University of Virginia Library

Friday July 20. in Convention.

The postponed Ratio of Electors for appointing the
Executive; to wit 1 for each State whose inhabitants
do not exceed 100.000. &c. being taken up.

Mr. Madison observed that this would make in
time all or nearly all the States equal. Since there
were few that would not in time contain the number
of inhabitants intitling them to 3 Electors; that
this ratio ought either to be made temporary, or so
varied as that it would adjust itself to the growing
population of the States.

Mr. Gerry moved that in the 1st. instance the Electors
should be allotted to the States in the following
ratio: to N. H. 1. Mass. 3. R. I. 1. Cont. 2. N. Y. 2.
N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.

On the question to postpone in order to take up
this motion of Mr. Gerry. It passed in the affirmative

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that 2 Electors be allotted
to N. H. Some rule ought to be pursued; and N.
H. has more than 100,000 inhabitants. He thought
it would be proper also to allot 2. to Georgia

Mr. Broom & Mr. Martin moved to postpone Mr.
Gerry's allotment of Electors, leaving a fit ratio to
be reported by the Committee to be appointed for
detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion,

Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Houston 2ded. the motion of Mr. Elseworth to add
another Elector to N. H. & Georgia. On the Question;

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Williamson moved as an amendment to Mr.
Gerry's allotment of Electors in the 1st. instance that
in future elections of the Natl. Executive, the number
of Electors to be appointed by the several States
shall be regulated by their respective numbers of
Representatives in the 1st. branch pursuing as nearly
as may be the present proportions.

On Question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of Electors

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

"to be removable on impeachment and conviction
for malpractice or neglect of duty," see Resol. 9.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out
this part of the Resolution. Mr. P. observd. he ought
not to be impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in
office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to
get himself re-elected. He considered this as an
essential security for the good behaviour of the
Executive.

Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making
the Executive impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He can do no criminal act without
Coadjutors who may be punished. In case he
should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof of
his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the

impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not
the mischief will go on. If it is the impeachment
will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will
render the Executive dependent on those who are to
impeach.

Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than
that the right of impeachment should be continued.
Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that
man be above it, who can commit the most extensive
injustice? When great crimes were committed he
was for punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors.
There had been much debate & difficulty as
to the mode of chusing the Executive. He approved
of that which had been adopted at first, namely of
referring the appointment to the Natl. Legislature.
One objection agst. Electors was the danger of their
being corrupted by the Candidates, & this furnished
a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in
office. Shall the man who has practised corruption
& by that means procured his appointment in the
first instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by
repeating his guilt?

Docr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable
to the Executive. History furnishes one example
only of a first Magistrate being formally
brought to public Justice. Every body cried out
agst. this as unconstitutional. What was the practice
before this in cases where the Chief Magistrate
rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had
to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of
his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his

character. It wd. be the best way therefore to provide
in the Constitution for the regular punishment
of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve
it, and for his honorable acquittal where he
should be unjustly accused.

Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few
other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable;
but thought the cases ought to be enumerated
& defined.

Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some
provision should be made for defending the Community
agst. the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of
the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of
his service was not a sufficient security. He might
lose his capacity after his appointment. He might
pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation
or oppression. He might betray his trust to
foreign powers. The case of the Executive Magistracy
was very distinguishable, from that of the
Legislature or any other public body, holding offices
of limited duration. It could not be presumed that
all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly
would either lose their capacity for discharging,
or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints
of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty
of acting in concert for purposes of corruption
was a security to the Public. And if one or a few
members only should be seduced, the soundness of
the remaining members, would maintain the integrity
and fidelity of the body. In the case of the
Executive Magistracy which was to be administered

by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was
more within the compass of probable events, and
either of them might be fatal to the Republic.

Mr. Pinkney did not see the necessity of impeachments.
He was sure they ought not to issue from
the Legislature who would in that case hold them as
a rod over the Executive and by that means effectually
destroy his independence. His revisionary
power in particular would be rendered altogether
insignificant.

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments.
A good Magistrate will not fear them. A bad one
ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the
maxim would never be adopted here that the chief
magistrate could do no wrong.

Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme
caution in favor of liberty might enervate the
Government we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three
great departments of Govts. should be separate &
independent: that the Executive & Judiciary should
be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive
should be so equally with the Judiciary. Would
this be the case, if the Executive should be impeachable?
It had been said that the Judiciary would be
impeachable. But it should have been remembered
at the same time that the Judiciary hold their places
not for a limited time, but during good behaviour.
It is necessary therefore that a form should be established
for trying misbehaviour. Was the Executive
to hold his place during good behaviour? The Executive

was to hold his place for a limited term like
the members of the Legislature. Like them, particularly
the Senate whose members would continue
in appointmt. the same term of 6 years he would
periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors,
who would continue or discontinue him in trust according
to the manner in which he had discharged
it. Like them therefore, he ought to be subject to
no intermediate trial, by impeachment. He ought
not to be impeachable unless he held his office during
good behavior, a tenure which would be most
agreeable to him; provided an independent and
effectual forum could be devised. But under no
circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the
Legislature. This would be destructive of his independence
and of the principles of the Constitution.
He relied on the vigor of the Executive as a great
security for the public liberties.

Mr. Randolph. The propriety of impeachments
was a favorite principle with him. Guilt wherever
found ought to be punished. The Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly
in time of war when the military force, and
in some respects the Public money will be in his
hands. Should no regular punishment be provided,
it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections.
He is aware of the necessity of proceeding
with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much as
possible the influence of the Legislature from the
business. He suggested for consideration an idea
which had fallen (from Col. Hamilton) of composing

a forum out of the Judges belonging to the States:
and even of requiring some preliminary inquest
whether just ground of impeachment existed.

Doctr. Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince
of Orange during the late war. An agreement was
made between France & Holland; by which their
two fleets were to unite at a certain time & place.
The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every body began
to wonder at it. At length it was suspected that the
Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This
suspicion prevailed more & more. Yet as he could
not be impeached and no regular examination took
place, he remained in his office, and strengthening
his own party, as the party opposed to him became
formidable, he gave birth to the most violent animosities
& contentions. Had he been impeachable,
a regular & peaceable enquiry would have taken place
and he would if guilty have been duly punished, if
innocent restored to the confidence of the Public.

Mr. King remarked that the case of the Statholder
was not applicable. He held his place for life, and
was not periodically elected. In the former case
impeachments are proper to secure good behaviour.
In the latter they are unnecessary; the periodical
responsibility to the electors being an equivalent
security.

Mr. Wilson observed that if the idea were to be
pursued, the Senators who are to hold their places
during the same term with the Executive, ought to
be subject to impeachment & removal.

Mr. Pinkney apprehended that some gentlemen

reasoned on a supposition that the Executive was to
have powers which would not be committed to him:
He presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed
as to render impeachments unnecessary.

Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by the
arguments used in the discussion. He was now sensible
of the necessity of impeachments, if the Executive
was to continue for any length of time in office.
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a
life interest, much less like one having an hereditary
interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater
interest to betray his trust; and no one would say
that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of
seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without
being able to guard agst. it by displacing him. One
would think the King of England well secured agst.
bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the
whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II. was bribed by
Louis XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be
impeachable for treachery: Corrupting his electors,
and incapacity were other causes of impeachment.
For the latter he should be punished not as a man,
but as an officer, and punished only by degradation
from his office. This Magistrate is not the King but
the prime Minister. The people are the King.
When we make him amenable to Justice however
we should take care to provide some mode that will
not make him dependent on the Legislature.

It was moved & 2ded. to postpone the question of
impeachments which was negatived, Mas. & S.
Carolina only being ay.

On ye. Question, Shall the Executive be removable
on impeachments &c.?

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

"Executive to receive fixed compensation."
Agreed to nem. con.

"to be paid out of the national Treasury" agreed
to, N. Jersey only in the negative.

Mr. Gerry & Govr. Morris moved that the Electors
of the Executive shall not be members of the Natl.
Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor shall
the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme
magistracy. Agreed to nem. con.

Docr. McClurg[4] asked whether it would not be
necessary, before a Committee for detailing the Constitution
should be appointed, to determine on the
means by which the Executive, is to carry the laws
into effect, and to resist combinations agst. them.
Is he to have a military force for the purpose, or to
have the command of the Militia, the only existing
force that can be applied to that use? As the Resolutions
now stand the Committee will have no determinate
directions on this great point.

Mr. Wilson thought that some additional directions
to the Committee wd. be necessary.

Mr. King. The Committee are to provide for the
end. Their discretionary power to provide for the
means is involved according to an established axiom.

Adjourned.