University of Virginia Library

TO HENRY WHEATON.

Dr Sir I have recd. your letter of the 3 inst: referring
to a penciled note of mine on a letter from
Mr. Pinkney.

It is a fact as there noted, that when the Embargo
was recommended to Congs. Decr. 18, 1807, a copy
of the British orders in Council of Novr. 11, 1807,
as printed in an English newspaper, stating them
to be ready in that form to be signed and issued, lay
on the President's table. From what quarter the
Newspaper came, or whether known, I do not recollect.
But the measure it threatened could not be
doubted, and manifestly required, if there had been

no other grounds for apprehending the danger, that
American property & seamen should not be exposed
to it. Besides the precise warning contained in the
Newspaper, it was generally understood that some
such outrage was contemplated by the British
Cabinet. I do not pretend to recollect the several
grounds for the belief. The files of the Department
of State may contain some of them. In a private
letter of Ocr. 5, 1807 from an intelligent & close
observer in London of the indicated views of the
Cabinet towards the U. S. I find the following passage
"The Gazette of Saturday has gone by without
announcing the injurious Blockade of all French
ports & all ports under the influence of France, which
was threatened all the week and very generally
expected. Another letter from the same of Ocr. 11,
adds "Two more Gazettes have been published
without announcing the rigorous blockade, one of
them as late as last night. I hope they have thought
better of it."

Altho' it is true therefore that no official evidence
existed of the Orders in Council when the Embargo
was recommended, there was a moral certainty in
the evidence described by Mr. Pinkney (vol. 6, p.
190 of State papers) which included "the Newspapers
of this Country (G. B.) recd. in the U. S. some days
before the Message of the President."

To this view of the case the language of the
Message was accommodated. And the subsequent
message of Feby. 2, 1808, founded on the official recs.
of the Orders in Council squares with the idea that

they had been unofficially known when the provident
measure of the Embargo was recommended.
If the files of Cong of that period are in preservation,
the papers communicated with the Message may
throw light on the subject. I cannot, I think, be
mistaken in saying that the information in the
English Newspaper was republished in the National
Intelligencer; and if so that alone must settle the
question.

I am glad to find you turning a critical attention
to this subject. No part of the public proceedings
during the two last administrations is less understood,
or more in danger of historical misinterpretations,
than the Embargo and the other restrictions of our
external commerce. It has become the fashion to
decry the whole as inefficacious and unworthy substitutes
for war. That immediate war under existing
circumstances was inexpedient & that experimental
measures short of war were preferable to naked
submission can not well be doubted. It is equally
clear That the Embargo as a precaution agst. the
surprise and devastation of our trade, was proper,
even if war had been intended, and the presumption
is strengthened by late experience that if faithfully
executed it would have produced a crisis in the
Brit: W. Indies that might have extorted justice
without a resort to war. If it failed, it was because
the Govt. did not sufficiently distrust those in a certain
quarter whose successful violations of the law led
to the general discontent witch called for its repeal.
Could the bold and combined perfidies have been

anticipated, an expence which would have proved
economical, might have prevented or quickly subdued
them. The patriotic fishermen of Marblehead
at one time offered their services; and if they cd. at an
early day have been employed in armed vessels, with
a right to their prizes, and an authority to carry
them into ports where the Tribunals would have
enforced the law, the smuggling would have been
crushed.

With respect to the restrictive laws generally, it is
a known fact that under all the disadvantages which
they encountered their pressure on the manufactures
of G. Britain as reported to the Parlt. and
painted by Mr. Brougham ultimately brought about
a revocation of the predatory orders. It is remarkable
that this revocation bearing date June
23d followed at no very long interval the letter of
Castlereagh to Foster communicated in extenso to the
American Govt. in which it was haughtily declared
that the Orders in Council would not be repealed;
and consistently with other engagements could not
be repealed; a declaration which leaving no alternative
to the U. S. but submission or war, was met of
course by the latter. Had the repeal of the orders
taken place a few weeks sooner, it is to be presumed
that the declaration of war which preceded the repeal
would at least have been suspended by that event,
with an experiment under its auspices of further
negotiations for a discontinuation of impressments,
the other great obstacle to pacific relations; and
that the success of the restrictive laws in obtaining

the repeal without a resort to war, would have
been followed by songs of praise, instead of the criticisms
to which an oblivion of their efficacy has
given rise.