University of Virginia Library

TO JAMES MONROE.

Dr. Sir,—I have just received from Mr. Jefferson
your letter to him, with the correspondence between
Mr. Canning & Mr. Rush, sent for his & my perusal
and our opinions on the subject of it.[53]

From the disclosures of Mr. Canning it appears,
as was otherwise to be inferred, that the success of
France agst. Spain would be followed by an attempt
of the Holy Allies to reduce the Revolutionized
Colonies of the latter to their former dependence.

The professions we have made to these neighbours,
our sympathies with their liberties & independence,
the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations
with them, and the consequences threatened
by a command of their resources by the Great
Powers confederated agst. the rights & reforms, of
which we have given so conspicuous & persuasive
an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to
defeat the meditated crusade. It is particularly

fortunate that the policy of G. Britain, tho' guided
by calculations different from ours, has presented
a co-operation for an object the same with ours.
With that co-operation we have nothing to fear
from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance
of success to our laudable views. There ought
not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in
meeting her in the way she has proposed; keeping
in view of course, the spirit & forms of the Constitution
in every step taken in the road to war, which
must be the last step if those short of war should be
without avail.

It cannot be doubted that Mr. Canning's proposal
thõ made with the air of consultation, as well
as concert, was founded on a predetermination to
take the course marked out, whatever might be
the reception given here to his invitation. But
this consideration ought not to divert us from what
is just & proper in itself. Our co-operation is due
to ourselves & to the world; and whilst it must ensure
success, in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles
the chance of success without that appeal. It is not
improbable that G. Britain would like best to have
the merit of being the sole Champion of her new
friends, notwithstanding the greater difficulty to be
encountered, but for the dilemma in which she would
be placed. She must in that case, either leave
us as neutrals to extend our commerce & navigation
at the expence of hers, or make us enemies, by
renewing her paper blockades & other arbitrary
proceedings on the Ocean. It may be hoped that

such a dilemma will not be without a permanent
tendency to check her proneness to unnecessary wars.

Why the B. Cabinet should have scrupled to arrest
the calamity it now apprehends, by applying to the
threats of France agst. Spain, "the small effort"
which it scruples not to employ in behalf of Spanish
America, is best known to itself. It is difficult to
find any other explanation than that interest in the
one case has more weight in its casuistry, than
principle had in the other.

Will it not be honorable to our Country, & possibly
not altogether in vain to invite the British Govt. to
extend the "avowed disapprobation" of the project
agst. the Spanish Colonies, to the enterprise of France
agst. Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory
Act in behalf of the Greeks. On the supposition
that no form could be given to the Act clearing
it of a pledge to follow it up by war, we ought to
compare the good to be done with the little injury
to be apprehended to the U. S., shielded as their
interests would be by the power and the fleets of
G. Britain united with their own. These are questions
however which may require more information
than I possess, and more reflection than I can now
give them.

What is the extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer
as to "the remaining possessions of Spain in America?"
Does it exclude future views of acquiring
Porto Rico &c, as well as Cuba? It leaves G.
Britain free as I understand it in relation to other
Quarters of the Globe.

I return the correspondence of Mr. Rush & Mr.
Canning, with assurances, &c.