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The writings of James Madison,

comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

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 I. 
 II. 
 III. 
 IV. 
 V. 
 VI. 
 VII. 
 VIII. 
 IX. 
 X. 
 XI. 
 XII. 
 XIII. 
 XIV. 
 XV. 
 XVI. 
 XVII. 
 XVIII. 
 XIX. 
 XX. 
 XXI. 
 XXII. 
 XXIII. 
XXIII
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion
of this Convention, that each assenting Convention


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should notify its assent and ratification to the United
States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after
receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions
of—States, should appoint and publish a
day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution;
that after such publication, the Legislatures of the
several States should elect members of the Senate,
and direct the election of members of the House of
Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature
should meet at the time and place assigned by
Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their
meeting, choose the President of the United States,
and proceed to execute this Constitution."

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in
order to give leisure to examine the Report; which
passed in the negative—N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no.
Pa. ay. Md. ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.

The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.

Tuesday August 7th.[17] In Convention

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken
up,
Mr. Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee
of the whole. This was strongly opposed by


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Mr. Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce
unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware
Maryd. & Virga. only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem.
con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety
of giving each branch a negative on the other
"in all cases." There were some cases in which it
was he supposed not intended to be given as in the
case of balloting for appointments.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert "legislative acts"
instead of "all cases."

Mr. Williamson 2ds. him.

Mr. Sherman. This will restrain the operation of
the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a
mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he
hoped would take place.

Mr. Ghorum contended that elections ought to be
made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be
made for the President, and the two branches should
be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention
& confusion may ensue. These inconveniences
have been felt in Masts. in the election of officers of
little importance compared with the Executive of


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the U. States. The only objection agst. a joint ballot
is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight;
but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to
the public tranquility & welfare.

Mr. Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases
at least; particularly in the choice of the President,
and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between
the two Houses during & concerng. the vacancy
of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of Mr. Govr.
Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent
part declared to be laws, they will therefore
be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be
made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed
that the mutual negative should be restrained
to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two
Houses.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought this but a repetition of the
same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent,
being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought
were not laws.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the words "each
of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the
other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the
preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative
power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the
respective powers and mode of exercising them were
fully delineated in a subsequent article.

Genl. Pinkney 2ded. the motion.

On question for inserting legislative Acts as
moved by Mr. Govr. Morris


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N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to Mr. M's motion to
strike out & c.—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison wished to know the reasons of the
Come. for fixing by ye. Constitution the time of Meeting
for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be
required only that one meeting at least should be
held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied
by law.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the sentence.
It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular
time, or even to require a meeting every year.
The public business might not require it.

Mr. Pinkney concurred with Mr. Madison.

Mr. Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution,
disputes will arise in the Legislature; and
the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the
times of their elections. In the N. England States
the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by
their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconveniencey
had resulted. He thought it necessary that there
should be one meeting at least every year as a check
on the Executive department.

Mr. Elseworth was agst. striking out the words. The
Legislature will not know till they are met whether
the public interest required their meeting or not. He
could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention
could judge of it as well as the Legislature.


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Mr. Wilson thought on the whole it would be best
to fix the day.

Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity
for a meeting every year. A great vice in our
system was that of legislating too much. The most
numerous objects of legislation belong to the States.
Those of the Natl. Legislature were but few. The
chief of them were commerce & revenue. When
these should be once settled alterations would be
rarely necessary & easily made.

Mr. Madison thought if the time of meeting should
be fixed by a law it wd. be sufficiently fixed & there
would be no difficulty then as had been suggested,
on the part of the States in adjusting their elections
to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate
strongly agst. fixing a time by the Constitution.
It might happen that the Legislature might be called
together by the public exigencies & finish their Session
but a short time before the annual period. In
this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble
so quickly & without the least necessity.
He thought one annual meeting ought to be required;
but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing
the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting
ought to be required as essential to the preservation
of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will
supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature,
besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers,
which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.


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Mr. Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as
well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body.
Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two
Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be
changeable—frequent meetings of Parliament were
required at the Revolution in England as an essential
safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings
in most of the American charters & constitutions.
There will be business eno' to require it. The Western
Country, and the great extent and varying
state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

Mr. Randolph was agst. fixing any day irrevocably;
but as there was no provision made any where in
the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting,
and some precise time must be fixed, untill the
Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree
to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which
he moved to add the words following—"unless a
different day shall be appointed by law."

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out Decr. & insert
May. It might frequently happen that our measures
ought to be influenced by those in Europe,
which were generally planned during the Winter and
of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, he preferred May to
Decr. because the latter would require the travelling
to & from the seat of Govt. in the most inconvenient
seasons of the year.


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Mr. Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient
season for business.

Mr. Elseworth. The summer will interfere too
much with private business, that of almost all the
probable members of the Legislature being more or
less connected with agriculture.

Mr. Randolph. The time is of no great moment
now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into
the Constitutions of the States, he found that the
times of their elections with which the election of
the Natl. Representatives would no doubt be made
to coincide, would suit better with Decr. than May.
And it was advisable to render our innovations as
little incommodious as possible.

On the question for "May" instead of "Decr."

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Read moved to insert after the word "Senate,"
the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter
provided." His object was to give an absolute
Negative to the Executive—He considered this as so
essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of
liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled
him to make the Motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that
an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made
necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from
doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion,


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"Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem.
con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd. to
nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power
shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate
& distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps. & a Senate.
The Legislature shall meet at least once in
every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1st.
Monday in Decr. unless a different day shall be appointed
by law."

"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the last member
of the section beginning with the words "qualifications
of Electors," in order that some other
provision might be substituted which wd. restrain
the right of suffrage to freeholders.

Mr. Fitzsimons 2ded. the motion

Mr. Williamson was opposed to it.

Mr. Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered
by the Committee, and he did not think it
could be changed for the better. It was difficult to
form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the
States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too
should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable
for the same persons at the same time, to
vote for representatives in the State Legislature and
to be excluded from a vote for those in the Natl.
Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Such a hardship would be neither
great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it
and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States.


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In some the qualifications are different for the choice
of the Govr. & Representatives; In others for different
Houses of the Legislature. Another objection
agst. the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications
of the Natl. Legislature depend on the will
of the States, which he thought not proper.

Mr. Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the
electors stood on the most proper footing. The
right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly
guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The
people will not readily subscribe to the Natl. Constitution
if it should subject them to be disfranchised.
The States are the best Judges of the circumstances
& temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not
attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations
on this point. Eight or nine States have
extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders.
What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised.
A power to alter the qualifications
would be a dangerous power in the hands of the
Legislature.

Mr. Butler. There is no right of which the people
are more jealous than that of suffrage Abridgments
of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland
where they have at length thrown all power into
the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves,
and form a rank aristocracy.

Mr. Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency
of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders
of the Country. He considered them as the


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best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the
right to them as a necessary defence agst. the dangerous
influence of those multitudes without property
& without principle with which our Country like all
others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity
of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical.
The great mass of our Citizens is composed
at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased
with it.

Mr. Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined?
Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote
for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his
money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers,
who will bear a full share of the public burthens
be not allowed a voice in the imposition
of them. Taxation & representation ought to go
together.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He had long learned not to be
the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore
had no effect on him. It was the thing, not
the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his
principal objections to the Constitution as it is now
before us, is that it threatens this Country with an
aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the
House of Representatives. Give the votes to people
who have no property, and they will sell them to the
rich who will be able to buy them. We should not
confine our attention to the present moment. The
time is not distant when this Country will abound
with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive
their bread from their employers. Will such men be


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the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they
be the impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was
as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation
& Representation." The man who does not
give his vote freely is not represented. It is the
man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote.
Why? because they want prudence, because they
have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent
can be as little trusted with the public
interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining
"freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that
the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people
are at present freeholders and these will certainly be
pleased with it. As to Merchts. &c. if they have
wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not
they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains
of antient prejudices, and view things too much
through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification
in England, & hence it is imagined to be the
only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was
that every man having evidence of attachment to &
permanent common interest with the Society ought
to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this
qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no
other kind of property but land evidence a common
interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides
property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the
merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number
of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his
own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters,


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and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights
of their fellow Citizens

Mr. Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one
of the fundamental articles of republican Government,
and ought not to be left to be regulated by the
Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has
been the mode in which aristocracies have been
built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the
Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold,
would with him depend much on the probable reception
such a change would meet with in States
where the right was now exercised by every description
of people. In several of the States a freehold
was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in
its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country
would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.
In future times a great majority of the people
will not only be without landed, but any other sort
of property. These will either combine, under the
influence of their common situation: in which case,
the rights of property & the public liberty, will not
be secure in their hands: or which is more probable,
they will become the tools of opulence & ambition,
in which case there will be equal danger on another
side. The example of England has been misconceived
(by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of
the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders.
The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs,
in many of which the qualification of suffrage
is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and
it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the


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Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence
of the Crown on elections was most dangerously
exerted.[18]

Docr. Franklin. It is of great consequence that we
shd. not depress the virtue & public spirit of our


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common people; of which they displayed a great deal
during the war, and which contributed principally to
the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable

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refusal of the American seamen who were carried
in great numbers into the British Prisons during the
war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek
their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the

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Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism
with a contemporary instance in which the
British seamen made prisoners by the Americans,
readily entered on the ships of the latter on being

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promised a share of the prizes that might be made
out of their own Country. This proceeded he said
from the different manner in which the common
people were treated in America & G. Britain. He

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did not think that the elected had any right in any
case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He
quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth
the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that
pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons
having freeholds of a certain value; observing that
this Statute was soon followed by another under the
succeeding Parliamt. subjecting the people who had
no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was
persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed
would give great uneasiness in the populous
States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being
themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at
being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons
of that description.


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Mr. Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in
many points, but in none more than the present.
He objected to the footing on which the qualification
was put, but particularly to the mode of election by
the people. The people can not know & judge of the
characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice
will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in
Virga. as an example in point. The people in Towns
can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by
that means always prevail over the people of the
Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes
among a variety of candidates.

Mr. Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the
right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised
one. It would create division among the people &
make enemies of all those who should be excluded.


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On the question for striking out as moved by Mr.
Govr. Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the
end of the III article

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not
prest.

Adjourned

 
[17]

Although the secrecy of the proceedings was guarded carefully,
the reason of the long adjournment was generally known outside of
the Convention.

"The Convention adjourned about three weeks ago and appointed
a Committee consisting of Mr. Rutlege, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Wilson, Mr.
Elsworth, & Mr. Gorham to draw into form the measures which had
been agreed upon—they reassembled last Monday sen'night to receive
the report—I suppose we shall have the result of this great business
in a few weeks more."—Edward Carrington to Monroe, August 7, 1787.

Monroe MSS.

Cf. King's account of the debate confirming the accuracy of Madison's
report (King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i. 617).

[18]

"Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August 7th.:

"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated
will, in part, be made by the State Govts., all the Citizens in States where
the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have
an indirect share of representation in the General Government. But
this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men cannot be
justly bound by laws in making which they have no part. Persons &
property being both essential objects of Government, the most that
either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave a reasonable
security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this
double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property
the object deemed least secure in popular Govts. the right of suffrage
for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not without
example among us, as well as other constitutional modifications, favouring
the influence of property in the Government. But the U. S. have
not reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the
Class with, and the Class without property, have the operation natural
to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political
arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to
give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal
principle,—which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from
the elective basis of it and controuls in various ways the propensity in
small republics to rash measures & the facility of forming & executing
them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem."
—Madison's note.

"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7th.] day of [August].

"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention
of 1787, on the [7th.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker's
more full & matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt
too much at the time the example of Virginia.

"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions.
The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar
delicacy. Allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of
persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves
it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the claims
of justice, may be overruled by a majority without property or interested
in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by
other popular Govts. and is not without examples in our own, particularly
in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

"In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an
essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the
enjoyment of its fruits; that industry from which property results, &
that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate use, but in
its posthumous destination to objects of choice and of kindred affection.

"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property
& of persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the former be
so in case of a universal & equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in
case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property?

"As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights common
to those without property, they may be the more restrained from
infringing, as well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter.
It is nevertheless certain, that there are various ways in which
the rich may oppress the poor; in which property may oppress liberty;
and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary that the
poor should have a defence against the danger.

"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot
be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property.
Bodies of men are not less swayed by interest than individuals,
and are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other motives
felt by individuals. Hence the liability of the rights of property, and
of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by Legislative
majorities having an interest real or supposed in the injustice: Hence
agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the cancelling or
evading of debts, and other violations of contracts. We must not
shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience.
Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals if two had
an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third? Make the
number as great as you please, the impartiality will not be increased;
nor any further security against injustice be obtained, than what may
testult from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.

"In all Govts. there is a power which is capable of oppressive exercise.
In Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a
want of sympathy & responsibility in the Govt. towards the people. In
popular Governments the danger lies in an undue sympathy among
individuals composing a majority, and a want of responsibility in the
majority to the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political
System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and organization of
its powers, which at the same time that they secure the dependence of
the Govt. on the will of the nation, provides better guards than are
found in any other popular Govt. against interested combinations of a
Majority against the rights of a Minority.

"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual
distribution of property particularly the landed property; and in the
universal hope of acquiring property. This latter peculiarity is among
the happiest contrasts in their situation to that of the old world, where
no anticipated change in this respect, can generally inspire a like sympathy
with the rights of property. There may be at present, a Majority
of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or the heirs or aspirants to
Freeholds. And the day may not be very near when such will cease to,
make up a Majority of the community. But they cannot always so
continue. With every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a
populousness not greater than that of England or France will reduce
the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority shall be without
landed or other equivalent property and without the means or hope
of acquiring it, what is to secure the rights of property agts. the danger
from an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power
over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a danger
in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing number on the
wealth of a few? In other Countries this dependence results in some
from the relations between Landlords & Tenants in others both from
that source & from the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent
labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the
last source; from the connection between the great Capitalists in
Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers employed by them. Nor
will accumulations of Capital for a certain time be precluded by our
laws of descent & of distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired
by free Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals and
associations may not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the
opportunities may be diminished, and the permanency defeated by the
equalizing tendency of our laws.

"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a natural
offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division of every
people is into the owners of the soil, and the other inhabitants. In a
certain sense the country may be said to belong to the former. If
each landholder has an exclusive property in his share, the Body of
Landholders have an exclusive property in the whole. As the Soil
becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view
of the subject derives force from the principle of natural law, which
vests in individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with
which he has incorporated his labour & improvements. Whatever
may be the rights of others derived from their birth in the Country,
from their interest in the highways & other parcels left open for common
use, as well as in the national edifices and monuments; from their
share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the
Govt., it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give
them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the
landed property without the consent of the proprietors. Some barrier
agst. the invasion of their rights would not be out of place in a just and
provident System of Govt. The principle of such an arrangement has
prevailed in all Govts. where peculiar privileges or interests held by a
part were to be secured agst. violation, and in the various associations
where pecuniary or other property forms the stake. In the former
case a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be
wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege to be defended.
In the latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals
have been with acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their
respective interests in the Common Stock.

"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of
Govt. as would give security to the part of the Society having most at
stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications present
themselves.

"1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold
an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The
objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle
of free Govt. that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a
voice in making them. And the violation wd. be more strikingly unjust
as the law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as
unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the
numerical & physical force in a constant struggle agst. the public authority;
unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.

"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of
property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This
arrangement which wd. give a mutual defence, where there might be
mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness.
But it wd. not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be
defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as
well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The temptation
also to encroach tho' in a certain degree mutual, Wd. be felt more
strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to
beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at
the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the State
into two Classes, with distinct & independt. Organs of power, and without
any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests & antipathies
not dissimilar to those between the Patricians & Plebeians at
Rome.

"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to
freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders
of property in electing the other Branch. This wd. give a defensive
power to holders of property, and to the class also without property
when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in
the meantime of a participation in the Public Councils. If the holders
of property would thus have a two-fold share of representation, they
wd. have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of property
as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Institutions. And
if no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable
that a preponderating weight shd. be allowed to the greater interest
than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice
in this case would correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of
the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned
whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly
be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical
indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory
ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact
the non-freeholders should be the majority.

"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal
suffrage for each branch of the Govt. such as prevails generally in
the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of the landed & other property,
when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an
enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature,
and an extension of its period of service. Large districts are
manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability,
and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over
competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a
contracted theatre. And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction,
might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by
espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to
many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of
service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and
more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction,
till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.

"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible,
and universal Suffrage and very short periods of elections within
contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the Govt., the security
for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived
from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior information
incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice
enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty
of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive
country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. &
even most of the individual States, from the small communities where
a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a
majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the
rights of the minor party.

"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the
Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws
which they are to obey, & in chusing the Magistrates who are to administer
them, and if the only alternative be between an equal & universal
right of suffrage for each branch of the Govt. and a confinement
of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better that those having
the greater interest at stake namely that of property & persons both,
should be deprived of half their share in the Govt. than, that those
having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived
of the whole."—Madison's note.