University of Virginia Library

Tuesday Aug. 14[27] . In Convention

Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.

Mr. Pinkney argued that the making the members
ineligible to offices was degrading to them, and the
more improper as their election into the Legislature
implied that they had the confidence of the people;
that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might
be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped

to see that body become a School of public Ministers,
a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because
the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the
first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone
the section in order to take up the following proposition
viz—"the members of each House shall be
incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for
which they or any of others for their benefit receive
any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind—and
the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats
respectively."

Genl. Mifflin[28] 2ded. the motion.

Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the
whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging

that exotic corruption which might not
otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil—for
compleating that Aristocrary which was probably in
the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting
into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent
characters who will do justice to each other's
merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In
the present state of American morals & manners,
few friends it may be thought will be lost to the
plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a
mercenary & depraved ambition.

Mr. Mercer. It is a first principle in political science,
that whenever the rights of property are secured,
an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective
Governments also necessarily become aristocratic,
because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments
for themselves from the many. The Governments
of America will become aristocracies. They
are so already. The public measures are calculated
for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people.
The people are dissatisfied & complain. They
change their rulers, and the public measures are
changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of
emolument to the rulers, for another. The people
gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability &
uncertainty to their other evils.—Governmts. can only
be maintained by force or influence. The Executive
has not force, deprive him of influence by rendering
the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive
offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority.
The Aristocratic part will not even let him

in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must
& will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the
people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive
ought to have a Council, being members of both
Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be
between the aristocracy & the people. He wished
it to be between the Aristocracy & the Executive.
Nothing else can protect the people agst. those speculating
Legislatures which are now plundering them
throughout the U. States.

Mr. Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of
Massts. passed before the Act of Congs. recommending
the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed
not to depart from the rotation established in the
5th. art: of Confederation, nor to agree in any case
to give to the members of Congs. a capacity to hold
offices under the Government. This he said was repealed
in consequence of the Act of Congs. with which
the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified
manner. The Sense of the State however
was Still the same. He could not think with Mr.
Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading.
Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers
& Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It is
the opinion of a great many that they ought to be
discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent
among us, & that source of influence be shut up. If
the Senate were to appoint Ambassadors as seemed
to be intended, they will multiply embassies for their
own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions
as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they

are once appointed, the House of Reps. will be obliged
to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of
the measures or not. If men will not serve in the
Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our
situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens
are actuated by such mercenary views we had better
chuse a single despot at once. It will be more easy
to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According
to the idea of one Gentleman (Mr. Mercer)
our Government it seems is to be a Govt. of plunder.
In that case it certainly would be prudent to have
but one rather than many to be employed in it. We
cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this
System. It will be examined on all sides and with a
very suspicious eye. The people who have been so
lately in arms agst. G. B. for their liberties, will not
easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing
at present under our Governments, but imputed
them to the faults of those in office, not to the people.
The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical
attention to the opportunities afforded by the new
system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands
it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed.
If great powers should be given to the Senate we
shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been
apprehended. He remarked that it would be very
differently constituted from Congs. 1. there will be
but 2 deputies from each State, in Congs. there may
be 7. and are generally 5.—2. they are chosen for six
years, those of Congress annually. 3. they are not
subject to recall; those of Congs. are. 4. In Congress
9 States are necessary for all great purposes, here 8
persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the
people will ever agree to such a system? He moved
to render the members of the H. of Reps. as well as of
the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one
year after the expiration of their terms.—If it should
be thought that this will injure the Legislature by
keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to
serve in other offices it may be required as a qualification
for other offices, that the Candidate shall have
served a certain time in the Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Exclude the officers of the army
& navy, and you form a band having a different
interest from & opposed to the civil power: you
stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking
Lords who dare not face the foe." Let this
spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your
troops shall have laid down their arms, and though
the Civil authority "be intrenched in parchment to
the teeth" they will cut their way to it. He was
agst. rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible
to offices. He was for rendering them eligible
agn. after having vacated their Seats by accepting
office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their
services if the people chuse to give them their confidence.
There can be little danger of corruption
either among the people or the Legislatures who are
to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits,
we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence
in them, have they not a right to give them a preference;
and can they be properly abridged of it.

Mr. Williamson; introduced his opposition to the
motion by referring to the question concerning
"money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its
Ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt
us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to
insist upon it as long as there was hope of retaining
it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with
reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was
said on the other side was that the restriction was
not convenient. We have now got a House of Lords
which is to originate money-bills.—To avoid another
inconveniency, we are to have a whole Legislature at
liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought
a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more
proper. Bad as the Constitution has been made by
expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning
money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging
the present Section. He had scarcely seen
a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N.
Carolina, which could not be traced up to office
hunting.

Mr. Sherman. The Constitution shd. lay as few
temptations as possible in the way of those in power.
Men of abilities will increase as the Country grows
more populous and as the means of education are
more diffused.

Mr. Pinkney. No State has rendered the members
of the Legislature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina
the Judges are eligible into the Legislature. It
cannot be supposed then that the motion will be
offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions

should be revised he believed restrictions of this sort
wd. be rather diminished than multiplied.

Mr. Wilson could not approve of the section as it
stood, and could not give up his judgment to any
supposed objections that might arise among the
people. He considered himself as acting & responsible
for the welfare of millions not immediately represented
in this House. He had also asked himself
the serious question what he should say to his constituents
in case they should call upon him to tell
them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case
where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he
to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to
flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort:
did you suppose the people of Penna. had not good
sense enough to receive a good Government? Under
this impression he should certainly follow his own
Judgment which disapproved of the section. He
would remark in addition to the objections urged
agst. it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to
be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the
other by the people of the States, as both are to be
paid by the States, and to be appointable to State
offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate
the Natl. Legislature, but to render its members ineligible
to Natl. offices, & by that means take away
its power of attracting those talents which were
necessary to give weight to the Governt. and to render
it useful to the people. He was far from thinking
the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity
and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure

it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to
withhold from it the prospect of those rewards,
which might engage it in the career of public service.
He observed that the State of Penna. which had gone
as far as any State into the policy of fettering power,
had not rendered the members of the Legislature
ineligible to offices of Govt.

Mr. Elsworth did not think the mere postponement
of the reward would be any material discouragement
of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2
years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of
qualifying themselves for other offices. This he
thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services
of the ablest men in the Legislature, although
whilst members they should be ineligible to Public
offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged,
when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to
circulate only within the Legislature, merit out of it
will be discouraged.

Mr. Mercer was extremely anxious on this point.
What led to the appointment of this Convention?
The corruption & mutability of the Legislative
Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy
these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not
be able in our private capacities to support & enforce
it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves
for the purpose.—It is a great mistake to suppose
that the paper we are to propose will govern the
U. States. It is The men whom it will bring into the
Governt. and interest in maintaining it that is to
govern them. The paper will only mark out the

mode & the form. Men are the substance and must
do the business. All Govt. must be by force or influence.
It is not the King of France—but 200,000
janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There
will be no such force here; influence then must be
substituted; and he would ask whether this could
be done, if the members of the Legislature should
be ineligible to offices of State; whether such a
disqualification would not determine all the most
influential men to stay at home, & prefer appointments
within their respective States.

Mr. Wilson was by no means satisfied with the
answer given by Mr. Elseworth to the argument as
to the discouragement of merit. The members
must either go a second time into the Legislature,
and disqualify themselves—or say to their Constituents,
we served you before only from the mercenary
view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and
haveg. answered this purpose we do not chuse to
be again elected.

Mr. Govr. Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen
the most capable of conducting it, happening to
be a member of the Legislature. What might have
been the consequence of such a regulation at the
commencement, or even in the Course of the late
contest for our liberties?

On question for postponing in order to take up
Mr. Pinkneys motion, it was lost,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. divd.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert, after "office,"
except offices in the army or navy: but in that
case their offices shall be vacated.

Mr. Broom 2ds. him.

Mr. Randolph had been & should continue uniformly
opposed to the striking out of the clause; as
opening a door for influence & corruption. No arguments
had made any impression on him, but those
which related to the case of war, and a co-existing
incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed.
He admitted great weight in these, and would agree
to the exception proposed by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. Butler & Mr. Pinkney urged a general postponemt.
of 9. Sect. Art. VI. till it should be seen what
powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would
be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing
the officers of State to be chosen out of that body.—
A general postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 10. taken up—"that members be
paid by their respective States."

Mr. Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject
he had been satisfied that too much dependence
on the States would be produced by this mode of
payment. He moved to strike it out and insert
that they should "be paid out of the Treasury of the
U. S. an allowance not exceeding ( ) dollars per
day or the present value thereof."

Mr. Govr. Morris, remarked that if the members
were to be paid by the States it would throw an unequal
burden on the distant States, which would be
unjust as the Legislature, was to be a national

Assembly. He moved that the payment be out of
the Natl. Treasury; leaving the quantum to the discretion
of the Natl. Legislature. There could be no
reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.

Mr. Butler contended for payment by the States;
particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be
so long out of their respective States, that they will
lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on
them for their support.

Mr. Langdon was agst. payment by the States.
There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum;
but it would be unjust to oblige the distant States
to bear the expence of their members in travelling
to and from the Seat of Govt.

Mr. Madison. If the H. of Reps. is to be chosen
biennially—and the Senate to be constantly dependent
on the Legislatures which are chosen annually, he
could not see any chance for that stability in the
Genl. Govt. the want of which was a principal evil in
the State Govts. His fear was that the organization
of the Govt. supposing the Senate to be really independt.
for six years, would not effect our purpose. It
was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities
of two of the State Govts. which separately
had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed
on the model of that of Maryld. The Revisionary
check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a
union of these provisions might be, could not be
foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the
Government was indeed a circumstance which he
thought would be favorable as he had on several

occasions undertaken to show. He was however for
fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by
the Natl. Legislre. in the payment of themselves.

Mr. Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides.
The observation of Mr. Butler has weight in it. On
the other side, the State Legislatures may turn out
the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such
things have been practised.

Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the
clause as it now stands makes the House of Represents.
also dependent on the State Legislatures: so
that both houses will be made the instruments of the
politics of the States whatever they may be.

Mr. Broom could see no danger in trusting the
Genl. Legislature with the payment of themselves.
The State Legislatures had this power, and no complaint
had been made of it.

Mr. Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature
would make their own wages too high; but too low,
so that men ever so fit could not serve unless they
were at the same time rich. He thought the best
plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be
paid out of the Natl. Treasy. and let the States make
such additions as they might judge fit. He moved
that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments
to be added by the States.

Mr. Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this
clause in the Report. The dependence of both
Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat; especially
as the members of the former are eligible to
State offices. The States can now say: if you do

not comply with our wishes, we will starve you; if
you do we will reward you. The new Govt. in this
form was nothing more than a second edition of
Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps
with very few amendments—

Mr. Dickenson took it for granted that all were
convinced of the necessity of making the Genl. Govt.
independent of the prejudices, passions, and improper
views of the State Legislatures. The contrary
of This was effected by the section as it stands.
On the other hand there were objections agst. taking
a permanent standard as wheat which had been
suggested on a former occasion, as well as against
leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Natl. Legislature.
He proposed that an Act should be passed
every 12 years by the Natl. Legislre. settling the
quantum of their wages. If the Genl. Govt. should
be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it
would be happy for us if we had never met in this
Room.

Mr. Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust
the Legislature with authority to regulate their own
wages, but well knew that an unlimited discretion
for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps
not insuperable objections. He thought changes in
the value of money, provided for by his motion in
the words, "or the present value thereof."

Mr. L, Martin. As the Senate is to represent the
States, the members of it ought to be paid by the
States.

Mr. Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage

the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates
of State interests. They ought then not to
be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the
Legislature out of the Natl. Treasury,

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that the pay be fixed at 5
dollrs. or the present value thereof per day during
their attendance & for every thirty miles in travelling
to & from Congress.

Mr. Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at,
liberty to make additions.

On question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Dickenson proposed that the wages of the members
of both houses sd. be required to be the same.

Mr. Broome seconded him.

Mr. Ghorum. this would be unreasonable. The
Senate will be detained longer from home, will be
obliged to remove their families, and in time of war
perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should
certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in
the States are allowed more, than those of the other
house.

Mr. Dickenson withdrew his motion.

It was moved & agreed to amend the section by
adding—"to be ascertained by law."

The section (Art. VI. Sect. 10) as amended, agreed
to nem. con.

Adjd.