University of Virginia Library

TO THOMAS COOPER.[61]

Dear Sir. I have rec'd the little pamphlet on
the Tariff before Congress, which you were so good

as to send me.[62] I had previously read its contents
in the Newspapers; but they are well worth possessing
in the other form you have given them.

I have always concurred in the general principle
that industrious pursuits of individuals ought to be
left to individuals, as most capable of choosing &
managing them. And this policy is certainly most
congenial with the spirit of a free people, & particularly
due to the intelligent & enterprizing citizens
of the U. States.

The true question to be decided therefore is, what
are the exceptions to the rule, not incompatible
with its generality; and what the reasons justifying
them. That there are such cases, seems to be not
sufficiently impressed on some of the opponents of
the Tariff. Its votaries on the other hand, some
of them at least, convert the exceptions into the
rule, & would make the Government, a general
supervisor of individual concerns. The length to
which they push their system, is involving it in
complexities & inconsistencies, which can hardly
fail to end in great modifications, if not total miscarriage.
What can be more incongruous than to
tax raw material in an act for encouraging manufactures,
or than to represent a temporary protection
of them, as ensuring an early competition
& reduction of prices; and at the same time to
require for their safety, a progressive augmentation

of the protecting import. I know not a better
service, that could be rendered to the science of
political economy, than a judicious explanation
of the 3 cases constituting exceptions to the principle
of free industry which as a general principle,
has been so unanswerably established. You
have glanced at some of them, among others that
may be added. I would admit cases in which there
could be scarce a doubt, that a manufacture, once
brought into activity, would support itself, & be
profitable to the nation. An example is furnished
by the Cotton branch among ourselves, which if it
had not been stimulated by the effect of the late
war, might not for a considerable time have sprung
up, and which with that impulse, has already
reached a maturity, which not only supplies the
home market, but faces its rivals in foreign ones.
To guard the example however, against fallacious
inferences, it has been well observed, that the manufactories
in this case, owe their great success to the
advantage they have, in the raw material, and to
the extraordinary proportion of the work, which
is performed by mechanical agency. Is it not fair
also, in estimating the comparative cost of domestic
and foreign products, to take into view the effect
of wars, even foreign wars, on the latter?

Were there a certainty of perpetual peace, &
still more, a universal freedom of commerce, the
theory might hold good without exception, that
Government should never bias individuals in the
choice of their occupation. But such a millenium

has not yet arrived, and experience shows, that if
peace furnishes supplies from abroad, cheaper than
they can be made at home, the cost in war, may
exceed that at which they could be afforded at
home, whilst it can not be expected, that a home
provision will be undertaken in war, if the return
of peace is to break down the undertakers. It
would seem reasonable therefore, that the war price
should be compared with the peace price, and the
war periods with the peace periods, which in the
last century have been nearly equal, & that from
these data, should be deduced the tax, that could
be afforded in peace, in order to avoid the tax
imposed by war.

In yielding thus much to the patrons of domestic
manufacturers, they ought to be reminded in every
doubtful case, the Government should forbear to
intermeddle; and that particular caution should be
observed, where one part of the community would
be favored at the expense of another. In Governments,
independent of the people, the danger of
oppression is from the will of the former. In Governments,
where the will of the people prevails,
the danger of injustice arises from the interest, real
or supposed, which a majority may have in trespassing
on that of the minority. This danger, in
small Republics, has been conspicuous.

The extent & peculiar structure of ours, are the
safeguards on which we must rely, and altho' they
may occasionally somewhat disappoint us, we have
a consolation always, in the greater abuses inseparable

from Governments less free, and in the hope
also, that the progress of political Science, and the
lessons of experience will not be lost on the National
Council.