him to decide as he did. The
twelve Judges confirmed the decision, presumably, perhaps
avowedly, with the same impressions. My memory cannot
refer to the source of my information on the subject. The
whole case if not already known to you will doubtless be
within your reach. Thus had fortune, or the fairness of the
British Courts, failed us, the Treaty would have lost much
of its favour with not a few of its warmest partizans.
In none of the Comments on the Declaration of the last
war, has the more immediate impulse to it been sufficiently
brought into view. This was the letter from Castlereagh to
Foster, which according to the authority given, the latter
put into the hands of the Secretary of State, to be read by
him, and by the President also. In that letter it was distinctly
& emphatically stated that the orders in Council, to
which we had declared we would not submit, would not be
which not violating any neutral right of the U. S. they had no
right to call on France to repeal, and which of course could
give to G. B. no imaginable right agst. the U. S. (see the
passages in the War Message and in the Committee's Report
in 1812 both founded on the letter without naming it). With
this formal notice, no choice remained but between war and
degradation, a degradation inviting fresh provocations &
rendering war sooner or later inevitable.
It is worthy of particular remark that notwithstanding the
peremptory declaration of the British Cabinet in the letter
of Castlereagh, such was the distress of the British manufacturers,
produced by our prohibititive and restrictive laws, as
pressed on the House of Commons by Mr. Broughton &
others, that the orders in Council were soon after repealed,
but not in time to prevent the effect of the declaration that
they would not be repealed. The cause of the war lay therefore
entirely on the British side. Had the repeal of the orders
been substituted for the declaration that they would not be
repealed, or had they been repealed but a few weeks sooner,
our declaration of war as proceeding from that cause would
have been stayed, and negociations on the subject of improvements,
the other great cause, would have been pursued
with fresh vigor & hopes, under the auspices of success in the
case of the orders in council.
The Declaration of War has been charged by G. B. & her
partizans with being made in subserviency to the views of
Napoleon. The charge is as foolish as it is false. If the
war coincided with the views of the Enemy of G. B. and was
favored by his operations against her, that assuredly could
be no sound objection to the time chosen for extorting justice
from her. On the contrary, the co-incidence, tho' it happened
not to be the moving consideration, would have been a rational
one; especially as it is not pretended that the U. S. acted in
concert with that Chief, or precluded themselves from making
peace without any understanding with him; or even from
and her continued violation of our neutral rights. It was
a fair calculation, indeed, when war became unavoidable, or
rather after it had commenced, that Napoleon whether successful
or not agst Russia, would find full employment for
her and her associates, G. B. included; and that it would be
required of G. B. by all the powers with whom she was
leagued, that she should not divert any part of her resources
from the common defence to a war with the U. S. having
no adequate object, or rather having objects adverse to the
maritime doctrines and interests of every nation combined
with her. Had the French Emperor not been broken down
as he was, to a degree at variance with all human probability,
and which no human sagacity could anticipate, can it be
doubted that G. B. would have been constrained by her own
situation and the demands of her allies, to listen to our
reasonable terms of reconciliation. The moment chosen
for the war would therefore have been well chosen if chosen
with a reference to the French expedition agst. Russia; and
although not so chosen, the coincidence between the war &
the expedition promised at the time to be as favorable as it
was fortuitous.
But the war was commenced without due preparation:
this is another charge. Preparations in all such cases are
comparative. The question to be decided is whether the
adversary was better prepared than we were; whether delay
on our side, after the approach of war would be foreseen on
the other, would have made the comparative preparations
better for us. As the main theatre of the war was to be in
our neighbourhood, and the augmented preparations of the
enemy were to be beyond the Atlantic, promptitude of attack
was the evident policy of the U. S. It was in fact not the
suddenness of the war as an Executive policy, but the tardiness
of the Legislative provisions, which gave whatever colour
existed for the charge in question. The recommendation
of military preparations went the Executive on the 5th
of the Government with the advantage of dispatch in the
measures to be adopted by Congress, that the Recommendation
as was known contemplated a force of a kind and extent
only which it was presumed might be made ready within the
requisite period. Unfortunately this consideration had not
its desired effect on the proceedings in Congress. The laws
passed on the subject were delayed, that for filling up the
peace establish till Decr. 24, and that for the new army to be
raised till Jany 14 and such were the extent and conditions
prescribed for the latter, that it could scarcely under any
circumstances and by no possibility under the circumstances
existing, be forthcoming within the critical season. It may
be safely affirmed that the force contemplated by the Executive
if brought into the field as soon as it might have been
would have been far more adequate to its object than that
enacted by the Legislature could have been if brought into
the field at the later day required for the purpose. When the
time arrived for appointing such a catalogue of officers
very few possessing a know edge of military duty, and
for enlisting so great a number of men for the repulsive
term of five years and without the possibility of a prompt
distribution in the midst of winter throughout the union
of the necessary equipments & the usual attractions to the
recruiting standards, the difference between the course
recommended & that pursued was felt in its distressing
force.
The Journals of Congress will shew that the Bills which
passed into laws were not even reported till the [14th] of [April]
by a Committee which was appointed on the [12th] of [November],
a tardiness as strange in its appearance as it was painful
in its consequences. Yet with all the disadvantages
under which hostilities were commenced, their progress would
have been very different, under a proper conduct of the
initiative expedition into Upper Canada. The individual
at the head of it had been pointed out for the service by very
of the Revolution the reputation of a brave & valuable officer:
He was of course an experienced one : He had been long the
chief magistrate in the quarter contiguous to the Theatre
of his projected operation; with the best opportunities of
being acquainted with the population and localities on the
hostile as well as his own side of the dividing straight: He
had also been the Superintendent of our affairs with the Indian
tribes holding intercourse with that district of country; a
trust which afforded him all the ordinary means of understanding,
conciliating, and managing their dispositions.
With such qualifications and advantages which seemed to
give him a claim above all others to the station assigned to
him, he sunk before obstacles at which not an officer near
him would have paused; and threw away an entire army, in
the moment of entering a career of success, which would have
made the war as prosperous in its early stages, and promising
in its subsequent course as it was rendered by that disaster
oppressive to our resources, and flattering to the hopes of the
enemy. By the surrender of Genl. Hull the people of Canada,
not indisposed to favor us, were turned against us; the Indians
were thrown into the service of the enemy; the expence &
delay of a new armament were incurred; the western militia
& volunteers were withheld from offensive co-operation with
the troops elsewhere by the necessity of defending their own
frontiers and families agst. incursions of the Savages; and a
general damp spread over the face of our affairs. What a
contrast would the success so easy at the outset of the war
have presented! A triumphant army would have seized on
Upper Canada and hastened to join the armies at the points
below; the important command of Lake Erie would have
fallen to us of course; the Indians would have been neutral
or submissive to our will; the general spirit of the country
would have been kindled into enthusiasm; enlistments would
have been accelerated; volunteers would have stepped forward
with redoubled confidence & alacrity; and what is not of
been smothered in their embrio state.[92]
But in spite of the early frowns of fortune, the war would
have pressed with a small portion of its weight but for the
great military Revolution in Europe, the most improbable of
troops, enured to combat and flushed with victory. Happily
this occurrence, so menacing in its aspect, led to exploits
which gained for the arms of our Country a reputation invaluable
for triumphs over them.
There is a circumstance relating to the Treaty of Ghent
which seems to have escaped the notice to which it is entitled.
and during the negociations for closing it with us, the question
arose in the House of Commons, whether the war taxes were
to cease with the European war, or to be continued on account
of the war with the U. S.; the British Minister having given
an assurance previous to the latter that those obnoxious
taxes should be repealed on the return of peace. The question
was put home to M. Vansittart the Exchequer Minister, who
well knowing that the nation would not support at that oppressive
expence a war reduced as the objects of it had become,
shunned an answer, got the Parliament prorogued till the
month of February, and in the meantime the Treaty was
concluded at Ghent. I have not the means of refreshing or
correcting my memory, but believe you will find on consulting
the parliamentary annals of that period that what is stated is
substantially true.
Permit me to repeat generally that these paragraphs are
intended for your examination, as well as consideration. They
may be neither free from errors, nor have a sufficient affinity
to your biographical text; and if admitted into it, will need
from your pen both developments and adaptations making
them your own. Whether admissible or not, they will prove
the sincerity of my promise to suggest anything that might
proofs also that I have not forgotten the other promise of
whatever might be caught by my eye, I inclose a small
pamphlet published within the period of Mr. Pinkney's public
life, and throwing light on the then state of parties in the U.
States. It was drawn up at the pressing instances of my political
friends, at the end of a fatiguing session of Congress,
and under a great impatience to be with my family on the
road homeward but with the advantage of having the whole
subject fresh in my memory and familiar to my reflections.
The tone pervading it will be explained if not excused by the
epoch which gave birth to it.
To Henry Lee, February, 1827, Madison wrote:
"The plan in question embraced—1. An expedition into Lake
Huron with 4 or 5 vessels, & 800 or 1,000 men, to obtain possession
of Mackinaw & St. Josephs. 2. An expedition with the forces under
General Brown, to Burlington Heights preparatory to further operations
for reducing the Peninsula; the expedition to depend on Chauncey's
getting the command of Lake Ontario without which supplies
could not be secured. 3. the building of 14 or 15 armed boats at
Sacket's Harbour, so to command the St Lawrence under the protection
of posts to be supplied from Izard's command, as to intercept
the communication between Montreal & Kingston. 4. The main
force under Izard to make demonstrations towards Montreal, in order
to divert the Enemy from operations westward, and afford the chance
of compelling Prevost to fight disadvantageously, or break up his
connection with Lake Champlaine.
"I pass to the reference you make to certain appointments both for
the army and for the Cabinet. Selections for office, always liable to
error was particularly so for military command at the commencement
of the late war. The survivors of the Revolutionary band who alone
had been instructed by experience in the field were but few; and of
those several of the most distinguished, were disqualified by age or
infirmities, or precluded by foreknown objections in the advisory
Branch of the appointing Department. This last cause deprived the
army of services which would have been very acceptable to the nominating
Branch. Among those who had acquired a mere disciplinary
experience, no sufficient criterion of military capacity existed; and
of course they had to undergo tests of another sort, before they were
marked out for high military trusts.
"That the appointment of Hull was unfortunate, was but too soon
made certain. Yet he was not only recommended from respectable
quarters, but by his ostensible fitness also. He was a man of good
understanding. He had served with reputation, and even some eclât
in the Revolutionary Army; He had been the Govr. at Detroit, and
could not but be acquainted with the population & localities on the
hostile as well as on his own side of the boundary; And he had been
the superintendant of our Affairs with the Indians, a knowledge of
which was of much importance. These advantages seemed to give
him not only a preference, but an appropriateness for his trust. They
were nevertheless fallacious; and it is not unworthy of recollection,
that after the disaster which proved it, some who had been most
warm in his recommendation, were most ready to condemn the confidence
put in him.
"The appointment of Genl. Dearborn is also very unfavorably
noticed. To say nothing of his acknowledged bravery & firmness, his
military experience & local knowledge acquired during the Revolutionary
war, had their value. And he had administered the Department
of War for 8 years, to the satisfaction of the then President
who thought well not only of his specific qualifications; but generally
of his sound and practical judgment. To these considerations were
added a public standing calculated to repress jealousies in others, not
easy to be guarded agst. in such cases, and always of the worst tendency;
It may well be questioned, whether any substituted appointment
would at the time have been more satisfactory.
"The advanced position in the service, given to General Smyth was
much to be regretted. Some of the circumstances which led to it were
specious, and the scale & cultivation of his understanding very respectable,
but his talent for military command was equally mistaken
by himself, and by his friends.
"Before I advert to your review of Cabinet appointments, I must
allude to the field of choice as narrowed by considerations never to be
wholly disregarded. Besides the more essential requisites in the
candidate, an eye must be had to his political principles and connexions,
his personal temper and habits, his relations of feelings
towards those with whom he is to be associated; and the quarter of the
Union to which he belongs. These considerations, the last as little as
any are not to be disregarded, but in cases where qualifications of a
transcendant order, designate individuals, and silence the patrons of
competitors whilst they satisfy the public opinion. Add to the
whole, the necessary sanction of the Senate; and what may also be
refused, the necessary consent of the most eligible individual: You
are probably very little aware of the number of refusals experienced
during the period to which your observations apply.
"I must be allowed to express my surprize at the unfavorable view
taken of the appointment of Mr. Jones. I do not hesitate to pronounce
him the fittest minister who had ever been charged with the Navy
Department. With a strong mind well stored with the requisite
knowledge, he possessed great energy of character and indefatigable
application to business. I cannot doubt that the evidence of his real
capacity, his appropriate acquirements, and his effective exertions,
in a most arduous service, & the most trying scenes, now to be found
on the files of the Department, as well as my own, would reverse the
opinion which seems to have been formed of him. Nor in doing him
justice ought it to be omitted that he had on his hands, the Treasury
as well as Navy Department, at a time when both called for unusual
attention, and that he did not shrink from the former, for which he
proved himself qualified, till the double burden became evidently
insupportable.
"Mr. Campbell was the only member of the Cabinet from the West
whose claims to a representation in it, were not unworthy of attention
under existing circumstances. It was not indeed the quarter most
likely to furnish fiscal qualifications; but it is certain that he had
turned his thoughts that way, whilst in public life more than appears
to have been generally known. He was, moreover, a man of sound
sense, of pure integrity, and of great application. He held the office
at a period when the difficulties were of a sort scarcely manageable by
the ablest hands, and when the ablest hands were least willing to encounter
them. It happened also that soon after he entered on his task,
his ill health commenced, & continued to increase till it compelled
him to leave the department.
"Of Mr. Crowninshield it may be said without claiming too much
for him, that he had not only recd. public testimonies of respectability
in a quarter of the Union feeling a deep interest in the Department to
which he was called, but added to a stock of practical good sense, a
useful stock of nautical experience and information; and an accommodating
disposition particularly valuable in the head of that Department,
since the auxiliary establishment of the Navy Board, on which
the labouring oar now devolves. Superior talents without such a
disposition, would not suit the delicacy of the legal relations between
the Secretary & the Board, and the danger of collisions of very embarrassing
tendency.
"As you have made no reference to Docr. Eustis, I ought perhaps
to observe a like silence. But having gone so far on the occasion, I
am tempted to do him the justice of saying that he was an acceptable
member of the Cabinet, that he possessed an accomplished mind, a
useful knowledge on military subjects derived from his connexion with
the Revolutionary army, and a vigilant superintendance of subordinate
agents; and that his retreat from his station, proceeded from causes
not inconsistent with these endowments. With the overload of duties
required by military preparations on the great scale enjoined by law,
and the refusal to him of assistants asked for who were ridiculed as
crutches for official infirmity, no minister could have sustained himself;
unless in the enjoyment of an implicit confidence on the part of the
public, ready to account for every failure, without an impeachment of
his official competency. In ordinary times Eustis wd. have satisfied
public expectation, & even in those he had to struggle with, the result
wd. have been very different with organizations for the War Dept.
equivalent to what has been found so useful in a time of peace for an
army reduced to so small an establishment.—Mad. MSS.
| The writings of James Madison, | |