University of Virginia Library

THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON.

JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1787.—Continued.

Thursday July 19. in Convention.

On reconsideration of the vote rendering the
Executive re-eligible a 2d. time, Mr. Martin moved to
re-instate the words, "to be ineligible a 2d. time."

Mr. Governeur Morris. It is necessary to take into
one view all that relates to the establishment of the
Executive; on the due formation of which must depend
the efficacy & utility of the Union among the
present and future States. It has been a maxim in
Political Science that Republican Government is not
adapted to a large extent of Country, because the
energy of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the
extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive
one. We must either then renounce the blessings of
the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient
vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject
was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged
in an extensive view of it. One great object

of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The
Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize &
perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical
moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion
for that purpose. It is necessary then that the
Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of the
people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative
tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in the
course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative
body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind to
nourish its love of power, and to stimulate it to
oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of
the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch
was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations
of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the
propensity in the 1st. branch to legislate too much to
run into projects of paper money & similar expedients.
It is no check on Legislative tyranny. On
the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st. branch
can be seduced may find the means of success. The
Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to
be the great protector of the Mass of the people.—
It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers
& to command the forces of the Republic: to
appoint 1. ministerial officers for the administration
of public affairs. 2. officers for the dispensation of
Justice. Who will be the best Judges whether these
appointments be well made? The people at large,
who will know, will see, will feel the effects of them.
Again who can judge so well of the discharge of military
duties for the protection & security of the
people, as the people themselves who are to be protected
& secured? He finds too that the Executive
is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this have?
1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit public
esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded
with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous
turn to one of the strongest passions in the human
breast. The love of fame is the great spring to
noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road to
Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the
sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the most of
the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate
wealth and provide for his friends. 3. It will produce
violations of the very constitution it is meant
to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried
abilities and established character of a favorite
magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of
the Constitution. The Executive is also to be impeachable.
This is a dangerous part of the plan.
It will hold him in such dependence that he will be
no check on the Legislature, will not be a firm guardian
of the people and of the public interest. He
will be the tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue
in the Legislature. These then are the faults
of the Executive establishment as now proposed.
Can no better establishmt. be devised? If he is to be
the Guardian of the people let him be appointed by
the people? If he is to be a check on the Legislature
let him not be impeachable. Let him be of
short duration, that he may with propriety be reeligible.
It has been said that the candidates for
this office will not be known to the people. If they
be known to the Legislature, they must have such
a notoriety and eminence of Character, that they
cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large.
It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently
distinguished himself to merit this high trust
without having his character proclaimed by fame
throughout the Empire. As to the danger from an
Unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it as
formidable. There must be certain great Officers of
State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign
affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their
functions in subordination to the Executive, and will
be amenable by impeachment to the Public Justice.
Without these ministers the Executive can do
nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial
election of the Executive at the time of electing the
1st. branch, and the Executive to hold over, so as to
prevent any interregnum in the administration. An
election by the people at large throughout so great
an extent of country could not be influenced by
those little combinations and those momentary lies,
which often decide popular elections within a narrow
sphere. It will probably, be objected that the election
will be influenced by the members of the Legislature;
particularly of the 1st. branch, and that it will
be nearly the same thing with an election by the
Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such
an influence would exist. But it might be answered
that as the Legislature or the candidates for it would
be divided, the enmity of one part would counteract
the friendship of another; that if the administration
of the Executive were good, it would be unpopular
to oppose his re-election, if bad it ought to be opposed
& a reappointmt. prevented; and lastly that
in every view this indirect dependence on the favor
of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a
direct dependence for his appointment. He saw no
alternative for making the Executive independent of
the Legislature but either to give him his office for
life, or make him eligible by the people. Again, it
might be objected that two years would be too short
a duration. But he believes that as long as he should
behave himself well, he would be continued in his
place. The extent of the Country would secure his
re-election agst. the factions & discontents of particular
States. It deserved consideration also that such an
ingredient in the plan would render it extremely
palatable to the people. These were the general ideas
which occurred to him on the subject, and which led
him to wish & move that the whole constitution of
the Executive might undergo reconsideration.

Mr. Randolph urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin
for restoring the words making the Executive ineligible
a 2d. time. If he ought to be independent,
he should not be left under a temptation to court a
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by
the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary
power will be of no avail. He had always
thought & contended as he still did that the danger
apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but
those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly

anxious for the motion. If the Executive be appointed,
as has been determined, by the Legislature,
he will probably be appointed either by joint ballot
of both houses, or be nominated by the 1st. and
appointed by the 2d. branch. In either case the
large States will preponderate. If he is to court the
same influence for his re-appointment, will he not
make his revisionary power, and all the other functions
of his administration subservient to the views
of the large States. Besides, is there not great
reason to apprehend that in case he should be reeligible,
a false complaisance in the Legislature
might lead them to continue an unfit man in office
in preference to a fit one. It has been said that a
constitutional bar to re-appointment will inspire unconstitutional
endeavours to perpetuate himself. It
may be answered that his endeavours can have no
effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree
as to render all precautions hopeless; to which may
be added that this argument supposes him to be
more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments
which have been used, admit, and consequently calls
for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought an
election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be
elected a second time would be more acceptable to the
people than the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought
there was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman,
that he who has proved himself most fit for an Office,
ought not to be excluded by the constitution from
holding it. He would therefore prefer any other

reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was
much disposed to think that in such cases the people
at large would chuse wisely. There was indeed some
difficulty arising from the improbability of a general
concurrence of the people in favor of any one man.
On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment
by electors chosen by the people for the purpose,
would be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided he said with
those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive
should be appointed by Electors to be chosen
by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector
to the smallest and three to the largest States.

Mr. Wilson. It seems to be the unanimous sense
that the Executive should not be appointed by the
Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d.
time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was
gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately
by the people.

Mr. Madison. If it be a fundamental principle of
free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary
powers should be separately exercised, it is equally
so that they be independently exercised. There is
the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive
shd. be independent of the Legislature, than why
the Judiciary should. A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous
to public liberty. It is essential then that
the appointment of the Executive should either be
drawn from some source, or held by some tenure
that will give him a free agency with regard to the

Legislature. This could not be if he was to be appointable
from time to time by the Legislature. It
was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance
even with an ineligibility afterwards would not establish
an improper connection between the two departments.
Certain it was that the appointment
would be attended with intrigues and contentions
that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He
was disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment
to some other source. The people at large was
in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as
likely as any that could be devised to produce an
Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character.
The people generally could only know & vote for
some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an
object of general attention & esteem. There was
one difficulty however of a serious nature attending
an immediate choice by the people. The right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern
than the Southern States; and the latter could have
no influence in the election on the score of the
Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this
difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to
fewest objections.

Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by
the Legislature he certainly ought not to be reeligible.
This would make him absolutely dependent.
He was agst. a popular election. The people
are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment
of the Executive by Electors to be chosen

by the State Executives. The people of the States
will then choose the 1st. branch; the legislatures of
the States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature,
and the Executives of the States, the National
Executive. This he thought would form a strong
attachmt. in the States to the National System. The
popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would
certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so
elected & should do his duty, he will be turned out
for it like Govr. Bowdoin in Massts. & President Sullivan
in N. Hamshire.

On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider
generally the Constitution of the Executive

Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. & all the others ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved to strike out the appointmt.
by the Natl. Legislature, and to insert, to be chosen
by electors appointed by the Legislatures of the
States in the following ratio; to wit—one for each
State not exceeding 200,000[1] inhabts. two for each
above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000. and three
for each State exceeding 300,000.—Mr. Broome 2ded.
the motion.[2]

Mr. Rutlidge was opposed to all the modes, except
the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature. He will be
sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible.

Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to

an appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, or by the
people; tho' not to an appt. by the State Executives.
He moved that the electors proposed by Mr. E.
should be 25 in number, and allotted in the following
proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to Cont.
2. to N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C.
2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.

The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being
divided, on the 1st. part shall ye. Natl. Executive be
appointed by Electors?

Mas. divd Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On 2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by the
State Legislatures?

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The part relating to the ratio in which the States
sd. chuse electors was postponed nem. con.

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible
a 2d. time.

Mr. Williamson, 2ds. the motion. He had no great
confidence in Electors to be chosen for the special
purpose. They would not be the most respectable
citizens; but persons not occupied in the high
offices of Govt. They would be liable to undue influence,
which might the more readily be practised
as some of them will probably be in appointment 6
or 8 months before the object of it comes on.

Mr. Elseworth supposed any persons might be appointed
Electors, excepting, solely, members of the
Natl. Legislature.

On the question Shall he be ineligible a 2d. time?

Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On the question Shall the Executive continue for
7 years? It passed in the negative

Mas. divd., Cont. ay.[3] N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. King was afraid we shd. shorten the term too
much.

Mr. Govr. Morris was for a short term, in order to
avoid impeachts. which wd. be otherwise necessary.

Mr. Butler was agst. the frequency of the elections.
Geo. & S. C. were too distant to send electors often.

Mr. Elseworth was for 6. years. If the elections
be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm eno.
There must be duties which will make him unpopular
for the moment. There will be outs as well as
ins. His administration therefore will be attacked
and misrepresented.

Mr. Williamson was for 6 years. The expence will
be considerable & ought not to be unnecessarily repeated.
If the Elections are too frequent, the best
men will not undertake the service and those of an
inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.

On the question for 6 years?

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

Friday July 20. in Convention.

The postponed Ratio of Electors for appointing the
Executive; to wit 1 for each State whose inhabitants
do not exceed 100.000. &c. being taken up.

Mr. Madison observed that this would make in
time all or nearly all the States equal. Since there
were few that would not in time contain the number
of inhabitants intitling them to 3 Electors; that
this ratio ought either to be made temporary, or so
varied as that it would adjust itself to the growing
population of the States.

Mr. Gerry moved that in the 1st. instance the Electors
should be allotted to the States in the following
ratio: to N. H. 1. Mass. 3. R. I. 1. Cont. 2. N. Y. 2.
N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.

On the question to postpone in order to take up
this motion of Mr. Gerry. It passed in the affirmative

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that 2 Electors be allotted
to N. H. Some rule ought to be pursued; and N.
H. has more than 100,000 inhabitants. He thought
it would be proper also to allot 2. to Georgia

Mr. Broom & Mr. Martin moved to postpone Mr.
Gerry's allotment of Electors, leaving a fit ratio to
be reported by the Committee to be appointed for
detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion,

Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Houston 2ded. the motion of Mr. Elseworth to add
another Elector to N. H. & Georgia. On the Question;

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Williamson moved as an amendment to Mr.
Gerry's allotment of Electors in the 1st. instance that
in future elections of the Natl. Executive, the number
of Electors to be appointed by the several States
shall be regulated by their respective numbers of
Representatives in the 1st. branch pursuing as nearly
as may be the present proportions.

On Question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of Electors

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

"to be removable on impeachment and conviction
for malpractice or neglect of duty," see Resol. 9.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out
this part of the Resolution. Mr. P. observd. he ought
not to be impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in
office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to
get himself re-elected. He considered this as an
essential security for the good behaviour of the
Executive.

Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making
the Executive impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He can do no criminal act without
Coadjutors who may be punished. In case he
should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof of
his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the

impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not
the mischief will go on. If it is the impeachment
will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will
render the Executive dependent on those who are to
impeach.

Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than
that the right of impeachment should be continued.
Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that
man be above it, who can commit the most extensive
injustice? When great crimes were committed he
was for punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors.
There had been much debate & difficulty as
to the mode of chusing the Executive. He approved
of that which had been adopted at first, namely of
referring the appointment to the Natl. Legislature.
One objection agst. Electors was the danger of their
being corrupted by the Candidates, & this furnished
a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in
office. Shall the man who has practised corruption
& by that means procured his appointment in the
first instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by
repeating his guilt?

Docr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable
to the Executive. History furnishes one example
only of a first Magistrate being formally
brought to public Justice. Every body cried out
agst. this as unconstitutional. What was the practice
before this in cases where the Chief Magistrate
rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had
to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of
his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his

character. It wd. be the best way therefore to provide
in the Constitution for the regular punishment
of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve
it, and for his honorable acquittal where he
should be unjustly accused.

Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few
other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable;
but thought the cases ought to be enumerated
& defined.

Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some
provision should be made for defending the Community
agst. the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of
the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of
his service was not a sufficient security. He might
lose his capacity after his appointment. He might
pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation
or oppression. He might betray his trust to
foreign powers. The case of the Executive Magistracy
was very distinguishable, from that of the
Legislature or any other public body, holding offices
of limited duration. It could not be presumed that
all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly
would either lose their capacity for discharging,
or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints
of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty
of acting in concert for purposes of corruption
was a security to the Public. And if one or a few
members only should be seduced, the soundness of
the remaining members, would maintain the integrity
and fidelity of the body. In the case of the
Executive Magistracy which was to be administered

by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was
more within the compass of probable events, and
either of them might be fatal to the Republic.

Mr. Pinkney did not see the necessity of impeachments.
He was sure they ought not to issue from
the Legislature who would in that case hold them as
a rod over the Executive and by that means effectually
destroy his independence. His revisionary
power in particular would be rendered altogether
insignificant.

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments.
A good Magistrate will not fear them. A bad one
ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the
maxim would never be adopted here that the chief
magistrate could do no wrong.

Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme
caution in favor of liberty might enervate the
Government we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three
great departments of Govts. should be separate &
independent: that the Executive & Judiciary should
be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive
should be so equally with the Judiciary. Would
this be the case, if the Executive should be impeachable?
It had been said that the Judiciary would be
impeachable. But it should have been remembered
at the same time that the Judiciary hold their places
not for a limited time, but during good behaviour.
It is necessary therefore that a form should be established
for trying misbehaviour. Was the Executive
to hold his place during good behaviour? The Executive

was to hold his place for a limited term like
the members of the Legislature. Like them, particularly
the Senate whose members would continue
in appointmt. the same term of 6 years he would
periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors,
who would continue or discontinue him in trust according
to the manner in which he had discharged
it. Like them therefore, he ought to be subject to
no intermediate trial, by impeachment. He ought
not to be impeachable unless he held his office during
good behavior, a tenure which would be most
agreeable to him; provided an independent and
effectual forum could be devised. But under no
circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the
Legislature. This would be destructive of his independence
and of the principles of the Constitution.
He relied on the vigor of the Executive as a great
security for the public liberties.

Mr. Randolph. The propriety of impeachments
was a favorite principle with him. Guilt wherever
found ought to be punished. The Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly
in time of war when the military force, and
in some respects the Public money will be in his
hands. Should no regular punishment be provided,
it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections.
He is aware of the necessity of proceeding
with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much as
possible the influence of the Legislature from the
business. He suggested for consideration an idea
which had fallen (from Col. Hamilton) of composing

a forum out of the Judges belonging to the States:
and even of requiring some preliminary inquest
whether just ground of impeachment existed.

Doctr. Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince
of Orange during the late war. An agreement was
made between France & Holland; by which their
two fleets were to unite at a certain time & place.
The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every body began
to wonder at it. At length it was suspected that the
Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This
suspicion prevailed more & more. Yet as he could
not be impeached and no regular examination took
place, he remained in his office, and strengthening
his own party, as the party opposed to him became
formidable, he gave birth to the most violent animosities
& contentions. Had he been impeachable,
a regular & peaceable enquiry would have taken place
and he would if guilty have been duly punished, if
innocent restored to the confidence of the Public.

Mr. King remarked that the case of the Statholder
was not applicable. He held his place for life, and
was not periodically elected. In the former case
impeachments are proper to secure good behaviour.
In the latter they are unnecessary; the periodical
responsibility to the electors being an equivalent
security.

Mr. Wilson observed that if the idea were to be
pursued, the Senators who are to hold their places
during the same term with the Executive, ought to
be subject to impeachment & removal.

Mr. Pinkney apprehended that some gentlemen

reasoned on a supposition that the Executive was to
have powers which would not be committed to him:
He presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed
as to render impeachments unnecessary.

Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by the
arguments used in the discussion. He was now sensible
of the necessity of impeachments, if the Executive
was to continue for any length of time in office.
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a
life interest, much less like one having an hereditary
interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater
interest to betray his trust; and no one would say
that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of
seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without
being able to guard agst. it by displacing him. One
would think the King of England well secured agst.
bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the
whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II. was bribed by
Louis XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be
impeachable for treachery: Corrupting his electors,
and incapacity were other causes of impeachment.
For the latter he should be punished not as a man,
but as an officer, and punished only by degradation
from his office. This Magistrate is not the King but
the prime Minister. The people are the King.
When we make him amenable to Justice however
we should take care to provide some mode that will
not make him dependent on the Legislature.

It was moved & 2ded. to postpone the question of
impeachments which was negatived, Mas. & S.
Carolina only being ay.

On ye. Question, Shall the Executive be removable
on impeachments &c.?

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

"Executive to receive fixed compensation."
Agreed to nem. con.

"to be paid out of the national Treasury" agreed
to, N. Jersey only in the negative.

Mr. Gerry & Govr. Morris moved that the Electors
of the Executive shall not be members of the Natl.
Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor shall
the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme
magistracy. Agreed to nem. con.

Docr. McClurg[4] asked whether it would not be
necessary, before a Committee for detailing the Constitution
should be appointed, to determine on the
means by which the Executive, is to carry the laws
into effect, and to resist combinations agst. them.
Is he to have a military force for the purpose, or to
have the command of the Militia, the only existing
force that can be applied to that use? As the Resolutions
now stand the Committee will have no determinate
directions on this great point.

Mr. Wilson thought that some additional directions
to the Committee wd. be necessary.

Mr. King. The Committee are to provide for the
end. Their discretionary power to provide for the
means is involved according to an established axiom.

Adjourned.

Saturday July 21 in Convention

Mr. Williamson moved that the Electors of the
Executive should be paid out of the National Treasury
for the Service to be performed by them. Justice
required this: as it was a national service they
were to render. The motion was agreed to Nem.
Con.

Mr. Wilson moved as an amendment to Resoln. 10.
that the supreme Natl. Judiciary should be associated
with the Executive in the Revisionary power. This
proposition had been before made and failed: but he
was so confirmed by reflection in the opinion of its
utility, that he thought it incumbent on him to make
another effort: The Judiciary ought to have an
opportunity of remonstrating agst. projected encroachments
on the people as well as on themselves.
It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the
Laws would have an opportunity of defending their
constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation;
but this power of the Judges did not go
far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise,
may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet
may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them

have a share in the Revisionary power, and they
will have an opportunity of taking notice of these
characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the
weight of their opinions the improper views of the
Legislature.—Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion

Mr. Ghorum did not see the advantage of employing
the Judges in this way. As Judges they are not
to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge
of the mere policy of public measures. Nor can it
be necessary as a security for their constitutional
rights. The Judges in England have no such additional
provision for their defence, yet their jurisdiction
is not invaded. He thought it would be best
to let the Executive alone be responsible, and at
most to authorize him to call on Judges for their
opinions.

Mr. Elseworth approved heartily of the motion.
The aid of the Judges will give more wisdom & firmness
to the Executive. They will possess a systematic
and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the
Executive cannot be expected always to possess.
The Law of Nations also will frequently come into
question. Of this the Judges alone will have competent
information.

Mr. Madison considered the object of the motion
as of great importance to the meditated Constitution.
It would be useful to the Judiciary departmt.
by giving it an additional opportunity of defending
itself agst. Legislative encroachments: It would be
useful to the Executive, by inspiring additional confidence
& firmness in exerting the revisionary power:

It would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable
assistance it would give in preserving a consistency,
conciseness, perspicuity & technical propriety in the
laws, qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet shamefully
wanting in our republican Codes. It would
moreover be useful to the Community at large as an
additional check agst. a pursuit of those unwise &
unjust measures which constituted so great a portion
of our calamities. If any solid objection could be
urged agst. the motion, it must be on the supposition
that it tended to give too much strength either to the
Executive or Judiciary. He did not think there was
the least ground for this apprehension. It was much
more to be apprehended that notwithstanding this
co-operation of the two departments, the Legislature
would still be an overmatch for them. Experience
in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in
the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex.
This was the real source of danger to the American
Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving
every defensive authority to the other departments
that was consistent with Republican principles.

Mr. Mason said he had always been a friend to this
provision. It would give a confidence to the Executive,
which he would not otherwise have, and without
which the Revisionary power would be of little
avail.

Mr. Gerry did not expect to see this point which
had undergone full discussion, again revived. The
object he conceived of the Revisionary power was
merely to secure the Executive department agst.

legislative encroachment. The Executive therefore
who will best know and be ready to defend his rights
ought alone to have the defence of them. The motion
was liable to strong objections. It was combining
& mixing together the Legislative & the other departments.
It was establishing an improper coalition
between the Executive & Judiciary departments.
It was making statesmen of the Judges; and setting
them up as the guardians of the Rights of the people.
He relied for his part on the Representatives of the
people as the guardians of their Rights & interests.
It was making the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators
which ought never to be done. A better expedient
for correcting the laws, would be to appoint
as had been done in Pena., a person or persons of
proper skill, to draw bills for the Legislature.

Mr. Strong thought with Mr. Gerry that the power
of making ought to be kept distinct from that of
expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established.
The Judges in exercising the function of
expositors might be influenced by the part they had
taken in framing the laws.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Some check being necessary on
the Legislature, the question is in what hands it
should be lodged. On one side it was contended
that the Executive alone ought to exercise it. He
did not think that an Executive appointed for 6
years, and impeachable whilst in office wd be a very
effectual check. On the other side it was urged that
he ought to be reinforced by the Judiciary department.
Agst. this it was objected that Expositors of

laws ought to have no hand in making them, and
arguments in favor of this had been drawn from
England. What weight was due to them might be
easily determined by an attention to facts. The
truth was that the Judges in England had a great
share in ye. Legislation. They are consulted in difficult
& doubtful cases. They may be & some of
them are members of the Legislature. They are or
may be members of the privy Council, and can there
advise the Executive as they will do with us if the
motion succeeds. The influence the English Judges
may have in the latter capacity in strengthening the
Executive check can not be ascertained, as the King
by his influence in a manner dictates the laws. There
is one difference in the two cases however which disconcerts
all reasoning from the British to our proposed
Constitution. The British Executive has so
great an interest in his prerogatives and such powerful
means of defending them that he will never yield
any part of them. The interest of our Executive is
so inconsiderable & so transitory, and his means of
defending it so feeble, that there is the justest ground
to fear his want of firmness in resisting incroachments.
He was extremely apprehensive that the
auxiliary firmness & weight of the Judiciary would
not supply the deficiency. He concurred in thinking
the public liberty in greater danger from Legislative
usurpations than from any other source. It
had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied
on as the proper Guardians of liberty. The answer
was short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be
pushed or not. On the latter supposition no check
will be wanted. On the former a strong check will
be necessary: and this is the proper supposition.
Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people—
a remission of debts and similar measures, will at
some times be popular, and will be pushed for that
reason. At other times such measures will coincide
with the interests of the Legislature themselves, &
that will be a reason not less cogent for pushing
them. It may be thought that the people will not
be deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience
teaches another lesson. The press is indeed
a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is found
to be unable to prevent it altogether.

Mr. L. Martin, considered the association of the
Judges with the Executive as a dangerous innovation;
as well as one which could not produce the
particular advantage expected from it. A knowledge
of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be
presumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges
than to the Legislature. And as to the Constitutionality
of laws, that point will come before the
Judges in their proper official character. In this character
they have a negative on the laws. Join them
with the Executive in the Revision and they will have
a double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme
Judiciary should have the confidence of the people.
This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the
task of remonstrating agst. popular measures of the
Legislature. Besides in what mode & proportion
are they to vote in the Council of Revision?

Mr. Madison could not discover in the proposed
association of the Judges with the Executive in the
Revisionary check on the Legislature any violation
of the maxim which requires the great departments
of power to be kept separate & distinct. On the
contrary he thought it an auxiliary precaution in
favor of the maxim. If a Constitutional discrimination
of the departments on paper were a sufficient
security to each agst. encroachments of the others, all
further provisions would indeed be superfluous. But
experience had taught us a distrust of that security;
and that it is necessary to introduce such a balance
of powers and interests as will guarantee the provisions
on paper. Instead therefore of contenting ourselves
with laying down the Theory in the Constitution
that each department ought to be separate &
distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive power
to each which should maintain the Theory in practice.
In so doing we did not blend the departments
together. We erected effectual barriers for keeping
them separate. The most regular example of this
theory was in the British Constitution. Yet it was
not only the practice there to admit the Judges to a
seat in the legislature, and in the Executive Councils,
and to submit to their previous examination all
laws of a certain description, but it was a part of
their Constitution that the Executive might negative
any law whatever; a part of their Constitution
which had been universally regarded as calculated
for the preservation of the whole. The objection
agst. a union of the Judiciary & Executive branches

in the revision of the laws, had either no foundation
or was not carried far enough. If such a Union was
an improper mixture of powers, or such a Judiciary
check on the laws, was inconsistent with the Theory
of a free Constitution, it was equally so to admit the
Executive to any participation in the making of
laws; and the revisionary plan ought to be discarded
altogether.

Col. Mason observed that the defence of the Executive
was not the sole object of the Revisionary
power. He expected even greater advantages from
it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the
Constitution of the Legislature, it would still so
much resemble that of the individual States, that it
must be expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious
laws. This restraining power was therefore
essentially necessary. It would have the effect not
only of hindering the final passage of such laws; but
would discourage demagogues from attempting to
get them passed. It has been said (by Mr. L. Martin)
that if the Judges were joined in this check on the
laws, they would have a double negative, since in
their expository capacity of Judges they would have
one negative. He would reply that in this capacity
they could impede in one case only, the operation of
laws. They could declare an unconstitutional law
void. But with regard to every law however unjust
oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly
under this description, they would be under the
necessity as Judges to give it a free course. He
wished the further use to be made of the Judges, of

giving aid in preventing every improper law. Their
aid will be the more valuable as they are in the habit
and practice of considering laws in their true principles,
and in all their consequences.

Mr. Wilson. The separation of the departments
does not require that they should have separate
objects but that they should act separately tho' on
the same objects. It is necessary that the two
branches of the Legislature should be separate and
distinct, yet they are both to act precisely on the
same object.

Mr. Gerry had rather give the Executive an absolute
negative for its own defence than thus to blend
together the Judiciary & Executive departments. It
will bind them together in an offensive and defensive
alliance agst. the Legislature, and render the
latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them.

Mr. Govr. Morris was surprised that any defensive
provision for securing the effectual separation of the
departments should be considered as an improper
mixture of them. Suppose that the three powers,
were to be vested in three persons, by compact
among themselves; that one was to have the power
of making, another of executing, and a third of
judging, the laws. Would it not be very natural
for the two latter after having settled the partition
on paper, to observe, and would not candor oblige
the former to admit, that as a security agst. legislative
acts of the former which might easily be so
framed as to undermine the powers of the two others,
the two others ought to be armed with a veto for

their own defence, or at least to have an opportunity
of stating their objections agst. acts of encroachment?
And would any one pretend that such a right tended
to blend & confound powers that ought to be separately
exercised? As well might it be said that if
three neighbours had three distinct farms, a right in
each to defend his farm agst. his neighbours, tended
to blend the farms together.

Mr. Ghorum. All agree that a check on the Legislature
is necessary. But there are two objections
agst. admitting the Judges to share in it which no
observations on the other side seem to obviate, the
1st. is that the Judges ought to carry into the exposition
of the laws no prepossessions with regard to
them. 2d. that as the Judges will outnumber the
Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown
entirely out of the Executive hands, and instead of
enabling him to defend himself, would enable the
Judges to sacrifice him.

Mr. Wilson. The proposition is certainly not liable
to all the objections which have been urged agst. it.
According (to Mr. Gerry) it will unite the Executive
& Judiciary in an offensive & defensive alliance agst.
the Legislature. According to Mr. Ghorum it will
lead to a subversion of the Executive by the Judiciary
influence. To the first gentleman the answer
was obvious: that the joint weight of the two departments
was necessary to balance the single
weight of the Legislature. To the 1st. objection
stated by the other Gentleman it might be answered
that supposing the prepossession to mix itself with

the exposition, the evil would be overbalanced by
the advantages promised by the expedient. To the
2d. objection, that such a rule of voting might be provided
in the detail as would guard agst. it.

Mr. Rutlidge thought the Judges of all men the
most unfit to be concerned in the revisionary Council.
The Judges ought never to give their opinion
on a law till it comes before them. He thought it
equally unnecessary. The Executive could advise
with the officers of State, as of war, finance &c. and
avail himself of their information & opinions.

On Question on Mr. Wilson's motion for joining the
Judiciary in the Revision of laws it passed in the
negative—

Mass. no. Cont. ay. N. J. not present. Pa. divd..
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
divd..

Resol. 10, giving the Ex a qualified veto, without
the amendt. was then agd. to nem. con.

The motion made by Mr. Madison July 18. & then
postponed, "that the Judges shd. be nominated by
the Executive & such nominations become appointments
unless disagreed to by ⅔ of the 2d. branch
of the Legislature," was now resumed.

Mr. Madison stated as his reasons for the motion.
1. that it secured the responsibility of the Executive
who would in general be more capable & likely
to select fit characters than the Legislature, or even
the 2d. b. of it, who might hide their selfish motives
under the number concerned in the appointment.
2 that in case of any flagrant partiality or error, in

the nomination it might be fairly presumed that ⅔
of the 2d. branch would join in putting a negative on
it. 3. that as the 2d. b. was very differently constituted
when the appointment of the Judges was formerly
referred to it, and was now to be composed of
equal votes from all the States, the principle of compromise
which had prevailed in other instances required
in this that there shd. be a concurrence of two
authorities, in one of which the people, in the other
the States should be represented. The Executive
Magistrate wd. be considered as a national officer, acting
for and equally sympathizing with every part of
the U. States. If the 2d. branch alone should have
this power, the Judges might be appointed by a
minority of the people, tho' by a majority, of the
States, which could not be justified on any principle
as their proceedings were to relate to the people,
rather than to the States: and as it would moreover
throw the appointments entirely into the hands of
ye. Northern States, a perpetual ground of jealousy
& discontent would be furnished to the Southern
States.

Mr. Pinkney was for placing the appointmt. in the
2d. b. exclusively. The Executive will possess neither
the requisite knowledge of characters, nor confidence
of the people for so high a trust.

Mr. Randolph wd. have preferred the mode of appointmt.
proposed formerly by Mr. Ghorum, as adopted
in the Constitution of Massts. but thought the motion
depending so great an improvement of the clause as
it stands, that he anxiously wished it success. He

laid great stress on the responsibility of the Executive
as a security for fit appointments. Appointments
by the Legislatures have generally resulted
from cabal, from personal regard, or some other
consideration than a title derived from the proper
qualifications. The same inconveniences will proportionally
prevail if the appointments be referred
to either branch of the Legislature or to any other
authority administered by a number of individuals.

Mr. Elseworth would prefer a negative in the Executive
on a nomination by the 2d. branch, the negative
to be overruled by a concurrence of 2/3 of the 2d.
b. to the mode proposed by the motion; but preferred
an absolute appointment by the 2d. branch to
either. The Executive will be regarded by the
people with a jealous eye. Every power for augmenting
unnecessarily his influence will be disliked.
As he will be stationary it was not to be supposed
he could have a better knowledge of characters. He
will be more open to caresses & intrigues than the
Senate. The right to supersede his nomination will
be ideal only. A nomination under such circumstances
will be equivalent to an appointment.

Mr. Govr. Morris supported the motion. 1. The
States in their corporate capacity will frequently
have an interest staked on the determination of the
Judges. As in the Senate the States are to vote the
Judges ought not to be appointed by the Senate.
Next to the impropriety of being Judge in one's own
cause, is the appointment of the Judge. 2. It had
been said the Executive would be uninformed of

characters. The reverse was ye. truth. The Senate
will be so. They must take the character of candidates
from the flattering pictures drawn by their
friends. The Executive in the necessary intercourse
with every part of the U. S. required by the nature
of his administration, will or may have the best possible
information. 3. It had been said that a jealousy
would be entertained of the Executive. If the
Executive can be safely trusted with the command
of the army, there cannot surely be any reasonable
ground of Jealousy in the present case. He added
that if the Objections agst. an appointment of the
Executive by the Legislature, had the weight that
had been allowed there must be some weight in the
objection to an appointment of the Judges by the
Legislature or by any part of it.

Mr. Gerry. The appointment of the Judges like
every other part of the Constitution shd. be so modelled
as to give satisfaction both to the people and
to the States. The mode under consideration will
give satisfaction to neither. He could not conceive
that the Executive could be as well informed of
characters throughout the Union, as the Senate. It
appeared to him also a strong objection that ⅔ of
the Senate were required to reject a nomination of
the Executive. The Senate would be constituted
in the same manner as Congress. And the appointments
of Congress have been generally good.

Mr. Madison, observed that he was not anxious
that ⅔ should be necessary to disagree to a nomination.
He had given this form to his motion chiefly

to vary it the more clearly from one which had just
been rejected. He was content to obviate the objection
last made, and accordingly so varied the
motion as to let a majority reject.

Col. Mason found it his duty to differ from his colleagues
in their opinions & reasonings on this subject.
Notwithstanding the form of the proposition
by which the appointment seemed to be divided
between the Executive & Senate, the appointment
was Substantially vested in the former alone. The
false complaisance which usually prevails in such
cases will prevent a disagreement to the first nominations.
He considered the appointment by the Executive
as a dangerous prerogative. It might even
give him an influence over the Judiciary department
itself. He did not think the difference of interest
between the Northern and Southern States could be
properly brought into this argument. It would
operate & require some precautions in the case of
regulating navigation, commerce & imposts; but
he could not see that it had any connection with the
Judiciary department.

On the question, the motion now being "that the
executive should nominate & such nominations
should become appointments unless disagreed to by
the Senate"

Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to the clause as it stands
by which the Judges are to be appointed by the 2d.
branch

Mass. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

Monday July 23. in Convention

Mr. John Langdon & Mr. Nicholas Gilman[5] from
N. Hampshire,[6] took their seats.

Resol:n 17. that provision ought to be made for
future amendments of the Articles of Union, agreed
to, nem. con.

Resoln. 18. "requiring the Legis: Execut: & Judy.
of the States to be bound by oath to support the
articles of Union," taken into consideration.

Mr. Williamson suggests that a reciprocal oath
should be required from the National officers, to support
the Governments of the States.

Mr. Gerry moved to insert as an amendmt. that the
oath of the officers of the National Government also
should extend to the support of the Natl. Govt. which
was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering
them as a left handed security only. A
good Govt. did not need them, and a bad one could
not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid

they might too much trammel the members of the
existing Govt. in case future alterations should be
necessary; and prove an obstacle to Resol: 17. just
agd. to.

Mr. Ghorum did not know that oaths would be of
much use; but could see no inconsistency between
them and the 17. Resol. or any regular amendt. of
the Constitution. The oath could only require fidelity
to the existing Constitution. A constitutional
alteration of the Constitution, could never be regarded
as a breach of the Constitution, or of any
oath to support it.

Mr. Gerry thought with Mr. Ghorum there could be
no shadow of inconsistency in the case. Nor could
he see any other harm that could result from the
Resolution. On the other side he thought one good
effect would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers
of the two Governments had considered them as
distinct from, and not as parts of the General System,
& had in all cases of interference given a preference
to the State Govts. The proposed oath will cure
that error.

The Resoln. (18) was agreed to nem. con.

Resol: 19. referring the new Constitution to Assemblies
to be chosen by the people for the express
purpose of ratifying it was next taken into consideration.

Mr. Elseworth moved that it be referred to the
Legislatures of the States for ratification. Mr. Patterson
2ded. the motion.

Col. Mason considered a reference of the plan to

the authority of the people as one of the most important
and essential of the Resolutions. The Legislatures
have no power to ratify it. They are the
mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot
be greater than their creators. And he knew of
no power in any of the Constitutions, he knew there
was no power in some of them, that could be competent
to this object. Whither then must we resort?
To the people with whom all power remains that has
not been given up in the Constitutions derived from
them. It was of great moment he observed that
this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free
Government. Another strong reason was that admitting
the Legislatures to have a competent authority,
it would be wrong to refer the plan to them,
because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority
could undo the acts of their predecessors; and
the National Govt. would stand in each State on the
weak and tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly.
There was a remaining consideration of some
weight. In some of the States the Govts. were not
derived from the clear & undisputed authority of the
people. This was the case in Virginia Some of the
best & wisest citizens considered the Constitution as
established by an assumed authority. A national
Constitution derived from such a source would be
exposed to the severest criticisms.

Mr. Randolph. One idea has pervaded all our
proceedings, to wit, that opposition as well from
the States as from individuals, will be made to the
System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly

imprudent, to furnish any unnecessary pretext by
the mode of ratifying it. Added to other objections
agst. a ratification by the Legislative authority only,
it may be remarked that there have been instances in
which the authority of the Common law has been
set up in particular States agst. that of the Confederation
which has had no higher sanction than Legislative
ratification.—Whose opposition will be most
likely to be excited agst. the System? That of the
local demagogues who will be degraded by it from
the importance they now hold. These will spare no
efforts to impede that progress in the popular mind
which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan,
and which every member will find to have taken
place in his own, if he will compare his present opinions
with those brought with him into the Convention.
It is of great importance therefore that
the consideration of this subject should be transferred
from the Legislatures where this class of men,
have their full influence to a field in which their
efforts can be less mischievous. It is moreover
worthy of consideration that some of the States are
averse to any change in their Constitution, and will
not take the requisite steps, unless expressly called
upon to refer the question to the people.

Mr. Gerry. The arguments of Col. Mason & Mr.
Randolph prove too much. They prove an unconstitutionality
in the present federal system &
even in some of the State Govts. Inferences drawn
from such a source must be inadmissible. Both the
State Govts. & the federal Govt. have been too long

acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered the
Confederation to be paramount to any State Constitution.
The last article of it authorizing alterations
must consequently be so as well as the others, and
every thing done in pursuance of the article must
have the same high authority with the article. Great
confusion he was confident would result from a recurrence
to the people. They would never agree on
any thing. He could not see any ground to suppose
that the people will do what their rulers will not.
The rulers will either conform to, or influence the
sense of the people.

Mr. Ghorum was agst. referring the plan to the
Legislatures. 1. Men chosen by the people for the
particular purpose, will discuss the subject more candidly
than members of the Legislature who are to
lose the power which is to be given up to the Genl.
Govt. 2. Some of the Legislatures are composed of
several branches. It will consequently be more
difficult in these cases to get the plan through the
Legislatures, than thro' a Convention. 3. in the
States many of the ablest men are excluded from the
Legislatures, but may be elected into a convention.
Among these may be ranked many of the Clergy who
are generally friends to good Government. Their
services were found to be valuable in the formation
& establishment of the Constitution of Massachts.
4. the Legislatures will be interrupted with a variety
of little business, by artfully pressing which designing
men will find means to delay from year to year,
if not to frustrate altogether the national system.

5. If the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued
the unanimous concurrence of the States will
be necessary. But will any one say, that all the
States are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho.
Island should persist in her opposition to general
measures. Some other States might also tread in
her steps. The present advantage which N. York
seems to be so much attached to, of taxing her
neighbours by the regulation of her trade, makes
it very probable, that she will be of the number.
It would therefore deserve serious consideration
whether provision ought not to be made for giving
effect to the System without waiting for the unanimous
concurrence of the States.

Mr. Elseworth. If there be any Legislatures who
should find themselves incompetent to the ratification,
he should be content to let them advise with
their constituents and pursue such a mode as wd. be
competent. He thought more was to be expected
from the Legislatures than from the people. The
prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States
is to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of
strengthening the Natl. Govt. carries with it that of
strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col.
Mason 1. that the Legislatures have no authority in
this case 2. that their successors having equal authority
could rescind their acts. As to the 2d. point
he could not admit it to be well founded. An Act
to which the States by their Legislatures, make
themselves parties, becomes a compact from which
no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the

1st. point, he observed that a new sett of ideas seemed
to have crept in since the articles of Confederation
were established. Conventions of the people, or
with power derived expressly from the people, were
not then thought of. The Legislatures were considered
as competent. Their ratification has been
acquiesced in without complaint. To whom have
Congs. applied on subsequent occasions for further
powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people.
The fact is that we exist at present, and we need not
enquire how, as a federal Society, united by a charter
one article of which is that alterations therein
may be made by the Legislative authority of the
States. It has been said that if the confederation
is to be observed, the States must unanimously concur
in the proposed innovations. He would answer
that if such were the urgency & necessity of our
situation as to warrant a new compact among a part
of the States, founded on the consent of the people;
the same pleas would be equally valid in favor of a
partial compact, founded on the consent of the
Legislatures.

Mr. Williamson thought the Resol:n (19) so expressed
as that it might be submitted either to the Legislatures
or to Conventions recommended by the Legislatures.
He observed that some Legislatures were
evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He
thought too that Conventions were to be preferred
as more likely to be composed of the ablest men in
the States.

Mr. Govr. Morris considered the inference of Mr. Elseworth

from the plea of necessity as applied to the
establishment of a new System on ye. consent of the
people of a part of the States, in favor of a like
establishmt. on the consent of a part of the Legislatures,
as a non sequitur. If the Confederation is to
be pursued no alteration can be made without the
unanimous consent of the Legislatures: Legislative
alterations not conformable to the federal compact,
would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider
them as null & void. Whereas in case of an
appeal to the people of the U. S., the supreme authority,
the federal compact may be altered by a
majority of them; in like manner as the Constitution
of a particular State may be altered by a majority of
the people of the State. The amendmt. moved by
Mr. Elseworth erroneously supposes that we are proceeding
on the basis of the Confederation. This
Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

Mr. King thought with Mr. Elseworth that the
Legislatures had a competent authority, the acquiescence
of the people of America in the Confederation,
being equivalent to a formal ratification by the
people. He thought with Mr. E. also that the plea
of necessity was as valid in the one case as the other.
At the same time he preferred a reference to the
authority of the people expressly delegated to Conventions,
as the most certain means of obviating all
disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the
new Constitution; as well as the most likely means
of drawing forth the best men in the States to decide
on it. He remarked that among other objections

made in the State of N. York to granting powers to
Congs. one had been that such powers as would operate
within the State, could not be reconciled to the
Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by
the Legislative authority. He considered it as of
some consequence also to get rid of the scruples
which some members of the State Legislatures
might derive from their oaths to support & maintain
the existing Constitutions.

Mr. Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures
were incompetent to the proposed changes. These
changes would make essential inroads on the State
Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous
doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution
under which it held its existence. There
might indeed be some Constitutions within the
Union, which had given a power to the Legislature
to concur in alterations of the federal Compact.
But there were certainly some which had not; and
in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity
be obtained from the people. He considered the
difference between a system founded on the Legislatures
only, and one founded on the people, to be the
true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution.
The former in point of moral obligation
might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of
political operation, there were two important distinctions
in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a
treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected
by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or
perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established

by the people themselves, would be considered
by the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine
laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties
is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties,
frees the other parties from their engagements.
In the case of a union of people under one Constitution,
the nature of the pact has always been understood
to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing
the two modes in point of expediency he thought all
the considerations which recommended this Convention
in preference to Congress for proposing the reform
were in favor of State Conventions in preference
to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.

On Question on Mr. Elseworth's motion to refer the
plan to the Legislatures of the States

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved that the reference of the
plan be made to one general Convention, chosen &
authorized by the people to consider, amend, &
establish the same.—Not seconded.

On question for agreeing to Resolution 19. touching
the mode of Ratification as reported from the
Committee of the Whole; viz, to refer the Constn.,
after the approbation of Conga. to assemblies chosen
by the people.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. King moved that the representation
in the second branch consist of—members
from each State, who shall vote per capita.

Mr. Elseworth said he had always approved of
voting in that mode.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to fill the blank with three.
He wished the Senate to be a pretty numerous body.
If two members only should be allowed to each
State, and a majority be made a quorum, the power
would be lodged in 14 members, which was too
small a number for such a trust.

Mr. Ghorum preferred two to three members for
the blank. A small number was most convenient
for deciding on peace & war &c. which he expected
would be vested in the 2d. branch. The number of
States will also increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the
Province of Mayne & Franklin will probably soon
be added to the present number. He presumed also
that some of the largest States would be divided.
The strength of the General Govt. will lie not in the
largeness, but in the smallness of the States.

Col. Mason thought 3 from each State including
new States would make the 2d. branch too numerous.
Besides other objections, the additional expence
ought always to form one, where it was not absolutely
necessary.

Mr. Williamson. If the number be too great, the
distant States will not be on an equal footing with the
nearer States. The latter can more easily send &
support their ablest Citizens. He approved of the
voting per capita.

On the question for filling the blank with "three"
N. H. no. Mass. no. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for filling it with "two." Agreed to
nem. con.

Mr. L Martin was opposed to voting per Capita, as
departing from the idea of the States being represented
in the 2d. branch.

Mr. Carroll,[7] was not struck with any particular
objection agst. the mode; but he did not wish so
hastily to make so material an innovation.

On the question on the whole motion viz. the 2d.
b. to consist of 2 members from each State and to
vote per Capita,

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Houston[8] & Mr. Spaight moved "that the appointment
of the Executive by Electors chosen by
the Legislatures of the States, be reconsidered."
Mr. Houston urged the extreme inconveniency & the
considerable expense, of drawing together men from
all the States for the single purpose of electing the
Chief Magistrate.

On the question which was put without any debate
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Virga. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Ordered that tomorrow be assigned for the reconsideration,
Cont. & Pena. no—all the rest ay.

Mr. Gerry moved that the proceedings of the Convention
for the establishment of a Natl. Govt. (except
the part relating to the Executive), be referred to a
Committee to prepare & report a Constitution conformable
thereto.

Genl. Pinkney reminded the Convention that if the
Committee should fail to insert some security to the
Southern States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and
taxes on exports, he shd. be bound by duty to his
State to vote agst. their Report. The appt. of a Come.
as moved by Mr. Gerry. Agd. to nem. con.

Shall the Come. consist of 10 members one from
each State prest.—All the States were no, except
Delaware, ay.

Shall it consist of 7. members

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
The question being lost by an equal division of Votes

It was agreed, nem-con- that the Committee consist
of 5 members to be appointed tomorrow.

Adjourned

Tuesday July 24. in Convention

The appointment of the Executive by Electors
reconsidered.

Mr. Houston moved that he be appointed by the
"Natl. Legislature," instead of "Electors appointed
by the State Legislatures" according to the last decision
of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability,
that capable men would undertake the
service of Electors from the more distant States.

Mr. Spaight seconded the motion.

Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no
ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr.
Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate
will be considered as of vast importance and will
create great earnestness. The best men, the Governours
of the States will not hold it derogatory from
their character to be the electors. If the motion
should be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the
Executive ineligible a 2d. time, in order to render him
independent of the Legislature; which was an idea
extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.

Mr. Strong supposed that there would be no necessity,
if the Executive should be appointed by the
Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d time; as new
elections of the Legislature will have intervened;
and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the
same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had
been suggested that gratitude for his past appointment
wd. produce the same effect as dependence for
his future appointment. He thought very differently.
Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors
who would be objects of gratitude as well as the
Legislature. It was of great importance not to make
the Govt. too complex which would be the case if a

new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced
into it. He thought also that the first characters
in the States would not feel sufficient motives to
undertake the office of Electors.

Mr. Williamson was for going back to the original
ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render
him ineligible a 2d. time. The proposed Electors
would certainly not be men of the 1st. nor even of the
2d. grade in the States. These would all prefer a
seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the
Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive.
He had wished the Executive power to be
lodged in three men taken from three districts into
which the States should be divided. As the Executive
is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there
is an essential difference of interests between the N.
& S. States, particularly in the carrying trade, the
power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be
taken from part of the Union, to the part from which
he is not taken. The case is different here from what
it is in England; where there is a sameness of interests
throughout the Kingdom. Another objection
agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective
King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare
no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay
a train for the succession of his children. It was
pretty certain he thought that we should at some
time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution
to be omitted that might postpone the event
as long as possible.—Ineligibility a 2d. time appeared
to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution

he had no objection to a longer term than 7
years. He would go as far as 10 or 12 years.

Mr. Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the States
should vote by ballot for the Executive in the same
proportions as it had been proposed they should
chuse electors; and that in case a majority of the
votes should not centre on the same person, the 1st.
branch of the Natl. Legislature should chuse two out
of the 4 candidates having most votes, and out
of these two, the 2d. branch should chuse the Executive.

Mr. King seconded the motion—and on the Question
to postpone in order to take it into consideration.
The noes were so predominant, that the States
were not counted.

Question on Mr. Houston's motion that the Executive
be appd. by the Nal. Legislature.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. L. Martin & Mr. Gerry moved to re-instate the
ineligibility of the Executive a 2d. time.

Mr. Elseworth. With many this appears a natural
consequence of his being elected by the Legislature.
It was not the case with him. The Executive he
thought should be reelected if his conduct proved him
worthy of it. And he will be more likely to render
himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The
most eminent characters also, will be more willing to
accept the trust under this condition, than if they
foresee a necessary degradation at a fixt period.

Mr. Gerry. That the Executive shd. be independent
of the Legislature is a clear point. The longer
the duration of his appointment the more will his
dependence be diminished. It will be better then
for him to continue 10. 15. or even 20. years and be
ineligible afterwards.

Mr. King was for making him re-eligible. This is
too great an advantage to be given up for the small
effect it will have on his dependence, if impeachments
are to lie. He considered these as rendering
the tenure during pleasure.

Mr. L Martin, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility,
moved "that the appointmt. of the Executive
shall continue for Eleven years.

Mr. Gerry suggested fifteen years.

Mr. King twenty years. This is the medium life
of princes.[9]

Mr. Davie eight years.

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties & perplexities into
which the House is thrown proceed from the election
by the Legislature which he was sorry had been reinstated.
The inconveniency of this mode was such
that he would agree to almost any length of time in
order to get rid of the dependence which must result
from it. He was persuaded that the longest term
would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election,
unless indeed it should be during good behaviour.
It seemed to be supposed that at a certain
advance of life, a continuance in office would cease

to be agreeable to the officer, as well as desirable to
the public. Experience had shewn in a variety of
instances that both a capacity & inclination for public
service existed in very advanced stages. He
mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was
elected after he was 80 years of age. The Popes
have generally been elected at very advanced periods,
and yet in no case had a more steady or a better
concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of
Rome. If the Executive should come into office at
35 years of age, which he presumes may happen &
his continuance should be fixt at 15 years, at the age
of 50. in the very prime of life, and with all the aid
of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless
hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British
Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50.
been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or
readiness to serve the public. The great luminary
(Ld. Mansfield) held his seat for thirty years after
his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had
been done he could not but hope that a better mode
of election would yet be adopted; and one that
would be more agreeable to the general sense of the
House. That time might be given for further deliberation
he wd. move that the present question be
postponed till tommorrow.

Mr. Broom seconded the motion to postpone.

Mr. Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on
this head. He would suggest whether it would not
be advisable to refer the clause relating to the Executive
to the Committee of detail to be appointed.

Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that
may unite the various opinions which have been
thrown out.

Mr. Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to spring
from the mode of election, he wd. suggest a mode
which had not been mentioned. It was that the
Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number,
not more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who
should retire immediately and make the election
without separating. By this mode intrigue would be
avoided in the first instance, and the dependence
would be diminished. This was not he said a digested
idea and might be liable to strong objections.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Of all possible modes of appointment
that by the Legislature is the worst. If the
Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach or to influence
the impeachment, the Executive will be the
mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the
impeachment but was now convinced that impeachments
must be provided for, if the appt. was to be of
any duration. No man wd. say, that an Executive
known to be in the pay of an Enemy, should not be
removable in some way or other. He had been
charged heretofore (by Col. Mason) with inconsistency
in pleading for confidence in the Legislature on
some occasions, & urging a distrust on others. The
charge was not well founded. The Legislature is
worthy of unbounded confidence in some respects,
and liable to equal distrust in others. When their
interest coincides precisely with that of their Constituents,

as happens in many of their Acts, no
abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a strong
personal interest happens to be opposed to the general
interest, the Legislature cannot be too much
distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties.
The Executive will necessarily be more connected
with one than with the other. There will be
a personal interest therefore in one of the parties to
oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much
had been said of the intrigues, that will be practised
by the Executive to get into office. Nothing had
been said on the other side of the intrigues to get him
out of office. Some leader of a party will always
covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will
cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting
him. This was the way in which the King
of England was got out, he meant the real King, the
Minister. This was the way in which Pitt (Ld.
Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for
pushing the matter still farther. If he had carried
his India bill, which he was very near doing, he
would have made the Minister, the King in form
almost as well as in substance. Our President will
be the British Minister, yet we are about to make
him appointable by the Legislature. Something had
been said of the danger of Monarchy. If a good
government should not now be formed, if a good
organization of the Executive should not be provided,
he doubted whether we should not have something
worse than a limited monarchy. In order to
get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a
2d. time had been devised. This was as much as to
say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and
then deprive ourselves of the use of it. But make
him ineligible a 2d. time—and prolong his duration
even to 15 years, will he by any wonderful interposition
of providence at that period cease to be a man?
No he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the
road to his object thro' the Constitution will be shut;
he will be in possession of the sword, a civil war will
ensue, and the Com̃ander of the victorious army
on which ever side, will be the despot of America.
This consideration renders him particularly anxious
that the Executive should be properly constituted.
The vice here would not, as in some other parts of
the system be curable. It is the most difficult of
all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too
weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers. Make
him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature.
He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a
different mode of election. A long period would prevent
an adoption of the plan: it ought to do so. He
shd. himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared
to decide on Mr. Wilson's mode of election just hinted
by him. He thought it deserved consideration. It
would be better that chance shd. decide than intrigue.

On a question to postpone the consideration of the
Resolution on the subject of the Executive

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. divd. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson then moved that the Executive be
chosen every—years by—Electors to be
taken by lot from the Natl. Legislature who shall
proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive
and not separate until it be made."

Mr. Carrol 2ds. the motion

Mr. Gerry. this is committing too much to
chance. If the lot should fall on a sett of unworthy
men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on the
Country. He thought it had been demonstrated
that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature
could be a good one.

Mr. King. The lot might fall on a majority from
the same State which wd. ensure the election of a
man from that State. We ought to be governed by
reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be
satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed

Mr. Wilson did not move this as the best mode.
His opinion remained unshaken that we ought to
resort to the people for the election. He seconded
the postponement.

Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the chances were
almost infinite agst. a majority of Electors from the
same State.

On a question whether the last motion was in
order, it was determined in the affirmative: 7. ays.
4 noes.

On the question of postponemt. it was agreed to
nem. con.

Mr. Carrol took occasion to observe that he considered
the clause declaring that direct taxation on

the States should be in proportion to representation,
previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very
objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the
right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee
of detail should leave it in the plan.

Mr. Govr. Morris hoped the Committee would strike
out the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation
to representation. He had only meant it as a
bridge[10] to assist us over a certain gulph; having
passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness,
liable to strong objections

On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution
conformable to the Resolutions passed by the
Convention, the members chosen were

Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Elseworth,
Mr. Wilson—

On motion to discharge the Come. of the whole
from the propositions submitted to the Convention
by Mr. C. Pinkney as the basis of a constitution, and
to refer them to the Committee of detail just appointed,
it was agd. to nem: con

A like motion was then made & agreed to nem:
con: with respect to the propositions of Mr. Patterson.

Adjourned.

Wednesday July 25. In Convention

Clause relating to the Executive being again under
consideration[11]

Mr. Elseworth moved "that the Executive be appointed
by the Legislature," except when the magistrate
last chosen shall have continued in office the
whole term for which he was chosen, & be reeligible,
in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed
by the Legislatures of the States for that
purpose. By this means a deserving magistrate
may be reelected without making him dependent on
the Legislature.

Mr. Gerry repeated his remark that an election at
all by the Natl. Legislature was radically and incurably
wrong; and moved that the Executive be
appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the
States, with advice of their Councils, and where
there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the
Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following
proportions: viz—

Mr. Madison. There are objections agst. every mode
that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election
must be made either by some existing authority
under the Natl. or State Constitutions—or by some
special authority derived from the people—or by the

people themselves.—The two Existing authorities
under the Natl. Constitution wd. be the Legislative &
Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the
question. The former was in his Judgment liable to
insuperable objections. Besides the general influence
of that mode on the independence of the Executive,
1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would
agitate & divide the legislature so much that the
public interest would materially suffer by it. Public
bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions,
but into more violent ones by such occasions
than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue
with the Legislature, would derive his appointment
from the predominant faction, and be apt
to render his administration subservient to its views.
3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and
would make use of, the opportunity to mix their
intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as
the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object
of great moment with the great rival powers of
Europe who have American possessions, to have at
the head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective
politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps
expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature
an appointmt. favorable to their wishes. Germany
& Poland are witnesses of this danger. In
the former, the election of the Head of the Empire,
till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all
Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference.
In the latter, altho' the elective Magistrate
has very little real power, his election has at all times
produced the most eager interference of forign
princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into
foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States
are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment
of the Natl. Executive by the first was
objectionable in many points of view, some of which
had been already mentioned. He would mention
one which of itself would decide his opinion. The
Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity
to a variety of pernicious measures. One
object of the Natl. Legislre. was to controul this propensity.
One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as
it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul
the Natl. Legislature so far as it might be infected
with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt. of
the Natl. Executive to the State Legislatures, and
this controuling purpose may be defeated. The
Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular
plan, and will promote the appointmt. of a man who
will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should
a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election
have the same object, or different objects of the
same kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered
subservient to them.—An appointment by the State
Executives, was liable among other objections to this
insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they
could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the
Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers
of foreign powers. The State Judiciary had not &
he presumed wd. not be proposed as a proper source
of appointment. The option before us then lay
between an appointment by Electors chosen by the
people—and an immediate appointment by the
people. He thought the former mode free from
many of the objections which had been urged agst. it,
and greatly preferable to an appointment by the
Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen
for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed
immediately to an appointment, there would be very
little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a
further precaution, it might be required that they
should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of
Govt. and even that no person within a certain distance
of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This
Mode however had been rejected so recently & by so
great a majority that it probably would not be proposed
anew. The remaining mode was an election
by the people or rather by the qualified part of them,
at large: With all its imperfections he liked this
best. He would not repeat either the general argumts.
for or the objections agst. this mode. He would only
take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to
have weight. The first arose from the disposition in
the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and
the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller States.
Great as this objection might be he did not think it
equal to such as lay agst. every other mode which had
been proposed. He thought too that some expedient
might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second
difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified
voters in the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages
which this mode would throw on the latter. The
answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion
would be continually decreasing under the influence
of the Republican laws introduced in the S.
States, and the more rapid increase of their population.
2. That local considerations must give way
to the general interest. As an individual from the
S. States, he was willing to make the sacrifice.

Mr. Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different
sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The
Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer
the candidate within the State; and the largest
States wd. invariably have the man.

Question on Mr. Elseworth's motion as above.

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature
be qualified with a proviso that no person be
eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve years.
He thought this would have all the advantage & at
the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency,
of an absolute ineligibility a 2d. time.

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction
of experience in the instance of Congs. and some
of the Executives of the States. It rendered the
Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility
after his first election, and opened the way at
the same time for the advantage of his future services.
He preferred on the whole the election by the
Natl. Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit,
that there was great danger of foreign influence,

as had been suggested. This was the most serious
objection with him that had been urged.

Mr. Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are
cabal at home, & influence from abroad. It will be
difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by
the Natl. Legislature. On the other hand. The
Govt. should not be made so complex & unwieldy as
to disgust the States. This would be the case, if the
election shd. be referred to the people. He liked best
an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of
the States. He was agst. a re-eligibility at all events.
He was also agst. a ratio of votes in the States. An
equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for
departing from it do not hold in the case of the
Executive as in that of the Legislature.

Mr. Gerry approved of Mr. Pinkney's motion as lessening
the evil.

Mr. Govr. Morris was agst. a rotation in every case.
It formed a political School, in wch. we were always
governed by the scholars, and not by the Masters.
The evils to be guarded agst. in this case are. 1. the
undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability of
Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst.
the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a
rotation which produces instability of Councils. To
avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men
is ever followed by a change of measures. We see
this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves,
particularly in the State of Pena. The self-sufficiency
of a victorious party scorns to tread in
the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not

imitate Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not
prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature.
The man in office will look forward to the period at
which he will become re-eligible. The distance of
the period, the improbability of such a protraction of
his life will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of
man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for
wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence to be
limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were
to live for ever. But taking another supposition,
the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If
the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election
to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep
in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature
itself. He will have little objection then to an
extension of power on a theatre where he expects to
act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling
to take any step that may endanger his popularity
with the Legislature, on his influence over which the
figure he is to make will depend. 3. To avoid the
third evil, impeachments will be essential. And
hence an additional reason agst. an election by the
Legislature. He considered an election by the
people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst,
mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but
favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture
of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal &
dependence.

Mr. Williamson was sensible that strong objections
lay agst. an election of the Executive by the Legislature,
and that it opened a door for foreign influence.

The principal objection agst. an election by the people
seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would
place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for
this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates,
one of them he observed would be probably
of his own State, the other 2. of some other States;
and as probably of a small as a large one.

Mr. Govr. Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an
amendment that each man should vote for two persons
one of whom at least should not be of his own
State.

Mr. Madison also thought something valuable
might be made of the suggestion with the proposed
amendment of it. The second best man in this case
would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection
which occurred was that each Citizen after
havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, wd.
throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of
another State, in order to ensure the object of his
first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that
the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of
having their favorite elected, as not to give their
second vote with sincerity to the next object of their
choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of
the smaller States that the Executive should not be
eligible more than—times in—years from the
same State.

Mr. Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically
vicious. The ignorance of the people would
put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed
through the Union & acting in Concert to delude

them into any appointment. He observed that such
a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati.
They are respectable, united, and influential.
They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every
instance, if the election be referred to the people.
His respect for the characters composing this Society
could not blind him to the danger & impropriety
of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr. Dickinson. As far as he could judge from the
discussions which had taken place during his attendance,
insuperable objections lay agst. an election of
the Executive by the Natl. Legislature; as also by
the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had
long leaned towards an election by the people which
he regarded as the best & purest source. Objections
he was aware lay agst. this mode, but not so great he
thought as agst. the other modes. The greatest difficulty
in the opinion of the House seemed to arise
from the partiality of the States to their respective
Citizens. But might not this very partiality be
turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each
State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know
the most eminent characters of their own States, and
the people of different States will feel an emulation in
selecting those of which they will have the greatest
reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus
selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen
either by the Natl. Legislature, or by Electors appointed
by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing
Mr. Pinkney's motion, in order to make way for some

such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. Williamson
& others, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On Mr. Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve
in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it
passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On a motion that the members of the Committee
be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was
so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House
might take copies of the Resolutions which had been
agreed to; which passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no—
Geo. no.

Mr. Gerry & Mr. Butler moved to refer the resolution
relating to the Executive (except the clause
making it consist of a single person) to the Com̃ittee
of detail

Mr. Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the
System wd. not be committed untill a general principle
shd. be fixed by a vote of the House.

Mr. Langdon. was for the commitment—Adjd.

Thursday July. 26. in Convention.[12]

Col. Mason. In every stage of the Question relative
to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and
the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared.
Nor have any of the modes of constituting
that department been satisfactory. 1. It has been
proposed that the election should be made by the
people at large; that is that an act which ought to
be performed by those who know most of Eminent
characters, & qualifications, should be performed by
those who know least. 2. that the election should be
made by the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the
Executives of the States. Agst. these modes also
strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been
proposed that the election should be made by Electors
chosen by the people for that purpose. This
was at first agreed to: But on further consideration
has been rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of
Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote
for several candidates has been proposed. This
seemed like many other propositions, to carry a
plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to

fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as
Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment
into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the
members of which he had a great respect, but which
he never wished to have a preponderating influence
in the Govt. 6. Another expedient was proposed
by Mr. Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable &
material an inconvenience that he had little doubt
of its being by this time rejected by himself. It
would exclude every man who happened not to be
popular within his own State; tho' the causes of his
local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to
recommend him to the States at large. 7. Among
other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But
as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand,
it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore
need be said on that subject. After reviewing
all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that
an election by the Natl. Legislature as originally proposed,
was the best. If it was liable to objections,
it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived
at the same time that a second election ought
to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary
object for the pole-star of his political conduct, the
preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as
an essential point, as the very palladium of civil
liberty, that the Great officers of State, and particularly
the Executive should at fixed periods return to
that mass from which they were at first taken, in
order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests,
Which are again to be personally valuable to
them. He concluded with moving that the constitution
of the Executive as reported by the Come. of
the whole be reinstated, viz. "that the Executive be
appointed for seven years, & be ineligible a 2d. time."

Mr. Davie seconded the motion.

Docr. Franklin. It seems to have been imagined
by some that the returning to the mass of the people
was degrading the magistrate. This he thought was
contrary to republican principles. In free Governments
the rulers are the servants, and the people
their superiors & sovereigns. For the former therefore
to return among the latter was not to degrade
but to promote them. And it would be imposing an
unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always
in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become
again one of the Masters.

Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which
passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Massts. not on floor. Ct. no. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris was now agst. the whole paragraph.
In answer to Col. Mason's position that a periodical
return of the great officers of the State into the mass
of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he
wd. observe that on the same principle the Judiciary
ought to be periodically degraded; certain it was
that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no
one had proposed, or conceived that the members
of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Docr.
Franklin, that a return into the mass of the people

would be a promotion, instead of a degradation, he
had no doubt that our Executive like most others
would have too much patriotism to shrink from the
burthen of his office, and too much modesty not to
be willing to decline the promotion.

On the question on the whole resolution as
amended in the words following—"that a National
Executive be instituted—to consist of a single person
—to be chosen by the Natl. legislature—for the
term of seven years—to be ineligible a 2d time—with
power to carry into execution the natl. laws—to appoint
to offices in cases not otherwise provided for—
to be removable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty—to receive a fixt
compensation for the devotion of his time to the
public service, to be paid out of the Natl. treasury"
—it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mass. not on floor. Ct. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. divd. Mr. Blair & Col.
Mason ay. Genl. Washington & Mr. Madison no. Mr.
Randolph happened to be out of the House. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Mason moved "that the Com̃ittee of detail be
instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications
of landed property & citizenship of the U.
States, in members of the Legislature, and disqualifying
persons having unsettled Accts. with or being indebted
to the U. S., from being members of the Natl.
Legislature."—He observed that persons of the latter
descriptions had frequently got into the State
Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might

shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had
crept into Congs. if Report was to be regarded.

Mr. Pinckney seconded the motion

Mr. Govr. Morris. If qualifications are proper, he
wd. prefer them in the electors rather than the elected.
As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to
persons having unsettled accounts he believed them
to be pretty many. He thought however that
such a discrimination would be both odious & useless,
and in many instances, unjust & cruel. The
delay of settlemt. had been more the fault of the
Public than of the individuals. What will be done
with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or
services or property to their Country, without having
been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims?
Are they to be excluded?

Mr. Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature the
providing agst. such abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications
adopted in the Reign of Queen Anne, which
he said had met with universal approbation.

Mr. Madison had witnessed the zeal of men having
accts. with the public, to get into the Legislatures for
sinister purposes. He thought however that if any
precaution were taken for excluding them, the one
proposed by Col. Mason ought to be new modelled.
It might be well to limit the exclusion to persons who
had recd. money from the public, and had not accounted
for it.

Mr. Govr. Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity
as well as of high authority that we should

not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought
to be equally on our guard agst. being wise overmuch.
The proposed regulation would enable the Governt. to
exclude particular persons from office as long as they
pleased. He mentioned the case of the Com̃ander in
Chief's presenting his account for secret services,
which he said was so moderate that every one was
astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt could
arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to
delay the settlement, how easily he might have
effected it, & how cruel wd. it be in such a case to keep
a distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary
disability & disfranchisement. He mentioned
this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature
of the proposition. He was opposed to such
minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary
qualifications quoted by Col. Mason,
had been disregarded in practice; and was but a
scheme of the landed agst. the monied interest.

Mr. Pinckney & Genl. Pinckney moved to insert by
way of amendmt. the words Judiciary & Executive
so as to extend the qualifications to those departments
which was agreed to nem con.

Mr. Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding
a few worthy individuals who might be public debtors
or have unsettled accts. ought not to be put in
the scale agst. the public advantages of the regulation,
and that the motion did not go far enough.

Mr. King observed that there might be great
danger in requiring landed property as a qualification
since it would exclude the monied interest,

whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies
to the public safety.

Mr. Dickinson, was agst. any recital of qualifications
in the Constitution. It was impossible to make
a compleat one, and a partial one wd. by implication
tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying
the omissions. The best defence lay in the freeholders
who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst
this Source should remain pure, the Public interest
would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no little
expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the
policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution
a veneration for wealth. He had always understood
that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were
the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed
improper that any man of merit should be subjected
to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood
to form the great title to public trust, honors
& rewards.

Mr. Gerry if property be one object of Government,
provisions to secure it cannot be improper.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the word landed,
before the word "qualifications." If the proposition
sd. be agreed to he wished the Committee to be at
liberty to report the best criterion they could devise.
Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real
wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who
were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust
Laws of the States had proceeded more from
this class of men, than any others. It had often happened
that men who had acquired landed property

on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view
of promoting an unjust protection agst. their Creditors.
In the next place, if a small quantity of land
should be made the standard, it would be no security;
if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives
of those classes of Citizens who were not
landholders. It was politic as well as just that the
interests & rights of every class should be duly represented
& understood in the public Councils. It was
a provision every where established that the Country
should be divided into districts & representatives
taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly
might equally understand & sympathize with the
rights of the people in every part of the Community.
It was not less proper that every class of Citizens
should have an opportunity of making their rights
be felt & understood in the public Councils. The
three principal classes into which our citizens were
divisible, were the landed the commercial, & the
manufacturing. The 2d. & 3d. class, bear as yet a
small proportion to the first. The proportion however
will daily increase. We see in the populous
Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter.
These classes understand much less of each others
interests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting
different districts. It is particularly requisite
therefore that the interests of one or two of them
should not be left entirely to the care, or impartiality
of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications
should be required; few of the mercantile,
& scarcely any of the manufacturing class chusing
whilst they continue in business to turn any part of
their Stock into landed property. For these reasons
he wished if it were possible that some other criterion
than the mere possession of land should be devised.
He concurred with Mr. Govr. Morris in thinking that
qualifications in the Electors would be much more
effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate
between real & ostensible property in the
latter; But he was aware of the difficulty of forming
any uniform standard that would suit the different
circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different
States.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion.

On the Question for striking out "landed"

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On Question on 1st. part of Col. Masons proposition
as to qualification of property & citizenship," as so
amended

N. H. ay. Masts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

"The 2d. part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons
having unsettled accounts," being under consideration.

Mr. Carrol moved to strike out "having unsettled
accounts"

Mr. Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that
it would put the commercial & manufacturing part of
the people on a worse footing than others as they

would be most likely to have dealings with the public.

Mr. L. Martin. if these words should be struck out,
and the remaining words concerning debtors retained,
it will be the interest of the latter class to
keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

Mr. Wilson was for striking them out. They put
too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who
might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in
order to prolong the disqualifications of particular
men. We should consider that we are providing a
Constitution for future generations, and not merely
for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The
time has been, and will again be, when the public
safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals
which will necessarily open accts. with the
public, and when such accts. will be a characteristic
of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of
cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying
odious & dangerous characters.

Mr. Langdon[13] was for striking out the whole clause
for the reasons given by Mr. Wilson. So many exclusions
he thought too would render the system unacceptable
to the people.

Mr. Gerry. If the argumts. used today were to prevail,
we might have a Legislature composed of Public
debtors, pensioners, placemen & contractors. He
thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing

to the people. They will be considered as a
security agst. unnecessary or undue burdens being
imposed on them. He moved to add "pensioners"
to the disqualified characters which was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. no. N. C. divided. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The last clause, relating to public
debtors will exclude every importing merchant.
Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as possible,
from trade. Duties of course will be bonded,
and the Merchts. will remain debtors to the public.
He repeated that it had not been so much the fault
of individuals as of the public that transactions between
them had not been more generally liquidated
& adjusted. At all events to draw from our short &
scanty experience rules that are to operate through
succeeding ages, does not savour much of real wisdom.

On question for striking out, "persons having unsettled
accounts with the U. States."

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

Mr. Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder
of the clause disqualifying Public debtors; and for
leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature and the
virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst. such
evils. Is the smallest as well as the largest debtor
to be excluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify.
Besides how is it to be known to the
people when they elect who are or are not public

debtors. The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in
Engld. is founded on a consideration not existing here.
As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown,
they tend to increase its influence.

Mr. Pinkney sd he was at first a friend to the proposition,
for the sake of the clause relating to qualifications
of property; but he disliked the exclusion of
public debtors; it went too far. It wd. exclude persons
who had purchased confiscated property or
should purchase Western territory of the public, and
might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying
public debtors

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason, observed that it would be proper, as
he thought, that some provision should be made in
the Constitution agst. choosing for the Seat of the
Genl. Govt. the City or place at which the Seat of any
State Govt. might be fixt. There were 2 objections
agst. having them at the same place, which without
mentioning others, required some precaution on the
subject. The 1st. was that it tended to produce disputes
concerning jurisdiction. The 2d. & principal
one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures
tended to give a provincial tincture to ye Natl.
deliberations. He moved that the Come. be instructed
to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the
Natl. Govt. being in the same City or town with
the Seat of the Govt. of any State longer than untill
the necessary public buildings could be erected.

Mr. Alex. Martin 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris did not dislike the idea, but was
apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies
of Philada. & N. York which had expectations of
becoming the Seat of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. Langdon approved the idea also: but suggested
the case of a State moving its seat of Govt. to
the natl. Seat after the erection of the Public buildings.

Mr. Ghorum. The precaution may be evaded by
the Natl. Legislre. by delaying to erect the Public
buildings.

Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the genl. sense of
America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor
any large commercial City should be the seat of the
Genl. Govt.

Mr. Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how
much the passions of men were agitated by this
matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst. the
System. He apprehended also that an evasion,
might be practised in the way hinted by Mr. Ghorum.

Mr. Pinkney thought the Seat of a State Govt.
ought to be avoided; but that a large town or its
vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the Genl.
Govt.

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at
this time, nor to excite any hostile passions agst. the
system. He was content to withdraw the motion
for the present.

Mr. Butler was for fixing by the Constitution the
place, & a central one, for the seat of the Natl. Govt.

The proceedings since Monday last were referred
unanimously to the Come. of detail, and the Convention
then unanimously adjourned till Monday,
Augst. 6. that the Come. of detail might have time to
prepare & report the Constitution. The whole proceedings
as referred are as follow [14] :

                                                                           

June 20.	I. Resolved, That the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive.
June 21.	II. Resolved, That the legislature consist of two branches.
	III. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states, for the term of two years; to be
June 22.	paid out of the publick treasury; to receive an adequate compensation for their services; to be of the age of twenty-five
June 23.	years at least; to be ineligible and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the
	functions of the first branch) during the term of service of the first branch.
June 25.	IV. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of
June 26.	the age of thirty years at least; to hold their offices for six years, one third to go out biennally; to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the publick service; to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any office, under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter.
	V. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.
	VI. Resolved, That the national legislature
Postponed 27.	ought to possess the
July 16.	legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and
July 17.	moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests
	of the union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.
	VII. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states,
July 17	or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary, notwithstanding.
July 16.	VIII. Resolved, That in the original formation of the legislature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members; of which number
	New Hampshire shall send  three,  Massachusetts  eight,  Rhode Island  one,  Connecticut  five,  New York  six,  New Jersey  four,  Pennsylvania  eight,  Delaware  one,  Maryland  six,  Virginia  ten,  North Carolina  five,  South Carolina  five,  Georgia  three.  But as the present situation of the states may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature of the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of representatives; and in case any of the states shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more states united, or any new states created within the limits of the United States, the legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of representatives,
	in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely—Provided always, that representation ought to be proportioned to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the states—
	IX. Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.
	X. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of
	the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the publick treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch.
	XI. Resolved, That in the second branch of the legislature of the United States, each state shall have an equal vote.
July 26.	XII. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and conviction of mal-practice or neglect or duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to the publick service; to be paid out of the publick treasury.
July 21.	XIII. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature.
July 18.	XIV. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be
July 21.	appointed by the second branch of the national legislature; to
July 18.	hold their offices during good behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution.
	XV. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.
	XVI. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature; and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony.
	XVII. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.
	XVIII. Resolved, That a republican form of government shall be guarantied to each state; and that each state shall be protected against foreign and domestick violence.
July 23.	XIX. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.
	XX. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states, and of the national government, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.
	XXI. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of
	Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
	XXII. Resolved, That the representation in the second branch of the legislature of the United States consist of two members from each state, who shall vote per capita.
July 26.	XXIII. Resolved, That it be an instruction to the committee, to whom were referred the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the United States, for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both branches of the legislature of the United States.

With the above resolutions were referred the
propositions offered by Mr. C. Pinckney on the 29th. of
May, & by Mr. Patterson on the 15th. of June.[15]

Monday August 6th. in Convention

Mr. John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his
seat.

Mr. Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee

of detail as follows: a printed copy being at
the same time furnished to each member [16] :

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia North-Carolina,
South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain,
declare, and establish the following Constitution for
the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.

Article I

The stile of the Government shall be, "The United
States of America."

II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.

III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress,
to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men,
a House of Representatives and a Senate; each of
which shall in all cases have a negative on the other.
The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in
December in every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives
shall be chosen every second year, by the
people of the several States comprehended within
this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall
be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors
in the several States, of the most numerous
branch of their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives
shall be of the age of twenty five years at
least; shall have been a citizen in the United States
for at least three years before his election; and shall
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State
in which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at
its first formation, and until the number of citizens
and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner hereinafter
described, consist of sixty-five Members, of
whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire,
eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in
New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania,
one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia,
five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina,
and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different
States will alter from time to time; as some of
the States may hereafter be divided; as others may
be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more
States may be united; as new States will be erected
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature
shall, in each of these cases, regulate the number of
representatives by the number of inhabitants, according
to the provisions herein after made, at the
rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives,
and shall not be altered or amended by
the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the
Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations
that shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have
the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its
Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives
shall be supplied by writs of election from the
executive authority of the State, in the representation
from which they shall happen.

V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be
chosen by the Legislatures of the several States.
Each Legislature shall chuse two members. Vacancies
may be supplied by the Executive until the next
meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have
one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six
years; but immediately after the first election they
shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly
as may be, numbered one, two and three. The
seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated
at the expiration of the second year, of the
second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of
the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so
that a third part of the members may be chosen every
second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of
the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a
citizen in the United States for at least four years
before his election; and shall be, at the time of his
election, a resident of the State for which he shall
be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President
and other officers.

VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of
holding the elections of the members of each House
shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State;
but their provisions concerning them may, at any
time, be altered by the Legislature of the United
States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications
of the members of each House, with regard
to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem
expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members
shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

Sect 4. Each House shall be the judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its own
members.

Sect 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the
Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in
any Court or place out of the Legislature; and the
members of each House shall, in all cases, except
treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at Congress,
and in going to and returning from it.

Sect 6. Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour; and may expel a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the
Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity,

shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and
shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas
and nays of the members of each House, on any
question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the
members present, be entered on the journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of
the other, shall adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that at which the two
Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not
extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the
powers mentioned in the—article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible
to, and incapable of holding any office under
the authority of the United States, during the time
for which they shall respectively be elected: and
the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and
incapable of holding any such office for one year
afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive
a compensation for their services, to be ascertained
and paid by the State, in which they shall be
chosen.

Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the
United States shall be, "Be it enacted by the Senate
and Representatives in Congress assembled."

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of
originating bills, except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before
it become a law, be presented to the President
of the United States for his revision: if, upon

such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his
approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision,
it shall appear to him improper for being passed
into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections
against it, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large
on their journal and proceed to reconsider the bill.
But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that
House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the
President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his
objections, be sent to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a
law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses
shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the
names of the persons voting for or against the bill
shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively.
If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within seven days after it shall have been
presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature,
by their adjournment, prevent its return; in
which case it shall not be a law.

VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization
throughout the United States;

To coin money;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices;

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of
the United States;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and
water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment
of counterfeiting the coin of the United States,
and of offences against the law of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application
of its legislature;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to
execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution,
in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall
consist only in levying war against the United States,
or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies of

the United States, or any of them. The Legislature
of the United States shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted
of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses.
No attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of
the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall
be regulated by the whole number of white and other
free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and
condition, including those bound to servitude for a
term of years, and three fifths of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except
Indians not paying taxes) which number shall,
within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature,
and within the term of every ten years afterwards,
be taken in such manner as the said Legislature
shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature
on articles exported from any State; nor on
the migration or importation of such persons as the
several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall
Such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the Census hereinbefore directed to be
taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without
the assent of two thirds of the members present
in each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any
title of Nobility.

VIII

The acts of the Legislature of the United States
made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all
treaties made under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the several States,
and of the citizens and inhabitants; and the judges
in the several States shall be bound thereby in
their decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or
laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.

IX

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall
have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors,
and Judges of the Supreme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now
subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between
two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory,
the Senate shall possess the following powers.
Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority,
or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with
another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the
matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice
of such memorial and application shall be given by
order of the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive
authority of the other State in Controversy.
The Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance
of the parties, by their agents, before the House.
The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint
consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a
Court for hearing and determining the matter in

question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate
shall name three persons out of each of the several
States; and from the list of such persons each
party shall alternately strike out one, until the number
shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that
number not less than seven nor more than nine
names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence,
be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose
names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall
be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine
the controversy; provided a majority of the
Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the determination.
If either party shall neglect to attend at
the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons
for not attending, or being present shall refuse to
strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three
persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate
shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing.
If any of the parties shall refuse to submit
to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear
to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the
Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment.
The judgment shall be final and conclusive.
The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President
of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the
public records for the security of the parties concerned.
Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in
Judgment, take an oath, to be administered by one
of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of
the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and
truly to hear and determine the matter in question
according to the best of his judgment, without favor,
affection, or hope of reward."

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands
claimed under different grants of two or more States,
whose jurisdictions, as they respect such lands, shall
have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such
grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the
Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in
the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding
controversies between different States.

X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United
States shall be vested in a single person. His stile
shall be, "The President of the United States of
America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency."
He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He
shall hold his office during the term of seven years;
but shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information
to the Legislature, of the state of the Union:
he may recommend to their consideration such measures
as he shall judge necessary, and expedient: he
may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In
case of disagreement between the two Houses, with
regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take
care that the laws of the United States be duly and
faithfully executed: he shall commission all the
officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers
in all cases not otherwise provided for by this

Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and
may correspond with the supreme Executives of the
several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons; but his pardon shall not be
pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be
commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several
States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his
services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased
nor diminished during his continuance in
office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his
department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation,
"I—solemnly swear, (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States of America." He shall be removed
from his office on impeachment by the House of
Representatives, and conviction in the Supreme
Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of
his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability
to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those
powers and duties, until another President of the
United States be chosen, or until the disability of the
President be removed.

XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time
to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the
United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and
of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during
good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed
by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of
the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two
or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory
or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of
another State, between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and
foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment,
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate,
with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature
may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned
(except the trial of the President of the United
States) in the manner, and under the limitations
which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except
in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where
they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment,
shall not extend further than to removal from office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honour, trust or profit, under the United States.
But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment
according to law.

XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of
marque and reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty,
alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of
Nobility.

XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature
of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or
make any thing but specie a tender in payment of
debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor
enter into any agreement or compact with another
State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any
war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies,
or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to
admit of a delay, until the Legislature of the United
States can be consulted.

XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States.

XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high
misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice,
and shall be found in any other State, shall, on
demand of the Executive power of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts
of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial
proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every
other State.

XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established
within the limits of the United States may be admitted,
by the Legislature, into this government;
but to such admission the consent of two thirds of
the members present in each House shall be necessary.
If a new State shall arise within the limits of
any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures
of such States shall be also necessary to its
admission. If the admission be consented to, the
new States shall be admitted on the same terms with
the original States. But the Legislature may make
conditions with the new States, concerning the Public
debt which shall be then subsisting.

XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State
a Republican form of Government; and shall protect

each State against foreign invasions, and, on
the application of its Legislature, against domestic
violence.

XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a convention for that purpose.

XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive
and Judicial officers of the United States, and
of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support
this Constitution.

XXI

The ratification of the Conventions of—States
shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United
States in Congress Assembled, for their approbation;
and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it
should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature,
in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion
of this Convention, that each assenting Convention

should notify its assent and ratification to the United
States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after
receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions
of—States, should appoint and publish a
day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution;
that after such publication, the Legislatures of the
several States should elect members of the Senate,
and direct the election of members of the House of
Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature
should meet at the time and place assigned by
Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their
meeting, choose the President of the United States,
and proceed to execute this Constitution."

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in
order to give leisure to examine the Report; which
passed in the negative—N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no.
Pa. ay. Md. ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.

The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.

Tuesday August 7th.[17] In Convention

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken
up,
Mr. Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee
of the whole. This was strongly opposed by

Mr. Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce
unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware
Maryd. & Virga. only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem.
con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety
of giving each branch a negative on the other
"in all cases." There were some cases in which it
was he supposed not intended to be given as in the
case of balloting for appointments.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert "legislative acts"
instead of "all cases."

Mr. Williamson 2ds. him.

Mr. Sherman. This will restrain the operation of
the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a
mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he
hoped would take place.

Mr. Ghorum contended that elections ought to be
made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be
made for the President, and the two branches should
be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention
& confusion may ensue. These inconveniences
have been felt in Masts. in the election of officers of
little importance compared with the Executive of

the U. States. The only objection agst. a joint ballot
is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight;
but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to
the public tranquility & welfare.

Mr. Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases
at least; particularly in the choice of the President,
and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between
the two Houses during & concerng. the vacancy
of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of Mr. Govr.
Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent
part declared to be laws, they will therefore
be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be
made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed
that the mutual negative should be restrained
to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two
Houses.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought this but a repetition of the
same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent,
being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought
were not laws.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the words "each
of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the
other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the
preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative
power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the
respective powers and mode of exercising them were
fully delineated in a subsequent article.

Genl. Pinkney 2ded. the motion.

On question for inserting legislative Acts as
moved by Mr. Govr. Morris

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to Mr. M's motion to
strike out & c.—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison wished to know the reasons of the
Come. for fixing by ye. Constitution the time of Meeting
for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be
required only that one meeting at least should be
held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied
by law.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the sentence.
It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular
time, or even to require a meeting every year.
The public business might not require it.

Mr. Pinkney concurred with Mr. Madison.

Mr. Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution,
disputes will arise in the Legislature; and
the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the
times of their elections. In the N. England States
the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by
their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconveniencey
had resulted. He thought it necessary that there
should be one meeting at least every year as a check
on the Executive department.

Mr. Elseworth was agst. striking out the words. The
Legislature will not know till they are met whether
the public interest required their meeting or not. He
could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention
could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

Mr. Wilson thought on the whole it would be best
to fix the day.

Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity
for a meeting every year. A great vice in our
system was that of legislating too much. The most
numerous objects of legislation belong to the States.
Those of the Natl. Legislature were but few. The
chief of them were commerce & revenue. When
these should be once settled alterations would be
rarely necessary & easily made.

Mr. Madison thought if the time of meeting should
be fixed by a law it wd. be sufficiently fixed & there
would be no difficulty then as had been suggested,
on the part of the States in adjusting their elections
to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate
strongly agst. fixing a time by the Constitution.
It might happen that the Legislature might be called
together by the public exigencies & finish their Session
but a short time before the annual period. In
this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble
so quickly & without the least necessity.
He thought one annual meeting ought to be required;
but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing
the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting
ought to be required as essential to the preservation
of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will
supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature,
besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers,
which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.

Mr. Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as
well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body.
Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two
Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be
changeable—frequent meetings of Parliament were
required at the Revolution in England as an essential
safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings
in most of the American charters & constitutions.
There will be business eno' to require it. The Western
Country, and the great extent and varying
state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

Mr. Randolph was agst. fixing any day irrevocably;
but as there was no provision made any where in
the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting,
and some precise time must be fixed, untill the
Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree
to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which
he moved to add the words following—"unless a
different day shall be appointed by law."

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out Decr. & insert
May. It might frequently happen that our measures
ought to be influenced by those in Europe,
which were generally planned during the Winter and
of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, he preferred May to
Decr. because the latter would require the travelling
to & from the seat of Govt. in the most inconvenient
seasons of the year.

Mr. Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient
season for business.

Mr. Elseworth. The summer will interfere too
much with private business, that of almost all the
probable members of the Legislature being more or
less connected with agriculture.

Mr. Randolph. The time is of no great moment
now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into
the Constitutions of the States, he found that the
times of their elections with which the election of
the Natl. Representatives would no doubt be made
to coincide, would suit better with Decr. than May.
And it was advisable to render our innovations as
little incommodious as possible.

On the question for "May" instead of "Decr."

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Read moved to insert after the word "Senate,"
the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter
provided." His object was to give an absolute
Negative to the Executive—He considered this as so
essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of
liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled
him to make the Motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that
an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made
necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from
doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion,

"Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem.
con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd. to
nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power
shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate
& distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps. & a Senate.
The Legislature shall meet at least once in
every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1st.
Monday in Decr. unless a different day shall be appointed
by law."

"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the last member
of the section beginning with the words "qualifications
of Electors," in order that some other
provision might be substituted which wd. restrain
the right of suffrage to freeholders.

Mr. Fitzsimons 2ded. the motion

Mr. Williamson was opposed to it.

Mr. Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered
by the Committee, and he did not think it
could be changed for the better. It was difficult to
form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the
States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too
should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable
for the same persons at the same time, to
vote for representatives in the State Legislature and
to be excluded from a vote for those in the Natl.
Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Such a hardship would be neither
great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it
and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States.

In some the qualifications are different for the choice
of the Govr. & Representatives; In others for different
Houses of the Legislature. Another objection
agst. the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications
of the Natl. Legislature depend on the will
of the States, which he thought not proper.

Mr. Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the
electors stood on the most proper footing. The
right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly
guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The
people will not readily subscribe to the Natl. Constitution
if it should subject them to be disfranchised.
The States are the best Judges of the circumstances
& temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not
attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations
on this point. Eight or nine States have
extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders.
What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised.
A power to alter the qualifications
would be a dangerous power in the hands of the
Legislature.

Mr. Butler. There is no right of which the people
are more jealous than that of suffrage Abridgments
of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland
where they have at length thrown all power into
the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves,
and form a rank aristocracy.

Mr. Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency
of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders
of the Country. He considered them as the

best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the
right to them as a necessary defence agst. the dangerous
influence of those multitudes without property
& without principle with which our Country like all
others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity
of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical.
The great mass of our Citizens is composed
at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased
with it.

Mr. Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined?
Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote
for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his
money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers,
who will bear a full share of the public burthens
be not allowed a voice in the imposition
of them. Taxation & representation ought to go
together.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He had long learned not to be
the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore
had no effect on him. It was the thing, not
the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his
principal objections to the Constitution as it is now
before us, is that it threatens this Country with an
aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the
House of Representatives. Give the votes to people
who have no property, and they will sell them to the
rich who will be able to buy them. We should not
confine our attention to the present moment. The
time is not distant when this Country will abound
with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive
their bread from their employers. Will such men be

the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they
be the impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was
as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation
& Representation." The man who does not
give his vote freely is not represented. It is the
man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote.
Why? because they want prudence, because they
have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent
can be as little trusted with the public
interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining
"freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that
the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people
are at present freeholders and these will certainly be
pleased with it. As to Merchts. &c. if they have
wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not
they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains
of antient prejudices, and view things too much
through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification
in England, & hence it is imagined to be the
only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was
that every man having evidence of attachment to &
permanent common interest with the Society ought
to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this
qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no
other kind of property but land evidence a common
interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides
property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the
merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number
of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his
own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters,

and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights
of their fellow Citizens

Mr. Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one
of the fundamental articles of republican Government,
and ought not to be left to be regulated by the
Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has
been the mode in which aristocracies have been
built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the
Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold,
would with him depend much on the probable reception
such a change would meet with in States
where the right was now exercised by every description
of people. In several of the States a freehold
was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in
its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country
would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.
In future times a great majority of the people
will not only be without landed, but any other sort
of property. These will either combine, under the
influence of their common situation: in which case,
the rights of property & the public liberty, will not
be secure in their hands: or which is more probable,
they will become the tools of opulence & ambition,
in which case there will be equal danger on another
side. The example of England has been misconceived
(by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of
the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders.
The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs,
in many of which the qualification of suffrage
is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and
it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the

Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence
of the Crown on elections was most dangerously
exerted.[18]

Docr. Franklin. It is of great consequence that we
shd. not depress the virtue & public spirit of our

common people; of which they displayed a great deal
during the war, and which contributed principally to
the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable
refusal of the American seamen who were carried
in great numbers into the British Prisons during the
war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek
their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the
Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism
with a contemporary instance in which the
British seamen made prisoners by the Americans,
readily entered on the ships of the latter on being
promised a share of the prizes that might be made
out of their own Country. This proceeded he said
from the different manner in which the common
people were treated in America & G. Britain. He
did not think that the elected had any right in any
case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He
quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth
the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that
pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons
having freeholds of a certain value; observing that
this Statute was soon followed by another under the
succeeding Parliamt. subjecting the people who had
no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was
persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed
would give great uneasiness in the populous
States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being
themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at
being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons
of that description.

Mr. Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in
many points, but in none more than the present.
He objected to the footing on which the qualification
was put, but particularly to the mode of election by
the people. The people can not know & judge of the
characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice
will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in
Virga. as an example in point. The people in Towns
can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by
that means always prevail over the people of the
Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes
among a variety of candidates.

Mr. Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the
right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised
one. It would create division among the people &
make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by Mr.
Govr. Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the
end of the III article

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not
prest.

Adjourned

Wednesday Augst. 8. in Convention

Art: IV. sect. 1.—Mr. Mercer expressed his dislike
of the whole plan, and his opinion that it never could
succeed.

Mr. Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency
from allowing such as were not freeholders to
vote, though it had long been tried. The elections
in Phila., N. York & Boston where the Merchants &
Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by
freeholders only. The case in England was not accurately
stated yesterday (by Mr. Madison) The
Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown influence
& corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs,
and not on account of the right which those who are
not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of
the number who vote. The people have been long
accustomed to this right in various parts of America,
and will never allow it to be abridged. We must
consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their
concurrence in our propositions.

Mr. Mercer did not object so much to an election

by the people at large including such as were not
freeholders, as to their being left to make their choice
without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates
ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.

On the question for agreeing to Art: IV—Sect. 1
it passd. nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. taken up.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants;
but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers
make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship
for three years was not enough for ensuring that
local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the
Representative. This was the principal ground of
his objection to so short a term. It might also happen
that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great
Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe
their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes.
He moved that "seven" years instead of "three,"
be inserted.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the Motion, & on the question,
all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident"
and insert "inhabitant," as less liable to
misconstruction.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, both were vague, but
the latter least so in common acceptation, and
would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a
considerable time on public or private business.
Great disputes had been raised in Virga. concerning
the meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives
which were determined more according to

the affection or dislike to the man in question, than
to any fixt interpretation of the word.

Mr. Wilson preferred "inhabitant."

Mr. Govr. Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring
nothing more than a freehold. He quoted
great disputes in N. York occasioned by these terms,
which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority.
Such a regulation is not necessary. People
rarely chuse a nonresident—It is improper as in the
1st. branch, the people at large, not the States, are
represented.

Mr. Rutlidge urged & moved, that a residence of 7
years shd. be required in the State Wherein the Member
shd. be elected. An emigrant from N. England to
S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and
could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge
in less time.

Mr. Read reminded him that we were now forming
a Natl. Govt. and such a regulation would correspond
little with the idea that we were one people.

Mr. Wilson. enforced the same consideration.

Mr. Madison suggested the case of new States in
the West, which could have perhaps no representation
on that plan.

Mr. Mercer. Such a regulation would present a
greater alienship among the States than existed
under the old federal system. It would interweave
local prejudices & State distinctions in the very
Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned
instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland
concerning the term "residence."

Mr. Elseworth thought seven years of residence was
by far too long a term: but that some fixt term of
previous residence would be proper. He thought
one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no
objection to three years.

Mr. Dickinson proposed that it should read "inhabitant
actually resident for—years." This
would render the meaning less indeterminate.

Mr. Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in
the blank, so strict an expression might be construed
to exclude the members of the Legislature,
who could not be said to be actual residents in their
States whilst at the Seat of the Genl. Government.

Mr. Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who
had once been inhabitants, and returning from residence
elsewhere to resettle in their original State;
although a want of the necessary knowledge could
not in such cases be presumed.

Mr. Mason thought 7 years too long, but would
never agree to part with the principle. It is a valuable
principle. He thought it a defect in the plan
that the Representatives would be too few to bring
with them all the local knowledge necessary. If
residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring
States, may employ with success the means of corruption
in some particular district and thereby get
into the public Councils after having failed in their
own State. This is the practice in the boroughs of
England.

On the question for postponing in order to consider
Mr. Dickinsons motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in
place of "resident"—agd. to nem. con.

Mr. Elseworth & Col. Mason move to insert "one
year" for previous inhabitancy.

Mr. Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He
thought "resident" a good eno' term. He was agst.
requiring any period of previous residence. New
residents if elected will be most zealous to conform
to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will
be watched with a more jealous eye.

Mr. Butler & Mr. Rutlidge moved "three years"
instead of "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

On the question for 3 years,

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On the question for "1 year"

N. H. no—Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. as amended in manner preceding,
was agreed to nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 3. taken up.

Genl. Pinkney & Mr. Pinkney moved that the number
of Representatives allotted to S. Carola. be "six."
On the question,

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Delaware ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The 3. Sect of Art: IV, was then agreed to.

Art: IV. Sect. 4. taken up.

Mr. Williamson moved to strike out "according to
the provisions hereinafter made" and to insert the
words "according to the rule hereafter to be provided
for direct taxation. "—See Art. VII. Sect. 3.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Williamson's
amendment

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. King wished to know what influence the vote
just passed was meant to have on the succeeding
part of the Report, concerning the admission of
Slaves into the rule of Representation. He could
not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent
objections to the latter part. The admission of
slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind,
& he believed would be so to a great part of the
people of America. He had not made a strenuous
opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that
this concession would have produced a readiness
which had not been manifested, to strengthen the
Genl. Govt. and to mark a full confidence in it. The
Report under consideration had by the tenor of it,
put an end to all those hopes. In two great points
the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied.
The importation of slaves could not be prohibited—
exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable?
What are the great objects of the Genl. System?
1. defence agst. foreign invasion. 2. agst. internal sedition.

Shall all the States then be bound to defend
each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness
which will render defence more difficult? Shall
one part of the U. S. be bound to defend another
part, and that other part be at liberty not only to
increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation
for the burden? If slaves are to be imported
shall not the exports produced by their labor,
supply a revenue the better to enable the Genl. Govt.
to defend their Masters? There was so much inequality
& unreasonableness in all this, that the
people of the Northern States could never be reconciled
to it. No candid man could undertake to
justify it to them. He had hoped that some accommodation
wd. have taken place on this subject; that
at least a time wd. have been limited for the importation
of slaves. He never could agree to let them be
imported without limitation & then be represented
in the Natl. Legislature. Indeed he could so little
persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice,
that he was not sure he could assent to it under any
circumstances. At all events, either slaves should
not be represented, or exports should be taxable.

Mr. Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous;
but the point of representation having been settled
after much difficulty & deliberation, he did not think
himself bound to make opposition; especially as the
present article as amended did not preclude any
arrangement whatever on that point in another place
of the Report.

Mr. Madison objected to 1 for every 40.000 inhabitants

as a perpetual rule. The future increase of
population if the Union shd. be permanent, will render
the number of Representatives excessive.

Mr. Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the
Govt. will last so long as to produce this effect. Can
it be supposed that this vast Country including the
Western territory will 150 years hence remain one
nation?

Mr. Elseworth. If the Govt. should continue so
long, alterations may be made in the Constitution in
the manner proposed in a subsequent article.

Mr. Sherman & Mr. Madison moved to insert the
words "not exceeding," before the words "1 for
every 40.000. which was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert "free" before the
word inhabitants. Much he said would depend on
this point. He never would concur in upholding
domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It
was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed.
Compare the free regions of the Middle
States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the
prosperity & happiness of the people, with the misery
& poverty which overspread the barren wastes of
Va. Mayrd. & the other States having slaves. Travel
thro' ye. whole Continent & you behold the prospect
continually varying with the appearance & disappearance
of slavery. The moment you leave ye.
E. States & enter N. York, the effects of the institution
become visible, passing thro' the Jerseys &
entering Pa. every criterion of superior improvement
witnesses the change. Proceed southwdly & every

step you take throye. great regions of slaves presents
a desert increasing, with ye. increasing [word is illegible]
proportion of these wretched beings. Upon
what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed
in the representation? Are they men? Then
make them Citizens and let them vote. Are they
property? Why then is no other property included?
The Houses in this city (Philada.) are worth more than
all the wretched Slaves which cover the rice swamps
of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the
Representation when fairly explained comes to this:
that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes
to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most
sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures
from their dearest connections & damns them
to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes
in a Govt. instituted for protection of the rights
of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa. or N. Jersey who
views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.
He would add that Domestic slavery is the most
prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of
the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the
poor has ever been the favorite offspring of Aristocracy.
And What is the proposed compensation to
the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle
Of right, of every impulse of humanity. They are
to bind themselves to march their militia for the
defence of the S. States; for their defence agst. those
very slaves of whom they complain. They must
supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign Attack.
The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax
them by excises, and duties on imports: both of
which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern
inhabitants; for the bohae tea used by a Northern
freeman, will pay more tax than the whole consumption
of the miserable slave, which consists of nothing
more than his physical subsistence and the rag that
covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern
States are not to be restrained from importing
fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to increase
the danger of attack, and the difficulty of defence;
nay they are to be encouraged to it by an
assurance of having their votes in the Natl. Govt.
increased in proportion, and are at the same time to
have their exports & their slaves exempt from all
contributions for the public service. Let it not be
said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to
representation. It is idle to suppose that the Genl.
Govt. can stretch its hand directly into the pockets
of the people scattered over so vast a Country. They
can only do it through the medium of exports imports
& excises. For What then are all the sacrifices
to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a
tax for paying for all the negroes in the U. States,
than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.

Mr. Dayton 2ded. the motion. He did it he said that
his sentiments on the subject might appear whatever
might be the fate of the amendment.

Mr. Sherman, did not regard the admission of the
Negroes into the ratio of representation, as liable to
such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of
the Southn. States who were in fact to be represented

according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes
are only included in the Estimate of the taxes.
This was his idea of the matter.

Mr. Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western
frontier as more burthensome to the U. S. than the
slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated if
the occasion were a proper one.

Mr. Wilson, thought the motion premature. An
agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object
of it.

Question On motion to insert "free" before "inhabitants,

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On the suggestion of Mr. Dickinson the words, "provided
that each State shall have one representative
at least,"—were added nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to con.
nem.

Art. IV. Sect. 5. taken up

Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving
no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives,
and as clogging the Govt. If the Senate can
be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it
surely may be trusted with that of originating money
bills.

Mr. Ghorum. was agst. allowing the Senate to originate;
but only to amend.

Mr. Govr. Morris. It is particularly proper that the
Senate shd. have the right of originating money bills.

They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller
number, and will be able to prepare such bills with
due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business
in the other House.

Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground
again. To strike out the Section, was to unhinge the
compromise of which it made a part. The duration
of the Senate made it improper. He does not object
to that duration. On the Contrary he approved of
it. But joined with the smallness of the number, it
was an argument against adding this to the other
great powers vested in that body. His idea of an
Aristocracy was that it was the governt. of the few
over the many. An aristocratic body, like the
screw in mechanics, workg its way by slow degrees,
and holding fast whatever it gains, should ever be
suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse
strings should never be put into its hands.

Mr. Mercer, considered the exclusive power of originating
Money bills as so great an advantage, that it
rendered the equality of votes in the Senate ideal
& of no consequence.

Mr. Butler was for adhering to the principle which
had been settled.

Mr. Wilson was opposed to it on its merits without
regard to the compromise.

Mr. Elseworth did not think the clause of any consequence,
but as it was thought of consequence by
some members from the larger States, he was willing
it should stand.

Mr. Madison was for striking it out; considering it

as of no advantage to the large States as fettering
the Govt. and as a source of injurious altercations
between the two Houses.

On the question for striking out "Sect. 5, Art. IV"

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Adjd.

Thursday, Augst. 9. in Convention

Art: IV. Sect. 6. Mr. Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction
at the disagreement yesterday to Sect.
5. concerning money bills, as endangering the success
of the plan, and extremely objectionable in
itself; and gave notice that he should move for a
reconsideration of the vote.

Mr. Williamson said he had formed a like intention.

Mr. Wilson, gave notice that he shd. move to reconsider
the vote, requiring seven instead of three years
of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates for the
House of Representatives.

Art. IV. Sec. 6. & 7. Agreed to nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 1. taken up.

Mr. Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate
being supplied by the Executives of the States. It
was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently.
It removes the appointment too far from
the people; the Executives in most of the States
being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always
thought the appointment of the Executives by the

Legislative department wrong; so it was still more so
that the Executive should elect into the Legislative
department.

Mr. Randolph thought it necessary in order to prevent
inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some
States the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the
Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller
number than the other House, vacancies there will
be of more consequence. The Executives might be
safely trusted he thought with the appointment for
so short a time.

Mr. Elseworth. It is only said that the Executive
may supply vacancies. When the Legislative meeting
happens to be near, the power will not be exerted.
As there will be but two members from a State
vacancies may be of great moment.

Mr. Williamson. Senators may resign or not accept.
This provision is therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out "vacancies shall
be supplied by the Executives

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies
shall be supplied by the Executives," the following
words "unless other provision shall be made by the
Legislature" (of the State).

Mr. Elseworth. He was willing to trust the Legislature,
or the Executive of a State, but not to give
the former a discretion to refer appointments for
the Senate to whom they pleased.

Question on Mr. Williamson's motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison in order to prevent doubts whether
resignations could be made by Senators, or whether
they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out
the words after "vacancies," & insert the words
"happening by refusals to accept, resignations or
otherwise, may be supplied by the Legislature of the
State in the representation of which such vacancies
shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the
next meeting of the Legislature"

Mr. Govr. Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise,
as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified
from being appointed to any office by Sect.
9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature
by appointing a man a Senator agst. his consent, to
deprive the U. S. of his services.

The motion of Mr. Madison was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Randolph called for division of the Section,
so as to leave a distinct question on the last words
"each member shall have one vote." He wished
this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration
should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art.
IV. concerning money bills. If that section should
not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation
in the Senate.

Mr. Strong concurred in Mr. Randolph's ideas on
this point.

Mr. Read did not consider the section as to money
bills of any advantage to the larger States and had

voted for striking it out as being viewed in the same
light by the larger States. If it was considered by
them as of any value, and as a condition of the
equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection
to its being re-instated.

Mr. Wilson—Mr. Elseworth & Mr. Madison urged
that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and
that it might be a dangerous source of contention
between the two Houses. All the principal powers
of the Natl. Legislature had some relation to money.

Docr. Franklin, considered the two clauses, the
originating of money bills, and the equality of votes
in the Senate, as essentially connected by the compromise
which had been agreed to.

Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing
this point. When the originating of money bills
shall be reconsidered, he thought it could be demonstrated
that it was of essential importance to restrain
the right to the House of Representatives the immediate
choice of the people.

Mr. Williamson. The State of N. C. had agreed to
an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration
that money bills should be confined to the other
House: and he was surprised to see the smaller
States forsaking the condition on which they had
received their equality.

Question on the section 1. down to the last sentence

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.[19] no.

Del. ay. Md. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. divd.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Randolph moved that the last sentence "each
member shall have one vote," be postponed.

It was observed that this could not be necessary;
as in case the sanction as to originating money bills
should not be reinstated, and a revision of the Constitution
should ensue, it wd. still be proper that
the members should vote per Capita. A postponement
of the preceding sentence allowing to each
State 2 members wd. have been more proper

Mr. Mason, did not mean to propose a change of
this mode of voting per capita in any event. But
as there might be other modes proposed, he saw no
impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State
may have two members, and yet may have unequal
votes. He said that unless the exclusive originating
of money bills should be restored to the House of
Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy but
duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality
of Representation in the Senate.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Such declarations were he supposed,
addressed to the smaller States in order to
alarm them for their equality in the Senate, and induce
them agst. their judgments, to concur in restoring
the section concerning money bills. He would
declare in his turn that as he saw no prospect of
amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered
the section relating to money bills as intrinsically
bad, he would adhere to the section establishing
the equality at all events.

Mr. Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by
some that the section concerning money bills is desirable
to the large States. The fact was that two of
those States (Pa. & Va.) had uniformly voted agst. it
without reference to any other part of the system.

Mr. Randolph, urged as Col. Mason had done that
the sentence under consideration was connected with
that relating to Money bills, and might possibly be
affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering
the latter. That the postponement was therefore
not improper.

Question for postponing "each member shall have
one vote,"

N. H. divd. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The words were then agreed to as part of the
section.

Mr. Randolph then gave notice that he should
move to reconsider this whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected
with the 5. Sect. Art. IV. as to which he had
already given such notice.

Art. V. Sect. 2d. taken up.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert after the words,
"immediately after," the following "they shall be
assembled in consequence of," which was agreed to
nem. con. as was then the whole sect. 2.

Art: V. Sect. 3. taken up.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4
years citizenship as a qualification for Senators:
urging the danger of admitting strangers into our
public Councils. Mr. Pinkney 2d. him

Mr. Elseworth, was opposed to the motion as discouraging
meritorious aliens from emigrating to this
Country.

Mr. Pinkney. As the Senate is to have the power
of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs,
there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening
its door to those who have foreign attachments. He
quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject
who made it death for any stranger to intrude his
voice into their Legislative proceedings.

Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the
motion. Were it not that many not natives of this
Country had acquired great merit during the revolution,
he should be for restraining the eligibility into
the Senate, to natives.

Mr. Madison was not averse to some restrictions on
this subject; but could never agree to the proposed
amendment. He thought any restriction however in
the Constitution unnecessary, and improper, unnecessary;
because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the right of
regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof
fix different periods of residence or conditions of enjoying
different privileges of Citizenship: Improper;
because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the
Constitution: because it will put it out of the power
of the Natl. Legislature even by special acts of naturalization
to confer the full rank of Citizens on
meritorious strangers & because it will discourage the
most desirable class of people from emigrating to
the U. S. Should the proposed Constitution have
the intended effect of giving stability & reputation to

our Govts. great numbers of respectable Europeans;
men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings,
will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither.
All such would feel the mortification of being marked
with suspicious incapacitations though they sd. not
covet the public honors. He was not apprehensive
that any dangerous number of strangers would be
appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were left
at liberty to do so: nor that foreign powers would
make use of strangers as instruments for their purposes.
Their bribes would be expended on men
whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite
jealousy & watchfulness in the public.

Mr. Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission
of foreigners without a long residence in the Country.
They bring with them, not only attachments to
other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from
ours that in every point of view they are dangerous.
He acknowledged that if he himself had been called
into public life within a short time after his coming
to America, his foreign habits opinions & attachments
would have rendered him an improper agent in public
affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed
in Great Britain on this subject.

Docr. Franklin was not against a reasonable time,
but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality
inserted in the Constitution. The people in
Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the
Country with which we have been lately at war,
we have now & had during the war, a great many
friends not only among the people at large but in

both houses of Parliament. In every other Country
in Europe all the people are our friends. We found
in the course of the Revolution, that many strangers
served us faithfully, and that many natives took part
agst. their Country. When foreigners after looking
about for some other Country in which they can
obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours, it
is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our
confidence & affection.

Mr. Randolph did not know but it might be problematical
whether emigrations to this Country were
on the whole useful or not: but he could never agree
to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate
in the public honours. He reminded the
Convention of the language held by our patriots
during the Revolution, and the principles laid down
in all our American Constitutions. Many foreigners
may have fixed their fortunes among us under the
faith of these invitations. All persons under this
description, with all others who would be affected
by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under
the banners of hostility to the proposed System. He
would go as far as seven years, but no further.

Mr. Wilson said he rose with feelings which were
perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of
his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas
of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being
incapacitated from holding a place under the very
Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of
making. He remarked the illiberal complexion
which the motion would give to the System & the

effect which a good system would have in inviting
meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement
& mortification they must feel from the
degrading discrimination now proposed. He had
himself experienced this mortification. On his removal
into Maryland, he found himself, from defect
of residence, under certain legal incapacities which
never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly
did not desire & would not have accepted the
offices to which they related. To be appointed to
a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable
of being appointed, is a circumstance grating
and mortifying.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The lesson we are taught is that
we should be governed as much by our reason, and
as little by our feelings as possible. What is the
language of Reason on this subject? That we
should not be polite at the expence of prudence.
There was a moderation in all things. It is said
that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality
so far as to offer to strangers their wives & daughters.
Was this a proper model for us? He would admit
them to his house, he would invite them to his table,
would provide for them comfortable lodgings; but
would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed
them with his wife. He would let them worship at
the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of
them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants
would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived
of that of being eligible to the great offices of
Government; observing that they exceeded the

privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the
world; and that as every Society from a great nation
down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions
on which new members should be admitted,
there could be no room for complaint. As to those
philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World
as they called themselves, He owned he did not wish
to see any of them in our public Councils. He would
not trust them. The men who can shake off their
attachments to their own Country can never love any
other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices
which uphold all Governments. Admit a
Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to
increase the commerce of France: an Englishman,
he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England.
It has been said that The Legislatures will not chuse
foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no
knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments
made by them, proved that every thing
ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised
on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner
who left this State in disgrace, and worked
himself into an appointment from another to Congress.

Question on the motion of Mr. Govr. Morris to insert
14 in place of 4 years

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On 13 years, moved by Mr. Govr. Morris

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.

Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On 10 years moved by Genl. Pinkney

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Dr. Franklin reminded the Convention that it did
not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in
the Constitution that the persons in question wd. be
actually chosen into the Legislature.

Mr. Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been
required for the House of Representatives. Surely
a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will
have more power.

Mr. Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the
Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery
& cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of
the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures
composed of a few men, than of the House of Represents.
who will be chosen by the people.

Mr. Randolph will agree to 9 years with the expectation
that it will be reduced to seven if Mr. Wilson's
motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the
House of Representatives should produce a reduction
of that period.

On a question for 9 years

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant"
inserted nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 3. as amended agreed to nem. con.
Sect. 4. agreed to nem. con.

Article VI. Sect. 1. taken up.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out
"each House" & to insert "the House of Representatives;"
the right of the Legislatures to regulate the
times & places &c in the election of Senators being
involved in the right of appointing them, which was
disagreed to.

Division of the question being called, it was taken
on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning
&c."

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Rutlidge moved to strike out the
remaining part viz but their provisions concerning
them may at any time be altered by the Legislature
of the United States. The States they contended
could & must be relied on in such cases.

Mr. Ghorum. It would be as improper take this
power from the Natl. Legislature, as to Restrain the
British Parliament from regulating the circumstances
of elections, leaving this business to the
Counties themselves—

Mr. Madison. The necessity of a Genl. Govt. supposes

that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail
or refuse to consult the common interest at the expence
of their local conveniency or prejudices. The
policy of referring the appointment of the House of
Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures
of the States, supposes that the result will be
somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the
question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the
States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of
regulating the times places & manner of holding elections.
These were words of great latitude. It was
impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be
made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors
should vote by ballot or viva voce, should
assemble at this place or that place; should be divided
into districts or all meet at one place, shd. all
vote for all the representatives; or all in a district
vote for a number allotted to the district; these &
many other points would depend on the Legislatures,
and might materially affect the appointments, Whenever
the State Legislatures had a favorite measure
to carry, they would take care so to mould their
regulations as to favor the candidates they wished
to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation
in the Legislatures of particular States,
would produce a like inequality in their representation
in the Natl. Legislature, as it was presumable
that the Counties having the power in the former
case would secure it to themselves in the latter.
What danger could there be in giving a controuling
power to the Natl. Legislature? Of whom was it to
consist? 1. of a Senate to be chosen by the State
Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be
trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous.
2. of Representatives elected by the same
people who elect the State Legislatures; Surely
then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due
to the former. It seemed as improper in principle,
though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to
give to the State Legislatures this great authority
over the election of the Representatives of the people
in the Genl. Legislature, as it would be to give to the
latter a like power over the election of their Representatives
in the State Legislatures.

Mr. King. If this power be not given to the Natl.
Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of
their members may be frustrated. No probability
has been suggested of its being abused by them.
Altho this scheme of erecting the Genl. Govt. on the
authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to
the federal establishment, it would seem as if many
gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the States might
make false returns and then make no provisions for
new elections.

Mr. Sherman did not know but it might be best to
retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient
confidence in the State Legislatures. The motion of
Mr. P. & Mr. R. did not prevail

The word "respectively" was inserted after the
word "State."

On the motion of Mr. Read the word "their" was
struck out, & "regulations in such cases" inserted in
place of "provisions concerning them" the clause
then reading—"but regulations in each of the foregoing
cases may at any time, be made or altered by
the Legislature of the U. S." This was meant to
give the Natl. Legislature a power not only to alter
the provisions of the States, but to make regulations
in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to
nem. con.

Adjourned.

Friday Augst. 10. in Convention

Art. VI. Sect. 2. taken up.

Mr. Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived
were instructed to report the proper qualifications of
property for the members of the Natl. Legislature;
instead of which they have referred the task to the
Natl. Legislature itself. Should it be left on this
footing, the first Legislature will meet without any
particular qualifications of property; and if it
should happen to consist of rich men they might fix
such qualifications as may be too favorable to the
rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be
run into. He was opposed to the establishment of
an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution

but he thought it essential that the members of the
Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should
be possessed of competent property to make them
independent & respectable. It was prudent when
such great powers were to be trusted to connect the
tie of property with that of reputation in securing a
faithful administration. The Legislature would have
the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The
President would also have a very great influence on
it. The Judges would have not only important
causes between Citizen & Citizen but also where foreigners
are concerned. They will even be the Umpires
between the U. States and individual States as
well as between one State & another. Were he to
fix the quantum of property which should be required,
he should not think of less than one hundred
thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum
for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the
members of the Natl. Legislature. He would however
leave the sums blank. His motion was that the
President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of
the Legislature should be required to swear that they
were respectively possessed of a cleared unincumbered
Estate to the amount of—in the case of
the President &c &c.

Mr. Rutlidge seconded the motion, observing that
the Committee had reported no qualifications because
they could not agree on any among themselves, being
embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing
the people by making them high, and on the other
of rendering them nugatory by making them low.

Mr. Elseworth. The different circumstances of different
parts of the U.S. and the probable difference
between the present and future circumstances of the
whole, render it improper to have either uniform or
fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be
useful in the S. States, and they will be inapplicable
to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they
will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner
what may be accommodated to the existing State of
things among us, may be very inconvenient in some
future state of them. He thought for these reasons
that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative
discretion than to attempt a provision for it
in the Constitution.

Doctr. Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing
that tended to debase the spirit of the common
people. If honesty was often the companion of
wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation,
it was not less true that the possession of
property increased the desire of more property.
Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted
with, were the richest rogues. We should remember
the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers,
that they should be men hating covetousness. This
Constitution will be much read and attended to in
Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to
the rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most
liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage
the common people from removing to this Country.

The Motion of Mr. Pinkney was rejected by so
general a no, that the States were not called.

Mr. Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting
an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature.
The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental
articles in a Republican Govt. and ought
to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature
could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert
the Constitution. A Republic may be converted
into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by
limiting the number capable of being elected, as the
number authorized to elect. In all cases where the
representatives of the people will have a personal
interest distinct from that of their Constituents,
there was the same reason for being jealous of them,
as there was for relying on them with full confidence,
when they had a common interest. This was one
of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow
them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges.
It was a power also which might be made subservient
to the views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be
devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans
of a weaker faction.

Mr. Elseworth, admitted that the power was not
unexceptionable; but he could not view it as dangerous.
Such a power with regard to the electors
would be dangerous because it would be much more
liable to abuse.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "with regard
to property" in order to leave the Legislature entirely
at large.

Mr. Williamson. This would surely never be admitted.

Should a majority of the Legislature be
composed of any particular description of men, of
lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition,
the future elections might be secured to their
own body.

Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliamt.
possessed the power of regulating the qualifications
both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse
they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention.
They had made the changes in both cases
subservient to their own views, or to the views of
political or Religious parties.

Question on the motion to strike out with regard
to property

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay
Del.[21] no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no
Geo. ay.

Mr. Rutlidge was opposed to leaving the power to
the Legislature—He proposed that the qualifications
should be the same as for members of the State
Legislatures.

Mr. Wilson thought it would be best on the whole
to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would
probably never be fixed by the Legislature, and this
particular power would constructively exclude every
other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2d.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On motion of Mr. Wilson to reconsider Art: IV.

Sect. 2; so as to restore 3 in place of seven years of
citizenship as a qualification for being elected into
the House of Represents.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration;
all the States being ay. except Massts. &
Georgia

Art: VI. Sect. 3. taken up.

Mr. Ghorum contended that less than a majority in
each House should be made a Quorum, otherwise
great delay might happen in business, and great inconvenience
from the future increase of numbers.

Mr Mercer was also for less than a majority. So
great a number will put it in the power of a few by
seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions,
and endanger the Governmt. Examples of secession
have already happened in some of the States.
He was for leaving it to the Legislature to fix the
Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite
number is small & no inconveniency has been experienced.

Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part
of the plan. In this extended Country, embracing
so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous
to the distant parts to allow a small number of
members of the two Houses to make laws. The
Central States could always take care to be on the
Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones,
Of wearying their patience, and outstaying them,

could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted
that inconveniences might spring from the
secession of a small number; But he had also known
good produced by an apprehension, of it. He had
known a paper emission prevented by that cause in
Virginia. He thought the Constitution as now
moulded was founded on sound principles, and was
disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the
same time he wished to guard agst. abuses as much as
possible. If the Legislature should be able to reduce
the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it
pleased & the U. States might be governed by a
Juncto—A majority of the number which had been
agreed on, was so few that he feared it would be
made an objection agst. the plan.

Mr. King admitted there might be some danger of
giving an advantage to the Central States; but he
was of opinion that the public inconveniency on the
other side was more to be dreaded.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33
members in the H. of Reps & 14 in the Senate. This
is a majority of the present number, and will be a
bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they
will generally attend knowing that advantage may
be taken of their absence, the Secession of a small
number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum.
Such events in the States may have been of little
consequence. In the national Councils they may be
fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break
up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular
part of the Continent may be in need of immediate

aid, to extort, by threatening a secession,
some unjust & selfish measure.

Mr. Mercer 2ded. the motion.

Mr. King said he had just prepared a motion which
instead of fixing the numbers proposed by Mr. Govr.
Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest numbers,
leaving the Legislature at liberty to increase them or
not. He thought the future increase of members
would render a majority of the whole extremely
cumbersome.

Mr. Mercer agreed to substitute Mr. King's motion
in place of Mr. Morris's.

Mr. Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a
pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no
law or burden could be imposed on them by a few
men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution
proposed to give such a discretion with regard
to the number of Representatives that a very inconvenient
number was not to be apprehended. The
inconveniency of secessions may be guarded agst. by
giving to each House an authority to require the
attendance of absent members.

Mr. Wilson concurred in the sentiments of Mr.
Elseworth.

Mr. Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions
than merely fixing the quorum might be
necessary. He observed that as 17 wd. be a majority
of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by
possibility be carried in the H. of Reps. by 2 large
States, and in the Senate by the same States with the
aid of two small ones.—He proposed that the number

for a quorum in the H. of Reps. should not exceed
50, nor be less than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion
to the Legislature.

Mr.King. As the quorum could not be altered
witht. the concurrence of the President by less than
⅔ of each House, he thought there could be no danger
in trusting the Legislature.

Mr. Carrol This would be no security agst. a continuance
of the quorums at 33 & 14. when they
ought to be increased.

On Question on Mr. Kings motion "that not less
than 33 in the H. of Reps. nor less than 14 in the
Senate shd. constitute a Quroum which may be increased
by a law, on additions of the members in
either House.

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison moved to add to the
end of Art. VI. Sect. 3, "and may be authorized to
compel the attendance of absent members in such
manner & under such penalties as each House may
provide." Agreed to by all except Pena. which was
divided.

Art. VI. Sect. 3. agreed to as amended nem. con.

 

Sect. 4. Sect. 5.

Agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Madison observed that the right of expulsion
(Art. VI. Sect. 6.) was too important to be exercised
by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies
of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved

that, "with the concurrence of 2/3," might be inserted
between may & expel.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Mason approved the idea.

Mr. Govr. Morris. This power may be safely trusted
to a majority. To require more may produce abuses
on the side of the minority. A few men from factious
motives may keep in a member who ought to
be expelled.

Mr.Carrol thought that the concurrence of 2/3 at
least ought to be required.

On the question requiring 2/3 in cases of expelling
a member.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. divd.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended agreed to nem.
con.

Art: VI. Sect. 7. taken up.

Mr. Govr. Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were
proper at all any individual ought to be authorized
to call for them; and moved an amendment to that
effect.—The small States may otherwise be under a
disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a concurrence
of 1/5.

Mr. Randolph 2ded. ye. motion.

Mr. Sherman had rather strike out the yeas & nays
altogether. They never have done any good, and
have done much mischief. They are not proper as
the reasons governing the voter never appear along
with them.

Mr. Elseworth was of the same opinion.

Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood. it was a
middle way between two extremes.

Mr. Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing
a single member to call the yeas & nays, and recited
the abuses of it in Massts. 1 in stuffing the
journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 in misleading
the people who never know the reasons
determing the votes.

The motion for allowing a single member to call
the yeas & nays was disagd. to nem. con.

Mr. Carrol. & Mr. Randolph moved to strike out the
words, "each House" and to insert the words, "the
House of Representatives" in Sect. 7. Art. 6. and to
add to the section the words "and any member of
the Senate shall be at liberty to enter his dissent."

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Wilson observed that if the
minority were to have a right to enter their votes &
reasons, the other side would have a right to complain,
if it were not extended to them: & to allow
it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of
a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.

Question on Mr. Carrols motion to allow a member
to enter his dissent

N. H. no. Mass. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry moved to strike out the words "when it
shall be acting in its legislative capacity" in order to
extend the provision to the Senate when exercising
its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such
parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy"

after the words "publish them."—(It was thought
by others that provision should be made with respect
to these when that part came under consideration
which proposed to vest those additional
authorities in the Senate.)

On this question for striking out the words "when
acting in its legislative capacity"

N. H. divd. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

Saturday Augst. 11 in Convention

Mr. Madison & Mr. Rutlidge moved "that each
House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, &
shall publish the same from time to time; except
such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when
acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be
judged by that House to require secrecy."

Mr. Mercer. This implies that other powers than
legislative will be given to the Senate which he hoped
would not be given.

Mr. Madison & Mr. R's motion was disagd. to by all
the States except Virga.

Mr. Gerry & Mr. Sharman moved to insert after the
words "publish them" the following "except such
as relate to treaties & military operations." Their
object was to give each House a discretion in such
cases.—On this question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Elseworth. As the clause is objectionable in
so many shapes, it may as well be struck out altogether.
The Legislature will not fail to publish
their proceedings from time to time. The people
will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.

Mr. Wilson thought the expunging of the clause
would be very improper. The people have a right
to know what their Agents are doing or have done,
and it should not be in the option of the Legislature
to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a
clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining
it would furnish the adversaries of the reform
with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds
may be easily misled.

Mr. Mason thought it would give a just alarm to
the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature.

Mr. Sherman thought the Legislature might be
trusted in this case if in any.

Question on 1st. part of the section down to
"publish them" inclusive: Agreed to nem. con.

Question on the words to follow, to wit "except
such parts thereof as may in their Judgment require
secrecy." N. H. divd. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

The remaining part as to yeas & nays,—agreed to
nem. con.

Art VI. Sect. 8. taken up.

Mr. King remarked that the section authorized the

2 Houses to adjourn to a new place. He thought
this inconvenient. The mutability of place had dishonored
the federal Govt. and would require as strong
a cure as we could devise. He thought a law at least
should be made necessary to a removal of the Seat
of Govt.

Mr. Madison viewed the subject in the same light,
and joined with Mr. King in a motion requiring a law.

Mr. Governr. Morris proposed the additional alteration
by inserting the words, "during the Session"
&c.

Mr. Spaight. This will fix the seat of Govt. at N. Y.
The present Congress will convene them there in the
first instance, and they will never be able to remove,
especially if the Presidt. should be [a] Northern Man.

Mr. Govr. Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with
all Govt.

Mr. Madison supposed that a central place for the
seat of Govt. was so just and wd. be so much insisted
on by the H. of Representatives, that though a law
should be made requisite for the purpose, it could &
would be obtained. The necessity of a central residence
of the Govt. wd. be much greater under the new
than old Govt. The members of the new Govt. wd. be
more numerous. They would be taken more from
the interior parts of the States; they wd. not like
members of ye. present Congs. come so often from
the distant States by water. As the powers & objects
of the new Govt. would be far greater yn. heretofore,
more private individuals wd. have business calling
them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary

that the Govt. should be in that position from which
it could contemplate with the most equal eye, and
sympathize most equally with, every part of the
nation. These considerations he supposed would
extort a removal even if a law were made necessary.
But in order to quiet suspicions both within & without
doors, it might not be amiss to authorize the 2
Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first
meeting to the most proper place, and to require
thereafter, the sanction of a law to their removal.

The motion was accordingly moulded into the
following form: "the Legislature shall at their first
assembling determine on a place at which their
future sessions shall be held; neither House shall
afterwards, during the session of the House of Reps.
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than three days, nor shall they adjourn to any other
place than such as shall have been fixt by law."

Mr. Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the
Presidt. check the will of the 2 Houses on this subject
at all.

Mr. Williamson supported the ideas of Mr. Spaight.

Mr. Carrol was actuated by the same apprehensions.

Mr. Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the
two Houses at their first meeting to fix on a place.
They will never agree.

After some further expressions from others denoting
an apprehension that the seat of Govt. might be
continued at an improper place if a law should be
made necessary to a removal, and the motion above

stated with another for recommitting the section had
been negatived, the section was left in the shape it
which it was reported as to this point. The words,
"during the session of the Legislature were prefixed
to the 8th section—and the last sentence "But this
regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it
shall exercise the powers mentioned in the——
article" struck out. The 8th. section as amended
was then agreed to.

Mr. Randolph moved according to notice to reconsider
Art: IV. Sect. 5. concerning money bills which
had been struck out. He argued 1. that he had not
wished for this privilege whilst a proportional Representation
in the Senate was in contemplation, but
since an equality had been fixed in that house, the
large States would require this compensation at
least. 2. that it would make the plan more acceptable
to the people, because they will consider the
Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will expect
that the usual guards agst. its influence be provided
according to the example in G. Britain. 3. the
privilege will give some advantage to the House of
Reps. if it extends to the originating only—but still
more if it restrains the Senate from amendg. 4. he
called on the smaller States to concur in the measure,
as the condition by which alone the compromise had
entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified
that he should propose instead of the original
section, a clause specifying that the bills in question
should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to
repel ye. objection agst. the extent of the words, "raising

money," which might happen incidentally, and
that the Senate should not so amend or alter as to
increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the
inconveniences urged agst. a restriction of the Senate
to a simple affirmation or negative.

Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Pinkney was sorry to oppose the opportunity
gentlemen asked to have the question again opened
for discussion, but as he considered it a mere waste
of time he could not bring himself to consent to it.
He said that notwithstanding what had been said as
to the compromise, he always considered this section
as making no part of it. The rule of Representation
in the 1st. branch was the true condition of that in the
2d. branch.—Several others spoke for & agst. the reconsideration,
but without going into the merits.—
On the Question to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J.[22] ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd.
Geo. ay.—Monday was then assigned—

Adjd.[23]

Monday, Augst. 13. In Convention

Art. IV. Sect. 2. reconsidered—

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Randolph moved to strike out
"7 years" and insert "4 years," as the requisite
term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Reps.
Mr.Wilson said it was very proper the electors should
govern themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary
& improper that the Constitution should
chain them down to it.

Mr. Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might
be confined to Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle
in our affairs, and spare no expence to influence
them. Persons having foreign attachments

will be sent among us & insinuated into our councils,
in order to be made instruments for their purposes.
Every one knows the vast sums laid out in Europe
for secret services. He was not singular in these
ideas. A great many of the most influential men
in Massts. reasoned in the same manner.

Mr. Williamson moved to insert 9 years instead of
seven. He wished this Country to acquire as fast as
possible national habits. Wealthy emigrants do
more harm by their luxurious examples, than good,
by the money, they bring with them.

Col. Hamilton was in general agst. embarrassing the
Govt. with minute restrictions. There was on one

side the possible danger that had been suggested.
On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners
was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe
of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here
where they will be on a level with the first Citizens.
He moved that the section be so altered as to require
merely citizenship & inhabitancy. The right of determining
the rule of naturalization will then leave a
discretion to the Legislature on this subject which
will answer every purpose.

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He wished to
maintain the character of liberality which had been
professed in all the Constitutions & publications of
America. He wished to invite foreigners of merit
& republican principles among us. America was indebted
to emigration for her settlement & Prosperity.
That part of America which had encouraged
them most had advanced most rapidly in population,
agriculture & the arts. There was a possible danger
he admitted that men with foreign predilections
might obtain appointments but it was by no means
probable that it would happen in any dangerous
degree. For the same reason that they would be
attached to their native Country, our own people
wd. prefer natives of this Country to them. Experience
proved this to be the case. Instances were rare
of a foreigner being elected by the people within any
short space after his coming among us. If bribery
was to be practised by foreign powers, it would not
be attempted among the electors but among the
elected, and among natives having full Confidence

of the people not among strangers who would be
regarded with a jealous eye.

Mr. Wilson cited Pennsylva. as a proof of the advantage
of encouraging emigrations. It was perhaps
the youngest (except Georgia) settlemt. on the
Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in
population & prosperity. He remarked that almost
all the Genl. officers of the Pena. line of the late army
were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been
made against their fidelity or merit. Three of her
deputies to the Convention (Mr. R. Morris, Mr. Fitzsimons
& himself) were also not natives. He had no
objection to Col. Hamiltons motion & would withdraw
the one made by himself.

Mr. Butler was strenuous agst. admitting foreigners
into our public Councils.

Question on Col. Hamilton's Motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no
Geo. no.

Question on Mr. Williamson's motion to insert 9
years instead of seven.

N. H. ay. Massts. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay
Geo. ay.

Mr. Wilson renewed the motion for 4 years instead
of 7; & on question

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no
Geo. no.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to add to the end of the

section (Art IV. S. 2) a proviso that the limitation of
seven years should not affect the rights of any person
now a Citizen.

Mr. Mercer 2ded. the motion. It was necessary he
said to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who
had become Citizens under and on the faith & according
to the laws & Constitution from being on a level
in all respects with natives.

Mr. Rutlidge. It might as well be said that all
qualifications are disfranchisemts. and that to require
the age of 25 years was a disfranchisement. The
policy of the precaution was as great with regard to
foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be
naturalized in future.

Mr. Sherman. The U. States have not invited foreigners
nor pledged their faith that they should enjoy
equal privileges with native Citizens. The Individual
States alone have done this. The former therefore
are at liberty to make any discriminations they
may judge requisite.

Mr. Ghorum. When foreigners are naturalized it
wd. seem as if they stand on an equal footing with
natives. He doubted then the propriety of giving
a retrospective force to the restriction.

Mr.Madison animadverted on the peculiarity of
the doctrine of Mr. Sharman. It was a subtilty by
which every national engagement might be evaded.
By parity of reason, Whenever our public debts, or
foreign treaties become inconvenient nothing more
Would be necessary to relieve us from them, than to
new model the Constitution. It was said that the

U. S. as such have not pledged their faith to the
naturalized foreigners, & therefore are not bound.
Be it so, & that the States alone are bound. Who
are to form the New Constitution by which the condition
of that class of citizens is to be made worse
than the other class? Are not the States ye. Agents?
will they not be the members of it? Did they not
appoint this Convention? Are not they to ratify its
proceedings? Will not the new Constitution be
their Act? If the new Constitution then violates the
faith pledged to any description of people will not
the makers of it, will not the States, be the violaters.
To justify the doctrine it must be said that the
States can get rid of their obligation by revising
the Constitution, though they could not do it by
repealing the law under which foreigners held their
privileges. He considered this a matter of real importance.
It would expose us to the reproaches of
all those who should be affected by it, reproaches
which wd. soon be echoed from the other side of the
Atlantic; and would unnecessarily enlist among the
Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body
of Citizens: We should moreover reduce every State
to the dilemma of rejecting it or of violating the faith
pledged to a part of its Citizens.

Mr. Govr. Morris considered the case of persons
under 25 years, as very different from that of foreigners.
No faith could be pleaded by the former
in bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever
been given that persons under that age should be in
all cases on a level with those above it. But with

regard to foreigners among us, the faith had been
pledged that they should enjoy the privileges of Citizens.
If the restriction as to age had been confined
to natives, & had left foreigners under 25 years,
eligible in this case, the discrimination wd. have been
an equal injustice on the other side.

Mr. Pinkney remarked that the laws of the States
had varied much the terms of naturalization in different
parts of America; and contended that the
U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such
an occasion as the present. It was a sort of recurrence
to first principles.

Col. Mason was struck not like (Mr. Madison) with
the peculiarity, but the propriety of the doctrine of
Mr. Sharman. The States have formed different
qualifications themselves, for enjoying different
rights of citizenship. Greater caution wd. be necessary
in the outset of the Govt. than afterwards. All
the great objects wd. then be provided for. Every
thing would be then set in motion. If persons
among us attached to G. B. should work themselves
into our Councils, a turn might be given to our
affairs & particularly to our Commercial regulations
which might have pernicious consequences. The
Great Houses of British Merchants will spare no
pains to insinuate the instruments of their views into
the Govt.

Mr. Wilson read the clause in the Constitution of
Pena. giving to foreigners after two years residence
all the rights whatsoever of Citizens, Combined it
with the article of Confederation making the Citizens

of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation
Pena. was under to maintain the faith thus pledged
to her citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints
which her failure would authorize: He observed
likewise that the Princes & States of Europe
would avail themselves of such breach of faith to
deter their subjects from emigration to the U. S.

Mr. Mercer enforced the same idea of a breach of
faith.

Mr. Baldwin could not enter into the force of the
arguments agst. extending the disqualification to foreigners
now Citizens. The discrimination of the
place of birth, was not more objectionable than that
of age which all had concurred in the propriety of.

Question on the proviso of Mr. Govr. Morris in
favor of foreigners now Citizens

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Carrol moved to insert "5 years" instead of
"seven" in Sect. 2d. Art: IV

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

The Section (Art IV. Sec. 2.) as formerly amended
was then agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Wilson moved that (in Art: V. Sect. 3.) 9 years
be reduced to seven, which was disagd. to and the
3d. section (Art. V.) confirmed by the following vote.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del.
ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sec. 5. being reconsidered.

Mr. Randolph moved that the clause be altered so
as to read—" Bills for raising money for the purpose
of revenue or for appropriating the same shall originate
in the House of Representatives and shall not
be so amended or altered by the Senate as to increase
or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode
of levying it, or the object of its appropriation."—
He would not repeat his reasons, but barely remind
the members from the smaller States of the compromise
by which the larger States were entitled to this
privilege.

Col. Mason. This amendment removes all the
objections urged agst. the section as it stood at first.
By specifying purposes of revenue, it obviated the
objection that the section extended to all bills under
which money might incidentally arise. By authorizing
amendments in the Senate it got rid of the
objections that the Senate could not correct errors
of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House
of Reps. the practice of tacking foreign matter to
money bills. These objections being removed, the
arguments in favor of the proposed restraint on the
Senate ought to have their full force. 1. the Senate
did not represent the people, but the States in their
political character. It was improper therefore that
it should tax the people. The reason was the same
agst. their doing it; as it had been agst. Congs. doing it.
Nor was it in any respect necessary in order to cure
the evils of our Republican system. He admitted
that notwithstanding the superiority of the Republican

form over every other, it had its evils. The
chief ones, were the danger of the majority oppressing
the minority, and the mischievous influence of
demagogues. The Genl. Government of itself will
cure them. As the States will not concur at the
same time in their unjust & oppressive plans, the
General Govt. will be able to check & defeat them,
whether they result from the wickedness of the majority,
or from the misguidance of demagogues.
Again, the Senate is not like the H. of Reps. chosen
frequently and obliged to return frequently among
the people. They are to be chosen by the Sts for 6
years, will probably settle themselves at the seat of
Govt. will pursue schemes for their own aggrandisement
—will be able by wearyg. out the H. of Reps. and
taking advantage of their impatience at the close of
a long Session, to extort measures for that purpose.
If they should be paid as he expected would be yet
determined & wished to be so, out of the Natl. Treasury,
they will particularly extort an increase of their
wages. A bare negative was a very different thing
from that of originating bills. The practice in Engld.
was in point. The House of Lords does not represent
nor tax the people, because not elected by the
people. If the Senate can originate, they will in the
recess of the Legislative Sessions, hatch their mischievous
projects, for their own purposes, and have
their money bills ready cut & dried (to use a common
phrase) for the meeting of the H. of Reps. He compared
the case to Poyning's law—and signified that
the House of Reps. might be rendered by degrees like
the Parliament of Paris, the mere depository of the
decrees of the Senate. As to the compromise so
much had passed on that subject that he would say
nothing about it. He did not mean by what he had
said to oppose the permanency of the Senate. On
the contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of
it—nor to allowing it a negative, though the Senate
was not by its present constitution entitled to it.
But in all events he would contend that the purse-strings
should be in the hands of the Representatives
of the people.

Mr. Wilson was himself directly opposed to the
equality of votes granted to the Senate by its present
Constitution. At the same time he wished not to
multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean
to enlarge on a subject which had been so much canvassed,
but would remark that as an insuperable
objection agst. the proposed restriction of money bills
to the H. of Reps. that it would be a source of perpetual
contentions where there was no mediator to
decide them. The Presidt. here could not like the
Executive Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation,
or dissolution. This restriction had been
found pregnant with altercation in every State where
the Constitution had established it. The House of
Reps. will insert other things in money bills, and by
making them conditions of each other, destroy the
deliberate liberty of the Senate. He stated the case
of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the House
of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, to the H. of
Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry,

who were to be impeached before the Lords, was
condemned; the Com̃ons thus extorting a premature
judgmt. without any hearing of the Parties to be
tried, and the H. of Lords being thus reduced to the
poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the authority
of a law, a protest on their Journals agst. its
being drawn into precedent. If there was any thing
like Poynings law in the present case, it was in the
attempt to vest the exclusive right of originating in
the H. of Reps. and so far he was agst. it. He should
be equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested
in the Senate. With regard to the purse strings, it
was to be observed that the purse was to have two
strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of
Reps. the other in those of the Senate. Both houses
must concur in untying, and of what importance
could it be which untied first, which last. He could
not conceive it to be any objection to the Senate's
preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for
that purpose and would be in the habits of business.
War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of
the Genl. Government. All of them are connected
with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of
Represents. would exclude the Senate from originating
any important bills whatever—

Mr. Gerry considered this as a part of the plan that
would be much scrutinized. Taxation & representation
are strongly associated in the minds of the
people, and they will not agree that any but their
immediate representatives shall meddle with their
purses. In short the acceptance of the plan will

inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from
originating money bills.

Mr. Governr. Morris. All the arguments suppose the
right to originate & to tax, to be exclusively vested
in the Senate.—The effects commented on may be
produced by a Negative only in the Senate. They
can tire out the other House, and extort their concurrence
in favorite measures, as well by withholding
their negative, as by adhering to a bill introduced
by themselves.

Mr. Madison thought If the substitute offered by
Mr.Randolph for the original section is to be adopted
it would be proper to allow the Senate at least so to
amend as to diminish the sums to be raised. Why
should they be restrained from checking the extravagance
of the other House? One of the greatest evils
incident to Republican Govt. was the spirit of contention
& faction. The proposed substitute, which in
some respects lessened the objections agst. the section,
had a contrary effect with respect to this particular.
It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes
between the two houses. The word revenue was ambiguous.
In many acts, particularly in the regulation
of trade, the object would be twofold. The
raising of revenue would be one of them. How
could it be determined which was the primary or
predominant one; or whether it was necessary that
revenue shd. be the sole object, in exclusion even of
other incidental effects. When the Contest was first
opened with G. B. their power to regulate trade was
admitted. Their power to raise revenue rejected.

An accurate investigation of the subject afterwards
proved that no line could be drawn between the two
cases. The words amend or alter form an equal
source of doubt & altercation. When an obnoxious
paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate to the
House of Reps., it will be called an origination under
the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually
couch extraneous matter under that name. In
these cases, the question will turn on the degree of
connection between the matter & object of the bill
and the alteration or amendment offered to it. Can
there be a more fruitful source of dispute, or a kind
of dispute more difficult to be settled? His apprehensions
on this point were not conjectural. Disputes
had actually flowed from this source in Virga.
where the Senate can originate no bill. The words,
"so as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised,"
were liable to the same objections. In levying indirect
taxes, which it seemed to be understood were
to form the principal revenue of the new Govt. the
sum to be raised, would be increased or diminished
by a variety of collateral circumstances influencing
the consumption, in general, the consumption of
foreign or of domestic articles—of this or that particular
species of articles and even by the mode of
collection which may be closely connected with the
productiveness of a tax.—The friends of the section
had argued its necessity from the permanency of the
Senate. He could not see how this argumt. applied.
The Senate was not more permanent now than in
the form it bore in the original propositions of Mr.
Randolph and at the time when no objection whatever
was hinted agst. its originating money bills. Or
if in consequence of a loss of the present question, a
proportional vote in the Senate should be reinstated
as has been urged as the indemnification the permanency
of the Senate will remain the same.—If the
right to originate be vested exclusively in the House
of Reps. either the Senate must yield agst. its judgment
to that House, in which case the Utility of the
check will be lost—or the Senate will be inflexible
& the H. of Reps. must adapt its money bill to the
views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive
right will be of no avail.—As to the Compromise of
which so much had been said, he would make a single
observation. There were 5 States which had opposed
the equality of votes in the Senate, viz, Massts.
Penna. Virga. N. Carolina & South Carola. As a compensation
for the sacrifice extorted from them on
this head, the exclusive origination of money bills in
the other House had been tendered. Of the five
States a majority viz. Penna. Virga. & S. Carola. have
uniformly voted agst. the proposed compensation, on
its own merits, as rendering the plan of Govt. still
more objectionable. Massts. has been divided. N.
Carolina alone has set a value on the compensation,
and voted on that principle. What obligation then
can the small States be under to concur agst. their
judgments in reinstating the section?

Mr. Dickenson. Experience must be our only
guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason
that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism

of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that
discovered or ever could have discovered the odd &
in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the
absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably
produced these discoveries, and experience has given
a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And
has not experience verified the utility of restraining
money bills to the immediate representatives of the
people. Whence the effect may have proceeded he
could not say: whether from the respect with which
this privilege inspired the other branches of Govt. to
the H. of Com̃ons, or from the turn of thinking it
gave to the people at large with regard to their
rights, but the effect was visible & could not be
doubted—Shall we oppose to this long experience,
the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves,
on this subject. As to disputes, they could
not be avoided any way. If both Houses should
originate, each would have a different bill to which
it would be attached, and for which it would contend.
—He observed that all the prejudices of the people
would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege
to the H. of Repress. and these prejudices shd.
never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose
was to be served. When this plan goes forth
it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy
will be the watchword; the Shiboleth among
its adversaries. Eight States have inserted in their
Constitutions the exclusive right of originating money
bills in favor of the popular branch of the Legislature.
Most of them however allowed the other branch to
amend. This he thought would be proper for us to
do.

Mr.Randolph regarded this point as of such consequence,
that as he valued the peace of this Country,
he would press the adoption of it. We had numerous
& monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we
ought not to increase them. When the people behold
in the Senate, the countenance of an aristocracy;
and in the president, the form at least of a
little monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently
raised without taking from their immediate representatives,
a right which has been so long appropriated
to them.—The Executive will have more
influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Reps.
Allow the Senate to originate in this Case, & that
influence will be sure to mix itself in their deliberations
& plans. The Declaration of War he conceived
ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men
only, but rather in the other House. In the other
House ought to be placed the origination of the
means of war. As to Commercial regulations which
may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided
by restraining the definition to bills, for the mere or
sole, purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will
be more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Reps.
and should therefore have less to do with money
matters. His principal object however was to prevent
popular objections against the plan, and to
secure its adoption.

Mr. Rutlidge. The friends of this motion are not
consistent in their reasoning. They tell us that we

ought to be guided by the long experience of G. B.
& not our own experience of 11 years; and yet they
themselves propose to depart from it. The H. of
Com̃ons not only have the exclusive right of originating,
but the Lords are not allowed to alter or amend
a money bill. Will not the people say that this restriction
is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot
but see that it is of no real consequence; and
will be more likely to be displeased with it as an
attempt to bubble them, than to impute it to a
watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he
would prefer giving the exclusive right to the Senate,
if it was to be given exclusively at all. The Senate
being more conversant in business, and having more
leisure, will digest the bills much better, and as they
are to have no effect, till examined & approved by
the H. of Reps. there can be no possible danger.
These clauses in the Constitutions of the States had
been put in through a blind adherence to the British
model. If the work was to be done over now, they
would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina,
where the Senate can originate or amend money
bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose;
and produces the very bad one of continually dividing
& heating the two houses. Sometimes indeed if
the matter of the amendment of the Senate is pleasing
to the other House they wink at the encroachment;
if it be displeasing, then the Constitution
is appealed to. Every Session is distracted by
altercations on this subject. The practice now becoming
frequent is for the Senate not to make
formal amendments; but to send down a schedule
of the alterations which will procure the bill their
assent.

Mr. Carrol. The most ingenious men in Maryd. are
puzzled to define the case of money bills, or explain
the Constitution on that point, tho it seemed to be
worded with all possible plainness & precision. It
is a source of continual difficulty & squabble between
the two houses.

Mr. McHenry[24] mentioned an instance of extraordinary
subterfuge, to get rid of the apparent force of
the Constitution.

On Question on the first part of the motion as to
the exclusive originating of Money bills in the H. of
Reps. N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. no. Virga. ay. Mr. Blair & Mr.
M. no. Mr.R, Col. Mason and Genl. Washington[25] ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Question on Originating by H. of Reps. & amending
by Senate, as reported Art IV. Sect. 5.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.

Del. no. Md. no. Va.[26] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Question on the last clause of Sect. 5, Art: IV—viz
"No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations that shall
originate in the House of Reps. It passed in the
negative—

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Adjd.

Tuesday Aug. 14[27] . In Convention

Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.

Mr. Pinkney argued that the making the members
ineligible to offices was degrading to them, and the
more improper as their election into the Legislature
implied that they had the confidence of the people;
that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might
be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped

to see that body become a School of public Ministers,
a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because
the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the
first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone
the section in order to take up the following proposition
viz—"the members of each House shall be
incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for
which they or any of others for their benefit receive
any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind—and
the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats
respectively."

Genl. Mifflin[28] 2ded. the motion.

Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the
whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging

that exotic corruption which might not
otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil—for
compleating that Aristocrary which was probably in
the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting
into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent
characters who will do justice to each other's
merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In
the present state of American morals & manners,
few friends it may be thought will be lost to the
plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a
mercenary & depraved ambition.

Mr. Mercer. It is a first principle in political science,
that whenever the rights of property are secured,
an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective
Governments also necessarily become aristocratic,
because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments
for themselves from the many. The Governments
of America will become aristocracies. They
are so already. The public measures are calculated
for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people.
The people are dissatisfied & complain. They
change their rulers, and the public measures are
changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of
emolument to the rulers, for another. The people
gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability &
uncertainty to their other evils.—Governmts. can only
be maintained by force or influence. The Executive
has not force, deprive him of influence by rendering
the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive
offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority.
The Aristocratic part will not even let him

in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must
& will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the
people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive
ought to have a Council, being members of both
Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be
between the aristocracy & the people. He wished
it to be between the Aristocracy & the Executive.
Nothing else can protect the people agst. those speculating
Legislatures which are now plundering them
throughout the U. States.

Mr. Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of
Massts. passed before the Act of Congs. recommending
the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed
not to depart from the rotation established in the
5th. art: of Confederation, nor to agree in any case
to give to the members of Congs. a capacity to hold
offices under the Government. This he said was repealed
in consequence of the Act of Congs. with which
the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified
manner. The Sense of the State however
was Still the same. He could not think with Mr.
Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading.
Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers
& Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It is
the opinion of a great many that they ought to be
discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent
among us, & that source of influence be shut up. If
the Senate were to appoint Ambassadors as seemed
to be intended, they will multiply embassies for their
own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions
as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they

are once appointed, the House of Reps. will be obliged
to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of
the measures or not. If men will not serve in the
Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our
situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens
are actuated by such mercenary views we had better
chuse a single despot at once. It will be more easy
to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According
to the idea of one Gentleman (Mr. Mercer)
our Government it seems is to be a Govt. of plunder.
In that case it certainly would be prudent to have
but one rather than many to be employed in it. We
cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this
System. It will be examined on all sides and with a
very suspicious eye. The people who have been so
lately in arms agst. G. B. for their liberties, will not
easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing
at present under our Governments, but imputed
them to the faults of those in office, not to the people.
The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical
attention to the opportunities afforded by the new
system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands
it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed.
If great powers should be given to the Senate we
shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been
apprehended. He remarked that it would be very
differently constituted from Congs. 1. there will be
but 2 deputies from each State, in Congs. there may
be 7. and are generally 5.—2. they are chosen for six
years, those of Congress annually. 3. they are not
subject to recall; those of Congs. are. 4. In Congress
9 States are necessary for all great purposes, here 8
persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the
people will ever agree to such a system? He moved
to render the members of the H. of Reps. as well as of
the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one
year after the expiration of their terms.—If it should
be thought that this will injure the Legislature by
keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to
serve in other offices it may be required as a qualification
for other offices, that the Candidate shall have
served a certain time in the Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Exclude the officers of the army
& navy, and you form a band having a different
interest from & opposed to the civil power: you
stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking
Lords who dare not face the foe." Let this
spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your
troops shall have laid down their arms, and though
the Civil authority "be intrenched in parchment to
the teeth" they will cut their way to it. He was
agst. rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible
to offices. He was for rendering them eligible
agn. after having vacated their Seats by accepting
office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their
services if the people chuse to give them their confidence.
There can be little danger of corruption
either among the people or the Legislatures who are
to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits,
we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence
in them, have they not a right to give them a preference;
and can they be properly abridged of it.

Mr. Williamson; introduced his opposition to the
motion by referring to the question concerning
"money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its
Ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt
us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to
insist upon it as long as there was hope of retaining
it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with
reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was
said on the other side was that the restriction was
not convenient. We have now got a House of Lords
which is to originate money-bills.—To avoid another
inconveniency, we are to have a whole Legislature at
liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought
a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more
proper. Bad as the Constitution has been made by
expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning
money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging
the present Section. He had scarcely seen
a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N.
Carolina, which could not be traced up to office
hunting.

Mr. Sherman. The Constitution shd. lay as few
temptations as possible in the way of those in power.
Men of abilities will increase as the Country grows
more populous and as the means of education are
more diffused.

Mr. Pinkney. No State has rendered the members
of the Legislature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina
the Judges are eligible into the Legislature. It
cannot be supposed then that the motion will be
offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions

should be revised he believed restrictions of this sort
wd. be rather diminished than multiplied.

Mr. Wilson could not approve of the section as it
stood, and could not give up his judgment to any
supposed objections that might arise among the
people. He considered himself as acting & responsible
for the welfare of millions not immediately represented
in this House. He had also asked himself
the serious question what he should say to his constituents
in case they should call upon him to tell
them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case
where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he
to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to
flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort:
did you suppose the people of Penna. had not good
sense enough to receive a good Government? Under
this impression he should certainly follow his own
Judgment which disapproved of the section. He
would remark in addition to the objections urged
agst. it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to
be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the
other by the people of the States, as both are to be
paid by the States, and to be appointable to State
offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate
the Natl. Legislature, but to render its members ineligible
to Natl. offices, & by that means take away
its power of attracting those talents which were
necessary to give weight to the Governt. and to render
it useful to the people. He was far from thinking
the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity
and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure

it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to
withhold from it the prospect of those rewards,
which might engage it in the career of public service.
He observed that the State of Penna. which had gone
as far as any State into the policy of fettering power,
had not rendered the members of the Legislature
ineligible to offices of Govt.

Mr. Elsworth did not think the mere postponement
of the reward would be any material discouragement
of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2
years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of
qualifying themselves for other offices. This he
thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services
of the ablest men in the Legislature, although
whilst members they should be ineligible to Public
offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged,
when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to
circulate only within the Legislature, merit out of it
will be discouraged.

Mr. Mercer was extremely anxious on this point.
What led to the appointment of this Convention?
The corruption & mutability of the Legislative
Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy
these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not
be able in our private capacities to support & enforce
it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves
for the purpose.—It is a great mistake to suppose
that the paper we are to propose will govern the
U. States. It is The men whom it will bring into the
Governt. and interest in maintaining it that is to
govern them. The paper will only mark out the

mode & the form. Men are the substance and must
do the business. All Govt. must be by force or influence.
It is not the King of France—but 200,000
janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There
will be no such force here; influence then must be
substituted; and he would ask whether this could
be done, if the members of the Legislature should
be ineligible to offices of State; whether such a
disqualification would not determine all the most
influential men to stay at home, & prefer appointments
within their respective States.

Mr. Wilson was by no means satisfied with the
answer given by Mr. Elseworth to the argument as
to the discouragement of merit. The members
must either go a second time into the Legislature,
and disqualify themselves—or say to their Constituents,
we served you before only from the mercenary
view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and
haveg. answered this purpose we do not chuse to
be again elected.

Mr. Govr. Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen
the most capable of conducting it, happening to
be a member of the Legislature. What might have
been the consequence of such a regulation at the
commencement, or even in the Course of the late
contest for our liberties?

On question for postponing in order to take up
Mr. Pinkneys motion, it was lost,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. divd.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert, after "office,"
except offices in the army or navy: but in that
case their offices shall be vacated.

Mr. Broom 2ds. him.

Mr. Randolph had been & should continue uniformly
opposed to the striking out of the clause; as
opening a door for influence & corruption. No arguments
had made any impression on him, but those
which related to the case of war, and a co-existing
incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed.
He admitted great weight in these, and would agree
to the exception proposed by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. Butler & Mr. Pinkney urged a general postponemt.
of 9. Sect. Art. VI. till it should be seen what
powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would
be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing
the officers of State to be chosen out of that body.—
A general postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 10. taken up—"that members be
paid by their respective States."

Mr. Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject
he had been satisfied that too much dependence
on the States would be produced by this mode of
payment. He moved to strike it out and insert
that they should "be paid out of the Treasury of the
U. S. an allowance not exceeding ( ) dollars per
day or the present value thereof."

Mr. Govr. Morris, remarked that if the members
were to be paid by the States it would throw an unequal
burden on the distant States, which would be
unjust as the Legislature, was to be a national

Assembly. He moved that the payment be out of
the Natl. Treasury; leaving the quantum to the discretion
of the Natl. Legislature. There could be no
reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.

Mr. Butler contended for payment by the States;
particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be
so long out of their respective States, that they will
lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on
them for their support.

Mr. Langdon was agst. payment by the States.
There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum;
but it would be unjust to oblige the distant States
to bear the expence of their members in travelling
to and from the Seat of Govt.

Mr. Madison. If the H. of Reps. is to be chosen
biennially—and the Senate to be constantly dependent
on the Legislatures which are chosen annually, he
could not see any chance for that stability in the
Genl. Govt. the want of which was a principal evil in
the State Govts. His fear was that the organization
of the Govt. supposing the Senate to be really independt.
for six years, would not effect our purpose. It
was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities
of two of the State Govts. which separately
had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed
on the model of that of Maryld. The Revisionary
check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a
union of these provisions might be, could not be
foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the
Government was indeed a circumstance which he
thought would be favorable as he had on several

occasions undertaken to show. He was however for
fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by
the Natl. Legislre. in the payment of themselves.

Mr. Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides.
The observation of Mr. Butler has weight in it. On
the other side, the State Legislatures may turn out
the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such
things have been practised.

Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the
clause as it now stands makes the House of Represents.
also dependent on the State Legislatures: so
that both houses will be made the instruments of the
politics of the States whatever they may be.

Mr. Broom could see no danger in trusting the
Genl. Legislature with the payment of themselves.
The State Legislatures had this power, and no complaint
had been made of it.

Mr. Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature
would make their own wages too high; but too low,
so that men ever so fit could not serve unless they
were at the same time rich. He thought the best
plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be
paid out of the Natl. Treasy. and let the States make
such additions as they might judge fit. He moved
that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments
to be added by the States.

Mr. Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this
clause in the Report. The dependence of both
Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat; especially
as the members of the former are eligible to
State offices. The States can now say: if you do

not comply with our wishes, we will starve you; if
you do we will reward you. The new Govt. in this
form was nothing more than a second edition of
Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps
with very few amendments—

Mr. Dickenson took it for granted that all were
convinced of the necessity of making the Genl. Govt.
independent of the prejudices, passions, and improper
views of the State Legislatures. The contrary
of This was effected by the section as it stands.
On the other hand there were objections agst. taking
a permanent standard as wheat which had been
suggested on a former occasion, as well as against
leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Natl. Legislature.
He proposed that an Act should be passed
every 12 years by the Natl. Legislre. settling the
quantum of their wages. If the Genl. Govt. should
be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it
would be happy for us if we had never met in this
Room.

Mr. Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust
the Legislature with authority to regulate their own
wages, but well knew that an unlimited discretion
for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps
not insuperable objections. He thought changes in
the value of money, provided for by his motion in
the words, "or the present value thereof."

Mr. L, Martin. As the Senate is to represent the
States, the members of it ought to be paid by the
States.

Mr. Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage

the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates
of State interests. They ought then not to
be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the
Legislature out of the Natl. Treasury,

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that the pay be fixed at 5
dollrs. or the present value thereof per day during
their attendance & for every thirty miles in travelling
to & from Congress.

Mr. Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at,
liberty to make additions.

On question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Dickenson proposed that the wages of the members
of both houses sd. be required to be the same.

Mr. Broome seconded him.

Mr. Ghorum. this would be unreasonable. The
Senate will be detained longer from home, will be
obliged to remove their families, and in time of war
perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should
certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in
the States are allowed more, than those of the other
house.

Mr. Dickenson withdrew his motion.

It was moved & agreed to amend the section by
adding—"to be ascertained by law."

The section (Art. VI. Sect. 10) as amended, agreed
to nem. con.

Adjd.

Wednesday August 15. in Convention.

Art: VI. Sect. 11. Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect 12. taken up.

Mr. Strong moved to amend the article so as to
read—"Each House shall possess the right of originating
all bills, except bills for raising money for
the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the
same and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the
Govt. which shall originate in the House of Representatives;
but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments as in other cases"

Col. Mason, 2ds. the motion. He was extremely
earnest to take this power from the Senate, who he
said could already sell the whole Country by means
of Treaties.

Mr. Ghorum urged the amendment as of great
importance. The Senate will first acquire the
habit of preparing money bills, and then the practice
will grow into an exclusive right of preparing
them.

Mr. Governr. Morris opposed it as unnecessary and
inconvenient.

Mr. Williamson, some think this restriction on the
Senate essential to liberty, others think it of no importance.
Why should not the former be indulged.

he was for an efficient and stable Govt.: but many
would not strengthen the Senate if not restricted in
the case of money bills. The friends of the Senate
would therefore lose more than they would gain by
refusing to gratify the other side. He moved to
postpone the subject till the powers of the Senate
should be gone over.

Mr. Rutlidge 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Mercer should hereafter be agst. returning to a
reconsideration of this section. He contended (alluding
to Mr. Mason's observations) that the Senate
ought not to have the power of treaties. This power
belonged to the Executive department; adding that
Treaties would not be final so as to alter the laws of
the land, till ratified by legislative authority. This
was the case of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly
the late Treaty of Com̃erce with France.

Col. Mason, did not say that a Treaty would repeal
a law; but that the Senate by means of treaty
might alienate territory &c, without legislative sanction.
The cessions of the British Islands in W. Indies
by Treaty alone were an example. If Spain should
possess herself of Georgia therefore the Senate might
by treaty dismember the Union. He wished the motion
to be decided now, that the friends of it might
know how to conduct themselves.

On the question for postponing Sect: 12. it passed
in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no.
Del: no. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison moved that all acts before they become
laws should be submitted both to the Executive
and supreme Judiciary Departments, that if
either of these should object 2/3 of each House, if both
should object, 3/4 of each House, should be necessary
to overrule the objections and give to the acts the
force of law.[29]

Mr. Wilson seconds the motion

Mr. Pinkney opposed the interference of the Judges
in the Legislative business: it will involve them in
parties, and give a previous tincture to their opinions.

Mr. Mercer heartily approved the motion. It is an
axiom that the Judiciary ought to be separate from
the Legislative; but equally so that it ought to be
independent of that department. The true policy of
the axiom is that legislative usurpation and oppression
may be obviated. He disapproved of the Doctrine

that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution
should have authority to declare a law void.
He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously
made, and then to be uncontroulable.

Mr. Gerry. This motion comes to the same thing
with what has been already negatived.

Question on the motion of Mr. Madison

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Govr. Morris regretted that something like the
proposed check could not be agreed to. He dwelt
on the importance of public Credit, and the difficulty
of supporting it without some strong barrier against
the instability of legislative Assemblies. He suggested
the idea of requiring three fourths of each
house to repeal laws where the President should not
concur. He had no great reliance on the revisionary
power as the Executive was now to be constituted
(elected by Congress.) The legislature will contrive
to soften down the President. He recited the history
of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the
legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the
distressing effects of such measures before their eyes.
Were the National legislature formed, and a war was.
now to break out, this ruinous expedient would be
again resorted to, if not guarded against. The requiring
3/4 to repeal would, though not a compleat
remedy, prevent the hasty passage of laws, and the
frequency of those repeals which destroy faith in the
public, and which are among our greatest calamities.

Mr. Dickenson was strongly impressed with the
remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges
to set aside the law. He thought no such power
ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss
what expedient to substitute. The Justiciary of
Arragon he observed became by degrees the lawgiver.

Mr. Govr. Morris, suggested the expedient of an
absolute negative in the Executive. He could not
agree that the Judiciary which was part of the Executive,
should be bound to say that a direct violation
of the Constitution was law. A controul over the
legislature might have its inconveniences. But view
the danger on the other side. The most virtuous
Citizens will often as members of a legislative body
concur in measures which afterwards in their private
capacity they will be ashamed of. Encroachments
of the popular branch of the Government ought to be
guarded agst. The Ephori at Sparta became in the
end absolute. The Report of the Council of Censors
in Pennsylva. points out the many invasions of the
legislative department on the Executive numerous
as the latter[30] is, within the short term of seven years,
and in a State where a strong party is opposed to the
Constitution, and watching every occasion of turning
the public resentments agst. it. If the Executive
be overturned by the popular branch, as happened
in England, the tyranny of one man will ensue. In
Rome where the Aristocracy overturned the throne,

the consequence was different. He enlarged on the
tendency of the legislative Authority to usurp on the
Executive and wished the section to be postponed,
in order to consider of some more effectual check
than requiring 2/3 only to overrule the negative of the
Executive.

Mr. Sharman. Can one man be trusted better
than all the others if they all agree? This was
neither wise nor safe. He disapproved of Judges
meddling in politics and parties. We have gone far
enough in forming the negative as it now stands.

Mr. Carrol. when the negative to be overruled by
2/3 only was agreed to, the quorum was not fixed. He
remarked that as a majority was now to be the
quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller house
might carry points. The advantage that might be
taken of this seemed to call for greater impediments
to improper laws. He thought the controuling
power however of the Executive could not be well
decided, till it was seen how the formation of that
department would be finally regulated. He wished
the consideration of the matter to be postponed.

Mr. Ghorum saw no end to these difficulties and
postponements. Some could not agree to the form
of Government before the powers were defined.
Others could not agree to the powers till it was seen
how the Government was to be formed. He thought
a majority as large a quorum as was necessary. It
was the quorum almost every where fixt in the
U. States.

Mr. Wilson; after viewing the subject with all the

coolness and attention possible was most apprehensive
of a dissolution of the Govt. from the legislature
swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked
that the prejudices agst. the Executive resulted from
a misapplication of the adage that the parliament
was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive
was really formidable, King and Tyrant, were naturally
associated in the minds of people; not legislature
and tyranny. But where the Executive was not formidable,
the two last were most properly associated.
After the destruction of the King in Great Britain,
a more pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the
parliament than had been exercised by the monarch.
He insisted that we had not guarded agst. the danger
on this side by a sufficient self-defensive power
either to the Executive or Judiciary department.

Mr. Rutlidge was strenuous agst. postponing; and
complained much of the tediousness of the proceedings.

Mr. Elseworth held the same language. We grow
more & more sceptical as we proceed. If we do not
decide soon, we shall be unable to come to any
decision.

The question for postponement passed in the
negative: Del: & Maryd. only being in the affirmative.

Mr. Williamson moved to change, "2/3 of each
House" into "3/4" as requisite to overrule the dissent
of the President. He saw no danger in this, and
preferred giving the power to the Presidt. alone, to
admitting the Judges into the business of legislation.

Mr. Wilson 2ds. the motion; referring to and repeating
the ideas of Mr. Carroll.

On this motion for 3/4, instead of two-thirds; it
passed in the affirmative

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pena.
divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

Mr. Madison, observing that if the negative of the
President was confined to bills; it would be evaded
by acts under the form and name of Resolutions,
votes &c, proposed that" or resolve" should be added
after "bill" in the beginning of sect 13. with an
exception as to votes of adjournment &c. After
a short and rather confused conversation on the
subject, the question was put & rejected, the States
being as follows,

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena.
no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

"Ten days (Sundays excepted)" instead of "seven"
were allowed to the President for returning bills with
his objections N. H. & Mas: only voting agst. it.

The 13 Sect: of Art. VI as amended was then
agreed to.

Adjourned.

Thursday, August 16. in Convention.

Mr. Randolph having thrown into a new form the
motion putting votes, Resolutions &c. on a footing

with Bills, renewed it as follows—"Every order resolution
or vote, to which the concurrence of the
Senate & House of Reps. may be necessary (except
on a question of adjournment and in the cases hereinafter
mentioned) shall be presented to the President
for his revision; and before the same shall have
force shall be approved by him, or being disapproved
by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House of
Reps. according to the rules & limitations prescribed
in the case of a Bill."

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary, except as to
votes taking money out of the Treasury which might
be provided for in another place.

On Question as moved by Mr. Randolph

N. H. ay. Mass. not present. Ct. ay. N. J. no.
Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

The Amendment was made section 14. of Art. VI.

Art: VII. Sect. 1. taken up.

Mr. L. Martin asked what was meant by the Committee
of detail in the expression,—"duties" and
"imposts." If the meaning were the same, the former
was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought
to be made clear.

Mr. Wilson. duties are applicable to many objects
to which the word imposts does not relate.
The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former
extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties
&c.

Mr. Carroll reminded the Convention of the great
difference of interests among the States, and doubts

the propriety in that point of view of letting a majority
be a quorum.

Mr. Mason urged the necessity of connecting with
the power of levying taxes duties &c, the prohibition
in Sect. 4 Art. VI that no tax should be laid on exports.
He was unwilling to trust to its being done
in a future article. He hoped the Northn. States did
not mean to deny the Southern this security. It
would hereafter be as desirable to the former when
the latter should become the most populous. He
professed his jealousy for the productions of the
Southern or as he called them, the staple States.
He moved to insert the following amendment: "provided
that no tax duty or imposition shall be laid by
the Legislature of the U. States on articles exported
from any State"

Mr. Sherman had no objection to the proviso here,
other than it would derange the parts of the report
as made by the Committee, to take them in such an
order.

Mr. Rutlidge. It being of no consequence in what
order points are decided, he should vote for the clause
as it stood, but on condition that the subsequent part
relating to negroes should also be agreed to.

Mr. Governeur Morris considered such a proviso
as inadmissible any where. It was so radically objectionable,
that it might cost the whole system the
support of some members. He contended that it
would not in some cases be equitable to tax imports
without taxing exports; and that taxes on exports
would be often the most easy and proper of the two.

Mr. Madison. 1. the power of laying taxes on exports
is proper in itself, and as the States cannot
with propriety exercise it separately, it ought to be
vested in them collectively. 2. it might with particular
advantage be exercised with regard to articles
in which America was not rivalled in foreign markets,
as Tob°. &c The contract between the French Farmers
Genl. and Mr. Morris stipulating that if taxes sd.
be laid in america on the export of Tob°. they sd. be
paid by the Farmers, shewed that it was understood
by them, that the price would be thereby raised in
America, and consequently the taxes be paid by the
European Consumer. 3. it would be unjust to the
States whose produce was exported by their neighbours,
to leave it subject to be taxed by the latter.
This was a grievance which had already filled N. H.
Cont. N. Jery. Del: and N. Carolina with loud complaints,
as it related to imports, and they would be
equally authorized by taxes by the States on exports.
4. The Southn. States being most in danger and most
needing naval protection, could the less complain if
the burthen should be somewhat heaviest on them.
5. we are not providing for the present moment only,
and time will equalize the situation of the States in this
matter. He was for these reasons agst. the motion.

Mr. Williamson considered the clause proposed agst.
taxes on exports as reasonable and necessary.

Mr. Elseworth was agst. Taxing exports; but
thought the prohibition stood in the most proper
place, and was agst. deranging the order reported by
the Committee.

Mr. Wilson was decidedly agst. prohibiting general
taxes on exports. He dwelt on the injustice and
impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c any
longer subject to the exactions of their commercial
neighbours.

Mr. Gerry thought the legislature could not be
trusted with such a power. It might ruin the
Country. It might be exercised partially, raising
one and depressing another part of it.

Mr. Govr. Morris. However the legislative power
may be formed, it will if disposed be able to ruin the
Country. He considered the taxing of exports to
be in many cases highly politic Virginia has found
her account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having
peculiar articles tax the exportation of them; as
France her wines and brandies. A tax here on
lumber, would fall on the W. Indies & punish their
restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live
stock and in some degree of flour. In case of a
dearth in the West Indies, we may extort what we
please. Taxes on exports are a necessary source of
revenue. For a long time the people of America
will not have money to pay direct taxes. Seize
and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.

Mr. Mercer was strenuous against giving Congress
power to tax exports. Such taxes are impolitic, as
encouraging the raising of articles not meant for exportation.
The States had now a right where their
situation permitted, to tax both the imports and the
exports of their uncommercial neighbours. It was

enough for them to sacrifice one half of it. It had
been said the Southern States had most need of
naval protection. The reverse was the case. Were
it not for promoting the carrying trade of the Northn.
States, the Southn. States could let the trade go into
foreign bottoms, where it would not need our protection.
Virginia by taxing her tobacco had given
an advantage to that of Maryland.

Mr. Sherman. To examine and compare the States
in relation to imports and exports will be opening a
boundless field. He thought the matter had been
adjusted, and that imports were to be subject, and
exports not, to be taxed. He thought it wrong to
tax exports except it might be such articles as ought
not to be exported. The complexity of the business
in America would render an equal tax on exports
impracticable. The oppression of the uncommercial
States was guarded agst. by the power to regulate
trade between the States. As to compelling foreigners,
that might be done by regulating trade in
general. The Government would not be trusted
with such a power. Objections are most likely to
be excited by considerations relating to taxes &
money. A power to tax exports would shipwreck
the whole.

Mr. Carrol was surprised that any objection should
be made to an exception of exports from the power
of taxation.

It was finally agreed that the question concerning
exports shd. lie over for the place in which the exception
stood in the report: Maryd. alone voting agst. it

Sect: 1. (Art. VII) agreed to; Mr. Gerry alone
answering, no.

Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations
&c. agreed to nem. con.
for coining money, agd. to nem. con.
for regulating foreign coin. d°. d°.
for fixing standard of weights & measures.
d°. d°.

"To establish post-offices," Mr. Gerry moved to
add, and post-roads. Mr. Mercer 2ded. & on question
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "and emit
bills on the credit of the U. States"—If the United
States had credit such bills would be unnecessary; if
they had not, unjust & useless.

Mr. Butler, 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Madison, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the
making them a tender? This will remove the temptation
to emit them with unjust views. And promissory
notes in that shape may in some emergencies be
best.

Mr. Govr. Morris, striking out the words will leave
room still for notes of a responsible minister which
will do all the good without the mischief. The
Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government,
if paper emissions be not prohibited.

Mr. Ghorum was for striking out, without inserting
any prohibition, if the words stand they may suggest
and lead to the measure.

Col. Mason had doubts on the subject. Congs. he
thought would not have the power unless it were
expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred to
paper money, yet as he could not forsee all emergencies,
he was unwilling to tie the hands of the
Legislature. He observed that the late war could
not have been carried on, had such a prohibition
existed.

Mr. Ghorum. The power as far as it will be
necessary or safe, is involved in that of borrowing.

Mr. Mercer was a friend to paper money, though in
the present state & temper of America, he should
neither propose nor approve of such a measure. He
was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it
altogether. It will stamp suspicion on the Government
to deny it a discretion on this point. It was
impolitic also to excite the opposition of all those
who were friends to paper money. The people of
property would be sure to be on the side of the plan,
and it was impolitic to purchase their further attachment
with the loss of the opposite class of
Citizens.

Mr. Elseworth thought this a favorable moment to
shut and bar the door against paper money. The
mischiefs of the various experiments which had been
made, were now fresh in the public mind and had
excited the disgust of all the respectable part of
America. By withholding the power from the new
Governt. more friends of influence would be gained
to it than by almost any thing else. Paper money
can in no case be necessary. Give the Government

credit, and other resources will offer. The power
may do harm, never good.

Mr. Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to
paper money, could not agree to strike out the words,
as he could not foresee all the occasions that might
arise.

Mr. Wilson. It will have a most salutary influence
on the credit of the U. States to remove the possibility
of paper money. This expedient can never
succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered. And
as long as it can be resorted to, it will be a bar to
other resources.

Mr. Butler remarked that paper was a legal tender
in no Country in Europe. He was urgent for disarming
the Government of such a power.

Mr. Mason was still averse to tying the hands of the
Legislature altogether. If there was no example in
Europe as just remarked it might be observed on the
other side, that there was none in which the Government
was restrained on this head.

Mr. Read, thought the words, if not struck; out,
would be as alarming as the mark of the Beast in
Revelations.

Mr. Langdon had rather reject the whole plan than
retain the three words (" and emit bills")

On the motion for striking out

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay.[31] N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The clause for borrowing money, agreed to nem.
con.

Adjd.

Friday August 17th. in Convention

Art. VII. Sect. 1. resumed. on the clause, "to
appoint Treasurer by ballot,"

Mr. Ghorum moved to insert "joint" before ballot,
as more convenient as well as reasonable, than to
require the separate concurrence of the Senate.

Mr. Pinkney 2ds. the motion. Mr. Sherman opposed
it as favoring the larger States.

Mr. Read moved to strike out the clause, leaving
the appointment of the Treasurer as of other officers
to the Executive. The Legislature was an improper
body for appointments. Those of the State legislatures
were a proof of it. The Executive being responsible
would make a good choice.

Mr. Mercer 2ds. the motion of Mr. Read.

On the motion for inserting the word "joint" before
ballot

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason in opposition to Mr. Reads motion desired
it might be considered to whom the money
would belong; if to the people, the legislature representing

the people ought to appoint the keepers
of it.

On striking out the clause as amended by inserting
"Joint"

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

"To constitute inferior tribunals" agreed to nem.
con.

"To make rules as to captures on land & water"
d°. d°.

"To declare the law and punishment of piracies
and felonies &c &c" considered.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out "and punishment
&c."

Mr. Mason doubts the safety of it, considering the
strict rule of construction in criminal cases. He
doubted also the propriety of taking the power in all
these cases wholly from the States.

Mr. Governr. Morris thought it would be necessary
to extend the authority further, so as to provide for
the punishment of counterfeiting in general. Bills of
exchange for example might be forged in one State
and carried into another.

It was suggested by some other member that foreign
paper might be counterfeited by Citizens; and
that it might be politic to provide by national authority
for the punishment of it.

Mr. Randolph did not conceive that expunging
" the punishment" would be a constructive exclusion
of the power. He doubted only the efficacy of the
word "declare."

Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. Strictness
was not necessary in giving authority to enact penal
laws; though necessary in enacting & expounding
them.

On motion for striking out "and punishment" as
moved by Mr. Madison

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "declare the
law" and insert "punish" before "piracies," and on
the question

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Randolph moved to insert "define
&," before "punish."

Mr. Wilson thought "felonies" sufficiently defined
by common law.

Mr. Dickenson concurred with Mr. Wilson

Mr. Mercer was in favor of the amendment.

Mr. Madison. felony at common law is vague. It
is also defective. One defect is supplied by Stat: of
Anne as to running away with vessels which at
com̃on law was a breach of trust only. Besides no
foreign law should be a standard farther than is expressly
adopted. If the laws of the States were to
prevail on this subject, the Citizens of different
States would be subject to different punishments for
the same offence at Sea. There would be neither uniformity
nor stability in the law—The proper remedy
for all these difficulties was to vest the power proposed
by the term "define" in the Natl. legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris would prefer designate to define, the
latter being as he conceived, limited to the preexisting
meaning.

It was said by others to be applicable to the creating
of offences also, and therefore suited the case both
of felonies & of piracies. The motion of Mr. M. & Mr.
R was agreed to.

Mr. Elseworth enlarged the motion so as to read
"to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the U. States, and offences agst.
the law of Nations" which was agreed to nem.
con.

"To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application
of its legislature"

Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out, "on the application
of its legislature"

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ds.

Mr. L. Martin opposed it as giving a dangerous &
unnecessary power. The consent of the State ought
to precede the introduction of any extraneous force
whatever.

Mr. Mercer supported the opposition of Mr. Martin.

Mr. Elseworth proposed to add after "legislature,"
"or Executive."

Mr. Govr. Morris. The Executive may possibly be
at the head of the Rebellion. The Genl. Govt. should
enforce obedience in all cases where it may be
necessary.

Mr. Elseworth. In many cases The Genl. Govt.
ought not to be able to interpose, unless called upon.

He was willing to vary his motion so as to read "or
without it when the legislature cannot meet."

Mr. Gerry was agst. letting loose the myrmidons of
the U. States on a State without its own consent.
The States will be the best Judges in such cases.
More blood would have been spilt in Massts. in the
late insurrection, if the Genl. Authority had intermeddled.

Mr. Langdon was for striking out as moved by
Mr. Pinkney. The apprehension of the national
force, will have a salutary effect in preventing insurrections.

Mr. Randolph. If the Natl. Legislature is to judge
whether the State legislature can or cannot meet,
that amendment would make the clause as objectionable
as the motion of Mr. Pinkney.

Mr. Govr. Morris. We are acting a very strange
part. We first form a strong man to protect us, and
at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him.
The legislature may surely be trusted with such a
power to preserve the public tranquillity.

On the motion to add, "or without it (application)
when the legislature cannot meet"

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. Pa. divd. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. So
agreed to.

Mr. Madison and Mr. Dickenson moved to insert as
explanatory, after "State"—"against the Government
thereof" There might be a rebellion agst. the
U. States—which was agreed to nem. con.

On the clause as amended

N. H. ay. Mass.[32] abst. Ct. ay. Pen. abst. Del.
no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg.
ay—so it was lost

"To make war"

Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the
Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd.
meet but once a year. the Hs. of Reps. would be too
numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would
be the best depository, being more acquainted with
foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.
If the States are equally represented in the
Senate, so as to give no advantage to the large
States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as
the small have their all at stake in such cases as well
as the large States. It would be singular for one
authority to make war, and another peace.

Mr. Butler. The Objections agst. the Legislature lie
in a great degree agst. the Senate. He was for vesting
the power in the President, who will have all the
requisite qualities, and will not make war but when
the Nation will support it.

Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare,"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive
the power to repel sudden attacks.

Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well. The
Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence
war. "Make" is better than "declare" the latter
narrowing the power too much.

Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion
to empower the Executive alone to declare war.

Mr. Elsworth. There is a material difference between
the cases of making war and making peace.
It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into it.
War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended
with intricate & secret negociations.

Mr. Mason was agst. giving the power of war to the
Executive because not safely to be trusted with it;
or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to
be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than
facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred
"declare" to "make".

On the motion to insert "declare"—in place of
"make," it was agreed to.

N. H. no. Mass. abst. Cont. no.[33] Pa. ay. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Pinkney's motion to strike out whole clause,
disagd. to without call of States.

Mr. Butler moved to give the Legislature the
power of peace, as they were to have that of war.

Mr. Gerry 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise
the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all
should be present; and may consequently give up
part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to
be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.

On the motion for adding "and peace" after
"war,"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md.
no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Adjourned

Saturday August 18. in Convention

Mr. Madison submitted, in order to be referred to the
Committee of detail the following powers as proper
to be added to those of the General Legislature

"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U.
States"

"To institute temporary Governments for new
States arising therein"

"To regulate affairs with the Indians as well
within as without the limits of the U. States.

"To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at
the seat of the General Government, and over a
district around the same, not exceeding—
square miles; the Consent of the Legislature of the
State or States comprising the same, being first obtained"

"To grant charters of incorporation in cases where
the public good may require them, and the authority
of a single State may be incompetent"

"To secure to literary authors their copy rights
for a limited time"

"To establish an University"

"To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement
of useful knowledge and discoveries"

"To authorize the Executive to procure and hold

for the use of the U. S. landed property for the erection
of Forts, magazines, and other necessary buildings"

These propositions were referred to the Committee
of detail which had prepared the Report and
at the same time the following which were moved
by Mr. Pinkney:—in both cases unanimously:

"To fix and permanently establish the seat of
Government of the U. S. in which they shall possess
the exclusive right of soil & jurisdiction"

"To establish seminaries for the promotion of
literature and the arts & sciences."

"To grant charters of incorporation"

"To grant patents for useful inventions"

"To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain
time"

"To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities
for the promotion of agriculture, commerce,
trades and manufactures"

"That funds which shall be appropriated for the
payment of public Creditors, shall not during the
time of such appropriation, be diverted or applied to
any other purpose and that the Committee prepare
a clause or clauses for restraining the Legislature of
the U. S. from establishing a perpetual revenue"

"To secure the payment of the public debt"

"To secure all creditors under the new Constitution
from a violation of the public faith when pledged
by the authority of the Legislature"

"To grant letters of mark and reprisal"

"To regulate Stages on the post roads"

Mr. Mason introduced the subject of regulating the
militia. He thought such a power necessary to be
given to the Genl. Government. He hoped there
would be no standing army in time of peace, unless
it might be for a few garrisons. The Militia ought
therefore to be the more effectually prepared for the
public defence. Thirteen States will never concur in
any one system, if the disciplining of the Militia be
left in their hands. If they will not give up the
power over the whole, they probably will over a part
as a select militia. He moved as an addition to the
propositions just referred to the Comittee of detail,
& to be referred in like manner, "a power to regulate
the militia."

Mr. Gerry remarked that some provision ought to be
made in favor of public Securities, and something inserted
concerning letters of marque, which he thought
not included in the power of war. He proposed that
these subjects should also go to a Committee.

Mr. Rutlidge moved to refer a clause "that funds
appropriated to public creditors should not be diverted
to other purposes."

Mr. Mason was much attached to the principle, but
was afraid such a fetter might be dangerous in time
of war. He suggested the necessity of preventing
the danger of perpetual revenue which must of necessity
subvert the liberty of any country. If it be
objected to on the principle of Mr. Rutlidge's motion
that public Credit may require perpetual provisions,
that case might be excepted; it being declared that
in other cases, no taxes should be laid for a longer

term than—years. He considered the caution
observed in Great Britain on this point as the paladium
of public liberty.

Mr. Rutlidge's motion was referred—He then
moved that a Grand Committee be appointed to
consider the necessity and expediency of the U.
States assuming all the State debts—A regular settlement
between the Union & the several States
would never take place. The assumption would be
just as the State debts were contracted in the common
defence. It was necessary, as the taxes on imports
the only sure source of revenue were to be
given up to the Union. It was politic, as by disburdening
the people of the State debts it would
conciliate them to the plan.

Mr. King and Mr. Pinkney seconded the motion.
(Col. Mason interposed a motion that the Committee
prepare a clause for restraining perpetual revenue,
which was agreed to nem. con.)

Mr. Sherman thought it would be better to authorize
the Legislature to assume the State debts, than
to say positively it should be done. He considered
the measure as just and that it would have a good
effect to say something about the matter.

Mr. Elseworth differed from Mr. Sherman. As far
as the State debts ought in equity to be assumed, he
conceived that they might and would be so.

Mr. Pinkney observed that a great part of the State
debts were of such a nature that although in point of
policy and true equity they ought, yet would they
not be viewed in the light of federal expenditures.

Mr. King thought the matter of more consequence
than Mr. Elseworth seemed to do; and that it was
well worthy of commitment. Besides the considerations
of justice and policy which had been mentioned,
it might be remarked that the State Creditors an
active and formidable party would otherwise be opposed
to a plan which transferred to the Union the
best resources of the States without transferring the
State debts at the same time. The State Creditors
had generally been the strongest foes to the impost-plan.
The State debts probably were of greater
amount than the federal. He would not say that
it was practicable to consolidate the debts, but he
thought it would be prudent to have the subject considered
by a Committee

On Mr. Rutlidge's motion, that a Come. be appointed
to consider of the assumption &c N. H. no. Mass. ay.
Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry's motion to provide for public securities,
for stages on post roads, and for letters of marque &
reprisal, were committed nem. con.

Mr. King suggested that all unlocated lands of particular
States ought to be given up if State debts
were to be assumed:—Mr. Williamson concurred in
the idea.

A Grand Committee was appointed consisting of
Mr. Langdon, Mr. King, Mr. Sharman, Mr. Livingston,
Mr. Clymer, Mr. Dickenson, Mr. Mc. Henry, Mr. Mason,
Mr. Williamson, Mr. C. C. Pinkney, Mr. Baldwin.

Mr. Rutlidge remarked on the length of the Session,

the probable impatience of the public and the extreme
anxiety of many members of the Convention
to bring the business to an end; concluding with a
motion that the Convention meet henceforward precisely
at 10 Oc A. M. and that precisely at 4 Oc P. M.
the President adjourn the House without motion for
the purpose, and that no motion to adjourn sooner
be allowed

On this question

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Elseworth observed that a Council had not
yet been provided for the President. He conceived
there ought to be one. His proposition was that it
should be composed of the President of the Senate,
the Chief Justice, and the ministers as they might be
estabd. for the departments of foreign & domestic
affairs, war finance and marine. who should advise
but not conclude the President.

Mr. Pinkney wished the proposition to lie over, as
notice had been given for a like purpose by Mr. Govr.
Morris who was not then on the floor. His own idea
was that the President shd. be authorized to call for
advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able
Council and it will thwart him; a weak one and he
will shelter himself under their sanction.

Mr. Gerry was agst. letting the heads of the Departments,
particularly of finance have any thing to do
in business connected with legislation. He mentioned
the Chief Justice also as particularly exceptionable.

These men will also be so taken up
with other matters as to neglect their own proper
duties.

Mr. Dickenson urged that the great appointments
should be made by the Legislature in which case
they might properly be consulted by the Executive,
but not if made by the Executive himself—This subject
by general consent lay over; & the House proceeded
to the clause "To raise armies."

Mr. Ghorum moved to add "and support" after
"raise." Agreed to nem. con. and then the clause
was agreed to nem. con. as amended

Mr. Gerry took notice that there was no check here
agst. standing armies in time of peace. The existing
Congs. is so constructed that it cannot of itself maintain
an army. This wd. not be the case under the
new system. The people were jealous on this head,
and great opposition to the plan would spring from
such an omission. He suspected that preparations
of force were now making agst. it. (he seemed to
allude to the activity of the Govr. of N. York at this
crisis in disciplining the militia of that State.) He
thought an army dangerous in time of peace & could
never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite
number. He proposed that there shall not be kept
up in time of peace more than—thousand troops.
His idea was that the blank should be filled with two
or three thousand.

Instead of "to build and equip fleets"—"to provide
and maintain a navy" agreed to nem. con. as a
more convenient definition of the power.

"To make rules for the Government and regulation
of the land & naval forces," added from the
existing Articles of Confederation.

Mr. L. Martin and Mr. Gerry now regularly moved
"provided that in time of peace the army shall not
consist of more than—thousand men."

Genl. Pinkney asked whether no troops were ever
to be raised untill an attack should be made on us?

Mr. Gerry. if there be no restriction, a few States
may establish a military Govt.

Mr. Williamson, reminded him of Mr. Mason's motion
for limiting the appropriation of revenue as the best
guard in this case.

Mr. Langdon saw no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust
of the Representatives of the people.

Mr. Dayton, preparations for war are generally
made in peace; and a standing force of some sort
may, for ought we know, become unavoidable. He
should object to no restrictions consistent with
these ideas.

The motion of Mr. Martin and Mr. Gerry was disagreed
to nem. con.

Mr. Mason moved as an additionl power "to make
laws for the regulation and discipline of the militia
of the several States, reserving to the States the appointment
of the officers." He considered uniformity
as necessary in the regulation of the Militia
throughout the Union.

Genl. Pinkney mentioned a case during the war in
which a dissimilarity in the militia of different States
had produced the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity

was essential. The States would never keep
up a proper discipline of their militia.

Mr. Elseworth was for going as far in submitting the
militia to the Genl. Government as might be necessary,
but thought the motion of Mr. Mason went too
far. He moved that the militia should have the
same arms & exercise and be under rules established
by the Genl. Govt. when in actual service of the U.
States and when States neglect to provide regulations
for militia, it shd. be regulated & established by
the Legislature of U. S. The whole authority over
the militia ought by no means to be taken away
from the States whose consequence would pine away
to nothing after such a sacrifice of power. He
thought the Genl. Authority could not sufficiently
pervade the Union for such a purpose, nor could it
accommodate itself to the local genius of the people.
It must be vain to ask the States to give the Militia
out of their hands.

Mr. Sherman 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Dickenson. We are come now to a most important
matter, that of the sword. His opinion was
that the States never would nor ought to give up all
authority over the Militia. He proposed to restrain
the general power to one fourth part at a time, which
by rotation would discipline the whole Militia.

Mr. Butler urged the necessity of Submitting the
whole Militia to the general Authority, which had
the care of the general defence.

Mr. Mason. had suggested the idea of a select militia.
He was led to think that would be in fact as much as

the Genl. Govt. could advantageously be charged with.
He was afraid of creating insuperable objections to
the plan. He withdrew his original motion, and
moved a power "to make laws for regulating and
disciplining the militia, not exceeding one tenth part
in any one year, and reserving the appointment of
officers to the States."

Genl. Pinkney, renewed Mr. Mason's original motion.
For a part to be under the Genl. and a part
under the State Govts. wd. be an incurable evil. he
saw no room for such distrust of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. Langdon 2ds. General Pinkney's renewal. He
saw no more reason to be afraid of the Genl. Govt. than
of the State Govts. He was more apprehensive of the
confusion of the different authorities on this subject,
than of either.

Mr. Madison thought the regulation of the Militia
naturally appertaining to the authority charged with
the public defence. It did not seem in its nature to
be divisible between two distinct authorities. If the
States would trust the Genl. Govt. with a power over
the public treasure, they would from the same consideration
of necessity grant it the direction of the
public force. Those who had a full view of the public
situation wd. from a sense of the danger, guard agst. it:
the States would not be separately impressed with
the general situation, nor have the due confidence
in the concurrent exertions of each other.

Mr. Elseworth, considered the idea of a select
militia as impracticable; & if it were not it would
be followed by a ruinous declension of the great body

of the Militia. The States would never submit to
the same militia laws. Three or four shillings as a
penalty will enforce better obedience in New England,
than forty lashes in some other places.

Mr. Pinkney thought the power such an one as
could not be abused, and that the States would see
the necessity of surrendering it. He had however
but a scanty faith in Militia. There must be also a
real military force. This alone can effectually answer
the purpose. The United States had been making an
experiment without it, and we see the consequence
in their rapid approaches toward anarchy.[34]

Mr. Sherman, took notice that the States might
want their militia for defence agst. invasions and insurrections,
and for enforcing obedience to their laws.
They will not give up this point. In giving up that
of taxation, they retain a concurrent power of raising
money for their own use.

Mr. Gerry thought this the last point remaining to
be surrendered. If it be agreed to by the Convention,
the plan will have as black a mark as was set
on Cain. He had no such confidence in the Genl.
Govt. as some gentlemen possessed, and believed it
would be found that the States have not.

Col. Mason, thought there was great weight in the
remarks of Mr. Sherman, and moved an exception to
his motion "of such part of the militia as might be
required by the States for their own use."

Mr. Read doubted the propriety of leaving the appointment
of the Militia officers in the States. In
some States they are elected by the Legislatures; in
others by the people themselves. He thought at
least an appointment by the State Executives ought
to be insisted on.

On committing to the grand Committee last appointed,
the latter motion of Col. Mason, & the
original one revived by Ge1. Pinkney

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

Monday August 20. in Convention

Mr. Pinkney submitted to the House, in order to be
referred to the Committee of detail, the following
propositions—" Each House shall be the judge of its
own privileges, and shall have authority to punish
by imprisonment every person violating the same,
or who, in the place where the Legislature may be
sitting and during the time of its Session, shall
threaten any of its members for any thing said or
done in the House; or who shall assault any of them
therefor—or who shall assault or arrest any witness
or other person ordered to attend either of the
Houses in his way going or returning; or who shall
rescue any person arrested by their order."

"Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the
supreme Executive shall have authority to require

the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions"

"The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas
corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the
most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not
be suspended by the Legislature except upon the
most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited
time not exceeding—months."

"The liberty of the Press, shall be inviolably preserved"

"No troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but
by consent of the Legislature"

"The military shall always be subordinate to the
Civil power, and no grants of money shall be made
by the Legislature for supporting military Land
forces, for more than one year at a time"

"No soldier shall be quartered in any house in
time of peace without consent of the owner."

"No person holding the office of President of the
U. S. a Judge of their supreme Court, Secretary for
the department of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, of
Marine, of War, or of—, shall be capable of holding
at the same time any other office of Trust or
emolument under the U. S. or an individual State."

"No religious test or qualification shall ever be
annexed to any oath of office under the authority of
the U. S."

"The U. S. shall be forever considered as one
Body corporate and politic in law, and entitled to all
the rights privileges and immunities, which to Bodies
corporate ought to or do appertain"

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have the power
of making the Great Seal which shall be kept by the
President of the U. S. or in his absence by the President
of the Senate, to be used by them as the
occasion may require.—It shall be called the Great
Seal of the U. S. and shall be affixed to all laws."

"All commissions and writs shall run in the name
of the U. S."

"The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be
extended to all controversies between the U. S. and
an individual State, or the U. S. and the Citizens
of an individual State"

These propositions were referred to the Committee
of detail without debate or consideration of them by
the House.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. by Mr. Pinkney, submitted the
following propositions which were in like manner referred
to the Committee of Detail.

"To assist the President in conducting the Public
affairs there shall be a Council of State composed of the
following officers—

1.

• The Chief Justice of the Supreme
  Court, who shall from time to time recommend
  such alterations of and additions to the laws of the
  U. S. as may in his opinion be necessary to the due
  administration of Justice, and such as may promote
  useful learning and inculcate sound morality throughout
  the Union: He shall be President of the Council
  in the absence of the President.

2.

• The Secretary of Domestic affairs who shall be
  appointed by the President and hold his office during
  pleasure. It shall be his duty to attend to matters
  

  ---

  243

  
  
  
  of general police, the State of Agriculture and manufactures,
  the opening of roads and navigations, and
  the facilitating communications thro' the U. States;
  and he shall from time to time recommend such
  measures and establishments as may tend to promote
  those objects.

3.

• The Secretary of Commerce and Finance who
  shall also be appointed by the President during
  pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend all
  matters relating to the public finances, to prepare
  & report plans of revenue and for the regulation of
  expenditures, and also to recommend such things
  as may in his Judgment promote the commercial
  interests of the U. S.

4.

• The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also
  be appointed by the President during pleasure. It
  shall be his duty to correspond with all foreign
  Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, & consider such
  as may be transmitted from abroad, and generally
  to attend to the interests of the U. S. in their connections
  with foreign powers.

5.

• The Secretary of War who shall also be appointed
  by the President during pleasure. It shall
  be his duty to superintend every thing relating to the
  war Department, such as the raising and equipping
  of troops, the care of military stores, public fortifications,
  arsenals & the like—also in time of war to prepare
  & recommend plans of offence and Defence.

6.

• The Secretary of the Marine who shall also
  be appointed during pleasure—It shall be his duty
  to superintend every thing relating to the Marine
  

  ---

  244

  
  
  
  Department, the public ships, Dock Yards, naval
  Stores & arsenals—also in the time of war to prepare
  and recommend plans of offence and defence.

The President shall also appoint a Secretary of
State to hold his office during pleasure; who shall
be Secretary to the Council of State, and also public
Secretary to the President. It shall be his duty to
prepare all Public dispatches from the President
which he shall countersign

The President may from time to time submit any
matter to the discussion of the Council of State, and
he may require the written opinions of any one or
more of the members: But he shall in all cases exercise
his own judgment, and either Conform to such
opinions or not as he may think proper; and every
officer above mentioned shall be responsible for
his opinion on the affairs relating to his particular
Department.

Each of the officers above mentioned shall be
liable to impeachment & removal from office for
neglect of duty malversation or corruption"

Mr. Gerry moved "that the Committee be instructed
to report proper qualifications for the President,
and a mode of trying the Supreme Judges in
cases of impeachment.

The clause "to call forth the aid of the Militia
&c. was postponed till report should be made as to
the power over the Militia referred yesterday to the
Grand Committee of eleven.

Mr. Mason moved to enable Congress "to enact
sumptuary laws." No Government can be maintained

unless the manners be made consonant to it.
Such a discretionary power may do good and can do
no harm. A proper regulation of excises & of trade
may do a great deal but it is best to have an express
provision. It was objected to sumptuary laws that
they were contrary to nature. This was a vulgar
error. The love of distinction it is true is natural;
but the object of sumptuary laws is not to extinguish
this principle but to give it a proper direction.

Mr. Elseworth. The best remedy is to enforce
taxes & debts. As far as the regulation of eating &
drinking can be reasonable, it is provided for in the
power of taxation.

Mr. Govr. Morris argued that sumptuary laws
tended to create a landed nobility, by fixing in the
great-landholders and their posterity their present
possessions.

Mr. Gerry, the law of necessity is the best sumptuary
law.

On Motion of Mr. Mason "as to sumptuary laws"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

"And to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested, by this Constitution, in the
Government of the U. S. or any department or officer
thereof."

Mr. Madison and Mr. Pinkney moved to insert between
"laws" and "necessary" "and establish all
offices," it appearing to them liable to cavil that the
latter was not included in the former.

Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Rutlidge and Mr.
Elseworth urged that the amendment could not be
necessary.

On the motion for inserting "and establish all
office"

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del.
no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The clause as reported was then agreed to nem.
con.

Art: VII Sect. 2. concerning Treason which see.

Mr. Madison, thought the definition too narrow. It
did not appear to go as far as the Stat. of Edwd. III.
He did not see why more latitude might not be left
to the Legislature. It wd. be as safe as in the hands of
State legislatures. And it was inconvenient to bar
a discretion which experience might enlighten, and
which might be applied to good purposes as well as
be abused.

Mr. Mason was for pursuing the Stat: of Edwd. III.

Mr. Govr. Morris was for giving to the Union an exclusive
right to declare what shd. be treason. In case
of a contest between the U. S. and a particular State,
the people of the latter must under the disjunctive
terms of the clause, be traitors to one or other authority.

Mr. Randolph thought the clause defective in
adopting the words, "in adhering" only. The British
Stat: adds, "giving them aid and comfort" which
had a more extensive meaning.

Mr. Elseworth considered the definition as the same
in fact with that of the Statute.

Mr. Govr. Morris "adhering" does not go so far as
"giving aid and comfort" or the latter words may
be restrictive of "adhering," in either case the
Statute is not pursued.

Mr. Wilson held "giving aid and comfort" to be
explanatory, not operative words; and that it was
better to omit them.

Mr. Dickenson, thought the addition of "giving aid
and comfort" unnecessary & improper; being too
vague and extending too far. He wished to know
what was meant by the "testimony of two witnesses"
whether they were to be witnesses to the same overt
act or to different overt acts. He thought also that
proof of an overt act ought to be expressed as essential
in the case.

Docr. Johnson considered "giving aid & comfort"
as explanatory of "adhering" & that something
should be inserted in the definition concerning overt
acts. He contended that Treason could not be both
agst. the U. States—and individual States; being an
offence agst. the Sovereignty which can be but one in
the same community.

Mr. Madison remarked that "and" before "in adhering"
should be changed into "or" otherwise both
offences viz. of "levying war," & of adhering to the
Enemy might be necessary to constitute Treason.
He added that, as the definition here was of treason
against the U. S. it would seem that the individual
States wd. be left in possession of a concurrent power
so far as to define & punish treason particularly agst.
themselves; which might involve double punishmt.

It was moved that the whole clause be recommitted
which was lost, the votes being equally divided.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. no.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Wilson & Docr. Johnson moved, that "or any
of them," after "United States" be struck out in
order to remove the embarrassment; which was
agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Madison. This has not removed the embarrassment.
The same Act might be treason agst. the
United States as here defined—and agst. a particular
State according to its laws.

Mr. Elseworth. There can be no danger to the genl.
authority from this; as the laws of the U. States are
to be paramount.

Docr. Johnson was still of opinion there could be no
Treason agst. a particular State. It could not even
at present, as the Confederation now stands, the
Sovereignty being in the Union; much less can it be
under the proposed system.

Col. Mason. The United States will have a qualified
sovereignty only. The individual States will
retain a part of the Sovereignty. An Act may be
treason agst. a particular State which is not so agst. the
U. States. He cited the Rebellion of Bacon in Virginia
as an illustration of the doctrine.

Docr. Johnson: That case would amount to
Treason agst. the Sovereign, the Supreme Sovereign,
the United States.

Mr. King observed that the controversy relating to

Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed;
as the Legislature might punish capitally
under other names than Treason.

Mr. Govr. Morris and Mr. Randolph wished to substitute
the words of the British Statute and moved
to postpone Sect 2. art VII in order to consider the
following substitute—"Whereas it is essential to
the preservation of liberty to define precisely and
exclusively what shall constitute the crime of
Treason, it is therefore ordained, declared & established,
that if a man do levy war agst. the U. S.
within their territories, or be adherent to the enemies
of the U. S. within the said territories, giving them
aid and comfort within their territories or elsewhere,
and thereof be provably attainted of open deed by
the people of his condition, he shall be adjudged
guilty of Treason."

On this question

N. H.—Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

It was then moved to strike out "agst. United
States" after "treason" so as to define treason, generally,
and on this question

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

It was then moved to insert after "two witnesses"
the words "to the same overt act."

Docr. Franklin wished this amendment to take place.
prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and
perjury too easily made use of against innocence.

Mr. Wilson. much may be said on both sides.
Treason may sometimes be practised in such a manner,
as to render proof extremely difficult—as in a
traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.

On the question—as to some overt act

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. King moved to insert before the word "power"
the word "sole," giving the U. States the exclusive
right to declare the punishment of Treason.

Mr. Broom 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Wilson in cases of a general nature, treason
can only be agst. the U—States, and in such they
shd. have the sole right to declare the punishment—
yet in many cases it may be otherwise. The subject
was however intricate and he distrusted his present
judgment on it.

Mr. King this amendment results from the vote
defining treason generally by striking out agst. the
U. States, which excludes any treason agst. particular
States. These may however punish offences as high
misdemesnors.

On inserting the word "sole." It passed in the
negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
no—

Mr. Wilson, the clause is ambiguous now. "Sole"
ought either to have been inserted, or "against the
U. S," to be re-instated.

Mr. King no line can be drawn between levying
war and adhering to enemy agst. the U. States and
agst. an individual State—Treason agst. the latter
must be so agst. the former.

Mr. Sherman, resistance agst. the laws of the U.
States as distinguished from resistance agst. the laws
of a particular State, forms the line.

Mr. Elseworth, the U. S. are sovereign on one side
of the line dividing the jurisdictions—the States on
the other—each ought to have power to defend
their respective Sovereignties.

Mr. Dickenson, war or insurrection agst. a member
of the Union must be so agst. the whole body; but
the constitution should be made clear on this point.

The clause was reconsidered nem. con—& then Mr.
Wilson & Mr. Elseworth moved to reinstate "agst. the
U. S." after "Treason—" on which question

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Madison was not satisfied with the footing on
which the clause now stood. As Treason agst. the U.
States involves treason agst. particular States, and
vice versa, the same act may be twice tried & punished
by the different authorities. Mr. Govr. Morris
viewed the matter in the same light—

It was moved & 2ded. to amend the sentence to read
—"Treason agst. the U. S. shall consist only in levying
war against them, or in adhering to their enemies"
which was agreed to.

Col. Mason moved to insert the words "giving

them aid and comfort," as restrictive of "adhering
to their Enemies &c." the latter he thought would
be otherwise too indefinite—This motion was agreed
to: Cont.: Del: & Georgia only being in the Negative.

Mr. L. Martin moved to insert after conviction &c
—"or on confession in open court"—and on the
question (the negative States thinking the words
superfluous) it was agreed to

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. P. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Art: VII. Sect. 2, as amended was then agreed to
nem. con.

Sect. 3. taken up. "white & other" struck out
nem. con. as superfluous.

Mr. Elseworth moved to require the first census to
be taken within "three" instead of "six" years from
the first meeting of the Legislature—and on question

N. H: ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of
direct taxation? No one answd.

Mr. Gerry moved to add to the 3d. Sect. Art: VII.
the following clause "That from the first meeting of
the Legislature of the U. S. until a Census shall be
taken all monies for supplying the public Treasury
by direct taxation shall be raised from the several
States according to the number of their Representatives
respectively in the first branch"

Mr. Langdon. This would bear unreasonably hard
on N. H. and he must be agst. it.

Mr. Carrol opposed it. The number of Reps. did
not admit of a proportion exact enough for a rule of
taxation.

Before any question the House

Adjourned.

Tuesday August 21. In Convention

Governour Livingston[35] from the Committee of
Eleven to whom was referred the propositions respecting
the debts of the several States and also the
Militia entered on the 18th. inst: delivered the following
report:

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to
fulfil the engagements which have been entered into
by Congress, and to discharge as well the debts of
the U. S. as the debts incurred by the several States
during the late war, for the common defence and
general welfare"

"To make laws for organizing arming and disciplining
the militia, and for governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the U. S. reserving
to the States respectively, the appointment of the

officers, and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by the U. States"

Mr. Gerry considered giving the power only, without
adopting the obligation, as destroying the security
now enjoyed by the public creditors of the
U—States. He enlarged on the merit of this class
of citizens, and the solemn faith which had been
pledged under the existing Confederation. If their
situation should be changed as here proposed great
opposition would be excited agst. the plan. He
urged also that as the States had made different
degrees of exertion to sink their respective debts,
those who had done most would be alarmed, if they
were now to be saddled with a share of the debts of
States which had done least.

Mr. Sharman. It means neither more nor less than
the confederation as it relates to this subject.

Mr. Elseworth moved that the Report delivered in
by Govr. Livingston should lie on the table.—Agreed
to nem. con.

Art: VII. Sect. 3 resumed.—Mr. Dickinson moved
to postpone this in order to reconsider Art: IV. Sect.
4. and to limit the number of representatives to be
allowed to the large States. Unless this were done
the small States would be reduced to entire insignificancy,
and encouragement given to the importation
of slaves.

Mr. Sherman would agree to such a reconsideration,
but did not see the necessity of postponing the section
before the House.—Mr. Dickenson withdrew his
motion.

Art: VII. Sect 3. then agreed to 10 ays, Delaware
alone being no.

Mr. Sherman moved to add to Sect 3. the following
clause "And all accounts of supplies furnished, services
performed, and monies advanced by the several
States to the U. States, or by the U. S. to the
several States shall be adjusted by the same rule"

Mr. Governr. Morris 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Ghorum, thought it wrong to insert this in the
Constitution. The Legislature will no doubt do
what is right. The present Congress have such a
power and are now exercising it.

Mr. Sherman unless some rule be expressly given
none will exist under the new system.

Mr. Elseworth. Though The contracts of Congress
will be binding, there will be no rule for executing
them on the States; and one ought to be provided.

Mr. Sherman withdrew his motion to make way for
one of Mr. Williamson to add to Sect. 3. "By this rule
the several quotas of the States shall be determined
in settling the expences of the late war."

Mr. Carrol brought into view the difficulty that
might arise on this subject from the establishment of
the Constitution as intended without the unanimous
consent of the States

Mr. Williamson's motion was postponed nem. con.

Art: VI Sect. 12. which had been postponed of
Aug: 15. was now called for by Col. Mason, who
wished to know how the proposed amendment as to
money bills would be decided, before he agreed to
any further points.

Mr. Gerry's motion of yesterday that previous to a
census, direct taxation be proportioned on the
States according to the number of Representatives,
was taken up. He observed that the principal acts
of Government would probably take place within
that period, and it was but reasonable that the
States should pay in proportion to their share in
them.

Mr. Elseworth thought such a rule unjust. there
was a great difference between the number of Represents.
and the number of inhabitants as a rule in
this case. Even if the former were proportioned as
nearly as possible to the latter, it would be a very
inaccurate rule. A State might have one Representative
only that had inhabitants enough for 1 ½
or more, if fractions could be applied, &c—. He
proposed to amend the motion by adding the words,
"subject to a final liquidation by the foregoing rule
when a census shall have been taken"

Mr. Madison. The last appointment of Congs. on
which the number of Representatives was founded,
was conjectural and meant only as a temporary rule
till a Census should be established.

Mr. Read. The requisitions of Congs. had been accommodated
to the impoverishment produced by
the war; and to other local and temporary circumstances.

Mr. Williamson opposed Mr. Gerry's motion.

Mr. Langdon was not here when N. H. was allowed
three members. If it was more than her share; he
did not wish for them.

Mr. Butler contended warmly for Mr. Gerry's motion
as founded in reason and equity.

Mr. Elseworth's proviso to Mr. Gerry's motion was
agreed to nem. con.

Mr. King thought the power of taxation given to
the Legislature rendered the motion of Mr. Gerry
altogether unnecessary.

On Mr. Gerry's motion as amended

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd.. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

On a question, Shall Art: VI Sect. 12. with the
amendment to it proposed & entered on the 15 instant,
as called for by Col. Mason be now taken up?
it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. L. Martin. The power of taxation is most
likely to be critcisied by the public. Direct taxation
should not be used but in cases of absolute necessity;
and then the States will be the best Judges of the
mode. He therefore moved the following addition to
Sect: 3: Art VII "And whenever the Legislature of
the U. S. shall find it necessary that revenue should
be raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the
same, according to the above rule on the several
States, requisitions shall be made of the respective
States to pay into the Continental Treasury their
respective quotas within a time in the said requisitions
specified; and in case of any of the States

failing to comply with such requisitions, then and
then only to devise and pass acts directing the mode,
and authorizing the collection of the same."

Mr. Mc.Henry 2ded. the motion—there was no debate,
and on the question

N. H. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pena. no. Del. no.
Md. divd. (Jenifer & Carol no) Va. no. N. C. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no.

Art. VII. Sect. 4.—Mr. Langdon, by this section
the States are left at liberty to tax exports. N. H.
therefore with other non-exporting States, will be
subject to be taxed by the States exporting its produce.
This could not be admitted. It seems to be
feared that the Northern States will oppress the
trade of the Southn. This may be guarded agst. by
requiring the concurrence of ⅔ or ¾ of the legislature
in such cases.

Mr. Elseworth. It is best as it stands. The power
of regulating trade between the States will protect
them agst. each other. Should this not be the case,
the attempts of one to tax the produce of another
passing through its hands, will force a direct exportation
and defeat themselves. There are solid,
reasons agst. Congs. taxing exports. 1. it will discourage
industry, as taxes on imports discourage
luxury. 2. The produce of different States is such
as to prevent uniformity in such taxes. There are
indeed but a few articles that could be taxed at all;
as Tob°. rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would
be partial & unjust. 3. The taxing of exports would
engender incurable jealousies.

Mr. Williamson. Tho' N. C. has been taxed by
Virga. by a duty on 12000 Hhs of her Tob°. exported
thro' Virga. yet he would never agree to this power.
Should it take place, it would destroy the last hope
of an adoption of the plan.

Mr. Govr. Morris. These local considerations ought
not to impede the general interest. There is great
weight in the argument, that the exporting States
will tax the produce of their uncommercial neighbours.
The power of regulating the trade between
Pa. & N. Jersey will never prevent the former from
taxing the latter. Nor will such a tax force a direct
exportation from N. Jersey. The advantages possessed
by a large trading City, outweigh the disadvantage
of a moderate duty; and will retain the
trade in that channel. If no tax can be laid on exports,
an embargo cannot be laid though in time of
war such a measure may be of critical importance.
Tobacco, lumber and live-stock are three objects belonging
to different States, of which great advantage
might be made by a power to tax exports. To these
may be added Genseng and Masts for Ships by which
a tax might be thrown on other nations. The idea
of supplying the West Indies with lumber from Nova
Scotia is one of the many follies of lord Sheffield's
pamphlets. The State of the Country also will
change, and render duties on exports, as skins,
beaver & other peculiar raw materials, politic in the
view of encouraging American manufactures.

Mr. Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over
exports, as unjust and alarming to the staple States.

Mr. Langdon suggested a prohibition on the States
from taxing the produce of other States exported
from their harbours.

Mr. Dickenson. The power of taxing exports may
be inconvenient at present; but it must be of dangerous
consequence to prohibit it with respect to
all articles and for ever. He thought it would be
better to except particular articles from the power.

Mr. Sherman. It is best to prohibit the National
legislature in all cases. The States will never give up
all power over trade. An enumeration of particular
articles would be difficult invidious and improper

Mr. Madison As we ought to be governed by national
and permanent views, it is a sufficient argument
for giving ye. power over exports that a tax,
tho' it may not be expedient at present, may be
so hereafter. A porper regulation of exports may
& probably will be necessary hereafter, and for the
same purposes as the regulation of imports; viz,
for revenue—domestic manufactures—and procuring
equitable regulations from other nations. An
Embargo may be of absolute necessity, and can alone
be effectuated by the Genl. authority. The regulation
of trade between State and State cannot effect
more than indirectly to hinder a State from taxing
its own exports; by authorizing its Citizens to carry
their commodities freely into a neighbouring State
which might decline taxing exports in order to draw
into its channel the trade of its neighbours. As to
the fear of disproportionate burthens on the more
exporting States, it might be remarked that it was

agreed on all hands that the revenue wd. principally
be drawn from trade, and as only a given revenue
would be needed, it was not material whether all
should be drawn wholly from imports—or half from
those, and half from exports. The imports and
exports must be pretty nearly equal in every
State—and relatively the same among the different
States.

Mr. Elseworth did not conceive an embargo by the
Congress interdicted by this section.

Mr. Mc.Henry conceived that power to be included
in the power of war.

Mr. Wilson. Pennsylvania exports the produce of
Maryd. N. Jersey, Delaware & will by & by when
the River Delaware is opened, export for N. York.
In favoring the general power over exports therefore,
he opposed the particular interest of his State. He
remarked that the power had been attacked by
reasoning which could only have held good in case
the Genl. Govt. had been compelled, instead of authorized,
to lay duties on exports. To deny this
power is to take from the Common Govt. half the
regulation of trade. It was his opinion that a power
over exports might be more effectual than that over
imports in obtaining beneficial treaties of commerce

Mr. Gerry was strenuously opposed to the power
over exports. It might be made use of to compel
the States to comply with the will of the Genl. Government,
and to grant it any new powers which
might be demanded. We have given it more
power already than we know how will be exercised.

It will enable the Genl. Govt. to oppress the States as
much as Ireland is oppressed by Great Britain.

Mr. Fitzimmons[36] would be agst. a tax on exports to
be laid immediately; but was for giving a power of
laying the tax when a proper time may call for it.
This would certainly be the case when America should
become a manufacturing Country. He illustrated
his argument by the duties in G. Britain on wool &c.

Col. Mason. If he were for reducing the States to
mere corporations as seemed to be the tendency of
some arguments, he should be for subjecting their
exports as well as imports to a power of general
taxation. He went on a principle often advanced &
in which he concurred, that "a majority when interested
will oppress the minority." This maxim had
been verified by our own Legislature (of Virginia).
If we compare the States in this point of view the
8 Northern States have an interest different from
the five Southn. States; and have in one branch of
the legislature 36 votes agst. 29. and in the other in
the proportion of 8 agst. 5. The Southern States had
therefore ground for their suspicions. The case of
Exports was not the same with that of imports. The
latter were the same throughout the States; the
former very different. As to Tobacco other nations
do raise it, and are capable of raising it as well as
Virga. &c. The impolicy of taxing that article had
been demonstrated by the experiment of Virginia.

Mr. Clymer[37] remarked that every State might
reason with regard to its particular productions, in
the same manner as the Southern States. The middle
States may apprehend an oppression of their
wheat flour, provisions &c. and with more reason,
as these articles were exposed to a competition in
foreign markets not incident to Tob°. rice &c. They
may apprehend also combinations agst. them between
the Eastern & Southern States as much as the latter
can apprehend them between the Eastern & middle.
He moved as a qualification of the power of taxing
Exports that it should be restrained to regulations of
trade by inserting after the word "duty" sect 4
art VII the words, "for the purpose of revenue."

On Question on Mr. Clymer's motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Madison. In order to require ⅔n of each House
to tax exports, as a lesser evil than a total prohibition
moved to insert the words "unless by consent
of two thirds of the Legislature"

Mr. Wilson 2ds. and on this question, it passed in
the Negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no (Col. Mason, Mr. Randolph
Mr. Blair no. Genl. Washington & J. M. ay.)
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Question on Sect: 4. Art VII. as far as to "no tax
shl. be laid on exports—it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. (Genl. W. & J. M. no) N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. L. Martin, proposed to vary the Sect: 4. art VII
so as to allow a prohibition or tax on the importation
of slaves. 1. as five slaves are to be counted
as 3 free men in the apportionment of Representatives;
such a clause would leave an encouragement to
this trafic. 2 slaves weakened one part of the Union
which the other parts were bound to protect; the
privilege of importing them was therefore unreasonable.
3. it was inconsistent with the principles of
the revolution and dishonorable to the American
character to have such a feature in the Constitution.

Mr. Rutlidge did not see how the importation of
slaves could be encouraged by this section. He was
not apprehensive of insurrections and would readily
exempt the other States from the obligation to
protect the Southern against them. Religion & humanity
had nothing to do with this question. Interest
alone is the governing principle with nations.
The true question at present is whether the Southn.
States shall or shall not be parties to the Union. If
the Northern States consult their interest, they will
not oppose the increase of slaves which will increase
the commodities of which they will become the
carriers.

Mr. Elseworth was for leaving the clause as it
stands, let every State import what it pleases. The

morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging
to the States themselves. What enriches a
part enriches the whole, and the States are the best
judges of their particular interest. The old confederation
had not meddled with this point, and he
did not see any greater necessity for bringing it
within the policy of the new one:

Mr. Pinkney. South Carolina can never receive
the plan if it prohibits the slave trade. In every
proposed extension of the powers of Congress, that
State has expressly & watchfully excepted that of
meddling with the importation of negroes. If the
States be all left at liberty on this subject, S. Carolina
may perhaps by degrees do of herself what is
wished, as Virginia & Maryland already have done.

Adjourned.

Wednesday August 22. in Convention.

Art VII sect 4. resumed. Mr. Sherman was for
leaving the clause as it stands. He disapproved of
the slave trade; yet as the States were now possessed
of the right to import slaves, as the public
good did not require it to be taken from them, & as
it was expedient to have as few objections as possible
to the proposed scheme of Government, he
thought it best to leave the matter as we find it. He
observed that the abolition of Slavery seemed to be
going on in the U. S. & that the good sense of the
several States would probably by degrees compleat

it. He urged on the Convention the necessity of
despatching its business.

Col. Mason. This infernal traffic originated in the
avarice of British Merchants. The British Govt. constantly
checked the attempts of Virginia to put a
stop to it. The present question concerns not the
importing States alone but the whole Union. The
evil of having slaves was experienced during the late
war. Had slaves been treated as they might have
been by the Enemy, they would have proved dangerous
instruments in their hands. But their folly
dealt by the slaves, as it did by the Tories. He
mentioned the dangerous insurrections of the slaves
in Greece and Sicily; and the instructions given by
Cromwell to the Commissioners sent to Virginia, to
arm the servants & slaves, in case other means of
obtaining its submission should fail. Maryland &
Virginia he said had already prohibited the importation
of slaves expressly. N. Carolina had done
the same in substance. All this would be in vain, if
S. Carolina & Georgia be at liberty to import. The
Western people are already calling out for slaves
for their new lands, and will fill that Country with
slaves if they can be got thro' S. Carolina & Georgia.
Slavery discourages arts & manufactures. The poor
despise labor when performed by slaves. They prevent
the immigration of Whites, who really enrich
& strengthen a Country. They produce the most
pernicious effect on manners. Every master of
slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment
of heaven on a Country. As nations can not

be rewarded or punished in the next world they
must be in this. By an inevitable chain of causes &
effects providence punishes national sins, by national
calamities. He lamented that some of our Eastern
brethren had from a lust of gain embarked in this
nefarious traffic. As to the States being in possession
of the Right to import, this was the case with
many other rights, now to be properly given up. He
held it essential in every point of view that the Genl.
Govt. should have power to prevent the increase of
slavery.

Mr. Elseworth. As he had never owned a slave
could not judge of the effects of slavery on character.
He said however that if it was to be considered in a
moral light we ought to go farther and free those
already in the Country.—As slaves also multiply so
fast in Virginia & Maryland that it is cheaper to
raise than import them, whilst in the sickly rice
swamps foreign supplies are necessary, if we go no
farther than is urged, we shall be unjust towards S.
Carolina & Georgia. Let us not intermeddle. As
population increases, poor laborers will be so plenty
as to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not
be a speck in our Country. Provision is already
made in Connecticut for abolishing it. And the
abolition has already taken place in Massachusetts.
As to the danger of insurrections from foreign influence,
that will become a motive to kind treatment
of the slaves.

Mr. Pinkney. If slavery be wrong, it is justified
by the example of all the world. He cited the case

of Greece Rome & other antient States; the sanction
given by France England, Holland & other modern
States. In all ages one half of mankind have been
slaves. If the S. States were let alone they will
probably of themselves stop importations. He wd.
himself as a citizen of S. Carolina vote for it. An
attempt to take away the right as proposed will produce
serious objections to the Constitution which he
wished to see adopted.

General Pinkney declared it to be his firm opinion
that if himself & all his colleagues were to sign the
Constitution & use their personal influence, it would
be of no avail towards obtaining the assent of their
Constituents. S. Carolina & Georgia cannot do
without slaves. As to Virginia she will gain by
stopping the importations. Her slaves will rise in
value, & she has more than she wants. It would be
unequal to require S. C. & Georgia to confederate on
such unequal terms. He said the Royal assent before
the Revolution had never been refused to S.
Carolina as to Virginia. He contended that the importation
of slaves would be for the interest of the
whole Union. The more slaves, the more produce
to employ the carrying trade; The more consumption
also, and the more of this, the more revenue for
the common treasury. He admitted it to be reasonable
that slaves should be dutied like other imports,
but should consider a rejection of the clause as an
exclusion of S. Carola. from the Union.

Mr. Baldwin had conceived national objects alone
to be before the Convention, not such as like the

present were of a local nature. Georgia was decided
on this point. That State has always hitherto supposed
a Genl. Governmt. to be the pursuit of the central
States who wished to have a vortex for every
thing—that her distance would preclude her from
equal advantage—& that she could not prudently
purchase it by yielding national powers. From
this it might be understood in what light she would
view an attempt to abridge one of her favorite prerogatives.
If left to herself, she may probably put
a stop to the evil. As one ground for this conjecture,
he took notice of the sect of—which he
said was a respectable class of people, who carried
their ethics beyond the mere equality of men, extending
their humanity to the claims of the whole
animal creation.

Mr. Wilson observed that if S. C. & Georgia were
themselves disposed to get rid of the importation of
slaves in a short time as had been suggested, they
would never refuse to Unite because the importation
might be prohibited. As the section now
stands all articles imported are to be taxed. Slaves
alone are exempt. This is in fact a bounty on that
article.

Mr. Gerry thought we had nothing to do with the
conduct of the States as to Slaves, but ought to be
careful not to give any sanction to it.

Mr. Dickenson considered it as inadmissible on
every principle of honor & safety that the importation
of slaves should be authorized to the States by
the Constitution. The true question was whether

the national happiness would be promoted or impeded
by the importation, and this question ought
to be left to the National Govt. not to the States
particularly interested. If Engd. & France permit
slavery, slaves are at the same time excluded from
both those kingdoms. Greece and Rome were made
unhappy by their slaves. He could not believe that
the Southn. States would refuse to confederate on
the account apprehended; especially as the power
was not likely to be immediately exercised by the
Genl. Government.

Mr. Williamson stated the law of N. Carolina on
the subject, to-wit that it did not directly prohibit
the importation of slaves. It imposed a duty of £5
on each slave imported from Africa, £10 on each
from elsewhere, & £50 on each from a State licensing
manumission. He thought the S. States could not
be members of the Union if the clause shd. be rejected,
and that it was wrong to force any thing down
not absolutely necessary, and which any State must
disagree to.

Mr. King thought the subject should be considered
in a political light only. If two States will not
agree to the Constitution as stated on one side, he
could affirm with equal belief on the other, that
great & equal opposition would be experienced from
the other States. He remarked on the exemption
of slaves from duty whilst every other import was
subjected to it, as an inequality that could not fail
to strike the commercial sagacity of the Northn. &
Middle States.

Mr. Langdon was strenuous for giving the power
to the Genl. Govt. He cd. not with a good conscience
leave it with the States who could then go on with
the traffic, without being restrained by the opinions
here given that they will themselves cease to import
slaves.

Genl. Pinkney thought himself bound to declare
candidly that he did not think S. Carolina would
stop her importations of slaves in any short time,
but only stop them occasionally as she now does.
He moved to commit the clause that slaves might
be made liable to an equal tax with other imports
which he thought right & wch. wd. remove one difficulty
that had been started.

Mr. Rutlidge. If the Convention thinks that N.
C. S. C. & Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless
their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation
is vain. The people of those States will
never be such fools as to give up so important an
interest. He was strenuous agst. striking out the
section, and seconded the motion of Genl. Pinkney for
a commitment.

Mr. Govr. Morris wished the whole subject to be
committed including the clauses relating to taxes on
exports & to a navigation act. These things may
form a bargain among the Northern & Southern
States.

Mr. Butler declared that he never would agree to
the power of taxing exports.

Mr. Sherman said it was better to let the S. States
import slaves than to part with them, if they made

that a sine qua non. He was opposed to a tax
on slaves imported as making the matter worse,
because it implied they were property. He acknowledged
that if the power of prohibiting the importation
should be given to the Genl. Government that
it would be exercised. He thought it would be its
duty to exercise the power.

Mr. Read was for the commitment provided the
clause concerning taxes on exports should also be
committed.

Mr. Sherman observed that that clause had been
agreed to & therefore could not be committed.

Mr. Randolph was for committing in order that
some middle ground might, if possible, be found.
He could never agree to the clause as it stands.
He wd. sooner risk the constitution. He dwelt on
the dilemma to which the Convention was exposed.
By agreeing to the clause, it would revolt the
Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the
States having no slaves. On the other hand, two
States might be lost to the Union. Let us then, he
said, try the chance of a commitment.

On the question for committing the remaining part
of Sect. 4 & 5. of Art: 7. N. H. no. Mass. abst.
Cont. ay N. J. ay Pa. no. Del. no Maryd. ay.
Va. ay. N. C. ay S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Langdon moved to commit Sect.
6. as to navigation act by two thirds of each House

Mr. Gorham did not see the propriety of it. Is it
meant to require a greater proportion of votes? He
desired it to be remembered that the Eastern States

had no motive to Union but a commercial one.
They were able to protect themselves. They were
not afraid of external danger, and did not need the
aid of the Southn. States.

Mr. Wilson wished for a commitment in order to
reduce the proportion of votes required.

Mr. Elseworth was for taking the plan as it is.
This widening of opinions has a threatening aspect.
If we do not agree on this middle & moderate ground
he was afraid we should lose two States, with such
others as may be disposed to stand aloof, should
fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and most
probably into several confederations and not without
bloodshed.

On Question for committing 6 Sect. as to navigation
act to a member from each State—N. H. ay. Mas.
ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The Committee appointed were Mr. Langdon,
King, Johnson, Livingston, Clymer, Dickenson, L.
Martin, Madison, Williamson, C. C. Pinkney, &
Baldwin.

To this committee were referred also the two
clauses above mentioned, of the 4 & 5. Sect: of Art. 7.

Mr. Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were
referred on the 18 & 20th. instant the propositions of
Mr. Madison & Mr. Pinkney made the Report following:[38]

"The committee report, that in their opinion the
following additions should be made to the report
now before the convention, namely,

"At the end of the first clause of the first section
of the seventh article add, 'for payment of the debts
and necessary expenses of the United States; provided
that no law for raising any branch of revenue,
except what may be specially appropriated for the
payment of interest on debts or loans, shall continue
in force for more than—years.'

"At the end of the second clause, second section,
seventh article, add, 'and with Indians, within the
limits of any state, not subject to the laws thereof.'

"At the end of the sixteenth clause of the second
section, seventh article, add, 'and to provide, as may
become necessary, from time to time, for the well
managing and securing the common property and
general interests and welfare of the United States in
such manner as shall not interfere with the governments
of individual states, in matters which respect
only their internal police, or for which their individual
authority may be competent.'

"At the end of the first section, tenth article, add,
'he shall be of the age of thirty-five years, and a
citizen of the United States, and shall have been an
inhabitant thereof for twenty-one years.'

"After the second section of the tenth article, insert
the following as a third section:

"'The President of the United States shall have
a privy council, which shall consist of the president
of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives,

the chief justice of the supreme court, and
the principal officer in the respective departments
of foreign affairs, domestic affairs, war, marine, and
finance, as such departments of office shall from time
to time be established, whose duty it shall be to
advise him in matters respecting the execution of his
office, which he shall think proper to lay before
them: but their advice shall not conclude him, nor
affect his responsibility for the measures which he
shall adopt.'

"At the end of the second section of the eleventh
article, add, 'the judges of the supreme court shall
be triable by the senate, on impeachment by the
house of representatives.'

"Between the fourth and fifth lines of the third
section of the eleventh article, after the word 'controversies,'
insert, 'between the United States and
an individual state, or the United States and an individual
person.'"

A motion to rescind the order of the House respecting
the hours of meeting & adjourning, was
negatived: Mass: Pa. Del. Mard. ay N. H. Con: N. J.
Va. N. C. S. C. Geo. no.

Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mc.Henry moved to insert after
the 2d. Sect. Art: 7, the clause following, to wit,
"The Legislature shall pass no bill of attainder nor
any ex post facto law."[39]

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of this prohibition,

which he said was greater in the National than the
State Legislature, because the number of members
in the former being fewer, they were on that account
the more to be feared.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the precaution as to ex
post facto laws unnecessary; but essential as to bills
of attainder

Mr. Elseworth contended that there was no lawyer,
no civilian who would not say that ex post facto
laws were void of themselves. It cannot then be
necessary to prohibit them.

Mr. Wilson was against inserting any thing in the
Constitution as to ex post facto laws. It will bring
reflextions on the Constitution—and proclaim that
we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation,
or are constituting a Government that will be so.

The question being divided, The first part of the
motion relating to bills of attainder was agreed to
nem contradicente.

On the second part relating to ex post facto laws—

Mr. Carrol remarked that experience overruled all
other calculations. It had proved that in whatever
light they might be viewed by civilians or others,
the State Legislatures had passed them, and they
had taken effect.

Mr. Wilson. If these prohibitions in the State
Constitutions have no effect, it will be useless to insert
them in this Constitution. Besides, both sides
will agree to the principle, and will differ as to its
application.

Mr. Williamson. Such a prohibitory clause is in

the Constitution of N. Carolina, and tho it has been,
violated, it has done good there & may do good here,
because the Judges can take hold of it.

Docr. Johnson thought the clause unnecessary, and
implying an improper suspicion of the National
Legislature.

Mr. Rutlidge was in favor of the clause.

On the question for inserting the prohibition of
ex post facto laws.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Virga. ay N. C. divd. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The report of the committee of 5. made by Mr.
Rutlidge, was taken up and then postponed that
each member might furnish himself with a copy.

The Report of the Committee of Eleven delivered
in & entered on the Journal of the 21st. inst. was then
taken up, and the first clause containing the words
"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to
fulfil the engagements which have been entered into
by Congress" being under consideration,

Mr. Elseworth argued that they were unnecessary.
The U. S. heretofore entered into Engagements by
Congs. who were their Agents. They will hereafter
be bound to fulfil them by their new agents.

Mr. Randolph thought such a provision necessary:
for though the U. States will be bound, the new
Govt. will have no authority in the case unless it be
given to them.

Mr. Madison thought it necessary to give the authority
in order to prevent misconstruction. He

mentioned the attempts made by the Debtors to British
subjects to shew that contracts under the old
Government, were dissolved by the Revolution
which destroyed the political identity of the Society.

Mr. Gerry thought it essential that some explicit
provision should be made on this subject, so that no
pretext might remain for getting rid of the public
engagements.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved by way of amendment to
substitute—"The Legislature shall discharge the
debts & fulfil the engagements of the U. States."

It was moved to vary the amendment by striking
out "discharge the debts" & to insert "liquidate the
claims," which being negatived,

The amendment moved by Mr. Govr. Morris was
agreed to all the States being in the affirmative.

It was moved & 2ded. to strike the following words
out of the 2d. clause of the report "and the authority
of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by the U. S." Before a question was
taken

The House adjourned.

Thursday in Convention Aug: 23, 1787

The Report of the Committee of Eleven made
Aug: 21. being taken up, and the following clause
being under consideration to wit "To make laws for
organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such parts of them as may be employed

in the service of the U. S. reserving to the
States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and authority of training the militia according to
the discipline prescribed"

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out the last member
"and authority of training &c. He thought it unnecessary.
The States will have this authority of
course if not given up.

Mr. Elseworth doubted the propriety of striking
out the sentence. The reason assigned applies as
well to the other reservation of the appointment to
offices. He remarked at the same time that the
term discipline was of vast extent and might be so
expounded as to include all power on the subject.

Mr. King, by way of explanation, said that by organizing,
the Committee meant, proportioning the
officers & men—by arming, specifying the kind size
& caliber of arms—& by disciplining, prescribing the
manual exercise evolutions &c.

Mr. Sherman withdrew his motion.

Mr. Gerry. This power in the U. S. as explained
is making the States drill-sergeants. He had as lief
let the Citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to
take the command from the States, and subject
them to the Genl. Legislature. It would be regarded
as a system of Despotism.

Mr. Madison observed that "arming" as explained
did not extend to furnishing arms; nor the term
"disciplining" to penalties & Courts Martial for enforcing
them.

Mr. King added to his former explanation that

arming meant not only to provide for uniformity of
arms, but included the authority to regulate the
modes of furnishing, either by the militia themselves,
the State Governments, or the National
Treasury; that laws for disciplining, must involve
penalties and every thing necessary for enforcing
penalties.

Mr. Dayton moved to postpone the paragraph, in
order to take up the following proposition

"To establish an uniform & general system of
discipline for the Militia of these States, and to make
laws for organizing, arming, disciplining & governing
such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the U. S., reserving to the States respectively the
appointment of the officers, and all authority over
the militia not herein given to the General Government"

On the question to postpone in favor of this proposition;
it passed in the Negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. P. no.
Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Elseworth & Mr. Sherman moved to postpone
the 2d. clause in favor of the following

"To establish an uniformity of arms, exercise &
organization for the militia, and to provide for the
Government of them when called into the service of
the U. States "

The object of this proposition was to refer the
plan for the Militia to the General Govt. but to leave
execution of it to the State Govts.

Mr. Langdon said he could not understand the
jealousy expressed by some Gentlemen. The General
& State Govts. were not enemies to each other,
but different institutions for the good of the people
of America. As one of the people he could say, the
National Govt. is mine, the State Govt. is mine. In
transferring power from one to the other, I only take
out of my left hand what it cannot so well use, and
put it into my right hand where it can be better
used.

Mr Gerry thought it was rather taking out of the
right hand & putting it into the left. Will any man
say that liberty will be as safe in the hands of eighty
or a hundred men taken from the whole continent,
as in the hands of two or three hundred taken from
a single State.

Mr. Dayton was against so absolute a uniformity.
In some States there ought to be a greater proportion
of cavalry than in others. In some places rifles
would be most proper, in others muskets &c.

Genl. Pinkney preferred the clause reported by the
Committee, extending the meaning of it to the case
of fines &c

Mr. Madison. The primary object is to Secure an
effectual discipline of the Militia. This will no more
be done if left to the States separately than the requisitions
have been hitherto paid by them. The
States neglect their Militia now, and the more they
are consolidated into one nation, the less each will
rely on its own interior provisions for its safety &
the less prepare its Militia for that purpose; in like

manner as the militia of a State would have been
still more neglected than it has been if each county
had been independently charged with the care of its
Militia. The Discipline of the Militia is evidently a
National concern, and ought to be provided for in
the National Constitution.

Mr. L. Martin was confident that the States would
never give up the power over the Militia; and that,
if they were to do so, the militia would be less attended
to by the Genl. than by the State Governments.

Mr. Randolph asked what danger there Could be
that the Militia could be brought into the field and
made to commit suicide on themselves. This is a
power that cannot from its nature be abused, unless
indeed the whole mass should be corrupted. He
was for trammelling the Genl. Govt. whenever there
was danger, but here there could be none. He
urged this as an essential point; observing that the
Militia were every where neglected by the State
Legislatures, the members of which courted popularity
too much to enforce a proper discipline. Leaving
the appointment of officers to the States protects
the people agst. every apprehension that could produce
murmur.

On Question on Mr. Elsworth's Motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

A motion was then made to recommit the 2d.
clause which was negatived.

On the question to agree to the 1st. part of the
clause, namely

"To make laws for organizing arming & disciplining
the Militia, and for governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the U. S."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Madison moved to amend the next part of the
clause so as to read "reserving to the States respectively,
the appointment of the officers, under the
rank of General officers"

Mr. Sherman considered this as absolutely inadmissible.
He said that if the people should be so
far asleep as to allow the most influential officers of
the militia to be appointed by the Genl. Government,
every man of discernment would rouse them by
sounding the alarm to them.

Mr. Gerry. Let us at once destroy the State Govts.
have an Executive for life or hereditary, and a
proper Senate, and then there would be some consistency
in giving full powers to the Genl. Govt. but
as the States are not to be abolished, he wondered at
the attempts that were made to give powers inconsistent
with their existence. He warned the Convention
agst. pushing the experiment too far. Some
people will support a plan of vigorous Government
at every risk. others of a more democratic cast will
oppose it with equal determination, and a Civil war
may be produced by the conflict.

Mr. Madison. As the greatest danger is that of

disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard agst. it
by sufficient powers to the Common govt. and as
the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing
armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual
provision for a good Militia.

On the Question to agree to Mr. Madison's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay[40] .

On the question to agree to the "reserving to the
States the appointment of the officers." It was
agreed to nem: contrad:

On the question on the clause "and the authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by the U. S."—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On the question to agree to Art. VII. Sect. 7. as
reported it passed nem: contrad:

Mr. Pinkney urged the necessity of preserving
foreign Ministers & other officers of the U. S. independent
of external influence and moved to insert,
after Art. VII Sect 7. the clause following—"No
person holding any office of profit or trust under the
U. S. shall without the consent of the Legislature,
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of
any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign
State which passed nem: contrad:

Mr. Rutlidge moved to amend Art: VIII to read as
follows,

"This Constitution & the laws of the U. S. made
in pursuance thereof, and all the Treaties made under
the authority of the U. S. shall be the supreme law
of the several States and of their citizens and inhabitants;
and the Judges in the several States shall
be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the
Constitutions or laws of the several States, to the
contrary notwithstanding."

which was agreed to, nem: contrad:

Art: IX being next for consideration,

Mr. Govr. Morris argued agst. the appointment of
officers by the Senate. He considered the body as
too numerous for the purpose; as subject to cabal;
and as devoid of responsibility. If Judges were to
be tried by the Senate according to a late report of
a Committee it was particularly wrong to let the
Senate have the filling of vacancies which its own
decrees were to create.

Mr. Wilson was of the same opinion & for like
reasons.

The art IX. being waved, and Art VII. Sect. 1.
resumed,

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike the following
words out of the 18 clause "enforce treaties" as
being superfluous, since treaties were to be "laws"
—which was agreed to nem: contrad:

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to alter 1st. part, of 18.
clause Sect. 1. art VII so as to read "to provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the

Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions"
—which was agreed to nem: contrad:

On the question then to agree to the 18 clause of
Sect. 1. Art: 7. as amended it passed in the affirmative
nem: contrad

Mr. C. Pinkney moved to add as an additional power
to be vested in the Legislature of the U. S. "To
negative all laws passed by the several States interfering
in the opinion of the legislature with the
general interests and harmony of the Union; "provided
that two thirds of the members of each House
assent to the same" This principle he observed had
formerly been agreed to. He considered the precaution
as essentially necessary. The objection drawn
from the predominance of the large States had been
removed by the equality established in the Senate.[41]

Mr. Broome 2ded. the proposition.

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary; the laws of
the General Government being supreme & paramount
to the State laws according to the plan, as it
now stands.

Mr. Madison proposed that it should be committed.
He had been from the beginning a friend to the principle;

but thought the modification might be made
better.

Mr. Mason wished to know how the power was to
be exercised. Are all laws whatever to be brought
up? Is no road nor bridge to be established without
the Sanction of the General Legislature? Is this to
sit constantly in order to receive & revise the State
Laws?—He did not mean by these remarks to condemn
the expedient, but he was apprehensive that
great objections would lie agst. it.

Mr. Williamson thought it unnecessary, having
been already decided, a revival of the question was
a waste of time.

Mr. Wilson considered this as the key-stone wanted
to compleat the wide arch of Government we are
raising. The power of self-defence had been urged
as necessary for the State Governments. It was
equally necessary for the General Government. The
firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient. Something
further is requisite. It will be better to prevent
the passage of an improper law, than to declare
it void when passed.

Mr. Rutlidge. If nothing else, this alone would
damn and ought to damn the Constitution. Will
any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this
manner. It is worse than making mere corporations
of them whose bye laws would not be subject to this
shackle.

Mr. Elseworth observed that the power contended
for wd. require either that all laws of the State Legislatures
should previously to their taking effect be

transmitted to the Genl. Legislature, or be repealable
by the Latter; or that the State Executives should
be appointed by the Genl. Government, and have a
controul over the State laws. If the last was meditated
let it be declared.

Mr. Pinkney declared that he thought the State
Executives ought to be so appointed with such a
controul, & that it would be so provided if another
Convention should take place.

Mr. Governr. Morris did not see the utility or practicability
of the proposition of Mr. Pinkney, but
wished it to be referred to the consideration of a
Committee.

Mr. Langdon was in favor of the proposition. He
considered it as resolvable into the question whether
the extent of the National Constitution was to be
judged of by the Genl. or the State Governments.

On the question for commitment, it passed in the
negative.

N. H. ay. Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Pinkney then withdrew his proposition.

The 1st. sect. of Art: VII being so amended as to
read "The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements
and discharge the debts of the U. S. & shall have the
power to lay & collect taxes duties imposts & excises,"
was agreed to

Mr. Butler expressed his dissatisfaction lest it
should compel payment as well to the Blood-suckers
who had speculated on the distresses of others, as to

those who had fought & bled for their country. He
would be ready he said to-morrow to vote for a
discrimination between those classes of people, and
gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration.

Art IX Sect. 1. being resumed, to wit "The
Senate of the U. S. shall have power to make treaties,
and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the
Supreme Court."

Mr. Madison observed that the Senate represented
the States alone, and that for this as well as other
obvious reasons it was proper that the President
should be an agent in Treaties.

Mr. Govr. Morris did not know that he should agree
to refer the making of Treaties to the Senate at all,
but for the present wd. move to add, as an amendment
to the section after "Treaties"—"but no
Treaty shall be binding on the U. S. which is not
ratified by a law."

Mr. Madison suggested the inconvenience of requiring
a legal ratification of treaties of alliance for the
purposes of war &c &c "

Mr. Ghorum. Many other disadvantages must be
experienced if treaties of peace & all negotiations are
to be previously ratified—and if not previously, the
Ministers would be at a loss how to proceed. What
would be the case in G. Britain if the King were to
proceed in this manner. American Ministers must
go abroad not instructed by the same Authority (as
will be the case with other Ministers) which is to
ratify their proceedings.

Mr. Govr. Morris. As to treaties of alliance, they
will oblige foreign powers to send their ministers here
the very thing we should wish for. Such treaties
could not be otherwise made, if his amendment shd.
succeed. In general he was not solicitious to multiply
& facilitate Treaties. He wished none to be
made with G. Britain, till she should be at war.
Then a good bargain might be made with her. So
with other foreign powers. The more difficulty in
making treaties, the more value will be set on them.

Mr. Wilson. In the most important Treaties, the
King of G. Britain being obliged to resort to Parliament
for the execution of them, is under the same
fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris' will impose
on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit
even the Legisature to lay duties on exports. Under
the clause without the amendment, the Senate alone
can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina
to be sent to some one particular port.

Mr. Dickinson concurred in the amendment, as
most safe and proper, tho' he was sensible it was unfavorable
to the little States, wch. would otherwise
have an equal share in making Treaties.

Docr. Johnson thought there was something of
solecism in saying that the acts of a minister with
plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should depend
for ratification on another Body. The Example
of the King of G. B. was not parallel. Full &
compleat power was vested in him. If the Parliament
should fail to provide the necessary means of
execution, the Treaty would be violated.

Mr. Ghorum in answer to Mr. Govr. Morris, said that
negotiations on the spot were not to be desired by
us, especially if the whole Legislature is to have any
thing to do with Treaties. It will be generally influenced
by two or three men, who will be corrupted
by the Ambassadors here. In such a Government
as ours, it is necessary to guard against the Government
itself being seduced.

Mr. Randolph observing that almost every Speaker
had made objections to the clause as it stood, moved
in order to a further consideration of the subject,
that the motion of Mr. Govr. Morris should be postponed,
and on this question It was lost the States
being equally divided.

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On Mr. Govr. Morris motion

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The several clauses of Sect: 1. Art IX, were then
separately postponed after inserting "and other
public ministers" next after "ambassadors."

Mr. Madison hinted for consideration, whether a
distinction might not be made between different
sorts of Treaties—allowing the President & Senate
to make Treaties eventual and of alliance for limited
terms—and requiring the concurrence of the whole
Legislature in other Treaties.

The 1st. Sect Art IX. was finally referred nem: con:
to the committee of Five, and the House then

Adjourned.

Friday August 24. 1787. In Convention

Governour Livingston, from the Committee of
Eleven, to whom were referred the two remaining
clauses of the 4th. Sect & the 5 & 6 Sect: of the 7th.
Art: delivered in the following Report:

"Strike out so much of the 4th. Sect: as was referred
to the Committee and insert—'The migration or
importation of such persons as the several States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800,
but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration
or importation at a rate not exceeding the average
of the duties laid on imports.' "

"The 5 Sect: to remain as in the Report"

"The 6 Sect. to be stricken out"

Mr. Butler, according to notice, moved that clause
1st. sect. 1. of art VII, as to the discharge of debts, be
reconsidered tomorrow. He dwelt on the division
of opinion concerning the domestic debts, and the
different pretensions of the different classes of holders.
Genl. Pinkney 2ded. him.

Mr. Randolph wished for a reconsideration in order
to better the expression, and to provide for the case
of the State debts as is done by Congress.

On the question for reconsidering

N. H. no. Mass: ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pena.
absent. Del. ay, Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. absent.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.—and tomorrow assigned for the
reconsideration.

Sect: 2 & 3 of art: IX being taken up,

Mr. Rutlidge said this provision for deciding controversies

between the States was necessary under
the Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary
by the National Judiciary now to be established,
and moved to strike it out.

Docr. Johnson 2ded. the motion

Mr. Sherman concurred: so did Mr. Dayton.

Mr. Williamson was for postponing instead of
striking out, in order to consider whether this might
not be a good provision, in cases where the Judiciary
were interested or too closely connected with the
parties.

Mr. Ghorum had doubts as to striking out. The
Judges might be connected with the States being
parties—He was inclined to think the mode proposed
in the clause would be more satisfactory than to
refer such cases to the Judiciary.

On the Question for postponing the 2d. & 3d. Section
it passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pena.
abst. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

Mr. Wilson urged the striking out, the Judiciary
being a better provision.

On Question for striking out 2 & 3 Sections Art: IX

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
abst. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.

Art X. Sect. 1. "The Executive power of the
U. S. shall be vested in a single person. His stile
shall be "The President of the U. S. of America" and
his title shall be "His Excellency." He shall be

elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold
his office during the term of seven years; but shall
not be elected a second time.

On the question for vesting the power in a single
person—It was agreed to nem: con: So also on the
stile and title.

Mr. Rutlidge moved to insert "joint" before the
word "ballot," as the most convenient mode of
electing.

Mr. Sherman objected to it as depriving the States
represented in the Senate of the negative intended
them in that house.

Mr. Ghorum said it was wrong to be considering at
every turn whom the Senate would represent. The
public good was the true object to be kept in view.
Great delay and confusion would ensue if the two
Houses shd. vote separately, each having a negative
on the choice of the other.

Mr. Dayton. It might be well for those not to
consider how the Senate was constituted, whose interest
it was to keep it out of sight.—If the amendment
should be agreed to, a joint ballot would in
fact give the appointment to one House. He could
never agree to the clause with such an amendment.
There could be no doubt of the two Houses separately
concurring in the same person for President.
The importance & necessity of the case would ensure
a concurrence.

Mr. Carrol moved to strike out "by the Legislature"
and insert "by the people." Mr. Wilson 2ded.
him & on the question

N. H. no. Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Brearly was opposed to the motion for inserting
the word "joint." The argument that the small
States should not put their hands into the pockets of
the large ones did not apply in this case.

Mr. Wilson urged the reasonableness of giving the
larger States a larger share of the appointment, and
the danger of delay from a disagreement of the two
Houses. He remarked also that the Senate had
peculiar powers balancing the advantage given by a
joint ballot in this case to the other branch of the
Legislature.

Mr. Langdon. This general officer ought to be
elected by the joint & general voice. In N. Hampshire
the mode of separate votes by the two Houses
was productive of great difficulties. The negative
of the Senate would hurt the feelings of the man
elected by the votes of the other branch. He was
for inserting "joint" tho' unfavorable to N. Hampshire
as a small State.

Mr. Wilson remarked that as the President of the
Senate was to be the President of the U. S. that Body
in cases of vacancy might have an interest in throwing
dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate concurrence
should be required.

Mr. Madison. If the amendment be agreed to the
rule of voting will give to the largest State, compared
with the smallest, an influence as 4 to 1 only,
altho the population is as 10 to 1. This surely cannot

be unreasonable as the President is to act for the
people not for the States. The President of the Senate
also is to be occasionally President of the U. S.
and by his negative alone can make ¾ of the other
branch necessary to the passage of a law. This is
another advantage enjoyed by the Senate.

On the question for inserting "joint," it passed in
the affirmative

N. H. ay. Massts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Mr. Dayton then moved to insert, after the word
"Legislatures" the words "each State having one
vote." Mr. Brearly 2ded. him, and on the question it
passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Pinkney moved to insert after the word
"Legislature" the words "to which election a majority
of the votes of the members present shall
be required" & on this question, it passed in the
affirmative

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Read moved "that in case the numbers for the
two highest in votes should be equal, then the President
of the Senate shall have an additional casting
vote," which was disagreed to by a general negative.

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed the election of the President

by the Legislature. He dwelt on the danger
of rendering the Executive uninterested in maintaining
the rights of his Station, as leading to Legislative
tyranny. If the Legislature have the Executive
dependent on them, they can perpetuate & support
their usurpations by the influence of tax-gatherers
& other officers, by fleets armies &c. Cabal &
corruption are attached to that mode of election: so
also is ineligibility a second time. Hence the Executive
is interested in Courting popularity in the
Legislature by sacrificing his Executive Rights; &
then he can go into that Body, after the expiration
of his Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of
his policy. To these considerations he added that
rivals would be continually intriguing to oust the
President from his place. To guard against all these
evils he moved that the President "shall be chosen
by Electors to be chosen by the People of the several
States" Mr. Carrol 2ded. him & on the question it
passed in the negative N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct.
ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Dayton moved to postpone the consideration
of the two last clauses of Sect. 1. art X. which was
disagreed to without a count of the States.

Mr. Broome moved to refer the two clauses to a
Committee of a member from each State, & on the
question, it failed the States being equally divided
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question taken on the first part of Mr. Govr.

Morris's motion to wit "shall be chosen by electors"
as an abstract question, it failed the States being
equally divided, N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. divd. N.
Jersey ay Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The consideration of the remaining clauses of
Sect 1. art X. was then postponed till tomorrow at
the instance of the Deputies of New Jersey.

Sect. 2. Art: X being taken up, the word information
was transposed & inserted after "Legislature"

On motion of Mr. Govr. Morris, "he may" was
struck out, & "and" inserted before "recommend"
in the clause 2d. sect 2d. art: X. in order to make it the
duty of the President to recommend, & thence prevent
umbrage or cavil at his doing it.

Mr. Sherman objected to the sentence "and shall
appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided
for by this Constitution." He admitted it to be
proper that many officers in the Executive Department
should be so appointed—but contended that
many ought not, as general officers in the army in
time of peace &c. Herein lay the corruption in G.
Britain. If the Executive can model the army, he
may set up an absolute Government; taking advantage
of the close of a war and an army commanded
by his creatures. James 2d. was not obeyed by his
officers because they had been appointed by his predecessors
not by himself. He moved to insert" or
by law" after the word "Constitution."

On motion of Mr. Madison "officers" was struck out
and "to offices" inserted, in order to obviate doubts

that he might appoint officers without a previous
creation of the offices by the Legislature.

On the question for inserting "or by law as moved
by Mr. Sherman N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J.
no. Pena. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
absent. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Dickinson moved to strike out the words "and
shall appoint to offices in all cases not otherwise provided
for by this Constitution" and insert—"and
shall appoint to all offices established by this Constitution,
except in cases herein otherwise provided
for, and to all offices which may hereafter be created.
by law."

Mr. Randolph observed that the power of appointments
was a formidable one both in the Executive
& Legislative hands—and suggested whether the
Legislature should not be left at liberty to refer appointments
in some cases, to some State authority.

Mr. Dickenson's motion, it passed in the affirmative
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

Mr. Dickinson then moved to annex to his last
amendment "except where by law the appointment
shall be vested in the Legislatures or Executives of
the several States." Mr. Randolph 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Wilson. If this be agreed to it will soon be a
standing instruction from the State Legislatures to
pass no law creating offices, unless the appts. be referred
to them.

Mr. Sherman objected to "Legislatures" in the

motion, which was struck out by consent of the
movers.

Mr. Govt. Morris. This would be putting it in the
power of the States to say, "You shall be viceroys
but we will be viceroys over you"—

The motion was negatived without a Count of the
States—

Ordered unanimously that the order respecting
the adjournment at 4 OClock be repealed, & that in
future the House assemble at 10 OC. & adjourn at
3OC.

Adjourned

Saturday August 25. 1787. in Convention

The 1st. clause of 1 Sect. of art: VII being reconsidered

Col. Mason objected to the term "shall"—fullfil
the engagements & discharge the debts &c as too
strong. It may be impossible to comply with it.
The Creditors should be kept in the same plight.
They will in one respect be necessarily and properly
in a better. The Government will be more able to
pay them. The use of the term shall will beget
speculations and increase the pestilent practice of
stock-jobbing. There was a great distinction between
original creditors & those who purchased
fraudulently of the ignorant and distressed. He
did not mean to include those who have bought
Stock in open market. He was sensible of the difficulty
of drawing the line in this case, but he did not

wish to preclude the attempt. Even fair purchasers
at 4. 5. 6. 8 for 1 did not stand on the same footing
with the first Holders, supposing them not to be
blameable. The interest they receive even in paper,
is equal to their purchase money. What he particularly
wished was to leave the door open for buying
up the securities, which he thought would be
precluded by the term "shall" as requiring nominal
payment, & which was not inconsistent with his ideas
of public faith. He was afraid also the word "shall,''
might extend to all the old continental paper.

Mr. Langdon wished to do no more than leave the
Creditors in statu quo.

Mr. Gerry said that for himself he had no interest
in the question being not possessed of more of the
securities than would, by the interest, pay his taxes.
He would observe however that as the public had
received the value of the literal amount, they ought
to pay that value to some body. The frauds on the
soldiers ought to have been foreseen, these poor &
ignorant people could not but part with their securities.
There are other creditors who will part with
any thing rather than be cheated of the capital of
their advances. The interest of the States he observed
was different on this point, some having more,
others less than their proportion of the paper.
Hence the idea of a scale for reducing its value had
arisen. If the public faith would admit, of which
he was not clear, he would not object to a revision of
the debt so far as to compel restitution to the ignorant
& distressed, who have been defrauded. As to

stock-jobbers he saw no reason for the censures
thrown on them. They keep up the value of the
paper. Without them there would be no market.

Mr. Butler said he meant neither to increase nor
diminish the security of the Creditors.

Mr. Randolph moved to postpone the clause in
favor of the following "All debts contracted & engagements
entered into, by or under the authority
of Congs. shall be as valid agst. the U. States under
this constitution as under the Confederation."

Docr. Johnson. The debts are debts of the U. S.
of the great Body of America. Changing the Government
cannot change the obligation of the U. S.
which devolves of course on the new Government.
Nothing was in his opinion necessary to be said. If
any thing, it should be a mere declaration as moved
by Mr. Randolph.

Mr. Govr. Morris, said he never had become a public
Creditor that he might urge with more propriety the
compliance with public faith. He had always done
so and always would, and preferr'd the term "shall"
as the most explicit. As to buying up the debt, the
term "shall" was not inconsistent with it, if provision
be first made for paying the interest: if not,
such an expedient was a mere evasion. He was content
to say nothing as the New Government would
be bound of course, but would prefer the clause with
the term "shall," because it would create many
friends to the plan.

On Mr. Randolph's Motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.

Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Sherman thought it necessary to connect with
the clause for laying taxes duties &c an express provision
for the object of the old debts &c—and moved
to add to the 1st. clause of 1st. sect. art VII "for the
payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences
that shall be incurred for the common defence
and general welfare."

The proposition, as being unnecessary was disagreed
to, Connecticut alone, being in the affirmative.

The Report of the Committee of eleven (see friday
the 24th. instant) being taken up,

Genl. Pinkney moved to strike out the words, "the
year eighteen hundred" as the year limiting the importation
of slaves, and to insert the words "the
year eighteen hundred and eight"

Mr. Ghorum 2ded. the motion

Mr. Madison. Twenty years will produce all the
mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty
to import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonourable
to the National character than to say
nothing about it in the Constitution.

On the motion; which passed in the affirmative,
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris was for making the clause read at
once, "the importation of slaves into N. Carolina, S.
Carolina & Georgia shall not be prohibited &c." This
he said would be most fair and would avoid the

ambiguity by which, under the power with regard to
naturalization, the liberty reserved to the States
might be defeated. He wished it to be known also
that this part of the Constitution was a compliance
with those States. If the change of language however
should be objected to by the members from
those States, he should not urge it.

Col: Mason was not against using the term "slaves"
but agst. naming N. C. S. C. & Georgia, lest it should
give offence to the people of those States.

Mr. Sherman liked a description better than the
terms proposed, which had been declined by the old
Congs. & were not pleasing to some people. Mr.
Clymer concurred with Mr. Sherman

Mr. Williamson said that both in opinion & practice
he was against slavery; but thought it more in
favor of humanity, from a view of all circumstances,
to let in S. C & Georgia on those terms, than to exclude
them from the Union.

Mr. Govr. Morris withdrew his motion.

Mr. Dickenson wished the clause to be confined to
the States which had not themselves prohibited the
importation of slaves, and for that purpose moved
to amend the clause so as to read "The importation
of slaves into such of the States as shall permit the
same shall not be prohibited by the Legislature of
the U. S. until the year 1808"—which was disagreed
to nem: con:[42]

The first part of the report was then agreed to,

amended as follows. "The migration or importation
of such persons as the several States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Legislature prior to the year 1808." N. H.
Mas. Con. Md.. N. C. S. C. Geo: ay. N. J. Pa. Del. Virga.
no

Mr. Baldwin in order to restrain & more explicitly
define "the average duty" moved to strike out of
the 2d. part the words "average of the duties laid on
imports" and insert "common impost on articles
not enumerated" which was agreed to nern: cont:

Mr. Sherman was agst. this 2d. part, as acknowledging
men to be property, by taxing them as
such under the character of slaves.

Mr. King & Mr. Langdon considered this as the
price of the 1st. part.

Genl. Pinkney admitted that it was so.

Col: Mason. Not to tax, will be equivalent to a
bounty on the importation of slaves.

Mr. Ghorum thought that Mr. Sherman should consider
the duty, not as implying that slaves are property,
but as a discouragement to the importation of
them.

Mr. Govr. Morris remarked that as the clause now
stands it implies that the Legislature may tax freemen
imported.

Mr. Sherman in answer to Mr. Ghorum observed
that the smallness of the duty shewed revenue to be
the object, not the discouragement of the importation.

Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the

Constitution the idea that there could be property in
men. The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves
are not like merchandize, consumed, &c

Col. Mason (in answr. to Govr. Morris) the provision
as it stands was necessary for the case of convicts
in order to prevent the introduction of them.

It was finally agreed nem. contrad: to make the
clause read "but a tax or duty may be imposed on
such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each
person," and then the 2d. part as amended was agreed
to.

Sect 5. art. VII was agreed to nem: con: as reported.

Sect. 6. art. VII. in the Report, was postponed.

On motion of Mr. Madison 2ded. by Mr. Govr. Morris
Article VIII was reconsidered and after the words
"all treaties made," were inserted nem: con: the
words" or which shall be made." This insertion was
meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of
treaties preexisting, by making the words "all
treaties made" to refer to them, as the words inserted
would refer to future treaties.

Mr. Carrol and Mr. L. Martin expressed their apprehensions,
and the probable apprehensions of
their constituents, that under the power of regulating
trade the General Legislature, might favor the
ports of particular States, by requiring vessels destined
to or from other States to enter & clear thereat,
as vessels belonging or bound to Baltimore, to enter
& clear at Norfolk &c. They moved the following
proposition

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall not oblige vessels
belonging to citizens thereof, or to foreigners, to
enter or pay duties or imposts in any other State
than in that to which they may be bound, or to
clear out in any other than the State in which their
cargoes may be laden on board; nor shall any privilege
or immunity be granted to any vessel on entering
or clearing out, or paying duties or imposts in
one State in preference to another"

Mr. Ghorum thought such a precaution unnecessary;
& that the revenue might be defeated, if vessels
could run up long rivers, through the jurisdiction
of different States without being required to
enter, with the opportunity of landing & selling
their cargoes by the way.

Mr. Mc.Henry & Genl. Pinkney made the following
propositions

"Should it be judged expedient by the Legislature
of the U. S. that one or more port for collecting duties
or imposts other than those ports of entrance & clearance
already established by the respective States,
should be established, the Legislature of the U. S. shall
signify the same to the Executives of the respective
States, ascertaining the number of such ports judged
necessary; to be laid by the said Executives before
the Legislatures of the States at their next session;
and the Legislature of the U. S. shall not have the
power of fixing or establishing the particular ports
for collecting duties or imposts in any State, except
the Legislature of such State shall neglect to fix and
establish the same during their first session to be

held after such notification by the Legislature of the
U. S. to the Executive of such State"

"All duties imposts & excises, prohibitions or restraints
laid or made by the Legislature of the U. S.
shall be uniform & equal throughout the U. S."

These several propositions were referred nem:
con: to a committee composed of a member from
each State. The committee appointed by ballot
were Mr. Langdon, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Sherman, Mr.
Dayton, Mr. Fitzimmons, Mr. Read, Mr. Carrol, Mr.
Mason, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Butler, Mr. Few.

On the question now taken on Mr. Dickinson's motion
of yesterday, allowing appointments to offices,
to be referred by the Genl. Legislature to the Executives
of the several States as a further amendment
to sect. 2. art. X, the votes were N. H. no Mas. no.
Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divided. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

In amendment of the same section, "other public
Ministers" were inserted after "ambassadors."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out of the section
—"and may correspond with the supreme Executives
of the several States" as unnecessary and implying
that he could not correspond with others. Mr.
Broome 2ded. him.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

"Shall receive ambassadors & other public Ministers,"
agreed to, nem. con.

Mr. Sherman moved to amend the "power to grant

reprieves & pardon" so as to read "to grant reprieves
until the ensuing session of the Senate, and
pardons with consent of the Senate."

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

"except in cases of impeachment" inserted nem.
con: after "pardon"

On the question to agree to—"but his pardon
shall not be pleadable in bar"

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Adjourned

Monday Augst. 27th. 1787. in Convention

Art X. Sect 2. being resumed,

Mr. L. Martin moved to insert the words "after
conviction" after the words "reprieves and pardons."

Mr. Wilson objected that pardon before conviction
might be necessary in order to obtain the testimony
of accomplices. He stated the case of forgeries in
which this might particularly happen.—Mr. L. Martin
withdrew his motion.

Mr. Sherman moved to amend the clause giving
the Executive the command of the Militia, so as to
read "and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the U. S." and on the
Question N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. N. J. abst.

Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

The clause for removing the President on impeachment
by the House of Reps. and conviction in
the supreme Court, of Treason, Bribery or corruption,
was postponed nem: con: at the instance of Mr.
Govr. Morris, who thought the Tribunal an improper
one, particularly, if the first Judge was to be of the
privy Council.

Mr. Govr. Morris objected also to the President of
the Senate being provisional successor to the President,
and suggested a designation of the Chief Justice.

Mr. Madison added as a ground of objection that
the Senate might retard the appointment of a
President in order to carry points whilst the revisionary
power was in the President of their own
body, but suggested that the Executive powers
during a vacancy, be administered by the persons
composing the Council to the President.

Mr. Williamson suggested that the Legislature
ought to have power to provide for occasional successors,
& moved that the last clause (of 2 sect. X
art:) relating to a provisional successor to the President,
be postponed.

Mr. Dickinson 2ded. the postponement, remarking
that it was too vague. What is the extent of the
term "disability" and who is to be the judge of it?

The postponement was agreed to nem: con:

Col: Mason & Mr. Madison moved to add to the
oath to be taken by the supreme Executive "and

will to the best of my judgment and power preserve
protect and defend the Constitution of the U. S."

Mr. Wilson thought the general provision for oaths
of office, in a subsequent place, rendered the amendment
unnecessary.—

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: XI. being taken up.

Docr. Johnson suggested that the judicial power
ought to extend to equity as well as law—and moved
to insert the words, "both in law and equity" after
the words "U. S" in the 1st. line of sect 1.

Mr. Read objected to vesting these powers in the
same Court.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. absent Ct. ay. N. J. abst P.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Virga. ay. N. C. abst. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

On the question to agree to Sect. 1. art. XI, as
amended

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. N. J. abst.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Dickinson moved as an amendment to sect. 2.
art XI after the words "good behavior" the words.
" provided that they may be removed by the Executive
on the application by the Senate and House
of Representatives."

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion

Mr. Govr. Morris thought it a contradiction in

terms to say that the Judges should hold their
offices during good behavior, and yet be removeable
without a trial. Besides it was fundamentally
wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority.

Mr. Sherman saw no contradiction or impropriety
if this were made a part of the Constitutional regulation
of the Judiciary establishment. He observed
that a like provision was contained in the British
Statutes.

Mr. Rutlidge. If the Supreme Court is to judge
between the U. S. and particular States, this alone
is an insuperable objection to the motion.

Mr. Wilson considered such a provision in the
British Government as less dangerous than here, the
House of Lords & House of Commons being less
likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice
Holt, he remarked, had successively offended by
his independent conduct, both houses of Parliament.
Had this happened at the same time, he would have
been ousted. The Judges would be in a bad situation
if made to depend on any gust of faction which
might prevail in the two branches of our Govt.

Mr. Randolph opposed the motion as weakening
too much the independence of the Judges.

Mr. Dickinson was not apprehensive that the Legislature
composed of different branches constructed
on such different principles, would improperly unite
for the purpose of displacing a Judge.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Dickinson's
Motion

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. abst. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Madison and Mr. Mc.Henry moved to reinstate
the words "increased or" before the word "diminished"
in 2d. sect, art XI.

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed it for reasons urged by
him on a former occasion—

Col: Mason contended strenuously for the motion.
There was no weight he said in the argument drawn
from changes in the value of the metals, because
this might be provided for by an increase of salaries
so made as not to affect persons in office, and this
was the only argument on which much stress seemed
to have been laid.

Genl. Pinkney. The importance of the Judiciary
will require men of the first talents: large salaries
will therefore be necessary, larger than the U. S. can
allow in the first instance. He was not satisfied
with the expedient mentioned by Col: Mason. He
did not think it would have a good effect or a good
appearance, for new Judges to come in with higher
salaries than the old ones.

Mr. Govr. Morris said the expedient might be
evaded & therefore amounted to nothing. Judges
might resign, & then be re-appointed to increased
salaries.

On the question

N. H. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divd.
Va. ay. S. C. no. Geo. abst. also Masts. & N. J. &
N. C.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison then moved to add
the following words to art XI. sect. 2. "nor increased
by any Act of the Legislature which shall
operate before the expiration of three years after
the passing thereof"

On the question

N. H. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. S. C. no. Geo. abst. also Mas. N. J. & N. C.

Sect. 3. art. XI. being taken up, the following
cause was postponed viz, "to the trial of impeachments
of officers of the U. S." by which the jurisdiction
of the supreme Court was extended to such
cases.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert
after the word "controversies" the words "to which
the U. S. shall be a party," which was agreed to
nem: con:

Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words "this
Constitution and the" before the word "laws"

Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too
far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally
to cases arising under the Constitution & whether it
ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature.
The right of expounding the Constitution in
cases not of this nature ought not to be given to
that Department.

The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem:
con: it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction
given was constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature.

On motion of Mr. Rutlidge the words "passed by

the Legislature" were struck out, and after the
words "U. S" were inserted nem. con: the words
"and treaties made or which shall be made under
their authority" conformably to a preceding amendment
in another place.

The clause "in cases of impeachment," was postponed.

Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant
by the words "In all the cases before-mentioned it
(jurisdiction) shall be appellate with such exceptions
&c," whether it extended to matters of fact as
well as law—and to cases of common law as well as
civil law.

Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed meant
facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil law.
The jurisdiction of the federal Court of Appeals had
he said been so construed.

Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate
"the words "both as to law & fact which was
agreed to nem: con:

Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out;
the beginning of the 3d. sect. "The jurisdiction of
the supreme Court" & to insert the words "the Judicial
power" which was agreed to nem: con:

The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to
insert "In all the other cases beforementioned the
Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as
the Legislature shall direct" Del. Virga. ay N. H
Con. P. M. S. C. G. no

On a question for striking out the last sentence of
of the sect. 3. "The Legislature may assign &c."

N. H. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Sherman moved to insert after the words "between
Citizens of different States" the words, "between
Citizens of the same State claiming lands under
grants of different States"—according to the provision
in the 9th Art: of the Confederation—which
was agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

Tuesday August 28 1787. in Convention

Mr. Sherman from the Committee to whom were
referred several propositions on the 25th. instant,
made the following report:—

That there be inserted after the 4 clause of 7th.
section

"Nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue
give preference to the ports of one State over those
of another, or oblige vessels bound to or from any
State to enter clear or pay duties in another and
all tonnage, duties, imposts & excises laid by the
Legislature shall be uniform throughout the U. S."

Art XI Sect. 3, It was moved to strike out
the words "it shall be appellate" to insert the
words "the supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction,"—in order to prevent uncertainty
whether "it" referred to the supreme Court, or to the
Judicial power.

On the question

N. H ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N C ay. S. C ay. Geo. ay.

Sect. 4. was so amended nem. con: as to read
"The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment)
shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held
in the State where the said crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any
State, then the trial shall be at such place or places
as the Legislature may direct" The object of this
amendment was to provide for trial by jury of
offences committed out of any State.

Mr. Pinkney urged the propriety of securing the
benefit of the Habeas corpus in the most ample manner,
moved "that it should not be suspended but
on the most urgent occasions, & then only for a
limited time not exceeding twelve months"

Mr. Rutlidge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus
inviolable. He did not conceive that a suspension
could ever be necessary at the same time through
all the States.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved that "The privilege of the
writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended; unless
where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it."

Mr. Wilson doubted whether in any case a suspension
could be necessary, as the discretion now exists
with Judges, in most important cases to keep in
Gaol or admit to Bail.

The first part of Mr. Govr. Morris' motion, to the
word "unless" was agreed to nem: con:—on the remaining
part;

N. H. ay. Mas ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Sec. 5. of art: XI. was agreed to nem: con.[43]

Art: XII being taken up.

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Sherman moved to insert after
the words "coin money" the words "nor emit bills
of credit, nor make any thing but gold & silver
coin a tender in payment of debts" making these
prohibitions absolute, instead of making the measures
allowable (as in the XIII art:) with the consent
of the Legislature of the U.S.

Mr. Ghorum thought the purpose would be as well
secured by the provisions of art: XIII which makes
the consent of the Genl. Legislature necessary, and
that in that mode no opposition would be excited;
whereas an absolute prohibition of paper money
would rouse the most desperate opposition from its
partizans.

Mr. Sherman thought this a favorable crisis for
crushing paper money. If the consent of the Legislature
could authorize emissions of it, the friends of
paper money would make every exertion to get into
the Legislature in order to license it.

The question being divided; on the 1st. part—
"nor emit bills of credit" N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct.
ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The remaining part of Mr Wilson's & Sherman's
motion was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. King moved to add, in the words used in the
Ordinance of Congr. establishing new States, a prohibition
on the States to interfere in private contracts.

Mr. Govr. Morris. This would be going too far.
There are a thousand laws, relating to bringing
actions—limitations, of actions & which affect contracts.
The Judicial power of the U. S. will be a
protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and
within the State itself a majority must rule, whatever
may be the mischief done among themselves.

Mr. Sherman. Why then prohibit bills of credit?

Mr. Wilson was in favor of Mr. King's motion.

Mr. Madison admitted that inconveniences might

arise from such a prohibition but thought on the
whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it.
He conceived however that a negative on the State
laws could alone secure the effect. Evasions might
and would be devised by the ingenuity of the Legislatures.

Col: Mason. This is carrying the restraint too far.
Cases will happen that cannot be foreseen, where
some kind of interference will be proper & essential.
He mentioned the case of limiting the period for
bringing actions on open account—that of bonds
after a certain lapse of time—asking whether it was
proper to tie the hands of the States from making
provision in such cases?

Mr. Wilson. The answer to these objections is that
retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited.

Mr. Madison. Is not that already done by the

prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will oblige
the Judges to declare such interferences null & void.

Mr. Rutlidge moved instead of Mr. King's Motion
to insert—" nor pass bills of attainder nor retrospective[44]
laws" on which motion N. H. ay. Ct. no. N.
J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Virga. no. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison moved to insert after the word "reprisal"
(art. XII) the words "nor lay embargoes,"
He urged that such acts by the States would be unnecessary
—impolitic—and unjust.

Mr. Sherman thought the States ought to retain
this power in order to prevent suffering & injury to
their poor.

Col: Mason thought the amendment would be not
only improper but dangerous, as the Genl. Legislature
would not sit constantly and therefore could
not interpose at the necessary moments. He enforced
his objection by appealing to the necessity of
sudden embargoes during the war, to prevent exports,
particularly in the case of a blockade.

Mr. Govr. Morris considered the provision as unnecessary;
the power of regulating trade between
State & State already vested in the Genl. Legislature,
being sufficient.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Mr. Madison moved that the words "nor lay imposts

or duties on imports" be transferred from art:
XIII where the consent of the Genl. Legislature may
license the act—into art: XII which will make the
prohibition of the States absolute. He observed
that as the States interested in this power by which
they could tax the imports of their neighbors passing
thro' their markets, were a majority, they could give
the consent of the Legislature, to the injury of. N.
Jersey, N. Carolina &c.

Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Sherman thought the power might safely be
left to the Legislature of the U. States.

Col: Mason observed that particular States might
wish to encourage by impost duties certain manufactures
for which they enjoyed natural advantages,
as Virginia, the manufacture of Hemp &c.

Mr. Madison. The encouragement of Manufactures
in that mode requires duties not only on imports
directly from foreign Countries, but from the
other States in the Union, which would revive all
the mischiefs experienced from the want of a Genl.
Government over commerce.[45]

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Dela. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Art: XII as amended agreed to nem: con:

Art: XIII being taken up. Mr. King moved to
insert after the word "imports" the words "or exports,"
so as to prohibit the States from taxing
either, & on this question it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. P. ay,
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Sherman moved to add after the word "exports"
—the words "nor with such consent but for
the use of the U. S."—so as to carry the proceeds of
all State duties on imports & exports, into the common
Treasury.

Mr. Madison liked the motion as preventing all
State imposts—but lamented the complexity we
were giving to the commercial system.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the regulation necessary
to prevent the Atlantic States from endeavoring to
tax the Western States—& promote their interest
by opposing the navigation of the Mississippi which
would drive the Western people into the arms of G.
Britain.

Mr. Clymer thought the encouragement of the
Western Country was suicide on the old States. If
the States have such different interests that they
cannot be left to regulate their own manufactures
without encountering the interests of other States,
it is a proof that they are not fit to compose one
nation.

Mr. King was afraid that the regulation moved by

Mr. Sherman would too much interfere with the
policy of States respecting their manufactures, which
may be necessary. Revenue he reminded the House
was the object of the general Legislature.

On Mr. Sherman's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay

Art XIII was then agreed to as amended.

Art. XIV was taken up.

Genl. Pinkney was not satisfied with it. He
seemed to wish some provision should be included in
favor of property in slaves.

On the question on Art: XIV.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
divided.

Art: XV. being taken up, the words "high misdemesnor,"
were struck out, and "other crime" inserted,
in order to comprehend all proper cases; it
being doubtful whether "high misdemeanor" had
not a technical meaning too limited.

Mr. Butler and Mr. Pinkney moved "to require
fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like
criminals."

Mr. Wilson. This would oblige the Executive of
the State to do it at the public expence.

Mr. Sherman saw no more propriety in the public
seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, than a
horse.

Mr. Butler withdrew his proposition in order that

some particular provision might be made apart from
this article.

Art XV as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned.

Wednesday August 29th. 1787. in Convention

Art: XVI. taken up.

Mr. Williamson moved to substitute in place of it,
the words of the Articles of Confederation on the
same subject. He did not understand precisely the
meaning of the article.

Mr. Wilson and Docr. Johnson supposed the meaning
to be that Judgments in one State should be the
ground of actions in other States, & that acts of the
Legislatures should be included, for the sake of Acts
of insolvency &c.

Mr. Pinkney moved to commit Art XVI with the
following proposition "To establish uniform laws
upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the
damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of
exchange"

Mr. Ghorum was for agreeing to the article, and committing
the proposition.

Mr. Madison was for committing both. He wished
the Legislature might be authorized to provide for
the execution of Judgments in other States, under
such regulations as might be expedient. He thought
that this might be safely done, and was justified by
the nature of the Union.

Mr. Randolph said there was no instance of one

nation executing judgments of the Courts of another
nation. He moved the following proposition:

"Whenever the Act of any State, whether Legislative,
Executive or Judiciary shall be attested &
exemplified under the seal thereof, such attestation
and exemplification, shall be deemed in other States
as full proof of the existence of that act—and its
operation shall be binding in every other State, in
all cases to which it may relate, and which are
within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State,
wherein the said act was done."

On the question for committing Art: XVI with
Mr. Pinkney's motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. Pa.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The motion of Mr. Randolph was also committed
nem: con:

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to commit also the following
proposition on the same subject.

"Full faith ought to be given in each State to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other State; and the Legislature shall by general
laws, determine the proof and effect of Such
acts, records, and proceedings" and it was committed
nem. contrad:

The Committee appointed for these references,
were Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr.
Wilson, & Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Dickenson mentioned to the House that on
examining Blackstone's Commentaries, he found
that the term "ex post facto" related to criminal

cases only; that they would not consequently restrain
the States from retrospective laws in civil
cases, and that some further provision for this purpose
would be requisite.

Art: VII Sect. 6 by ye. Com̃ittee of eleven reported
to be struck out (see the 24 instant) being now taken
up,

Mr. Pinkney moved to postpone the Report in
favor of the following proposition—"That no act of
the Legislature for the purpose of regulating the
commerce of the U. S. with foreign powers among
the several States, shall be passed without the assent
of two thirds of the members of each House."
He remarked that there were five distinct commercial
interests. 1. the fisheries & W. India trade.
which belonged to the N. England States. 2. the
interest of N. York lay in a free trade. 3. Wheat &
flour the Staples of the two middle States (N. j.
& Penna.). 4. Tobo. the staple of Maryld. & Virginia &
partly of N. Carolina. 5. Rice & Indigo, the staples
of S. Carolina & Georgia. These different interests
would be a source of oppressive regulations if no
check to a bare majority should be provided. States
pursue their interests with less scruple than indi
viduals. The power of regulating commerce was a
pure concession on the part of the S. States. They
did not need the protection of the N. States at
present.

Mr. Martin 2ded. the motion

Genl. Pinkney said it was the true interest of the
S. States to have no regulation of commerce; but

considering the loss brought on the commerce of the
Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal conduct
towards the views [46] of South Carolina. and the
interest the weak Southn States had in being united
with the strong Eastern States, he thought it proper
that no fetters should be imposed on the power of
making commercial regulations, and that his constituents
though prejudiced against the Eastern
States, would be reconciled to this liberality. He
had himself, he said, prejudices agst. the Eastern
States before he came here, but would acknowledge
that he had found them as liberal and candid as any
men whatever.

Mr. Clymer. The diversity of commercial interests
of necessity creates difficulties, which ought not
to be increased by unnecessary restrictions. The
Northern & middle States will be ruined, if not enabled
to defend themselves against foreign regulations.

Mr. Sherman, alluding to Mr. Pinkney's enumeration
of particular interests, as requiring a security
agst. abuse of the power; observed that the diversity
was of itself a security, adding that to require more
than a majority to decide a question was always embarrassing
as had been experienced in cases requiring
the votes of nine States in Congress.

Mr. Pinkney replied that his enumeration meant

the five minute interests. It still left the two great
divisions of Northern & Southern interests.

Mr. Govr. Morris, opposed the object of the motion
as highly injurious. Preferences to american ships
will multiply them, till they can carry the Southern
produce cheaper than it is now carried.—A navy was
essential to security, particularly of the S. States,
and can only be had by a navigation act encouraging
american bottoms & seamen. In those points of
view then alone, it is the interest of the S. States that
navigation acts should be facilitated. Shipping he
said was the worst & most precarious kind of property,
and stood in need of public patronage.

Mr. Williamson was in favor of making two thirds
instead of a majority requisite, as more satisfactory
to the Southern people. No useful measure he believed
had been lost in Congress for want of nine
votes. As to the weakness of the Southern States,
he was not alarmed on that account. The sickliness
of their climate for invaders would prevent their
being made an object. He acknowledged that he
did not think the motion requiring 2/3 necessary in itself,
because if a majority of the Northern States
should push their regulations too far the S. States
would build ships for themselves; but he knew
the Southern people were apprehensive on this subject
and would be pleased with the precaution.

Mr. Spaight was against the motion. The Southern
States could at any time save themselves from oppression,
by building ships for their own use.

Mr. Butler differed from those who considered the

rejection of the motion as no concession on the part
of the S. States. He considered the interest of these
and of the Eastern States, to be as different as the
interests of Russia and Turkey. Being notwithstanding
desirous of conciliating the affections of
the East: States, he should vote agst. requiring 2/3 instead
of a majority.

Col: Mason. If the Govt. is to be lasting, it must
be founded in the confidence & affections of the
people, and must be so constructed as to obtain these.
The Majority will be governed by their interests.
The Southern States are the minority in both Houses.
Is it to be expected that they will deliver themselves
bound hand & foot to the Eastern States, and
enable them to exclaim, in the words of Cromwell on
a certain occasion—"the lord hath delivered them
into our hands.

Mr. Wilson took notice of the several objections
and remarked that if every peculiar interest was to
be secured, unanimity ought to be required. The
majority he said would be no more governed by interest
than the minority. It was surely better to
let the latter be bound hand and foot than the former.
Great inconveniences had, he contended, been experienced
in Congress from the article of confederation
requiring nine votes in certain cases.

Mr. Madison went into a pretty full view of the
subject. He observed that the disadvantage to the
S. States from a navigation act, lay chiefly in a temporary
rise of freight, attended however with an increase
of Southn. as well as Northern Shipping—with

the emigration of Northern Seamen & merchants to
the Southern States—& with a removal of the existing
& injurious retaliations among the States on each
other. The power of foreign nations to obstruct our
retaliating measures on them by a corrupt influence
would also be less if a majority shd. be made competent
than if 2/3 of each House shd. be required to
legislative acts in this case. An abuse of the power
would be qualified with all these good effects. But
he thought an abuse was rendered improbable by
the provision of 2 branches—by the independence
of the Senate, by the negative of the Executive, by
the interest of Connecticut & N. Jersey which were
agricultural, not commercial States; by the interior
interest which was also agricultural in the most commercial
States, by the accession of Western States
which wd. be altogether agricultural. He added that
the Southern States would derive an essential advantage
in the general security afforded by the increase
of our maritime strength. He stated the
vulnerable situation of them all, and of Virginia in
particular. The increase of the coasting trade, and
of seamen, would also be favorable to the S. States,
by increasing, the consumption of their produce. If
the wealth of the Eastern should in a still greater
proportion be augmented, that wealth wd. contribute
the more to the public wants, and be otherwise a
national benefit.

Mr. Rutlidge was agst. the motion of his colleague.
It did not follow from a grant of the power to regulate
trade, that it would be abused, At the worst a

navigation act could bear hard a little while only on
the S. States. As we are laying the foundation for
a great empire, we ought to take a permanent view
of the subject and not look at the present moment
only. He reminded the House of the necessity of
securing the West India trade to this country. That
was the great object, and a navigation act was necessary
for obtaining it.

Mr. Randolph said that there were features so
odious in the constitution as it now stands, that he
doubted whether he should be able to agree to it. A
rejection of the motion would compleat the deformity
of the system. He took notice of the argument in
favor of giving the power over trade to a majority,
drawn from the opportunity foreign powers would
have of obstructing retaliatory measures if two
thirds were made requisite. He did not think there
was weight in that consideration. The difference
between a majority & two thirds did not afford room
for such an opportunity. Foreign influence would
also be more likely to be exerted on the President
who could require three fourths by his negative. He
did not mean however to enter into the merits.
What he had in view was merely to pave the way for
a declaration which he might be hereafter obliged to
make if an accumulation of obnoxious ingredients
should take place, that he could not give his assent
to the plan.

Mr. Gorham. If the Government is to be so fettered
as to be unable to relieve the Eastern States what
motive can they have to join in it, and thereby tie

their own hands from measures which they could
otherwise take for themselves. The Eastern States
were not led to strengthen the Union by fear for
their own safety. He deprecated the consequences
of disunion, but if it should take place it was the
Southern part of the Continent that had most reason
to dread them. He urged the improbability of a
combination against the interest of the Southern
States, the different situations of the Northern &
Middle States being a security against it. It was
moreover certain that foreign ships would never be
altogether excluded especially those of Nations in
treaty with us.

On the question to postpone in order to take up
Mr. Pinkney's motion N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no.
N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C
ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The Report of the Committee for striking out Sect.
6. requiring two thirds of each House to pass a navigation
act was then agreed to, nem: con:

Mr. Butler moved to insert after Art: XV. "If any
person bound to service or labor in any of the U.
States shall escape into another State, he or she
shall not be discharged from such service or labor,
in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the
State to which they escape, but shall be delivered up
to the person justly claiming their service or labor,"
which was agreed to nem: con:

Art: XVII being taken up, Mr. Govr. Morris moved
to strike out the two last sentences, to wit "If the
admission be consented to, the new States shall be

admitted on the same terms with the original States.
But the Legislature may make conditions with the
new States, concerning the public debt which shall
be then subsisting."—He did not wish to bind down
the Legislature to admit Western States on the
terms here stated.

Mr. Madison opposed the motion, insisting that the
Western States neither would nor ought to submit
to a union which degraded them from an equal rank
with the other States.

Col: Mason. If it were possible by just means to
prevent emigrations to the Western Country, it
might be good policy. But go the people will as
they find it for their interest, and the best policy is
to treat them with that equality which will make
them friends not enemies.

Mr. Govr. Morris did not mean to discourage the
growth of the Western Country. He knew that to
be impossible. He did not wish however to throw
the power into their hands.

Mr. Sherman, was agst. the motion & for fixing an
equality of privileges by the Constitution.

Mr. Langdon was in favor of the motion, he did not
know but circumstances might arise which would
render it inconvenient to admit new States on terms
of equality.

Mr. Williamson was for leaving the Legislature free.
The existing small States enjoy an equality now,
and for that reason are admitted to it in the Senate.
This reason is not applicable to new Western States.

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion for striking out.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. L. Martin & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike
out of art XVII, "but to such admission the consent
of two thirds of the members present shall be necessary."
Before any question was taken on this
motion,

Mr. Govr. Morris moved the following proposition
as a substitute for the XVII Art:

"New States may be admitted by the Legislature
into this Union; but no new State shall be erected
within the limits of any of the present States, without
the consent of the Legislature of such State, as
well as of the Genl. Legislature."

The first part to Union inclusive was agreed to
nem; con:

Mr. L. Martin opposed the latter part. Nothing
he said would so alarm the limited States as to Make
the consent of the large States claiming the Western
lands, necessary to the establishment of new States
within their limits. It is proposed to guarantee the
States. Shall Vermont be reduced by force in
favor of the States claiming it? Frankland & the
Western county of Virginia were in a like situation.

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion to substitute &c it
was agreed to. N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N.
J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: XVII—before the House, as amended.

Mr. Sherman was against it. He thought it unnecessary.

The Union cannot dismember a State
without its consent.

Mr. Langdon thought there was great weight in
the argument of Mr. Luther Martin, and that the
proposition substituted by Mr. Govr. Morris would excite
a dangerous opposition to the plan.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought on the contrary that the
small States would be pleased with the regulation,
as it holds up the idea of dismembering the large
States.

Mr. Butler. If new States were to be erected without
the consent of the dismembered States, nothing
but confusion would ensue. Whenever taxes should
press on the people, demagogues would set up their
schemes of new States.

Docr. Johnson agreed in general with the ideas of
Mr. Sherman, but was afraid that as the clause stood,
Vermont would be subjected to N. York, contrary
to the faith pledged by Congress. He was of opinion
that Vermont ought to be compelled to come into
the Union.

Mr. Langdon said his objections were connected
with the case of Vermont. If they are not taken in,
& remain exempt from taxes, it would prove of great
injury to N. Hampshire and the other neighbouring
States

Mr. Dickinson hoped the article would not be
agreed to. He dwelt on the impropriety of requiring
the small States to secure the large ones in their extensive
claims of territory.

Mr. Wilson. When the majority of a State wish to

divide they can do so. The aim of those in opposition
to the article, he perceived was that the Genl.
Government should abet the minority, & by that
means divide a State against its own consent.

Mr. Govr. Morris. If the forced division of the
States is the object of the new system, and is to be
pointed agst. one or two States, he expected the Gentlemen
from these would pretty quickly leave us.

Adjourned.

Thursday August 30th. 1787. In Convention

Art XVII resumed for a question on it as amended
by Mr. Govr. Morris's substitutes

Mr. Carrol moved to strike out so much of the article
as requires the consent of the State to its being
divided. He was aware that the object of this prerequisite
might be to prevent domestic disturbances;
but such was our situation with regard to the Grown
lands, and the sentiments of Maryland on that subject,
that he perceived we should again be at sea, if
no guard was provided for the right of the U. States
to the back lands. He suggested that it might be
proper to provide that nothing in the Constitution
should affect the Right of the U. S. to lands ceded by
G. Britain in the Treaty of peace, and proposed a
committment to a member from each State. He
assured the House that this was a point of a most
serious nature. It was desirable above all things
that the act of the Convention might be agreed to
unanimously. But should this point be disregarded,

he believed that all risks would be run by a considerable
minority, sooner than give their concurrence.

Mr. L. Martin 2ded. the motion for a commitment.

Mr. Rutlidge is it to be supposed that the States
are to be cut up without their own consent. The
case of Vermont will probably be particularly provided
for. There could be no room to fear, that
Virginia or N. Carolina would call on the U. States
to maintain their Government over the Mountains.

Mr. Williamson said that N. Carolina was well disposed
to give up her western lands, but attempts at
compulsion was not the policy of the U. S. He was
for doing nothing in the constitution in the present
case, and for leaving the whole matter in Statu quo.

Mr. Wilson was against the commitment. Unanimity
was of great importance, but not to be purchased
by the majority's yielding to the minority.
He should have no objection to leaving the case of
the new States as heretofore. He knew nothing
that would give greater or juster alarm than the
doctrine, that a political society is to be torn assunder
without its own consent.

On Mr. Carrol's motion for commitment

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Sherman moved to postpone the substitute for
Art: XVII agreed to yesterday in order to take up
the following amendment

"The Legislature shall have power to admit other
States into the Union, and new States to be formed

by the division or junction of States now in the
Union, with the consent of the Legislature of such
States." (The first part was meant for the case of
Vermont to secure its admission.)

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words "hereafter
formed or" after the words "shall be" in the
substitute for Art: XVII (the more clearly to save
Vermont as being already formed into a State, from
a dependence on the consent of N. York for her admission.
The motion was agreed to Del. & Md.
only dissenting.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the word
"limits" in the substitute, and insert the word "jurisdiction"
(This also was meant to guard the case of
Vermont, the jurisdiction of N. York not extending
over Vermont which was in the exercise of sovereignty,
tho' Vermont was within the asserted limits
of New York.)

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. L. Martin urged the unreasonableness of forcing
& guaranteeing the people of Virginia beyond the
Mountains, the Western people of N. Carolina & of
Georgia, & the people of Maine, to continue under
ihe States now governing them, without the consent

of those States to their separation. Even if they
should become the majority, the majority of Counties,
as in Virginia may still hold fast the dominion over
them. Again the majority may place the seat of
Government entirely among themselves & for their
own conveniency, and still keep the injured parts
of the States in subjection, under the guarantee of
the Genl. Government agst. domestic violence. He
wished Mr. Wilson had thought a little sooner of the
value of political bodies. In the beginning, when the
rights of the small States were in question, they were
phantoms, ideal beings. Now when the Great States
were to be affected, political societies were of a
sacred nature. He repeated and enlarged on the
unreasonableness of requiring the small States to
guarantee the Western claims of the large ones.—It
was said yesterday by Mr. Govr. Morris, that if the
large States were to be split to pieces without their
consent, their representatives here would take their
leave. If the Small States are to be required to
guarantee them in this manner, it will be found that
the Representatives of other States will with equal
firmness take their leave of the Constitution on the
table.

It was moved by Mr. L. Martin to postpone the
substituted article, in order to take up the following.

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to
erect New States within as well as without the territory
claimed by the several States or either of them,
and admit the same into the Union: provided that
nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to

affect the claim of the U. S. to vacant lands ceded to
them by the late treaty of peace, which passed in the
negative: N. J. Del. & Md. only ay.

On the question to agree to Mr. Govr. Morris's substituted
article as amended in the words following.

"New States may be admitted by the Legislature
into the Union: but no new State shall be hereafter
formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of
the present States without the consent of the Legislature
of such State as well as of the General Legislature"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Dickinson moved to add the following clause
to the last—

"Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of
two or more States or parts thereof, without the
consent of the Legislature of such States, as well as
of the Legislature of the U. States," which was agreed
to without a count of the votes.

Mr. Carrol moved to add—"Provided nevertheless
that nothing in this Constitution shall be construed
to affect the claim of the U. S. to vacant lands ceded
to them by the Treaty of peace." This he said
might be understood as relating to lands not claimed
by any particular States, but he had in view also
some of the claims of particular States.

Mr. Wilson was agst. the motion. There was nothing
in the Constitution affecting one way or the
Other the claims of the U. S. & it was best to insert

nothing, leaving every thing on that litigated subject
in statu quo.

Mr. Madison considered the claim of the U. S. as in
fact favored by the jurisdiction of the Judicial power
of the U. S. over controversies to which they should
be parties. He thought it best on the whole to be
silent on the subject. He did not view the proviso
of Mr. Carrol as dangerous; but to make it neutral
& fair, it ought to go further & declare that the
claims of particular States also should not be affected.

Mr. Sherman thought the proviso harmless, especially
with the addition suggested by Mr. Madison in
favor of the claims of particular States.

Mr. Baldwin did not wish any undue advantage to
be given to Georgia. He thought the proviso proper
with the addition proposed. It should be remembered
that if Georgia has gained much by the cession
in the Treaty of peace, she was in danger during
the war of a Uti possidetis.

Mr. Rutlidge thought it wrong to insert a proviso
where there was nothing which it could restrain, or
on which it could operate.

Mr. Carrol withdrew his motion and moved the
following.

"Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed
to alter the claims of the U. S. or of the individual
States to the Western territory, but all such claims
shall be examined into & decided upon, by the Supreme
Court of the U. States."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to postpone this in order to
take up the following.

"The Legislature shall have power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the
U. States; and nothing in this constitution contained,
shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims either of the U. S. or of any particular State."

—The postponemt. agd. to nem. con.

Mr. L. Martin moved to amend the proposition of
Mr. Govr. Morris by adding—" But all such claims
may be examined into & decided upon by the supreme
Court of the U. States."

Mr. Govr. Morris. this is unnecessary, as all suits
to which the U. S. are parties, are already to be decided
by the Supreme Court.

Mr. L. Martin. it is proper in order to remove all
doubts on this point.

Question on Mr. L. Martin's amendatory motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no—States not farther called
the negatives being sufficient & the point given
up.

The Motion of Mr. Govr. Morris was then agreed to,
Md. alone dissenting.

Art: XVIII being taken up,—the word "foreign"
was struck out nem: con: as superfluous, being implied
in the term "invasion."

Mr. Dickinson moved to strike out "on the application
of its Legislature, against" He thought it of
essential importance to the tranquility of the U. S.
that they should in all cases suppress domestic violence,
which may proceed from the State Legislature

itself, or from disputes between the two branches
where such exist.

Mr. Dayton mentioned the Conduct of Rho: Island
as shewing the necessity of giving latitude to the
power of the U. S. on this subject.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On a question for striking out "domestic violence"
and insertg. "insurrections—" It passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Dickinson moved to insert the words, "or Executive"
after the words "application of its Legislature."
—The occasion itself he remarked might hinder
the Legislature from meeting.

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. L. Martin moved to subjoin to the last amendment
the words "in the recess of the Legislature"
On which question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On Question on the last clause as amended

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo
ay.

Art: XIX taken up.

Mr. Govr. Morris suggested that the Legislature
should be left at liberty to call a Convention, whenever
they please.

The Art: was agreed to nem: con:

Art: XX. taken up.—"or affirmation" was added
after "oath."

Mr. Pinkney moved to add to the Art:—"but no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under the authority of
the U. States"

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary, the prevailing
liberality being a sufficient security agst. such tests.

Mr. Govr. Morris & Genl. Pinkney approved the
motion.

The motion was agreed to nem: con: and then the
whole Article; N. C. only no—and Md. divided

Art: XXI. taken up, viz: "The ratifications of the
Conventions of—States shall be sufficient for organizing
this Constitution."

Mr. Wilson proposed to fill the blank with "seven"
that being a majority of the whole number & sufficient
for the commencement of the plan.

Mr. Carrol moved to postpone the article in order to
take up the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see
Tuesday Augst. 28)—and on the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the blank ought to be
filled in a twofold way, so as to provide for the event
of the ratifying States being contiguous which would

render a smaller number suificient, and the event of
their being dispersed, which wd. require a greater
number for the introduction of the Government.

Mr. Sherman observed that the States being now
confederated by articles which require unanimity in
changes, he thought the ratification in this case of
ten States at least ought to be made necessary.

Mr. Randolph was for filling the blank with "nine"
that being a respectable majority of the whole, and
being a number made familiar by the constitution of
the existing Congress.

Mr. Wilson mentioned "eight" as preferable.

Mr. Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of
Congress is to be essential to the establishment of
the system, whether the refusing States in the Confederacy
could be deserted—and whether Congress
could concur in contravening the system under
which they acted?

Mr. Madison, remarked that if the blank should be
filled with "seven" "eight," or "nine," the Constitution
as it stands might be put in force over the
whole body of the people, tho' less than a majority of
them should ratify it.

Mr. Wilson. As the Constitution stands, the States
only which ratify can be bound. We must he said
in this case go to the original powers of Society.
The House on fire must be extinguished, without a
scrupulous regard to ordinary rights.

Mr. Butler was in favor of "nine." He revolted at
the idea, that one or two States should restrain the
rest from consulting their safety.

Mr. Carrol moved to fill the blank with "the thirteen,"
unanimity being necessary to dissolve the
existing confederacy which had been unanimously
established.

Mr. King thought this amendt. necessary, otherwise
as the Constitution now stands it will operate on the
whole though ratified by a part only. Adjourned.

Friday August 31st. 1787 In Convention.

Mr. King moved to add to the end of Art: XXI the
words "between the said States" so as to confine the
operation of the Govt. to the States ratifying it.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Md. no. Virga. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison proposed to fill the blank in the article
with "any seven or more States entitled to thirty
three members at least in the House of Representatives
according to the allotment made in the 3 Sect:
of Art: 4." This he said would require the concurrence
of a majority of both the States and the people.

Mr. Sherman doubted the propriety of authorizing
less than all the States to execute the Constitution,
considering the nature of the existing Confederation.
Perhaps all the States may concur, and on that supposition
it is needless to hold out a breach of faith.

Mr. Clymer and Mr. Carrol moved to postpone the
consideration of Art: XXI in order to take up the
Reports of Committees not yet acted on. On this
question, the States were equally divided. N. H. ay.

Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md.
ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. G. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "Conventions
of the" after "ratifications" leaving the States to
pursue their own modes of ratification.

Mr. Carrol mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution
of Maryland pointed out therein, and that
no other mode could be pursued in that State.

Mr. King thought that striking out "Conventions,"
as the requisite mode was equivalent to giving up
the business altogether. Conventions alone, which
will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated
formation of the Legislatures, will succeed, and if
not positively required by the plan its enemies will
oppose that mode.

Mr. Govr. Morris said he meant to facilitate the
adoption of the plan, by leaving the modes approved
by the several State Constitutions to be followed.

Mr. Madison considered it best to require Conventions;
Among other reasons, for this, that the powers
given to the Genl. Govt. being taken from the State
Govts. the Legislatures would be more disinclined
than conventions composed in part at least of other
men; and if disinclined, they could devise modes apparently
promoting, but really thwarting the ratification.
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater
than in other States, where no mode of change was
pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were
under oath to support it. The people were in fact,
the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them,
all difficulties were got over. They could alter

constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle
in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be
resorted to.

Mr. Mc.Henry said that the officers of Govt. in Maryland
were under oath to support the mode of alteration
prescribed by the Constitution.

Mr. Ghorum urged the expediency of "Conventions"
also Mr. Pinkney, for reasons formerly urged on a discussion
of this question.

Mr. L. Martin insisted on a reference to the State
Legislatures. He urged the danger of commotions
from a resort to the people & to first principles, in
which the Governments might be on one side and the
people on the other. He was apprehensive of no
such consequences however in Maryland, whether the
Legislature or the people should be appealed to.
Both of them would be generally against the Constitution.
He repeated also the peculiarity in the
Maryland Constitution.

Mr. King observed that the Constitution of Massachusetts
was made unalterable till the year 1790,
yet this was no difficulty with him. The State must
have contemplated a recurrence to first principles
before they sent deputies to this Convention.

Mr. Sherman moved to postpone art. XXI. & to
take up art: XXII on which question,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. P. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion to strike out "Conventions
of the," it was negatived

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On filling the blank in Art: XXI with "thirteen"
moved by Mr. Carrol & Martin, N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no, all except Maryland.

Mr. Sherman & Mr. Dayton moved to fill the blank
with "ten."

Mr. Wilson supported the motion of Mr. Madison,
requiring a majority both of the people and of States.

Mr. Clymer was also in favor of it.

Col: Mason was for preserving ideas familiar to
the people. Nine States had been required in all
great cases under the Confederation & that number
was on that account preferable

On the question for "ten"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

On question for "nine"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all
the States, Maryland excepted, & Mr. Jenifer being ay.

Art. XXII taken up, to wit, "This Constitution
shall be laid before the U. S. in Congs. assembled for
their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention
that it should be afterwards submitted to a
Convention chosen, in each State under the recommendation
of its Legislature, in order to receive the
ratification of such Convention."

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out
the words "for their approbation" On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay.[47] Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Pinkney then moved to amend
the art: so as to read

"This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S.
in Congress assembled; and it is the opinion of this
Convention that it should afterwards be submitted
to a Convention chosen in each State, in order to receive
the ratification of such Convention; to which
end the several Legislatures ought to provide for the
calling Conventions within their respective States as
speedily as circumstances will permit." Mr. Govr.
Morris said his object was to impress in stronger
terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order
to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving it the go
by. When it first appears, with the sanction of this
Convention, the people will be favorable to it. By
degrees the State officers, & those interested in the
State Govts. will intrigue & turn the popular current
against it.

Mr. L. Martin believed Mr. Morris to be right, that
after a while the people would be agst. it, but for a
different reason from that alledged. He believed
they would not ratify it unless hurried into it by
surprize.

Mr. Gerry enlarged on the idea of Mr. L. Martin in

which he concurred, represented the system as full
of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of destroying
the existing Confederation, without the unanimous
consent of the parties to it.

Question on Mr. Govr. Morris's & Mr. Pinkney's
motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Gerry moved to postpone art: XXII.

Col: Mason 2ded. the motion, declaring that he
would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to
the Constitution as it now stands. He wished to see
some points not yet decided brought to a decision,
before being compelled to give a final opinion on this
article. Should these points be improperly settled,
his wish would then be to bring the whole subject
before another general Convention.

Mr. Govr. Morris was ready for a postponement.
He had long wished for another Convention, that
will have the firmness to provide a vigorous Government,
which we are afraid to do.

Mr. Randolph stated his idea to be, in case the final
form of the Constitution should not permit him to
accede to it, that the State Conventions should be
at liberty to propose amendments to be submitted to
another General Convention which may reject or incorporate
them, as may be judged proper.

On the question for postponing

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question on Art: XXII

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Art: XXIII being taken up, as far as the words
"assigned by Congress" inclusive, was agreed to
nem: con: the blank having been first filled with the
word "nine" as of course.

On a motion for postponing the residue of the
clause, concerning the choice of the President &c.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Govr. Morris then moved to strike out the words
"choose the President of the U. S. and"—this point,
of choosing the President not being yet finally determined,
& on this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.[48]
Geo. ay.

Art: XXIII as amended was then agreed to nem:
con:

The Report of the Grand Committee of eleven
made by Mr. Sherman was then taken up (see Aug:
28)

On the question to agree to the following clause,
to be inserted after sect. 4. art: VII. "nor shall any
regulation of commerce or revenue give preference
to the ports of one State over those of another."
Agreed to nem: con:

On the clause "or oblige vessels bound to or from
any State to enter clear or pay duties in another"

Mr. Madison thought the restriction wd. be inconvenient,
as in the River Delaware, if a vessel cannot
be required to make entry below the jurisdiction of
Pennsylvaina.

Mr. Fitzimmons admitted that it might be inconvenient,
but thought it would be a greater inconvenience
to require vessels bound to Philada. to enter
below the jurisdiction of the State.

Mr. Ghorum & Mr. Langdon, contended that the
Govt. would be so fettered by this clause, as to defeat
the good purpose of the plan. They mentioned
the situation of the trade of Mas. & N. Hampshire,
the case of Sandy Hook which is in the State of N.
Jersey, but where precautions agst. smuggling into N.
York, ought to be established by the Genl. Government.

Mr. Mc. Henry said the clause would not screen a
vessel from being obliged to take an officer on board
as a security for due entry &c.

Mr. Carrol was anxious that the clause should be
agreed to. He assured the House, that this was a
tender point in Maryland.

Mr. Jennifer urged the necessity of the clause in the
same point of view.

On the question for agreeing to it

N. H. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The word "tonnage" was struck out, nem: con: as
comprehended in "duties."

On Question on the clause of the Report "and all
duties, imposts & excises, laid by the Legislature
shall be uniform throughout the U. S." It was
agreed to nem: con:[49]

On motion, of Mr. Sherman it was agreed to refer
such parts of the Constitution as have been postponed,
and such parts of Reports as have not been
acted on, to a Committee of a member from each
State; the Committee appointed by ballot, being,
Mr. Gilman, Mr. King, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Brearly, Mr.
Govr. Morris, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Carrol, Mr. Madison,
Mr. Williamson, Mr. Butler, & Mr. Baldwin.

The House adjourned

Saturday Sepr. 1. 1787 In Convention.

Mr. Brearley from the Commn. of eleven to which
were referred yesterday the postponed part of the
Constitution, & parts of Reports not acted upon,
made the following partial report.

That in lieu of the 9th. Sect: of Art: 6. the words following
be inserted viz "The members of each House
shall be ineligible to any Civil office under the authority
of the U. S. during the time for which they
shall respectively be elected, and no person holding
an office under the U, S. shall be a member of either
House during his continuance in office."

Mr. Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were

referred sundry propositions (see Aug: 29), together
with art: XVI reported that the following additions
be made to the Report—viz

After the word "States" in the last line on the
Margin of the 3d. page (see the printed Report),—
add "to establish uniform laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies."

And insert the following as Art: XVI viz

"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each
State to the public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings
of every other State, and the Legislature
shall, by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect which Judgments obtained in one
State, shall have in another."

After receiving these reports

The House adjourned to 10OC on Monday next

Monday Sepr. 3 1787. In Convention

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to amend the Report concerning
the respect to be paid to Acts Records &c of
one State, in other States (see Sepr. 1.) by striking
out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in
another" and to insert the word "thereof" after the
word "effect"

Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the
"effect" was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial
proceedings

Mr. Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were

not allowed to declare the effect the provision would
amount to nothing more than what now takes place
among all Independent Nations.

Docr. Johnson thought the amendment as worded
would authorize the Genl. Legislature to declare the
effect of Legislative acts of one State in another
State.

Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the
general objection agst. the plan, that its definition of
the powers of the Government was so loose as to give
it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He
was for not going farther than the Report, which
enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of
judgments.

On the amendment, as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris

Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C, ay, S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On motion of Mr. Madison, "ought to" were struck
out, and "shall" inserted; and "shall" between
"Legislature" & "by general laws" struck out, and
"may" inserted, nem: con:

On the question to agree to the report as amended
viz "Full faith & credit shall be given in each State
to the public acts, records & judicial proceedings of
every other State, and the Legislature may by general
laws prescribe the manner in which such acts
records & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof" Agreed to witht. a count of Sts.

The clause in the Report "To establish uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" being taken up.

Mr. Sherman observed that Bankruptcies were in

some cases punishable with death by the laws of
England, & He did not chuse to grant a power by
which that might be done here.

Mr. Govr. Morris said this was an extensive & delicate
subject. He would agree to it because he saw
no danger of abuse of the power by the Legislature of
the U. S.

On the question to agree to the clause

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Pinkney moved to postpone the Report of the
Committee of Eleven (see Sepr. 1.) in order to take up
the following,

"The members of each House shall be incapable
of holding any office under the U. S. for which they
or any other for their benefit, receive any salary,
fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance
of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."
He was strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of
members to office, and therefore wished to restrain
the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered
the eligibility of members of the Legislature
to the honourable offices of Government, as resembling
the policy of the Romans, in making the temple
of virtue the road to the temple of fame.

On this question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. King moved to insert the word "created" before
the word "during" in the Report of the Committee,
This he said would exclude the members of

the first Legislature under the Constitution, as most
of the offices wd. then be created.

Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion. He did not see
why members of the Legislature should be ineligible
to vacancies happening during the term of their
election.

Mr. Sherman was for entirely incapacitating members
of the Legislature. He thought their eligibility
to offices would give too much influence to the Executive.
He said the incapacity ought at least to be
extended to cases where salaries should be increased,
as well as created, during the term of the member.
He mentioned also the expedient by which the restriction
could be evaded to wit: an existing officer
might be translated to an office created, and a member
of the Legislature be then put into the office
vacated.

Mr. Govr. Morris contended that the eligibility of
members to office wd. lessen the influence of the Executive.
If they cannot be appointed themselves,
the Executive will appoint their relations & friends,
retaining the service & votes of the members for
his purposes in the Legislature. Whereas the appointment
of the members deprives him of such an
advantage.

Mr. Gerry, thought the eligibility of members
would have the effect of opening batteries agst. good
officers, in order to drive them out & make way for
members of the Legislature.

Mr. Gorham was in favor of the amendment. Without
it we go further than has been done in any of the

States, or indeed any other Country. The experience
of the State Governments where there was no
such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary;
on the contrary that the eligibility was among the
inducements for fit men to enter into the Legislative
service.

Mr. Randolph was inflexibly fixed against inviting
men into the Legislature by the prospect of being
appointed to offices.

Mr. Baldwin remarked that the example of the
States was not applicable. The Legislatures there
are so numerous that an exclusion of their members
would not leave proper men for offices. The case
would be otherwise in the General Government.

Col: Mason. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility
will keep out corruption, by excluding
office-hunters.

Mr. Wilson considered the exclusion of members of
the Legislature as increasing the influence of the
Executive as observed by Mr. Govr. Morris at the
same time that it would diminish, the general energy
of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification
for office would be odious to those who did
not wish for office, but did not wish either to be
marked by so degrading a distinction.

Mr. Pinkney. The first Legislature will be composed
of the ablest men to be found. The States will
select such to put the Government into operation.
Should the Report of the Committee or even the
amendment be agreed to, The great offices, even
those of the Judiciary Department which are to

continue for life, must be filled while those most capable
of filling them will be under a disqualification.

On the question on Mr King's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The amendment being thus lost by the equal division
of the States, Mr. Williamson moved to insert
the words" created or the emoluments whereof shall
have been increased" before the word "during" in
the Report of the Committee.

Mr. King 2ded. the motion, & on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided.

The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature
& an office incompatible was agreed to nem. con:

The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows.

"The members of each House shall be ineligible to
any Civil office under the authority of the U. States,
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have
been increased during the time for which they shall
respectively be elected—And no person holding any
office under the U. S. shall be a member of either
House during his continuance in office."

Adjourned.

Tuesday Sepr. 4. 1787. In Convention

Mr. Brearly from the Committee of eleven made a
further partial Report as follows

"The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions
&c were referred on the 31st. of August, report

that in their opinion the following additions and alterations
should be made to the Report before the
Convention, viz[50]

(1.)

• The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as
  follows—'The Legislature shall have power to lay and
  collect taxes duties imposts & excises, to pay the
  debts and provide for the common defence & general
  welfare of the U.S.'

(2.)

• At the end of the 2d. clause of sect. 1. art. 7.
  add 'and with the Indian tribes.'

(3.)

• In the place of the 9th. art. Sect. 1. to be inserted
  'The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to
  try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted
  without the concurrence of two thirds of the
  members present.'

(4.)

• After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10.
  to be inserted. 'He shall hold his office during the
  term of four years, and together with the Vice-President,
  chosen for the same term, be elected in
  the following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint
  in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number
  

  ---

  362

  
  
  
  of electors equal to the whole number of Senators
  and members of the House of Representatives, to
  which the State may be entitled in the Legislature.
  The Electors shall meet in their respective States,
  and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at
  least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State
  with themselves; and they shall make a list of all
  the persons voted for, and of the number of votes
  for each, which list they shall sign and certify and
  transmit sealed to the Seat of the Genl. Government,
  directed to the President of the Senate—The President
  of the Senate shall in that House open all
  the certificates, and the votes shall be then & there
  counted. The Person having the greatest number of
  votes shall be the President, if such number be a
  majority of that of the electors; and if there be more
  than one who have such a majority, and have an
  equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately
  choose by ballot one of them for President:
  but if no person have a majority, then from the five
  highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot
  the President, and in every case after the choice of
  the President, the person having the greatest number
  of votes shall be vice-president: but if there
  should remain two or more who have equal votes,
  the Senate shall choose from them the Vice-President.
  The Legislature may determine the time of
  choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner
  of certifying and transmitting their votes.'

(5)

• 'Sect. 2. No person except a natural born
  citizen or a Citizen of the U. S. at the time of the
  

  ---

  363

  
  
  
  adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the
  office of President; nor shall any person be elected
  to that office, who shall be under the age of thirty
  five years, and who has not been in the whole, at
  least fourteen years a resident within the U. S.'

(6)

• 'Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio
  President of the Senate, except when they sit to try
  the impeachment of the President, in which case the
  Chief Justice shall preside, and excepting also when
  he shall exercise the powers and duties of President,
  in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate
  shall chuse a President pro tempore—The vice President
  when acting as President of the Senate shall
  not have a vote unless the House be equally divided.'

(7)

• 'Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice
  and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to
  make Treaties; and he shall nominate and by and
  with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint
  ambassadors, and other public ministers,
  Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of
  the U.S. whose appointments are not otherwise herein
  provided for. But no Treaty shall be made without
  the consent of two thirds of the members present.'

(8)

• After the words—"into the service of the U.
  S." in sect. 2. art: 10. add 'and may require the
  opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of
  the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating
  to the duties of their respective offices.'

  The latter part of Sect. 2. art: 10. to read as follows.

(9)

• 'He shall be removed from his office on
  

  ---

  364

  
  
  
  impeachment by the House of Representatives, and
  conviction by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery,
  and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence,
  resignation or inability to discharge the powers
  or duties of his office, the vice-president shall
  exercise those powers and duties until another President
  be chosen, or until the inability of the President
  be removed'

The (1st.) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem.
con.

The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide
previously on the mode of electing the President.

The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

Mr. Gorham disapproved of making the next highest
after the President, the vice-President, without
referring the decision to the Senate in case the next
highest should have less than a majority of votes.
As the regulation stands a very obscure man with
very few votes may arrive at that appointment

Mr. Sherman said the object of this clause of the
report of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility,
which was attached to the mode of election
by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent
of the Legislature. As the choice of the
President was to be made out of the five highest,
obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against
in that case; and he had no objection to requiring
the vice-President to be chosen in like manner,
where the choice was not decided by a majority in
the first instance

Mr. Madison was apprehensive that by requiring
both the President & vice President to be chosen out
of the five highest candidates, the attention of the
electors would be turned too much to making candidates
instead of giving their votes in order to a
definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the
business, The election would, in fact be consigned to
the Senate altogether. It would have the effect at
the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination
of the candidates to the largest States.

Mr. Govr. Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks
of Mr. Madison.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Pinkney wished for a particular
explanation & discussion of the reasons for changing
the mode of electing the Executive.

Mr. Govr. Morris said he would give the reasons of
the Committee and his own. The 1st. was the danger
of intrigue & faction if the appointmt. should be made
by the Legislature. 2 the inconveniency of an ineligibility
required by that mode in order to lessen
its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a Court of
Impeachments, other than the Senate which would
not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch
for the impeachment of the President, if appointed
by the Legislature. 4. Nobody had appeared to be
satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5.
Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by
the people. 6. the indispensable necessity of making
the Executive independent of the Legislature.—As
the Electors would vote at the same time throughout
the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other,

the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible
also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason
for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court
the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to
try the President after the trial of the impeachment.

Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee
had removed some capital objections, particularly
the danger of cabal and corruption. It
was liable however to this strong objection, that
nineteen times in twenty the President would be
chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the
purpose

Mr. Butler thought the mode not free from objections,
but much more so than an election by the
Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal
faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

Mr. Pinkney stated as objections to the mode 1.
that it threw the whole appointment in fact into the
hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be strangers
to the several candidates and of course unable
to decide on their comparative merits. 3. It makes
the Executive reeligible which will endanger the
public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men
which will in fact elect the President his Judges in
case of an impeachment.

Mr. Williamson had great doubts whether the advantage
of reeligibility would balance the objection
to such a dependence of the President on the Senate
for his reappointment. He thought at least the
Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on
the list

Mr. Govr. Morris said the principal advantage aimed
at was that of taking away the opportunity for cabal.
The President may be made if thought necessary ineligible
on this as well as on any other mode of election.
Other inconveniences may be no less redressed
on this plan than any other.

Mr. Baldwin thought the plan not so objectionable
when well considered, as at first view. The increasing
intercourse among the people of the States,
would render important characters less & less unknown;
and the Senate would consequently be less
& less likely to have the eventual appointment
thrown into their hands.

Mr. Wilson. This subject has greatly divided the
House, and will also divide the people out of doors.
It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we
have had to decide. He had never made up an
opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He
thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement
on the former. It gets rid of one great evil,
that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters
will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to
enable the electors in every part of the Union to
know & judge of them. It clears the way also for a
discussion of the question of re-eligibility on its own
merits which the former mode of election seemed to
forbid. He thought it might be better however to
refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature
than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller
number than five of the Candidates. The eventual
election by the Legislature wd. not open cabal anew,

as it would be restrained to certain designated objects
of choice, and as these must have had the previous
sanction of a number of the States; and if the
election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of
the Electors are opened & it is known that no one
has a majority of the whole there can be little danger
of corruption. Another reason for preferring
the Legislature to the Senate in this business was
that the House of Reps. will be so often changed as
to be free from the influence & faction to which
the permanence of the Senate may subject that
branch.

Mr. Randolph preferred the former mode of constituting
the Executive, but if the change was to be
made, he wished to know why the eventual election
was referred to the Senate and not to the Legislature?
He saw no necessity for this and many objections to
it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of
the eventual appointment would fall into the hands
of the States near the seat of Government.

Mr. Govr. Morris said the Senate was preferred because
fewer could then say to the President, you owe
your appointment to us. He thought the President
would not depend so much on the Senate for his reappointment
as on his general good conduct.

The further consideration of the Report was postponed
that each member might take a copy of the
remainder of it.

The following motion was referred to the Committee
of Eleven—to wit,—"To prepare & report a plan
for defraying the expences of the Convention"

[51] Mr. Pinkney moved a clause declaring "that each
House should be judge of the privilege of its own
members." Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison expressed doubts as to
the propriety of giving such a power, & wished for a
postponement.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought it so plain a case that no
postponement could be necessary.

Mr. Wilson thought the power involved, and the
express insertion of it needless. It might beget doubts
as to the power of other public bodies, as Courts &c.
Every Court is the judge of its own privileges.

Mr. Madison distinguished between the power of
Judging of privileges previously & duly established,
and the effect of the motion which would give a discretion
to each House as to the extent of its own
privileges. He suggested that it would be better to
make provision for ascertaining by law, the privileges
of each House, than to allow each House to decide
for itself. He suggested also the necessity of
considering what privileges ought to be allowed to
the Executive.

Adjourned

Wednesday Sepr. 5. 1787. In Convention.

Mr. Brearley from the Committee of Eleven made a
farther report as follows,

(1)

• To add to the clause "to declare war" the
  words "and grant letters of marque and reprisal"

---

370





(2)

• To add to the clause "to raise and support
  armies" the words "but no appropriation of money
  to that use shall be for a longer term than two years"

(3)

• Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say—"All bills for
  raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,
  and shall be subject to alterations and
  amendments by the Senate: no money shall be
  drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
  made by law."

(4)

• Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1.
  art. 7. insert "To exercise exclusive legislation in all
  cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding
  ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
  States and the acceptance of the Legislature become
  the Seat of the Government of the U. S and to exercise
  like authority over all places purchased for the
  erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock Yards,
  and other needful buildings."

(5)

• "To promote the progress of Science and useful
  arts by securing for limited times to authors &
  inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
  writings and discoveries"

This report being taken up,—The (1) clause was
agreed to nem: con:

To the (2) clause Mr. Gerry objected that it admitted
of appropriations to an army, for two years
instead of one, for which he could not conceive a
reason, that it implied that there was to be a standing
army which he inveighed against as dangerous to
liberty, as unnecessary even for so great an extent of
Country as this, and if necessary, some restriction

on the number & duration ought to be provided:
Nor was this a proper time for such an innovation.
The people would not bear it.

Mr. Sherman remarked that the appropriations
were permitted only, not required to be for two years.
As the Legislature is to be biennally elected, it would
be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for
one year, as there might be no Session within the
time necessary to renew them. He should himself
he said like a reasonable restriction on the number
and continuance of an army in time of peace.

The (2) clause was then agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause, Mr. Govr. Morris moved to postpone.
It had been agreed to in the Committee on the
ground of compromise, and he should feel himself at
liberty to dissent to it, if on the whole he should not
be satisfied with certain other parts to be settled.—
Mr. Pinkney 2ded. the motion

Mr. Sherman was for giving immediate ease to
those who looked on this clause as of great moment,
and for trusting to their concurrence in other proper
measures.

On the question for postponing

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of
Government was agreed to nem: con:

On the residue to wit, "to exercise like authority
over all places purchased for forts &c.

Mr. Gerry contended that this power might be made

use of to enslave any particular State by buying up
its territory, and that the strongholds proposed
would be a means of awing the State into an undue
obedience to the Genl. Government.

Mr. King thought himself the provision unnecessary,
the power being already involved: but would
move to insert after the word "purchased" the
words "by the consent of the Legislature of the
State" This would certainly make the power safe.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion, which was agreed
to nem: con: as was then the residue of the clause as
amended.

The (5) clause was agreed to nem: con:

The following Resolution & order being reported
from the Committee of eleven, to wit,

"Resolved that the U. S. in Congress be requested
to allow and cause to be paid to the Secretary and
other officers of this Convention such sums in proportion
to their respective times of service, as are
allowed to the Secretary & similar officers of Congress."

"Ordered that the Secretary make out & transmit
to the Treasury office of the U. S. an account for the
said services & for the incidental expences of this
Convention"

The resolution & order were separately agreed to
nem: con:

Mr. Gerry gave notice that he should move to reconsider
articles XIX. XX. XXI. XXII.

Mr. Williamson gave like notice as to the article
fixing the number of Representatives, which he

thought too small. He wished also to allow Rho:
Island more than one, as due to her probable number
of people, and as proper to stifle any pretext arising
from her absence on the occasion.

The Report made yesterday as to the appointment
of the Executive being then taken up. Mr. Pinkney
renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that
the electors will not have sufficient knowledge of the
fittest men, & will be swayed by an attachment to
the eminent men of their respective States. Hence
2dly. the dispersion of the votes would leave the appointment
with the Senate, and as the President's
reappointment will thus depend on the Senate he
will be the mere creature of that body. 3. He will
combine with the Senate agst. the House of Representatives.
4. This change in the mode of election
was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President
a second time, whereby he will become fixed for
life under the auspices of the Senate.

Mr. Gerry did not object to this plan of constituting
the Executive in itself, but should be governed in
his final vote by the powers that may be given to
the President.

Mr. Rutlidge was much opposed to the plan reported
by the Committee. It would throw the whole
power into the Senate. He was also against a reeligibility.
He moved to postpone the Report under
consideration & take up the original plan of appointment
by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which
election a majority of the votes of the members

present shall be required: He shall hold his office
during the term of seven years; but shall not be
elected a second time."

On this motion to postpone

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Col. Mason admitted that there were objections to
an appointment by the Legislature as originally
planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but
would state his objections to the mode proposed by
the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment in fact
into the hands of the Senate; as it will rarely happen
that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one
candidate: and as the existing President will always
be one of the 5 highest, his reappointment will of course
depend on the Senate. 2. Considering the powers
of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition
should be established between these two branches,
they will be able to subvert the Constitution—The
great objection with him would be removed by depriving
the Senate of the eventual election. He
accordingly moved to strike out the words "if such
number be a majority of that of the electors."

Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion. He could not
agree to the clause without some such modification.
He preferred making the highest tho' not having a
majority of the votes, President, to a reference of the
matter to the Senate. Referring the appointment
to the Senate lays a certain foundation for corruption
& aristocracy.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the point of less consequence
than it was supposed on both sides. It is
probable that a majority of the votes will fall on the
same man. As each Elector is to give two votes,
more than ¼ will give a majority. Besides as one
vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as
this vote will not be thrown away, ½ the votes will
fall on characters eminent & generally known. Again
if the President shall have given satisfaction, the
votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of
them will reappoint him, without resort to the Senate:
If he should be disliked, all disliking him,
would take care to unite their votes so as to ensure
his being supplanted.

Col. Mason those who think there is no danger of
there not being a majority for the same person in the
first instance, ought to give up the point to those who
think otherwise.

Mr. Sherman reminded the opponents of the new
mode proposed that if the small States had the advantage
in the Senate's deciding among the five
highest candidates the large States would have in
fact the nomination of these candidates.

On the motion of Col: Mason

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay.[52] Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson moved to strike out "Senate" and insert
the word "Legislature"

Mr. Madison considered it as a primary object to

render an eventual resort to any part of the Legislature
improbable. He was apprehensive that the
proposed alteration would turn the attention of
the large States too much to the appointment of
candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual appointment
of the officer, as the large States would predominate
in the Legislature which would have the
final choice out of the candidates. Whereas if the
Senate in which the small States predominate should
have the final choice, the concerted effort of the
large States would be to make the appointment in
the first instance conclusive.

Mr. Randolph. We have in some revolutions of
this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy. We are
now doing the same for an aristocracy. He dwelt on
the tendency of such an influence in the Senate over
the election of the President in addition to its other
powers, to convert that body into a real & dangerous
Aristocracy.

Mr. Dickinson was in favor of giving the eventual
election to the Legislature, instead of the Senate. It
was too much influence to be superadded to that body.

On the question moved by Mr. Wilson

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Williamson moved to strike out
the word "majority" and insert "one-third" so that
the eventual power might not be exercised if less
than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of the Electors
should vote for the same person.

Mr. Gerry objected that this would put it in the
power of three or four States to put in whom they
pleased.

Mr. Williamson. There are seven States which do
not contain one third of the people. If the Senate are
to appoint, less than one sixth of the people will have
the power.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Gerry suggested that the eventual election
should be made by six Senators and seven Representatives
chosen by joint ballot of both Houses.

Mr. King observed that the influence of the Small
States in the Senate was somewhat balanced by the
influence of the large States in bringing forward
the candidates,[53] and also by the Concurrence of the
small States in the Committee in the clause vesting
the exclusive origination of Money bills in the House
of Representatives.

Col: Mason moved to strike out the word "five"
and insert the word "three" as the highest candidates
for the Senate to choose out of.

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion

Mr. Sherman would sooner give up the plan. He
would prefer seven or thirteen.

On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr.
Gerry

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Delaware [and] Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Spaight and Mr. Rutlidge moved to strike out
"five" and insert "thirteen"—to which all the
States disagreed—except N. C. & S. C.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Williamson moved to insert after
"Electors" the words "who shall have balloted" so
that the non voting electors not being counted might
not increase the number necessary as a majority of
the whole to decide the choice without the agency of
the Senate.

On this question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Dickinson moved, in order to remove ambiguity
from the intention of the clause as explained
by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number
be a majority of the whole number of the Electors"
the word "appointed"

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Delaware [and] Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Col: Mason. As the mode of appointment is now

regulated, he could not forbear expressing his opinion
that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer
the Government of Prussia to one which will put all
power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix
an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.

The words "and of their giving their votes" being
inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words
"The Legislature may determine the time of chusing
and assembling the Electors"

The House adjourned.

Thursday Sepr. 6. 1787. In Convention

Mr. King and Mr. Gerry moved to insert in the (5)[54]
clause of the Report (see Sepr. 4) after the words
"may be entitled in the Legislature" the words following
—"But no person shall be appointed an elector
who is a member of the Legislature of the U.S. or
who holds any office of profit or trust under the U.
S." which passed nem: con:

Mr. Gerry proposed as the President was to be
elected by the Senate out of the five highest candidates,
that if he should not at the end of his term
be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no
other candidate should have a majority, the eventual
election should be made by the Legislature. This
he said would relieve the President from his particular
dependence on the Senate for his continuance in
office.

Mr. King liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy
particular members and promote unanimity & as
likely to operate but seldom.

Mr. Read opposed it, remarking that if individual
members were to be indulged, alterations would be
necessary to satisfy most of them.

Mr. Williamson espoused it as a reasonable precaution
against the undue influence of the Senate.

Mr. Sherman liked the arrangement as it stood,
though he should not be averse to some amendments.
He thought he said that if the Legislature were to
have the eventual appointment instead of the Senate,
it ought to vote in the case by States, in favor
of the small States, as the large States would have
so great an advantage in nominating the candidates.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought favorably of Mr. Gerry's
proposition. It would free the President from being
tempted in naming to offices, to Conform to the will
of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the appointments
to office, to the Senate.

Mr. Wilson said that he had weighed carefully the
report of the Committee for remodelling the constitution
of the Executive; and on combining it with
other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider
the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy;
as throwing a dangerous power into the
hands of the Senate. They will have in fact, the
appointment of the President, and through his dependence
on them, the virtual appointment to offices;
among others the Officers of the Judiciary Department.
They are to make Treaties; and they are to

try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to
make the Executive & Judiciary appointments, to
be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties
which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive
& Judiciary powers are all blended in one
branch of the Government. The power of making
Treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here as
an additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded.
According to the plan as it now stands, the President
will not be the man of the people as he ought to be,
but the minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint
a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had
always thought the Senate too numerous a body for
making appointments to office. The Senate, will
moreover in all probability be in constant Session.
They will have high salaries. And with all those
powers, and the President in their interest, they will
depress the other branch of the Legislature, and
aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all
this, that the Senate sitting in conclave, can by
holding up to their respective States various and
improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their
votes, as to bring the appointment of the President
ultimately before themselves. Upon the whole, he
thought the new mode of appointing the President,
with some amendments, a valuable improvement;
but he could never agree to purchase it at the price
of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a
system of which they make a part.

Mr. Govr. Morris expressed his wonder at the observations
of Mr. Wilson so far as they preferred the

plan in the printed Report to the new modification
of it before the House, and entered into a comparative
view of the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr.
Wilsons objections to the last. By the first the Senate
he observed had a voice in appointing the President
out of all the Citizens of the U.S: by this they
were limited to five candidates previously nominated
to them, with a probability of being barred altogether
by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here surely
was no increase of power. They are now to appoint
Judges nominated to them by the President. Before
they had the appointment without any agency whatever
of the President. Here again was surely no
additional power. If they are to make Treaties as
the plan now stands, the power was the same in the
printed plan. If they are to try impeachments, the
Judges must have been triable by them before.
Wherein then lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations
to establish an aristocracy in the Senate?
As to the appointment of officers, the weight of sentiment
in the House, was opposed to the exercise of
it by the President alone; though it was not the case
with himself. If the Senate would act as was suspected,
in misleading the States into a fallacious disposition
of their votes for a President, they would,
if the appointment were withdrawn wholly from
them, make such representations in their several
States where they have influence, as would favor the
object of their partiality.

Mr. Williamson, replying to Mr. Morris, observed
that the aristocratic complexion proceeds from the

change in the mode of appointing the President
which makes him dependent on the Senate.

Mr. Clymer said that the aristocratic part to which
he could never accede was that in the printed plan,
which gave the Senate the power of appointing to
offices.

Mr. Hamilton said that he had been restrained
from entering into the discussions by his dislike of
the Scheme of Govt. in General; but as he meant to
support the plan to be recommended, as better than
nothing, he wished in this place to offer a few remarks.
He liked the new modification, on the whole, better
than that in the printed Report. In this the President
was a Monster elected for seven years, and
ineligible afterwards; having great powers, in appointments
to office, & continually tempted by this
constitutional disqualification to abuse them in order
to subvert the Government. Although he should
be made re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legislature,
he would be tempted to make use of corrupt
influence to be continued in office. It seemed peculiarly
desirable therefore that some other mode of
election should be devised. Considering the different
views of different States, & the different districts
Northern Middle & Southern, he concurred with
those who thought that the votes would not be concentered,
and that the appointment would consequently
in the present mode devolve on the Senate.
The nomination to offices will give great weight to
the President. Here then is a mutual connexion &
influence, that will perpetuate the President, and

aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be
the remedy? He saw none better than to let the
highest number of ballots, whether a majority or
not, appoint the President. What was the objection
to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint.
But as the plan stands, the Senate may take
the candidate having the smallest number of votes,
and make him President.

Mr. Spaight & Mr. Williamson moved to insert
"seven" instead of "four" years for the term of the
President[55] —

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Spaight & Mr. Williamson, then moved to insert
"six," instead of "four" On which motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

On the term "four" all the States were ay, except
N. Carolina, no.

On the question (Clause 4. in the Report) for appointing
President by electors—down to the words,
—"entitled in the Legislature" inclusive

N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.—
ay.

It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat
of the Genl. Govt. which passed in the Negative N.
C. only being ay.

It was moved to insert the words "under the seal
of the State" after the word "transmit" in the 4th.
clause of the Report which was disagreed to; as
was another motion to insert the words "and who
shall have given their votes" after the word "appointed"
in the 4th. Clause of the Report as added
yesterday on motion of Mr. Dickinson.

On several motions, the words "in presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives" were inserted
after the word "counted" and the word "immediately"
before the word "choose;" and the words "of
the Electors" after the word "votes."

Mr. Spaight said if the election by Electors is to
be crammed down, he would prefer their meeting
altogether and deciding finally without any reference
to the Senate and moved "that the Electors
meet at the seat of the General Government."

Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion, on which all the
States were in the negative except N: Carolina.

On motion the words "But the election shall be on
the same day throughout the U. S." were added after
the words "transmitting their votes" N. H. ay.
Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md.
ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo—ay

On a question on the sentence in clause (4) "if
such number be a majority of that of the Electors
appointed"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.

Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

On a question on the clause referring the eventual
appointment of the President to the Senate

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. Here the call ceased.

Mr. Madison made a motion requiring 2/3 at least of
the Senate to be present at the choice of a President.
Mr. Pinkney 2ded. the motion

Mr. Gorham thought it a wrong principle to require
more than a majority in any case. In the
present case it might prevent for a long time any
choice of a President. On the question moved by
Mr. M. and Mr. P.

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Williamson suggested as better than an eventual
choice by the Senate, that this choice should be
made by the Legislature, voting by States and not
per capita.

Mr. Sherman suggested the "House of Reps". as
preferable to the Legislature, and moved accordingly.

To strike out the words "The Senate shall immediately
choose &c." and insert "The House of Representatives
shall immediately choose by ballot one
of them for President, the members from each State
having one vote."

Col: Mason liked the latter mode best as lessening
the aristocratic influence of the Senate.

On the motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.

Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris suggested the idea of providing
that in all cases, the President in office, should not
be one of the five Candidates; but be only re-eligible
in case a majority of the electors should vote for him.
(This was another expedient for rendering the President
independent of the Legislative body for his
continuance in office.)

Mr. Madison remarked that as a majority of members
wd. make a quorum in the H. of Reps. it would
follow from the amendment of Mr. Sherman giving
the election to a majority of States, that the President
might be elected by two States only, Virga. &
Pena. which have 18 members, if these States alone
should be present

On a motion that the eventual election of Presidt.
in case of an equality of the votes of the electors
be referred to the House of Reps.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. King moved to add to the amendment of Mr.
Sherman "But a quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two thirds of the
States," and also of a majority of the whole number
of the House of Representatives."

Col: Mason liked it as obviating the remark of Mr.
Madison—The motion as far as "States" inclusive
was agd. to. On the residue to wit, "and also of a
majority of the whole number of the House of Repss."
it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

The Report relating to the appointment of the
Executive stands as amended, as follows.

"He shall hold his office during the term of four
years, and together with the vice-President, chosen
for the same term, be elected in the following manner.

Each State shall appoint in such manner as its
Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal
to the whole number of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, to which the State
may be entitled in the Legislature:

But no person shall be appointed an Elector who
is a member of the Legislature of the U. S. or who
holds any office of profit or trust under the U. S.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States
and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at
least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State
with themselves; and they shall make a list of all
the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for
each, which list they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the Seat of the General Government,
directed to the President of the Senate.

The President of the Senate shall in the presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives open all
the certificates & the votes shall then be counted.

The person having the greatest number of votes
shall be the President (if such number be a majority
of the whole number of electors appointed) and if

there be more than one who have such majority,
and have an equal number of votes, then the House
of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot
one of them for President, the Representation
from each State having one vote. But if no person
have a majority, then from the five highest on the
list, the House of Representatives shall in like manner
choose by ballot the President. In the choice
of a President by the House of Representatives, a
Quorum shall consist of a member or members from
two thirds of the States, ([56] and the concurrence of
a majority of all the States shall be necessary to
such choice.)—And in every case after the choice of
the President, the person having the greatest number
of votes of the Electors shall be the vice-president:
But, if there should remain two or more who
have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them
the vice-President.[57]

The Legislature may determine the time of choosing
the Electors, and of their giving their votes; and
the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes

—But the election shall be on the same day throughout
the U. States."

Adjourned

Friday Sepr. 7[58] 1787. In Convention

The mode of constituting the Executive being resumed,
Mr. Randolph moved, to insert in the first
section of the report made yesterday

"The Legislature may declare by law what officer
of the U. S. shall act as President in case of the
death, resignation, or disability of the President and
Vice-President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the time of electing a President shall arrive."

Mr. Madison observed that this, as worded, would
prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate

election of the President, and moved to substitute—
"until such disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.[59] Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion,
which was agreed to.

It seemed to be an objection to the provision with
some, that according to the process established for
chusing the Executive, there would be difficulty in
effecting it at other than the fixed periods; with
others, that the Legislature was restrained in the
temporary appointment to "officers" of the U. S.:

They wished it to be at liberty to appoint others
than such.

On the Motion of Mr. Randolph as amended, it
passed in the affirmative

N. H. divided. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry moved "that in the election of President
by the House of Representatives, no State shall
vote by less than three members, and where that
number may not be allotted to a State, it shall be
made up by its Senators; and a concurrence of a
majority of all the States shall be necessary to make
such choice." Without some such provision five individuals
might possibly be competent to an election;
these being a majority of two thirds of the
existing number of States; and two thirds being a
quorum for this business.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion

Mr. Read observed that the States having but one
member only in the House of Reps. would be in danger
of having no vote at all in the election: the
sickness or absence either of the Representative or
one of the Senators would have that effect.

Mr. Madison replied that, if one member of the
House of Representatives should be left capable of
voting for the State, the states having one Representative
only would still be subject to that danger.
He thought it an evil that so small a number at any
rate should be authorized to elect. Corruption would
be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was

liable to this further weighty objection that the representatives
of a Minority of the people, might reverse
the choice of a majority of the States and of the
people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency
might yet be provided.

Mr. Gerry withdrew the first part of his motion;
and on the, Question on the 2d. part viz: "and a concurrence
of a majority of all the States shall be necessary
to make such choice" to follow the words "a
member or members from two thirds of the States"
—It was agreed to nem: con:

The section 2. (see Sepr. 4) requiring that the
President should be a natural-born Citizen &c, &
have been resident for fourteen years, & be thirty
five years of age, was agreed to nem: con:

Section 3 (see Sepr. 4). "The vice President shall
be ex-officio President of the Senate"

Mr. Gerry opposed this regulation. We might as
well put the President himself at the head of the
Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist
between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely
improper. He was agst. having any vice
President.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The vice President then will be
the first heir apparent that ever loved his father. If
there should be no vice president, the President of
the Senate would be temporary successor, which
would amount to the same thing.

Mr. Sherman saw no danger in the case. If the
vice-President were not to be President of the Senate,
he would be without employment, and some

member by being made President must be deprived
of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes
might happen in the Senate, which would be but
seldom.

Mr. Randolph concurred in the opposition to the
clause.

Mr. Williamson, observed that such an officer as
vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced
only for the sake of a valuable mode of election
which required two to be chosen at the same time.

Col: Mason, thought the office of vice-President an
encroachment on the rights of the Senate; and that
it mixed too much the Legislative & Executive,
which as well as the Judiciary departments, ought
to be kept as separate as possible. He took occasion
to express his dislike of any reference whatever of
the power to make appointments, to either branch
of the Legislature. On the other hand he was
averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President
alone. As a method for avoiding both, he suggested
that a privy Council of six members to the
president should be established; to be chosen for
six years by the Senate, two out of the Eastern two
out of the middle, and two out of the Southern
quarters of the Union, & to go out in rotation two
every second year; the concurrence of the Senate
to be required only in the appointment of Ambassadors,
and in making treaties, which are more of a
legislative nature. This would prevent the constant
sitting of the Senate which he thought dangerous,
as well as keep the departments separate & distinct.

It would also save the expence of constant sessions of
the Senate. He had he said always considered the
Senate as too unwieldy & expensive for appointing
officers, especially the smallest, such as tide waiters
&c. He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it
could be easily done if it should be found acceptable.

On the question shall the vice President be ex
officio President of the Senate? N. H. ay. Mas. ay.
Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Mar. no. Va.
ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The other parts of the same Section (3) were then
agreed to.

The Section 4.—to wit. "The President by &
with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have
power to make Treaties &c"

Mr. Wilson moved to add after the word "Senate"
the words, "and House of Representatives." As
treaties he said are to have the operation of laws,
they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The
circumstance of secrecy in the business of treaties
formed the only objection; but this he thought, so
far as it was inconsistent with obtaining the Legislative
sanction, was outweighed by the necessity of
the latter.

Mr. Sherman thought the only question that could
be made was whether the power could be safely
trusted to the Senate. He thought it could; and
that the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties
forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature.

Mr. Fitzimmons 2ded. the motion of Mr. Wilson, &

on the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J.
no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.

The first sentence as to making treaties was then
Agreed to; nem: con:

"He shall nominate &c Appoint Ambassadors
&c."

Mr. Wilson objected to the mode of appointing, as
blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive.
Good laws are of no effect without a good
Executive; and there can be no good Executive
without a responsible appointment of officers to
execute. Responsibility is in a manner destroyed
by such an agency of the Senate. He would prefer
the council proposed by Col: Mason, provided its
advice should not be made obligatory on the President.

Mr. Pinkney was against joining the Senate in these
appointments, except in the instances of Ambassadors
who he thought ought not to be appointed by
the President

Mr. Govr. Morris said that as the President was to
nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the
Senate was to concur, there would be security. As
Congress now make appointments there is no responsibility.

Mr. Gerry. The idea of responsibility in the nomination
to offices is Chimerical. The President cannot
know all characters, and can therefore always
plead ignorance.

Mr. King. As the idea of a Council proposed by

Col. Mason has been supported by Mr. Wilson, he
would remark that most of the inconveniences
charged on the Senate are incident to a Council of
Advice. He differed from those who thought the
Senate would sit constantly. He did not suppose it
was meant that all the minute officers were to be
appointed by the Senate, or any other original
source, but by the higher officers of the departments
to which they belong. He was of opinion also that
the people would be alarmed at an unnecessary
creation of new Corps which must increase the expence
as well as influence of the Government.

On the question on these words in the clause viz
—"He shall nominate & by & with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors,
and other public ministers (and consuls) Judges of
the Supreme Court" Agreed to nem: con: the insertion
of "and consuls" having first taken place.

On the question on the following words "And all
other officers of U. S." N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct.
ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On motion of Mr. Spaight—"that the President
shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the end of the
next Session of the Senate" It was agreed to nem:
con:

Section 4. "The President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate shall have power to
make Treaties,—But no treaty shall be made without

the consent of two thirds of the members present"—
this last clause being before the House.

Mr. Wilson thought it objectionable to require the
concurrence of 2/3 which puts it into the power of a
minority to controul the will of a majority.

Mr. King concurred in the objection; remarking
that as the Executive was here joined in the business,
there was a check which did not exist in Congress
where the concurrence of 2/3 was required.

Mr. Madison moved to insert after the word "treaty"
the words "except treaties of peace" allowing these
to be made with less difficulty than other treaties—
It was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. Madison then moved to authorize a concurrence
of two thirds of the Senate to make treaties of
peace, without the concurrence of the President.—
The President he said would necessarily derive so
much power and importance from a state of war
that he might be tempted if authorized, to impede a
treaty of peace. Mr. Butler 2ded. the motion

Mr. Gorham thought the precaution unnecessary
as the means of carrying on the war would not be in
the hands of the President, but of the Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the power of the President
in this case harmless; and that no peace ought to be
made without the concurrence of the President, who
was the general Guardian of the National interests.

Mr. Butler was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary
security against ambitious & corrupt Presidents.
He mentioned the late perfidious policy of the Statholder
in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of

Marlbro' to prolong the war of which he had the
management.

Mr. Gerry was of opinion that in treaties of peace a
greater rather than less proportion of votes was
necessary, than in other treaties. In Treaties of
peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the
fisheries, territory &c. In treaties of peace also
there is more danger to the extremities of the Continent
of being sacrificed, than on any other occasions.

Mr. Williamson thought that Treaties of peace
should be guarded at least by requiring the same
concurrence as in other Treaties.

On the motion of Mr. Madison & Mr. Butler

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

On the part of the clause concerning treaties
amended by the exception as to Treaties of peace,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

"and may require the opinion in writing of the
principal officer in each of the Executive Departments,
upon any subject relating to the duties of
their respective offices," being before the House

Col: Mason[60] said that in rejecting a Council to the
President we were about to try an experiment on
which the most despotic Government had never
ventured. The Grand Signer himself had his Divan.

He moved to postpone the consideration of the
clause in order to take up the following

"That it be an instruction to the Committee of
the States to prepare a clause or clauses for establishing
an Executive Council, as a Council of State
for the President of the U. States, to consist of six
members, two of which from the Eastern, two from
the middle, and two from the Southern States, with
a Rotation and duration of office similar to those of
the Senate; such Council to be appointed by the
Legislature or by the Senate."

Doctor Franklin 2ded. the motion. We seemed he
said too much to fear cabals in appointments by a
number, and to have too much confidence in those
of single persons. Experience shewed that caprice,
the intrigues of favorites & mistresses, were nevertheless
the means most prevalent in monarchies.
Among instances of abuse in such modes of appointment,
he mentioned the many bad Governors appointed
in G. B. for the Colonies. He thought a
Council would not only be a check on a bad President
but be a relief to a good one.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The question of a Council was
considered in the Committee, where it was judged
that the Presidt. by persuading his Council to concur
in his wrong measures, would acquire their protection
for them.

Mr. Wilson approved of a Council in preference to
making the Senate a party to appointmts.

Mr. Dickinson was for a Council. It wd. be a singular
thing if the measures of the Executive were

not to undergo some previous discussion before the
President.

Mr. Madison was in favor of the instruction to the
Committee proposed by Col: Mason.

The motion of Mr. Mason was negatived. Mayd.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay—N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no Pa. no. Del. no. Va. no. N. C.
no

On the question, "authorizing the President to
call for the opinions of the Heads of Departments, in
writing": it passed in the affirmative N. H. only
being no.[61]

The clause was then unanimously agreed to—

Mr. Williamson & Mr. Spaight moved "that no
Treaty of peace affecting Territorial rights shd. be
made without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members of the Senate present.

Mr. King. It will be necessary to look out for
securities for some other rights, if this principle be
established; he moved to extend the motion—"to
all present rights of the U. States."

Adjourned.

Saturday September 8th. In Convention

The last Report of the Committee of Eleven (see
Sepr. 4) was resumed.

Mr. King moved to strike out the "exception of

Treaties of peace" from the general clause requiring
two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties

Mr. Wilson wished the requisition of two thirds to
be struck out altogether If the majority cannot be
trusted, it was a proof, as observed by Mr. Ghorum,
that we were not fit for one Society.

A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed
to.

Mr. Govr. Morris was agst. striking out the "exception
of Treaties of peace" If two thirds of the Senate
should be required for peace, the Legislature will be
unwilling to make war for that reason, on account of
the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects
of the Union. Besides, if a majority of the Senate
be for peace, and are not allowed to make it, they
will be apt to effect their purpose in the more disagreeable
mode, of negativing the supplies for the
war.

Mr. Williamson remarked that Treaties are to be
made in the branch of the Govt. where there may be
a majority of the States without a majority of the
people. Eight men may be a majority of a quorum,
& should not have the power to decide the conditions
of peace. There would be no danger, that the exposed
States, as S. Carolina or Georgia, would urge
an improper war for the Western Territory.

Mr. Wilson If two thirds are necessary to make
peace, the minority may perpetuate war, against the
sense of the majority.

Mr. Gerry enlarged on the danger of putting the
essential rights of the Union in the hands of so small

a number as a majority of the Senate, representing
perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The Senate will
be corrupted by foreign influence.

Mr. Sherman was agst. leaving the rights established
by the Treaty of peace, to the Senate, &
moved to annex a proviso that no such rights shd. be
ceded without the sanction of the Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris seconded the ideas of Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Madison observed that it had been too easy in
the present Congress, to make Treaties altho' nine
States were required for the purpose.

On the question for striking "except Treaties of
peace"

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Dayton move to strike out the
clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making
Treaties; on which,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Rutlidge & Mr. Gerry moved that "no Treaty
be made without the consent of 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate"—according to the example in the
present Congs.

Mr. Ghorum. There is a difference in the case, as
the President's consent will also be necessary in the
new Govt.

On the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. (Mr. Gerry ay) Ct. no. N. J.

no. Pa. no. Del no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Sherman movd. that no Treaty be made without
a Majority of the whole number of the Senate. Mr.
Gerry seconded him.

Mr. Williamson. This will be less security than 2/3
as now required.

Mr. Sherman. It will be less embarrassing.

On the question, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Madison moved that a Quorum of the Senate
consist of 2/3 of all the members.

Mr. Govr. Morris—This will put it in the power of
one man to break up a Quorum.

Mr. Madison. This may happen to any Quorum.

On the Question it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Williamson & Mr. Gerry movd. "that no Treaty
shd. be made witht. previous notice to the members,
& a reasonable time for their attending."

On the Question

All the States no; except N. C. S. C. & Geo. ay.

On a question on clause of the Report of the Come.
of Eleven relating to Treaties by 2/3 of the Senate.
Alt the States were ay—except Pa. N. J. & Geo. no.

Mr. Gerry movd. that "no officer be appd. but to
offices created by the Constitution or by law."—

This was rejected as unnecessary by six no's & five
ays:

The Ayes. Mass. Ct. N. J. N. C. Geo.—Noes.
N. H. Pa. Del. Md. Va. S. C.

The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments
agst. the President, for Treason & bribery,
was taken up.

Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to
Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the
Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous
offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason.
Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be
Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder
which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden,
it is the more necessary to extend the power
of impeachments. He movd. to add, after "bribery"
"or maladministration." Mr. Gerry seconded him.

Mr. Madison so vague a term will be equivalent
to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.

Mr. Govr. Morris, it will not be put in force & can
do no harm. An election of every four years will
prevent maladministration.

Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes
"other high crimes & misdemesnors agst. the
State"

On the question thus altered

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.[62] Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison objected to a trial of the President by
the Senate, especially as he was to be impeached by

the other branch of the Legislature, and for any act
which might be called a misdemesnor. The President
under these circumstances was made improperly
dependent. He would prefer the Supreme Court
for the trial of impeachments, or rather a tribunal of
which that should form a part.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought no other tribunal than the
Senate could be trusted. The supreme Court were
too few in number and might be warped or corrupted.
He was agst. a dependence of the Executive
on the Legislature, considering the Legislative tyranny
the great danger to be apprehended; but
there could be no danger that the Senate would say
untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty
of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can
be turned out.

Mr. Pinkney disapproved of making the Senate the
Court of impeachments, as rendering the President
too dependent on the Legislature. If he opposes a
favorite law, the two Houses will combine agst. him,
and under the influence of heat and faction throw
him out of office.

Mr. Williamson thought there was more danger of
too much lenity than of too much rigour towards the
President, considering the number of cases in which
the Senate was associated with the President.

Mr. Sherman regarded the Supreme Court as improper
to try the President, because the Judges
would be appointed by him.

On motion of Mr. Madison to strike out the words
—"by the Senate" after the word "conviction"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

In the amendment of Col: Mason just agreed to,
the word "State" after the words "misdemeanors
against," was struck out, and the words "United
States," inserted unanimously, in order to remove
ambiguity.

On the question to agree to clause as amended,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont ay N J ay. Pa. no. Del
ay Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On motion "The vice-President and other Civil
officers of the U. S. shall be removed from office on
impeachment and conviction as aforesaid" was added
to the clause on the subject of impeachments.

The clause of the report made on the 5th. Sepr. &
postponed was taken up to wit—"All bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives;
and shall be subject to alterations and amendments
by the Senate. No money shall be drawn
from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by law."

It was moved to strike out the words "and shall
be subject to alterations and amendments by the
Senate" and insert the words used in the Constitution
of Massachusetts on the same subject—"but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments
as in other bills" which was agreed too nem: con:

On the question On the first part of the clause—
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives"[63]

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to add to clause (3) of the
report made on Sepr. 4. the words "and every
member shall be on oath" which being agreed to,
and a question taken on the clause so amended viz
—"The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try
all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present; and every member shall be on
oath"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del—ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry repeated his motion above made on this
day, in the form following: "The Legislature shall
have the sole right of establishing offices not heretofore
provided for" which was again negatived: Mas.
Cont. & Geo. only being ay.

Mr. McHenry observed that the President had not
yet been any where authorized to convene the Senate,
and moved to amend Art X. sect. 2. by striking
out the words "he may convene them (the Legislature)
on extraordinary occasions," & insert, "He may
convene both or either of the Houses on extraordinary
occasions." This he added would also provide
for the case of the Senate being in Session, at
the time of convening the Legislature.

Mr. Wilson said he should vote agst. the motion,
because it implied that the senate might be in Session,

when the Legislature was not, which he thought
improper.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

A Committee was then appointed by Ballot to
revise the stile of and arrange the articles which
had been agreed to by the House. The committee
consisted of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Govr.
Morris, Mr. Madison and Mr. King.

Mr. Williamson moved that, previous to this work
of the Committee the clause relating to the number
of the House of Representatives shd. be reconsidered
for the purpose of increasing the number.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the Motion

Mr. Sherman opposed it he thought the provision
on that subject amply sufficient.

Col: Hamilton expressed himself with great earnestness
and anxiety in favor of the motion. He
avowed himself a friend to a vigorous Government,
but would declare at the same time, that he held it
essential that the popular branch of it should be on
a broad foundation. He was Seriously of opinion
that the House of Representatives was on so narrow a
scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a
jealousy in the people for their liberties. He remarked
that the connection between the President
& Senate would tend to perpetuate him, by corrupt
influence. It was the more necessary on this account
that a numerous representation in the other
branch of the Legislature should be established.

On the motion of Mr. Williamson to reconsider, it
was negatived[64]

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
no.

Adjd.

Monday Sepr. 10. 1787 In Convention[65]

Mr. Gerry moved to reconsider Art XIX. viz. "On
the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the States in the Union, for an amendment of this
Constitution, the Legislature of the U. S. shall call
a Convention for that purpose," (see Aug 6)

This constitution he said is to be paramount to
the State Constitutions. It follows hence, from this
article that two thirds of the States may obtain a
Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union
to innovations that may subvert the State Constitutions
altogether. He asked whether this was a
situation proper to be run into.

Mr. Hamilton 2ded. the motion, but he said with a
different view from Mr. Gerry. He did not object

to the consequences stated by Mr. Gerry. There was
no greater evil in subjecting the people of the U. S.
to the major voice than the people of a particular
State. It had been wished by many and was much
to have been desired that an easier mode of introducing
amendments had been provided by the articles
of the Confederation. It was equally desirable
now that an easy mode should be established for
supplying defects which will probably appear in the
new System. The mode proposed was not adequate.
The State Legislatures will not apply for
alterations but with a view to increase their own
powers. The National Legislature will be the first
to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity
of amendments, and ought also to be empowered,
whenever two thirds of each branch should concur to
call a Convention. There could be no danger in
giving this power, as the people would finally decide
in the case.

Mr. Madison remarked on the vagueness of the
terms, "call a Convention for the purpose," as sufficient
reason for reconsidering the article. How was
a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide?
what the force of its acts?

On the motion of Mr. Gerry to reconsider

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Sherman moved to add to the article "or the
Legislature may propose amendments to the several
States for their approbation, but no amendments

shall be binding until consented to by the several
States."

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion

Mr. Wilson moved to insert, "two thirds of" before
the words "several States"—on which amendment
to the motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Wilson then moved to insert "three fourths
of" before "the several Sts" which was agreed to
nem: con:

Mr. Madison moved to postpone the consideration
of the amended proposition in order to take up the
following,

"The Legislature of the U. S. whenever two thirds
of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application
of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
several States, shall propose amendments to this
Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have
been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures
of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of
the U. S:"

Mr. Hamilton 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Rutlidge said he never could agree to give a
power by which the articles relating to slaves might
be altered by the States not interested in that property
and prejudiced against it. In order to obviate

this objection, these words were added to the proposition:[66]
"provided that no amendments which
may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any
manner affect the 4 & 5 sections of the VII article"
—The postponement being agreed to,

On the question on the proposition of Mr. Madison
& Mr. Hamilton as amended

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Gerry moved to reconsider Art: XXI and XXII.
from the latter of which "for the approbation of
Congs." had been struck out. He objected to proceeding
to change the Government without the
approbation of Congress, as being improper and
giving just umbrage to that body: He repeated his
objections also to an annulment of the confederation
with so little scruple or formality.

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the
indecorum of not requiring the approbation of Congress.
He considered this as a necessary ingredient
in the transaction. He thought it wrong also to
allow nine States as provided by Art XXI. to institute
a new Government on the ruins of the existing
one. He wd. propose as a better modification
of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan
should be sent to Congress in order that the same
if approved by them, may be communicated to

the State Legislatures, to the end that they may
refer it to State conventions; each Legislature declaring
that if the Convention of the State should
think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying
States, the same shd. take effect accordingly.

Mr. Gorham. Some States will say that nine States
shall be sufficient to establish the plan, others will
require unanimity for the purpose. And the different
and conditional ratifications will defeat the plan
altogether.

Mr. Hamilton. No Convention convinced of the
necessity of the plan will refuse to give it effect on
the adoption by nine States. He thought this mode
less exceptionable than the one proposed in the
article, while it would attain the same end.

Mr. Fitzimmons remarked that the words "for
their approbation" had been struck out in order to
save Congress from the necessity of an Act inconsistent
with the Articles of Confederation under
which they held their authority.

Mr. Randolph declared, if no change should be
made in this part of the plan, he should be obliged
to dissent from the whole of it. He had from the
beginning he said been convinced that radical
changes in the system of the Union were necessary.
Under this conviction he had brought forward a set
of republican propositions as the basis and outline
of a reform. These Republican propositions had
however, much to his regret, been widely, and, in
his opinion, irreconcileably departed from. In this
state of things it was his idea and he accordingly

meant to propose, that the State Conventions shd. be
at liberty to offer amendments to the plan; and that
these should be submitted to a second General Convention,
with full power to settle the Constitution
finally. He did not expect to succeed in this proposition,
but the discharge of his duty in making the
attempt, would give quiet to his own mind.

Mr. Wilson was against a reconsideration for any
of the purposes which had been mentioned.

Mr. King thought it would be more respectful to
Congress to submit the plan generally to them; than
in such a form as expressly and necessarily to require
their approbation or disapprobation. The assent
of nine States he considered as sufficient; and
that it was more proper to make this a part of the
Constitution itself, than to provide for it by a supplemental
or distinct recommendation.

Mr. Gerry urged the indecency and pernicious tendency
of dissolving in so slight a manner, the solemn
obligations of the articles of confederation. If nine
out of thirteen can dissolve the compact. Six out
of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new one
hereafter.

Mr. Sherman was in favor of Mr. King's idea of submitting
the plan generally to Congress. He thought
nine States ought to be made sufficient: but that it
would be best to make it a separate act and in some
such form as that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than
to make it a particular article of the Constitution.

On the question for reconsidering the two articles,
XXI & XXII—

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Mr. Hamilton then moved to postpone art XXI in
order to take up the following, containing the ideas
he had above expressed, viz

Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution
be transmitted to the U. S. in Congress assembled,
in order that if the same shall be agreed to by them,
it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the
several States, to the end that they may provide for
its final ratification by referring the same to the
Consideration of a Convention of Deputies in each
State to be chosen by the people thereof, and that it
be recommended to the said Legislatures in their
respective acts for organizing such convention to
declare, that if the said Convention shall approve of
the said Constitution, such approbation shall be
binding and conclusive upon the State, and further
that if the said Convention should be of opinion that
the same upon the assent of any nine States thereto,
ought to take effect between the States so assenting,
such opinion shall thereupon be also binding upon
such a State, and the said Constitution shall take
effect between the States assenting thereto

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Wilson. This motion being seconded, it is
necessary now to speak freely. He expressed in
strong terms his disapprobation of the expedient
proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of
the Convention on the approbation of Congress. He

declared it to be worse than folly to rely on the concurrence
of the Rhode Island members of Congs. in
the plan. Maryland has voted on this floor; for requiring
the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the
proposed change in the federal System. N. York has
not been represented for a long time past in the Convention.
Many individual deputies from other States
have spoken much against the plan. Under these
circumstances can it be safe to make the assent of
Congress necessary. After spending four or five
months in the laborious & arduous task of forming
a Government for our Country, we are ourselves at
the close throwing insuperable obstacles in the way
of its success.

Mr. Clymer thought that the mode proposed by Mr.
Hamilton would fetter & embarrass Congs. as much
as the original one, since it equally involved a breach
of the articles of Confederation

Mr. King concurred with Mr. Clymer. If Congress
can accede to one mode, they can to the other. If
the approbation of Congress be made necessary, and
they should not approve, the State Legislatures will
not propose the plan to Conventions; or if the
States themselves are to provide that nine States
shall suffice to establish the System, that provision
will be omitted, every thing will go into confusion,
and all our labor be lost.

Mr. Rutlidge viewed the matter in the same light
with Mr. King.

On the question to postpone in order to take up
Col: Hamilton's motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

A Question being then taken on the article XXI.
It was agreed to unanimously.

Col: Hamilton withdrew the remainder of the
motion to postpone art XXII, observing that his
purpose was defeated by the vote just given.

Mr. Williamson & Mr. Gerry moved to re-instate
the words "for the approbation of Congress" in Art:
XXII. which was disagreed to nem: con:

Mr. Randolph took this opportunity to state his
objections to the System. They turned on the Senate's
being made the Court of Impeachment for trying
the Executive—on the necessity of ¾ instead of
⅔ of each house to overrule the negative of the President
—on the smallness of the number of the Representative
branch,—on the want of limitation to a
standing army—on the general clause concerning
necessary and proper laws—on the want of some
particular restraint on navigation acts—on the
power to lay duties on exports—on the authority of
the General Legislature to interpose on the application
of the Executives of the States—on the want of
a more definite boundary between the General &
State Legislatures—and between the General and
State Judiciaries—on the unqualified power of the
President to pardon treasons—on the want of some
limit to the power of the Legislature in regulating
their own compensations. With these difficulties in
his mind, what course he asked was he to pursue?

Was he to promote the establishment of a plan which
he verily believed would end in Tyranny? He was
unwilling he said to impede the wishes and Judgment
of the Convention, but he must keep himself
free, in case he should be honored with a seat in the
Convention of his State, to act according to the dictates
of his judgment. The only mode in which his
embarrassments could be removed, was that of submitting
the plan to Congs. to go from them to the
State Legislatures, and from these to State Conventions
having power to adopt reject or amend;
the process to close with another General Convention
with full power to adopt or reject the alterations
proposed by the State Conventions, and to
establish finally the Government. He accordingly
proposed a Resolution to this effect.

Docr. Franklin 2ded. the motion

Col: Mason urged & obtained that the motion
should lie on the table for a day or two to see what
steps might be taken with regard to the parts of the
system objected to by Mr. Randolph.

Mr. Pinkney moved "that it be an instruction to
the Committee for revising the stile and arrangement
of the articles agreed on, to prepare an address
to the people, to accompany the present Constitution,
and to be laid with the same before the U.
States in Congress"

[67] The motion itself was referred to the Committee
nem: con:

[68] Mr. Randolph moved to refer to the Committee
also a motion relating to pardons in cases of Treason
—which was agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

Tuesday Sepr. 11. 1787. In Convention

The Report of the Com̃ittee of stile & arrangement
not being made & being waited for,

The House Adjourned

Wednesday Sepr. 12. 1787. In Convention

Docr. Johnson from the Committee of stile &c. reported
a digest of the plan, of which printed copies
were ordered to be furnished to the members. He
also reported a letter to accompany the plan, to
Congress.[69]

We, the people of the United States, in order to form
a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.

Article I.

Sect. 1. ALL legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed
of members chosen every second year by the people of the
several states, and the electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature.

No person shall be a representative who shall not have
attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years
a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.
The actual enumeration shall be made within three years
after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner
as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives
shall not exceed one for every forty thousand, but each
state shall have at least one representative: and until such
enumeration shall be made, the state of New-Hampshire shall
be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island
and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York,

six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one,
Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South-Carolina
five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the representation from any
state, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker
and other officers; and they shall have the sole power of
impeachment.

Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature
thereof, for six years: and each senator shall have one
vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence
of the first election, they shall be divided[70] as equally as may
be into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first
class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of
the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of
third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that
one-third may be chosen every second year: and if vacancies
happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of
the Legislature of any state, the Executive thereof may
make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the
Legislature.

No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained
to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of
the United States, and who shall not. when elected, be an
inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be, ex officio,[71]
President of the senate, but shall have no vote, unless they
be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.
When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath.
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United
States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment,
according to law.

Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections
for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each
state by the legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any
time by law make or alter such regulations.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year,
and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December,
unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of
each shall constitute a quorum to do business: but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized
to compel the attendance of absent members, in such
manner, and under such penalties as each house may provide.

Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings;
punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may
in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of
the members of either house on any question shall, at the
desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that in which the two houses
shall be sitting.

Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a
compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and
paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in
all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session
of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they
shall not be questioned in any other place.

No senator or representative shall, during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under
the authority of the United States, which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time; and no person holding any office under the
United States, shall be a member of either house during his
continuance in office.

Sect. 7. The enacting stile of the laws shall be, "Be it
enacted by the senators and representatives in Congress
assembled."

All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of
representatives: but the senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other bills.

Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives
and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented
to the president of the United States. If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections
to that house in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed
to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds
of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all

such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by
yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and
against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house
respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment
prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to
the President of the United States; and before the same
shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved
by him, shall be repassed by [72] three-fourths [73] of the
Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules
and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer.
They shall have power

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare of the United States.[74]

To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes.

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States.

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the United States.

To establish post offices and post roads.

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.

To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court.

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and [75] offences against the law of nations.

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and water.

To raise and support armies: but no appropriations of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

To provide and maintain a navy.

To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws
of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by
cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress,
become the seat of the government of the United States, and
to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the
consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings—And

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other

powers vested by this constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as
the several states now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be
imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each person.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it.

No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto
law.

No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the
census herein before directed to be taken.[76]

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
State.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence
of appropriations made by law.

No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States.
And no person holding any office of profit or trust under
them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of
any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever,
from any king, prince, or foreign state.

Sect, 10. No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit,
nor make anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment
of debts, nor pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post facto laws,
nor laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts; nor
grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation, nor grant any title of nobility.

No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts
or duties on imports or exports, nor with such consent,

but to the use of the treasury of the United States.[77] [78] Nor keep
troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor enter into any
agreement or compact with another state, nor with any foreign
power. Nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually
invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so iminent,
as not to admit of delay until the Congress can be consulted.

II.

Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president
of the United States of America. He shall hold his office
during the term of four years, and, altogether with the vice-president,
chosen for the same term, be elected in the following
manner:

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole
number of senators and representatives to which the state
may be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative
shall be appointed an elector, nor any person holding an
office of trust or profit under the United States.

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be
an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they
shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number
of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of the general government,
directed to the president of the senate. The president of the
senate shall in the presence of the senate and house of representatives
open all the certificates, and the votes shall then

be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes
shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more
than one who have such majority, and have an equal number
of votes, then the house of representatives shall immediately
chuse by ballot one of them for president; and if no
person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list
the said house shall in like manner choose the president.
But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by
states and not per capita,[79] the representation from each
state having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
In every case, after the choice of the president by the representatives,[80]
the person having the greatest number of votes
of the electors shall be the vice-president. But if there
should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate
shall choose from them by ballot the vice-president.

The Congress may determine the time of chusing the
electors, and the time in[81] which they shall give their votes;
but the election shall be on the same day[82] throughout the
United States.

No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the
United States, at the time of the adoption of this constitution,
shall be eligible to the office of president; neither shall
any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained
to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years
a resident within the United States.

In case of the removal of the president from office, or of
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the

vice-president, and the Congress may by law provide for
the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the
president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then
act as president, and such ofiicer shall act accordingly, until
the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another
president arrive.[83]

The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation
for his services, which shall neither be encreased nor
diminished during the period for which he shall have been
elected.

Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take
the following oath or affirmation: "I—, do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of
president of the United States, and will to the best of my
judgment and power, preserve, protect and defend the constitution
of the United States."

Sect. 2, The president shall be commander in chief of the
army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of
the several States: he may require the opinion, in writing, of
the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon
any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,
when called into the actual service of the United States,[84]
and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offences against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent
of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of
the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States,

whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for.

The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that
may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions
which shall expire at the end of their next session.

Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress
information of the state of the union, and recommend to
their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient: he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene
both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement
between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he
may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper:
he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers: he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall
commission all the officers of the United States.

Sect. 4. The president, vice-president and all civil officers
of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors.

III.

Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in
law and equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour,
and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office.

Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both
in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority. To all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to

which the United States shall be a party. To controversies
between two or more States; between a state and citizens of
another state; between citizens of different States; between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme
court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other
cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions,
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state
where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment
of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted.

IV.

Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall
be proved, and the effect thereof.

Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges aad immunities of citizens in the several states.

A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other

crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state
from which he fled be delivered up, and removed to the state
having jurisdiction of the crime.

No person legally held to service or labour in one state,
escaping into another, shall in consequence of regulations
subsisting therein be discharged from such service or labor,
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
service or labour may be due.

Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into
this union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within
the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed
by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states,
without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned
as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulatians respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States: and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims
of the United States, or of any particular state.

Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state
in this union a Republican form of government, and shall
protect each of them against invasion; and on application of
the legislature or executive, against domestic violence.

V.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall
deem necessary, or on the application of two-thirds[85] of the
legislatures [86] of the several states, shall propose amendments
to this constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part thereof, when the same shall have been
ratified by three-fourths at least of[87] the legislatures [88] of the

several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as
the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which may be
made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the
—[89] and [90] —section [91] of [92] article

VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into before
the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the
United States under this Constitution as under the confederation.

This constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the
members of the several state legislatures, and all executive
and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support
this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States.

VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between
the States so ratifying the same.

LETTER.[93]

We have now the Honor to submit to the Consideration of
the United States in Congress assembled that Constitution
which has appeared to us the most advisable.

The Friends of our Country have long seen and desired that
the Power of making War Peace and Treaties, that of levying
Money & regulating Commerce and the correspondent executive
and judicial Authorities should be fully and effectually
vested in the general Government of the Union. But the
Impropriety of delegating such extensive Trust to one Body
of Men is evident. Hence results the Necessity of a different
organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the fœderal Government of
these States to secure all Rights of independent Sovereignty
to each and yet provide for the Interest and Safety of all.
Individuals entering into Society must give up a Share of
Liberty to preserve the Rest. The Magnitude of the Sacrifice
must depend as well on Situation and Circumstances as
on the Object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to
draw with Precision the Line between those Rights which
must be surrendered and those which may be reserved. And
on the present Occasion this Difficulty was increased by a
Difference among the several States as to their Situation Extent
Habits and particular Interests.

In all our Deliberations on this Subject we kept steadily in

our View that which appears to us the greatest Interest of
every true American The Consolidation of our Union in
which is involved our Prosperity Felicity Safety perhaps our
national Existence. This important Consideration seriously
and deeply impressed on our Minds led each State in the Convention
to be less rigid in Points of inferior Magnitude than
might have been otherwise expected. And thus the Constitution
which we now present is the Result of a Spirit of Amity
and of that mutual Deference & Concession which the Peculiarity
of our political Situation rendered indispensable.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every
State is not perhaps to be expected. But each will doubtless
consider that had her Interests been alone consulted the
Consequences might have been particularly disagreable or
injurious to others. That it is liable to as few Exceptions as
could reasonably have been expected we hope and believe
That it may promote the lasting Welfare of that Country so
dear to us all and secure her Freedom and Happiness is our
most ardent Wish—

Mr. Williamson moved to reconsider the clause requiring
three fourths of each House to overrule the
negative of the President, in order to strike out 3/4
and insert 2/3. He had he remarked himself proposed
3/4 instead of 2/3, but he had since been convinced
that the latter proportion was the best. The
former puts too much in the power of the President.

Mr. Sherman was of the same opinion; adding that
the States would not like to see so small a minority
and the President, prevailing over the general voice.
In making laws regard should be had to the sense of
the people, who are to be bound by them, and it was
more probable that a single man should mistake or
betray this sense than the Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Considering the difference between
the two proportions numerically, it amounts
in one House to two members only; and in the
others to not more than five; according to the numbers
of which the Legislature is at first to be composed.
It is the interest moreover of the distant
States to prefer 3/4 as they will be oftenest absent and
need the interposing check of the President. The
excess rather than the deficiency, of laws was to be
dreaded. The example of N. York shews that 2/3 is
not sufficient to answer the purpose.

Mr. Hamilton added his testimony to the fact that
2/3 in N. York had been ineffectual either where a
popular object, or a legislative faction operated; of
which he mentioned some instances.

Mr. Gerry. It is necessary to consider the danger
on the other side also. 2/3 will be a considerable,
perhaps a proper security. 3/4 puts too much in the
power of a few men. The primary object of the
revisionary check in the President is not to protect
the general interest, but to defend his own department.
If 3/4 be required, a few Senators having hopes
from the nomination of the President to offices, will
combine with him and impede proper laws. Making
the vice-President Speaker increases the danger.

Mr. Williamson was less afraid of too few than of
too many laws. He was most of all afraid that the
repeal of bad laws might be rendered too difficult by
requiring 3/4 to overcome the dissent of the President.

Col: Mason had always considered this as one of
the most exceptionable parts of the System. As to

the numerical argument of Mr. Govr. Morris, little
arithmetic was necessary to understand that 3/4
was more than 2/3, whatever the numbers of the
Legislature might be. The example of New York
depended on the real merits of the laws. The
Gentlemen citing it, had no doubt given their own
opinions. But perhaps there were others of opposite
opinions who could equally paint the abuses on
the other side. His leading view was to guard
against too great an impediment to the repeal of
laws.

Mr. Govr. Morris dwelt on the danger to the public
interest from the instability of laws, as the most to
be guarded against. On the other side there could
be little danger. If one man in office will not consent
where he ought, every fourth year another can
be substituted. This term was not too long for fair
experiments. Many good laws are not tried long
enough to prove their merit. This is often the case
with new laws opposed to old habits. The Inspection
laws of Virginia & Maryland to which all are
now so much attached were unpopular at first.

Mr. Pinkney was warmly in opposition to 3/4 as
putting a dangerous power in the hands of a few
Senators headed by the President.

Mr. Madison. When 3/4 was agreed to, the President
was to be elected by the legislature and for
seven years. He is now to be elected by the people
and for four years. The object of the revisionary
power is two fold. 1. to defend the Executive rights
2. to prevent popular or factious injustice. It was

an important principle in this & in the State Constitutions
to check legislative injustice and encroachments.
The Experience of the States had
demonstrated that their checks are insufficient. We
must compare the danger from the weakness of 2/3
with the danger from the strength of 3/4. He
thought on the whole the former was the greater.
As to the difficulty of repeals it was probable that
in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place
of limiting the duration of laws so as to require
renewal instead of repeal.

The reconsideration being agreed to. On the
question to insert 2/3 in place of 3/4.

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Mr. McHenry no. Va. no. Genl.
Washington Mr. Blair, Mr. Madison no. Col. Mason,
Mr. Randolph ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Williamson, observed to the House that no
provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases and
suggested the necessity of it.

Mr. Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate
equity cases from those in which juries are proper.
The Representatives of the people may be safely
trusted in this matter.

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard
agst. corrupt Judges. He proposed that the Committee
last appointed should be directed to provide
a clause for securing the trial by Juries.

Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by
Mr. Gorham. The jury cases cannot be specified. A
general principle laid down on this and some other

points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had
been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second
a Motion if made for the purpose. It would give
great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the
State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few
hours.

Mr. Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a
Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights. Col: Mason
2ded. the motion.

Mr. Sherman, was for securing the rights of the
people where requisite. The State Declarations of
Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and
being in force are sufficient. There are many cases
where juries are proper which cannot be discriminated.
The Legislature may be safely trusted.

Col: Mason. The laws of the U. S. are to be paramount
to State Bills of Rights. On the question
for a Come. to prepare a Bill of Rights

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no, Geo.
no.

The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered,
at the instance of Col: Mason, who urged that the
restriction on the States would prevent the incidental
duties necessary for the inspection & safekeeping
of their produce, and be ruinous to the
Staple States, as he called the five Southern States,
he moved as follows—"provided nothing herein contained
shall be construed to restrain any State from
laying duties upon exports for the sole purpose of
defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing

and indemnifying the losses in keeping the commodities
in the care of public officers, before exportation."
In answer to a remark which he anticipated,
to wit, that the States could provide for
these expences, by a tax in some other way, he stated
the inconveniency of requiring the Planters to pay a
tax before the actual delivery for exportation.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion. It would at least be
harmless; and might have the good effect of restraining
the States to bona fide duties for the purpose,
as well as of authorizing explicitly such duties; tho'
perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power
of the States on this subject, was the right in the
Genl. Government to regulate trade between State
& State.

Mr. Govr. Morris saw no objection to the motion.
He did not consider the dollar per Hhd laid on Tob°.
in Virga. as a duty on exportation, as no drawback
would be allowed on Tob°. taken out of the Warehouse
for internal consumption.

Mr. Dayton was afraid the proviso wd. enable Pennsylva.
to tax N. Jersey, under the idea of Inspection
duties of which Pena. would Judge.

Mr. Gorham & Mr. Langdon, thought there would
be no security if the proviso shd. be agreed to, for
the States exporting thro' other States, agst. these
oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be
obtained in case duties should be laid beyond the
purpose expressed?

Mr. Madison. There will be the same security as
in other cases. The jurisdiction of the supreme

Court must be the source of redress. So far only
had provision been made by the plan agst. injurious
acts of the States. His own opinion was, that this
was sufficient. A negative on the State laws alone
could meet all the shapes which these could assume.
But this had been overruled.

Mr. Fitzimmons. Incidental duties on Tob°. &
flour never have been & never can be considered as
duties on exports.

Mr. Dickinson. Nothing will save the States in
the situation of N. Hampshire N Jersey Delaware
&c from being oppressed by their neighbors, but
requiring the assent of Congs. to inspection duties.
He moved that this assent shd. accordingly
be required.

Mr. Butler 2ded. the motion.

Adjourned

Thursday Sepr. 13. 1787. In Convention

Col. Mason.[94] He had moved without success for
a power to make sumptuary regulations. He had
not yet lost sight of his object. After descanting on
the extravagance of our manners, the excessive consumption
of foreign superfluities, and the necessity
of restricting it, as well with œconomical as republican
views, he moved that a Committee be appointed

to report articles of association for encouraging
by the advice the influence and the example of
the members of the Convention, œconomy frugality
and american manufactures.

Docr. Johnson 2ded. the motion which was without
debate agreed to, nem: con: and a Committee appointed,
consisting of Col: Mason, Docr. Franklin,
Mr. Dickenson, Docr. Johnson and Mr. Livingston.[95]

Col: Mason renewed his proposition of yesterday
on the subject of inspection laws, with an additional
clause giving to Congress a controul over them in
case of abuse—as follows:

"Provided that no State shall be restrained from
imposing the usual duties on produce exported from
such State, for the sole purpose of defraying the
charges of inspecting, packing, storing, and indemnifying
the losses on such produce, while in the
custody of public officers: but all such regulations
shall in case of abuse, be subject to the revision and
controul of Congress."

There was no debate & on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The Report from the committee of stile & arrangement,
was taken up, in order to be compared with
the articles of the plan as agreed to by the House &
referred to the Committee, and to receive the final
corrections and sanction of the Convention.

Art: 1, sect. 2. On motion of Mr. Randolph the

word "servitude" was struck out, and "service"
unanimously[96] inserted, the former being thought to
express the condition of slaves, & the latter the obligations
of free persons.

Mr. Dickenson & Mr. Wilson moved to strike out,
"and direct taxes," from sect. 2, art 1, as improperly
placed in a clause relating merely to the Constitution
of the House of Representatives.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The insertion here was in consequence
of what had passed on this point; in order
to exclude the appearance of counting the negroes
in the Representation. The including of them may
now be referred to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally
only to that of Representation.

On the motion to strike out "and direct taxes"
from this place N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J.
ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.

Art. 1, sect. 7.—"if any bill shall not be returned
by the president within ten days (sundays excepted)
after it shall have been presented to him &c"

Mr. Madison moved to insert between "after" and
"it" in sect. 7, Art. 1 the words "the day on which."
in order to prevent a question whether the day on
which the bill be presented ought to be counted or
not as one of the ten days.

Mr. Randolph 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Governer. Morris. The amendment is unnecessary.
The law knows no fractions of days.

A number of members being very impatient &
calling for the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no.
N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no—

Docr. Johnson made a further report from the
Committee of stile &c of the following resolutions to
be substituted for 22 & 23 articles.

"Resolved that the preceding Constitution be
laid before the U. States in Congress assembled, and
that it is the opinion of this Convention, that it
should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of
Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof,
under the recommendation of its Legislature, for
their assent & ratification; & that each Convention
assenting & ratifying the same should give notice
thereof to the U. S. in Congs. assembled.

"Resolved that it is the opinion of this Convention
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States, shall
have ratified this Constitution, the U. S. in Congs.
assembled should fix a day on which electors should
be appointed by the States which shall have ratified
the same; and a day on which the Electors should
assemble to vote for the President; and the time and
place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution
—That after such publication the Electors
should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives
elected: That the Electors should meet
on the day fixed for the election of the President, and
should transmit their votes certified signed, sealed
and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the
Secretary of the U. States in Congs. assembled: that

the Senators and Representatives should convene at
the time & place assigned: that the Senators should
appoint a President for the sole purpose of receiving,
opening, and counting the votes for President, and
that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together
with the President should without delay proceed to
execute this Constitution."

Adjourned

Friday SepR. 14th. 1787. In Convention

The Report of the Committee of stile & arrangement
being resumed

Mr. Williamson moved to reconsider in order to
increase the number of Representatives fixed for the
first Legislature. His purpose was to make an addition
of one half generally to the number allotted to
the respective States; and to allow two to the smallest
States

On this motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Art. 1. sect. 3. the words "by lot"[97] were struck
out nem: con: on motion of Mr. Madison, that some
rule might prevail in the rotation that would prevent
both the members from the same State from going
out at the same time.

"Ex officio" struck out of the same section as
superfluous; nem: con; and "or affirmation" after
"oath" inserted also unanimously.

Mr. Rutlidge and Mr. Govr. Morris moved "that
persons impeached be suspended from their office
until they be tried and acquitted"

Mr. Madison. The President is made too dependent
already on the Legislature by the power of one
branch to try him in consequence of an impeachment
by the other. This intermediate suspension,
will put him in the power of one branch only. They
can at any moment, in order to make way for the
functions of another who will be more favorable to
their views, vote a temporary removal of the existing
magistrate.

Mr. King concurred in the opposition to the amendment

On the question to agree to it

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Art. 1. sect. 4. "except as to the places of choosing
Senators" was added nem: con: to the end of the
first clause, in order to exempt the seats of Govt. in
the States from the power of Congress.

Art. 1. Sect. 5. "Each House shall keep a Journal
of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment
require secrecy."

Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry moved to insert after the
word "parts," the words "of the proceedings of the

Senate" so as to require publication of all the proceedings
of the House of Representatives.

It was intimated on the other side that cases
might arise where secrecy might be necessary in
both Houses. Measures preparatory to a declaration
of war in which the House of Reps. was to concur,
were instanced.

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. no. (Rh. I abs) Mas. no. Con: no (N.
Y. abs) N. J. no. Pen. ay. Del. no. Mary. ay.
Virg. no. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geor. no.

Mr. Baldwin observed that the clause, Art. 1. Sect.
6. declaring that no member of Congs. "during the
time for which he was elected, shall be appointed to
any Civil office under the authority of the U. S.
which shall have been created, or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased during such time,"
would not extend to offices created by the Constitution;
and the salaries of which would be created,
not increased by Congs. at their first session. The
members of the first Congs. consequently might evade
the disqualification in this instance.—He was neither
seconded nor opposed; nor did any thing further
pass on the subject.

Art. 1. Sect. 8. The Congress "may by joint ballot
appoint a Treasurer"

Mr. Rutlidge moved to strike out this power, and
let the Treasurer be appointed in the same manner
with other officers.

Mr. Gorham & Mr. King said that the motion, if
agreed to, would have a mischievous tendency. The

people are accustomed & attached to that mode of
appointing Treasurers, and the innovation will multiply
objections to the system.

Mr. Govr. Morris remarked that if the Treasurer be
not appointed by the Legislature, he will be more
narrowly watched, and more readily impeached.

Mr. Sherman. As the two Houses appropriate
money, it is best for them to appoint the officer who
is to keep it; and to appoint him as they make the
appropriation, not by joint but several votes.

Genl. Pinkney. The Treasurer is appointed by
joint ballot in South Carolina. The consequence is
that bad appointments are made, and the Legislature
will not listen to the faults of their own officer.

On the motion to strike out

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Art 1 sect. 8. "but all such duties imposts & excises,
shall be uniform throughout the U. S." were
unanimously annexed to the power of taxation.

To define & punish piracies and felonies on the
high seas, and "punish" offences against the law of
nations.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "punish" before
the words "offences agst. the law of nations," so
as to let these be definable as well as punishable,
by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.

Mr. Wilson hoped the alteration would by no
means be made. To pretend to define the law of
nations which depended on the authority of all the

civilized nations of the world, would have a look of
arrogance, that would make us ridiculous.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The word define is proper when
applied to offences in this case; the law of nations
being often too vague and deficient to be a rule.

On the question to strike out the word "punish"
it passed in the affirmative N. H. ay. Mas. no.
Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Docr. Franklin moved[98] to add after the words
"post roads" Art 1. Sect. 8. "a power to provide
for cutting canals where deemed necessary"

Mr. Wilson 2ded. the motion

Mr. Sherman objected. The expence in such cases
will fall on the U. States, and the benefit accrue to
the places where the canals may be cut.

Mr. Wilson. Instead of being an expence to the
U. S. they may be made a source of revenue.

Mr. Madison suggested an enlargement of the
motion into a power "to grant charters of incorporation
where the interest of the U. S. might require
& the legislative provisions of individual
States may be incompetent." His primary object
was however to secure an easy communication between
the States which the free intercourse now to be
opened, seemed to call for. The political obstacles
being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far
as possible ought to follow. Mr. Randolph 2ded. the
proposition.

Mr. King thought the power unnecessary.

Mr. Wilson. It is necessary to prevent a State from
obstructing the general welfare.

Mr. King. The States will be prejudiced and
divided into parties by it. In Philada. & New York,
It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank,
which has been a subject of contention in those
Cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile
monopolies.

Mr. Wilson mentioned the importance of facilitating
by canals, the communication with the Western
settlements. As to Banks he did not think with Mr.
King that the power in that point of view would excite
the prejudices & parties apprehended. As to
mercantile monopolies they are already included in
the power to regulate trade.

Col: Mason was for limiting the power to the single
case of Canals. He was afraid of monopolies of
every sort, which he did not think were by any
means already implied by the Constitution as supposed
by Mr. Wilson.

The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct
question specifying & limited to the case of
canals,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

The other part fell of course, as including the
power rejected.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Pinkney then moved to insert in
the list of powers vested in Congress a power—"to

establish an University, in which no preferences or
distinctions should be allowed on account of Religion."

Mr. Wilson supported the motion

Mr. Govr. Morris. It is not necessary. The exclusive
power at the Seat of Government, will reach
the object.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. divd. Dr. Johnson ay.
Mr. Sherman no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md.
no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Col: Mason, being sensible that an absolute prohibition
of standing armies in time of peace might
be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to insert
something pointing out and guarding against the
danger of them, moved to preface the clause (Art 1
sect. 8) "To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia &c" with the words "And that
the liberties of the people may be better secured
against the danger of standing armies in time of
peace" Mr. Randolph 2ded. the motion

Mr. Madison was in favor of it. It did not restrain
Congress from establishing a military force in
time of peace if found necessary; and as armies in
time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil,
it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution,
as far as will consist with the essential power
of the Govt. on that head.

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed the motion as setting a
dishonorable mark of distinction on the military
class of Citizens

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Bedford concurred in the opposition.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Col: Mason moved to strike out from the clause
(art 1 sect 9.) "no bill of attainder nor any ex post
facto law shall be passed" the words "nor any ex
post facto law." He thought it not sufficiently
clear that the prohibition meant by this phrase was
limited to cases of a criminal nature, and no Legislature
ever did or can altogether avoid them in Civil
cases.

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion but with a view to extend
the prohibition to "civil cases," which he
thought ought to be done.

On the question; all the States were—no

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Gerry, moved to insert a declaration
"that the liberty of the Press should be
inviolably observed."

Mr. Sherman. It is unnecessary. The power of
Congress does not extend to the Press. On the
question, it passed in the negative

N. H.[99] no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay: Geo.
no.

Art 1. Sect. 9. "no capitation tax shall be laid,
unless &c"

Mr. Read moved to insert after "capitation" the

words, "or other direct tax" He was afraid that
some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the
States, with a readjustment by this rule, of past
requisitions of Congs.—and that his amendment by
giving another cast to the meaning would take away
the pretext. Mr. Williamson 2ded. the motion which
was agreed to. On motion of Col: Mason "or enumeration"
inserted after, as explanatory of "Census"
Con. & S. C. only, no.[100]

At the end of the clause "no tax or duty shall be
laid on articles exported from any State" was added
the following amendment conformably to a vote on
the [31] of [August] viz—no preference shall be given
by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the
ports of one State over those of another: nor shall
vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to
enter, clear or pay duties in another.

Col. Mason moved a clause requiring "that an
Account of the public expenditures should be annually
published" Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion

Mr. Govr. Morris urged that this wd. be impossible
in many cases.

Mr. King remarked, that the term expenditures
went to every minute shilling. This would be impracticable.
Congs. might indeed make a monthly
publication, but it would be in such general statements
as would afford no satisfactory information.

Mr. Madison proposed to strike out "annually"
from the motion & insert "from time to time,"

which would enjoin the duty of frequent publications
and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature.
Require too much and the difficulty will
beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles of Confederation
require halfyearly publications on this
subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible,
the practice has ceased altogether.

Mr. Wilson 2ded. & supported the motion. Many
operations of finance cannot be properly published
at certain times.

Mr. Pinkney was in favor of the motion.

Mr. Fitzimmons. It is absolutely impossible to
publish expenditures in the full extent of the term.

Mr. Sherman thought "from time to time" the
best rule to be given.

"Annual" was struck out—& those words—inserted
nem: con:

The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then
agreed to nem: con: and added after—"appropriations
by law" as follows—"And a regular statement
and account of the receipts & expenditures of
all public money shall be published from time to
time"

The first clause of Art. 1 Sect. 10—was altered so
as to read—"no State shall enter into any Treaty
alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque
and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;
make any thing but gold & silver coin a tender in
payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or grant any title of nobility."

Mr. Gerry entered into observations inculcating
the importance of public faith, and the propriety of
the restraint put on the States from impairing the
obligation of contracts, alledging that Congress ought
to be laid under the like prohibitions, he made a
motion to that effect. He was not 2ded.

Adjourned.

Saturday Sepr. 15th. 1787. In Convention

Mr. Carrol reminded the House that no address to
the people had yet been prepared. He considered
it of great importance that such an one should accompany
the Constitution. The people had been
accustomed to such on great occasions, and would
expect it on this. He moved that a Committee be
appointed for the special purpose of preparing an
address.

Mr. Rutlidge objected on account of the delay it
would produce and the impropriety of addressing
the people before it was known whether Congress
would approve and support the plan. Congress if
an address be thought proper can prepare as good a
one. The members of the Convention can also explain
the reasons of what has been done to their
respective Constituents.

Mr. Sherman concurred in the opinion that an address
was both unnecessary and improper.

On the motion of Mr. Carrol

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.

Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.[101] abst. S. C.[101] no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Langdon. Some gentlemen have been very
uneasy that no increase of the number of Representatives
has been admitted. It has in particular
been thought that one more ought to be allowed to
N. Carolina. He was of opinion that an additional
one was due both to that State and to Rho: Island,
& moved to reconsider for that purpose.

Mr. Sherman. When the Committee of eleven reported
the apportionment—five Representatives
were thought the proper share of N. Carolina. Subsequent
information however seemed to entitle that
State to another.

On the motion to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pen.
divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Langdon moved to add 1 member to each of
the Representations of N. Carolina & Rho: Island.[102]

Mr. King was agst. any change whatever as opening
the door for delays. There had been no official

proof that the numbers of N. C are greater than
before estimated, and he never could sign the Constitution
if Rho: Island is to be allowed two members
that is one fourth of the number allowed to
Massts, which will be known to be unjust.

Mr. Pinkney urged the propriety of increasing the
number of Reps. allotted to N. Carolina.

Mr. Bedford contended for an increase in favor of
Rho: Island, and of Delaware also it passed in the
negative.

On the question for allowing two Reps. to Rho:
Island, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

On the question for allowing six to N. Carolina,
it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Art 1. Sect. 10. (paragraph 2) "No State shall, without
the consent of Congress lay imposts or duties on
imports or exports; nor with such consent, but to the
use of the Treasury of the U. States."

In consequence of the proviso moved by Col:
Mason; and agreed to on the 13 Sepr., this part of the
section was laid aside in favor of the following substitute
viz: "No State shall, without the consent of
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or
exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its Inspection laws; and the nett produce
of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on
imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury
of the U. S; and all such laws shall be subject to
the revision and controul of the Congress"

On a motion to strike out the last part "and all
such laws shall be subject to the revision and controul
of the Congress" it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. divd.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

The substitute was then agreed to; Virga. alone
being in the negative.

The remainder of the paragraph being under consideration
—viz—"nor keep troops nor ships of war
in time of peace, nor enter into any agreement or
compact with another State, nor with any foreign
power. Nor engage in any war, unless it shall be
actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion
be so imminent as not to admit of delay,
until Congress can be consulted."

Mr. Mc Henry & Mr. Carrol moved that "no State
shall be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for
the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting lighthouses."

Col. Mason in support of this explained and urged
the situation of the Chesapeak which peculiarly required
expences of this sort.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The States are not restrained
from laying tonnage as the Constitution now stands.
The exception proposed will imply the contrary, and
will put the States in a worse condition than the gentleman
(Col. Mason) wishes.

Mr. Madison. Whether the States are now restrained
from laying tonnage duties, depends on the
extent of the power "to regulate commerce." These
terms are vague, but seem to exclude this power of
the States. They may certainly be restrained by
Treaty. He observed that there were other objects
for tonnage Duties as the support of seamen &c. He
was more & more convinced that the regulation of
Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to
be wholly under one authority.

Mr. Sherman. The power of the U. States to regulate
trade being supreme can controul interferences of
the State regulations when such interferences happen;
so that there is no danger to be apprehended
from a concurrent jurisdiction.

Mr. Langdon insisted that the regulation of tonnage
was an essential part of the regulation of trade, and
that the States ought to have nothing to do with it,
On motion "that no State shall lay any duty on
tonnage without the consent of Congress."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

The remainder of the paragraph was then remoulded
and passed as follows viz—"No State
shall without the consent of Congress, lay any duty
of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of
peace, enter into any agreement or compact with
another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in
war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay."

Art II. sect. 1. (paragraph 6) "or the period for
chusing another president arrive" were changed
into "or a President shall be elected" conformably
to a vote of the [OMITTED] of [OMITTED].

Mr. Rutlidge and Docr. Franklin moved to annex
to the end of paragraph 7. Sect. 1. Art II—"and he
(the President) shall not receive, within that period,
any other emolument from the U. S. or any of them."
on which question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
—ay.

Art: II. Sect. 2. "he shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offences against the U.
S. &c."

Mr. Randolph moved to except "cases of treason."
The prerogative of pardon in these cases was too
great a trust. The President may himself be guilty.
The Traitors may be his own instruments.

Col: Mason supported the motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris had rather there should be no
pardon for treason, than let the power devolve on
the Legislature.

Mr. Wilson. Pardon is necessary for cases of
treason, and is best placed in the hands of the Executive.
If he be himself a party to the guilt he can
be impeached and prosecuted.

Mr. King thought it would be inconsistent with the
Constitutional separation of the Executive & Legislative
powers to let the prerogative be exercised by
the latter. A Legislative body is utterly unfit for
the purpose. They are governed too much by the
passions of the moment. In Massachusetts, one assembly
would have hung all the insurgents in that
State: the next was equally disposed to pardon them
all. He suggested the expedient of requiring the
concurrence of the Senate in acts of Pardon.

Mr. Madison admitted the force of objections to the
Legislature, but the pardon of treasons was so peculiarly
improper for the President that he should
acquiesce in the transfer of it to the former, rather
than leave it altogether in the hands of the latter.
He would prefer to either an association of the Senate
as a Council of advice, with the President.

Mr. Randolph could not admit the Senate into a
share of the power. The great danger to liberty
lay in a combination between the President & that
body.

Col: Mason. The Senate has already too much
power. There can be no danger of too much lenity
in legislative pardons, as the Senate must concur, &
the President moreover can require 2/3 of both
Houses.

On the motion of Mr. Randolph

N. H. no—Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

Art II. Sect. 2. (paragraph 2) To the end of this,
Mr. Governr. Morris moved to annex "but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of such inferior
officers as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of Departments."
Mr. Sherman 2ded. the motion

Mr. Madison. It does not go far enough if it be
necessary at all. Superior officers below Heads of
Departments ought in some cases to have the appointment
of the lesser offices.

Mr. Govr Morris There is no necessity. Blank
commissions can be sent—

On the motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

The motion being lost by an equal division of
votes, It was urged that it be put a second time
some such provision being too necessary to be
omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to
nem: con.

Art. II. Sect. 1. The words "and not per capita"
were struck out as superfluous and the words "by
the Representatives" also—as improper, the choice
of President being in another mode as well as eventually
by the House of Reps.

Art II. Sect. 2. After "officers of the U. S. whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for," were

added the words "and which shall be established by
law."

Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Gerry
moved to annex to the end, "And a trial by jury
shall be preserved as usual in civil cases."

Mr. Gorham. The constitution of Juries is different
in different States and the trial itself is usual in
different cases in different States.

Mr. King urged the same objections

Genl. Pinkney also. He thought such a clause in
the Constitution would be pregnant with embarrassments.

The motion was disagreed to nem: con:

Art. IV. Sect. 2. parag: 3. the term "legally" was
struck out, and "under the laws thereof" inserted
after the word "State" in compliance with the wish
of some who thought the term legal equivocal, and
favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral
view.

Art. IV. Sect 3. "New States may be admitted
by the Congress into this Union: but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of
any other State; nor any State be formed by the
junction of two or more States, or parts of States,
without the consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congs."

Mr. Gerry moved to insert after "or parts of States"
the words "or a State and part of a State" which
was disagreed to by a large majority; it appearing to
be supposed that the case was comprehended in the
words of the clause as reported by the Committee.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. After the word "Executive"
were inserted the words "when the Legislature cannot
be convened."

Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of
both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application
of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
several States shall propose amendments to this
Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have
been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures
of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode
of ratification may be proposed by the Congress:
Provided that no amendment which may be made
prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the
1 & 4 clauses in the 9. Section of article 1"

Mr. Sherman expressed his fears that three fourths
of the States might be brought to do things fatal to
particular States, as abolishing them altogether or
depriving them of their equality in the Senate. He
thought it reasonable that the proviso in favor of the
States importing slaves should be extended so as to
provide that no State should be affected in its internal
police, or deprived of its equality in the
Senate.

Col: Mason thought the plan of amending the
Constitution exceptionable & dangerous. As the
proposing of amendments is in both the modes to
depend, in the first immediately, and in the second
ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the
proper kind would ever be obtained by the people,

if the Government should become oppressive, as he
verily believed would be the case.

Mr. Govt. Morris & Mr. Gerry moved to amend the
article so as to require a Convention on application
of 2/3 of the Sts

Mr. Madison did not see why Congress would not
be as much bound to propose amendments applied
for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention
on the like application. He saw no objection
however against providing for a Convention for the
purpose of amendments, except only that difficulties
might arise as to the form, the quorum &c.
which in constitutional regulations ought to be as
much as possible avoided.

The motion of Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Gerry was
agreed to nem: con: (see the first part of the article
as finally past)

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out of art. V. after
"legislatures" the words "of three fourths" and so
after the word "Conventions" leaving future Conventions
to act in this matter, like the present Conventions
according to circumstances.

On this motion

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo—
no.

Mr. Gerry moved to strike out the words "or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof" On this
motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Sherman moved according to his idea above
expressed to annex to the end of the article a further
proviso "that no State shall without its consent be
affected in its internal police, or deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate."

Mr. Madison. Begin with these special provisos,
and every State will insist on them, for their boundaries,
exports &c.

On the motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Sherman then moved to strike out art V altogether

Mr. Brearley 2ded. the motion, on which

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del divd. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to annex a further proviso
—"that no State, without its consent shall be deprived
of its equal suffrage in the Senate"

This motion being dictated by the circulating
murmurs of the small States was agreed to without
debate, no one opposing it, or on the question, saying
no.

Col: Mason expressing his discontent at the power
given to Congress by a bare majority to pass navigation
acts, which he said would not only enhance
the freight, a consequence he did not so much
regard—but would enable a few rich merchants
in Philada N. York & Boston, to monopolize the

Staples of the Southern States & reduce their value
perhaps 50 Per Ct. moved a further proviso that no
law in the nature of a navigation act be passed
before the year 1808, without the consent of 2/3 of
each branch of the Legislature

On this motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Randolph animadverting on the indefinite and
dangerous power given by the Constitution to Congress,
expressing the pain he felt at differing from
the body of the Convention, on the close of the great
& awful subject of their labours, and anxiously
wishing for some accommodating expedient which
would relieve him from his embarrassments, made a
motion importing "that amendments to the plan
might be offered by the State Conventions, which
should be submitted to and finally decided on by
another general Convention" Should this proposition
be disregarded, it would he said be impossible
for him to put his name to the instrument.
Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would
not then decide but he would not deprive himself of
the freedom to do so in his own State, if that course
should be prescribed by his final judgment.

Col: Mason 2ded. & followed Mr. Randolph in animadversions
on the dangerous power and structure
of the Government, concluding that it would end
either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy;
which, he was in doubt, but one or other, he was

sure. This Constitution had been formed without
the knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention
will know more of the sense of the people,
and be able to provide a system more consonant to
it. It was improper to say to the people, take this
or nothing. As the Constitution now stands, he
could neither give it his support or vote in Virginia;
and he could not sign here what he could not support
there. With the expedient of another Convention
as proposed, he could sign.

Mr. Pinkney. These declarations from members
so respectable at the close of this important scene,
give a peculiar solemnity to the present moment.
He descanted on the consequences of calling forth
the deliberations & amendments of the different
States on the subject of Government at large.
Nothing but confusion & contrariety could spring
from the experiment. The States will never agree in
their plans, and the Deputies to a second Convention
coming together under the discordant impressions of
their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions
are serious things, and ought not to be repeated.
He was not without objections as well as others to
the plan. He objected to the contemptible weakness
& dependence of the Executive. He objected
to the power of a majority only of Congs. over Commerce.
But apprehending the danger of a general
confusion, and an ultimate decision by the sword,
he should give the plan his support.

Mr. Gerry stated the objections which determined
him to withhold his name from the Constitution. 1.

the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate. 2. the
power of the House of Representatives to conceal
their journals. 3. the power of Congress over the
places of election. 4. the unlimited power of Congress
over their own compensation. 5. Massachusetts
has not a due share of Representatives allotted
to her. 6. 3/5 of the Blacks are to be represented
as if they were freemen. 7. Under the power over
commerce, monopolies may be established. 8. The
vice president being made head of the Senate. He
could however he said get over all these, if the rights
of the Citizens were not rendered insecure 1. by the
general power of the Legislature to make what laws
they may please to call necessary and proper. 2.
raise armies and money without limit. 3. to establish
a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star-chamber
as to Civil cases. Under such a view of
the Constitution, the best that could be done he conceived
was to provide for a second general Convention.

On the question on the proposition of Mr. Randolph.
All the States answered no

On the question to agree to the Constitution as
amended. All the States ay.

The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed.
and the House adjourned.

Monday Sepr. 17. 1787. in Convention

The engrossed Constitution being read.

Docr. Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which

he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency,
and which Mr. Wilson read in the words following.

Mr. President

I confess that there are several parts of this constitution
which I do not at present approve, but I
am not sure I shall never approve them: For having
lived long, I have experienced many instances of
being obliged by better information or fuller consideration,
to change opinions even on important
subjects, which I once thought right, but found to
be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow,
the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and
to pay more respect to the judgment of others.
Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion
think themselves in possession of all truth, and that
wherever others differ from them it is so far error.
Steele a Protestant in a Dedication tells the Pope,
that the only difference between our Churches in
their opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is,
the Church of Rome is infallible and the Church of
England is never in the wrong. But though many
private persons think almost as highly of their own
infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally
as a certain french lady, who in a dispute with
her sister, said "I don't know how it happens, Sister
but I meet with nobody but myself, that is always
in the right—Il n'y a que moi qui a toujours raison."

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution
with all its faults, if they are such; because I
think a general Government necessary for us, and
there is no form of Government but what may be a

blessing to the people if well administered, and believe
farther that this is likely to be well administered
for a course of years, and can only end in
Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when
the people shall become so corrupted as to need
despotic Government, being incapable of any other.
I doubt too whether any other Convention we can
obtain may be able to make a better Constitution.
For when you assemble a number of men to have the
advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble
with those men, all their prejudices, their
passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests,
and their selfish views. From such an assembly can
a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes
me, Sir, to find this system approaching so
near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish
our enemies, who are waiting with confidence
to hear that our councils are confounded like those
of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on
the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for
the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus
I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect
no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not
the best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I
sacrifice to the public good. I have never whispered
a syllable of them abroad. Within these walls they
were born, and here they shall die. If every one of
us in returning to our Constituents were to report
the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain
partizans in support of them, we might prevent its
being generally received, and thereby lose all the
salutary effects & great advantages resulting naturally
in our favor among foreign nations as well as
among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity.
Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government
in procuring and securing happiness to the
people, depends, on opinion, on the general opinion
of the goodness of the Government, as well as of
the wisdom and integrity of its Governors. I hope
therefore that for our own sakes as a part of the
people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act
heartily and unanimously in recommending this
Constitution (if approved by Congress & confirmed
by the Conventions) wherever our influence may
extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors
to the means of having it well administered.

On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish
that every member of the Convention who may
still have objections to it, would with me, on this
occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and
to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to
this instrument.—He then moved that the Constitution
be signed by the members and offered the
following as a convenient form viz: "Done in Convention
by the unanimous consent of the States
present the 17th. of Sepr. &c.—In witness whereof we
have hereunto subscribed our names."

This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr.
G. M. in order to gain the dissenting members, and
put into the hands of Docr. Franklin that it might
have the better chance of success.

Mr. Gorham said if it was not too late he could

wish, for the purpose of lessening objections to the
Constitution, that the clause declaring "the number
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
forty thousand" which had produced so much discussion,
might be yet reconsidered, in order to strike
out 40,000 & insert "thirty thousand." This would
not he remarked establish that as an absolute rule,
but only give Congress a greater latitude which
could not be thought unreasonable.

Mr. King & Mr. Carrol seconded & supported the
ideas of Mr. Gorham.

When the President rose, for the purpose of putting
the question, he said that although his situation
had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments
on questions depending in the House, and it
might be thought, ought now to impose silence on
him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish
that the alteration proposed might take place. It
was much to be desired that the objections to the
plan recommended might be made as few as possible.
The smallness of the proportion of Representatives
had been considered by many members of the Convention
an insufficient security for the rights & interests
of the people. He acknowledged that it had
always appeared to himself among the exceptionable
parts of the plan, and late as the present moment was
for admitting amendments, he thought this of so
much consequence that it would give much satisfaction
to see it adopted.[103]

No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr.
Gorham and it was agreed to unanimously.

On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled
in order to be signed. It was agreed to all the
States answering ay.

Mr. Randolph then rose and with an allusion to the
observations of Docr. Franklin apologized for his refusing
to sign the Constitution notwithstanding the
vast majority & venerable names that would give
sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said however
that he did not mean by this refusal to decide
that he should oppose the Constitution without
doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be
governed by his duty as it should be prescribed by
his future judgment. He refused to sign, because
he thought the object of the convention would be
frustrated by the alternative which it presented to
the people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan
and confusion must ensue. With such a view of the
subject he ought not, he could not, by pledging himself
to support the plan, restrain himself from taking
such steps as might appear to him most consistent
with the public good.

Mr. Govr. Morris said that he too had objections,
but considering the present plan as the best that was
to be attained, he should take it with all its faults.
The majority had determined in its favor, and by
that determination he should abide. The moment
this plan goes forth all other considerations will be
laid aside, and the great question will be, shall there
be a national Government or not? and this must take

place or a general anarchy will be the alternative.
He remarked that the signing in the form proposed
related only to the fact that the States present were
unanimous.

Mr. Williamson suggested that the signing should
be confined to the letter accompanying the Constitution
to Congress, which might perhaps do nearly
as well, and would be found satisfactory to some
members[104] who disliked the Constitution. For himself
he did not think a better plan was to be expected
and had no scruples against putting his name to it.

Mr. Hamilton expressed his anxiety that every
member should sign. A few characters of consequence,
by opposing or even refusing to sign the
Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling
the latent sparks which lurk under an enthusiasm in
favor of the Convention which may soon subside.
No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than
his own were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate
between anarchy and Convulsion on one
side, and the chance of good to be expected from the
plan on the other.

Mr. Blount[105] said he had declared that he would not
sign, so as to pledge himself in support of the plan,
but he was relieved by the form proposed and would

without committing himself attest the fact that the
plan was the unanimous act of the States in Convention.

Docr. Franklin expressed his fears from what Mr.
Randolph had said, that he thought himself alluded
to in the remarks offered this morning to the House.
He declared that when drawing up that paper he did
not know that any particular member would refuse
to sign his name to the instrument, and hoped to be
so understood. He possessed a high sense of obligation
to Mr. Randolph for having brought forward the
plan in the first instance, and for the assistance he
had given in its progress, and hoped that he would
yet lay aside his objections, and by concurring with
his brethren, prevent the great mischief which the
refusal of his name might produce.

Mr. Randolph could not but regard the signing in
the proposed form, as the same with signing the Constitution.
The change of form therefore could make
no difference with him. He repeated that in refusing
to sign the Constitution he took a step which
might be the most awful of his life, but it was dictated
by his conscience, and it was not possible for
him to hesitate, much less, to change. He repeated
also his persuasion, that the holding out this plan
with a final alternative to the people, of accepting or
rejecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy
& civil convulsions which were apprehended from
the refusal of individuals to sign it.

Mr. Gerry described the painful feelings of his situation,
and the embarrassments under which he rose

to offer any further observations on the subject wch.
had been finally decided. Whilst the plan was depending,
he had treated it with all the freedom he
thought it deserved. He now felt himself bound
as he was disposed to treat it with the respect due to
the Act of the Convention. He hoped he should not
violate that respect in declaring on this occasion his
fears that a Civil war may result from the present
crisis of the U. S. In Massachusetts, particularly he
saw the danger of this calamitous event—In that
State there are two parties, one devoted to Democracy,
the worst he thought of all political evils, the
other as violent in the opposite extreme. From the
collision of these in opposing and resisting the Constitution,
confusion was greatly to be feared. He
had thought it necessary, for this & other reasons
that the plan should have been proposed in a more
mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and opposition
of parties. As it had been passed by the Convention,
he was persuaded it would have a contrary
effect. He could not therefore by signing the Constitution
pledge himself to abide by it at all events.
The proposed form made no difference with him.
But if it were not otherwise apparent, the refusals
to sign should never be known from him. Alluding
to the remarks of Docr. Franklin, he could not he
said but view them as levelled at himself and the
other gentlemen who meant not to sign.

Genl Pinkney. We are not likely to gain many
converts by the ambiguity of the proposed form of
signing. He thought it best to be candid and let the

form speak the substance. If the meaning of the
signers be left in doubt, his purpose would not be
answered. He should sign the Constitution with a
view to support it with all his influence, and wished
to pledge himself accordingly.

Docr. Franklin. It is too soon to pledge ourselves
before Congress and our Constituents shall have
approved the plan.

Mr. Ingersol[106] did not consider the signing, either as
a mere attestation of the fact, or as pledging the
signers to support the Constitution at all events;
but as a recommendation, of what, all things considered,
was the most eligible.

On the motion of Docr. Franklin

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd[107] . Geo.
ay.

Mr. King suggested that the Journals of the Convention
should be either destroyed, or deposited in
the custody of the President. He thought if suffered
to be made public, a bad use would be made of
them by those who would wish to prevent the adoption
of the Constitution.

Mr. Wilson preferd the second expedient, he had
at one time liked the first best; but as false suggestions

may be propagated it should not be made impossible
to contradict them.

A question was then put on depositing the Journals
and other papers of the Convention in the hands of
the President, on which.

N. H. ay. Mus. ay. C$ ay. N. J. ay. Pena, ay.
Del. ay. Md. no[108] . Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay[109] .

The President having asked what the Convention
meant should be done with the Journals &c, whether
copies were to be allowed to the members if applied
for. It was Resolved nem. con: "that he retain the
Journal and other papers, subject to the order of
Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution."

The members then proceeded to sign the instrument.

Whilst the last members were signing it Doctr.
Franklin looking towards the President's Chair, at
the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted,
observed to a few members near him, that Painters

had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a
rising from a setting sun. I have said he, often and
often in the course of the Session, and the vicissitudes
of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at
that behind the President without being able to tell
whether it was rising or setting: But now at length
I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and
not a setting Sun.

The Constitution being signed by all the members
except Mr. Randolph, Mr. Mason and Mr. Gerry, who
declined giving it the sanction of their names, the
Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine
die[110] —

[Following is a literal copy of the engrossed Constitution
as signed. It is in four sheets, with an
additional sheet containing the resolutions of transmissal.
The note indented at the end is in the
original precisely as reproduced here.]

We the people of the United States, in Order to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.

Article. I.

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by
the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and
been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be
made within three Years after the first Meeting of
the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as
they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives
shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one

Representative; and until such enumeration shall
be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled
to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island
and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut
five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania
eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten,
North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation
from any State, the Executive Authority thereof
shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The house of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen
by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each
Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence
of the first Election, they shall be divided
as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats
of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at
the Expiration of the second Year, of the second
Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of
the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year,
so that one third may be chosen every second Year;
and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise,
during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary
Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature,
which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the
Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office
of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they
shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President
of the United States is tried the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without
the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law.

Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or

alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year, and such Meetings shall be on the first Monday
in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a
different Day.

Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such
Manner, and under such Penalties as each House
may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy;
and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either
House on any question shall, at the Desire of one
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other Place than
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall
receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of

the United States. They shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged
from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the
Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.

Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become
a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two thirds of that

House, it shall become a Law. But in all such
Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined
by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill
shall not be returned by the President within ten
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like
Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case
it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President
of the United States; and before the Same shall take
Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved
by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according
to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case
of a Bill.

Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United
States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,
and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of
foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting
the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation
of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,

the Militia, and for governing such Part of them
as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States, and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by
the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.

No Capitation, or other direct. Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over
those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from,
one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties
in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law;
and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit
or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of
the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State.

Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit;
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,

lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce
of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury
of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject
to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.

Article. II.

Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America. He
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years,
and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the
same Term, be elected, as follows

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States,
and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at
least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State

with themselves. And they shall make a List of all
the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes
for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of
the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
counted. The Person having the greatest Number
of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be
a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed;
and if there be more than one who have
such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately
chuse by Ballot one of them for President;
and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five
highest on the List the said House shall in like
Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the
President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the
Representation from each State having one Vote;
A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member
or Members from two thirds of the States, and a
Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the
President, the Person having the greatest Number
of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.
But if there should remain two or more who have
equal votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by
Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give

their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President; neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from
Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and
the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for
his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither
be encreased nor diminished during the Period for
which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument
from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he
shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States; he may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.

Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on

extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or
either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between
them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think
proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the
Officers of the United States.

Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all
civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Article. III.

Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.

Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies

to which the United States shall be a Party;
—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between
Citizens of different States,—between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted.

Article. IV.

Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason,
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice,
and be found in another State, shall on Demand of
the executive Authority of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.

Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction
of two or more States, or Parts of States, without
the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and

make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State.

Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or
of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which,
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed
by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment
which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner
affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section
of the first Article; and that no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage
in the Senate.

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be as valid against the United States under this Constitution,
as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures,
and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment
of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the Same.

   

The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first	done in Convention by the Unanimous consent of the States present the Seventeenth
Page, The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.	Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

Attest William Jackson Secretary

Go:Washington—Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia

                       

New Hampshire	John Langdon Nicholas Gilman
Massachusetts	Nathaniel Gorham Rufus King
Connecticut	WM: Saml. Johnson Roger Sherman
New York	Alexander Hamilton
New Jersey	Wil: Livingston David Brearley. Wm: Paterson. Jona: Dayton
Pennsylvania	B Franklin Thomas Mifflin Robt Morris Geo. Clymer Thos. FitzSimons Jared Ingersoll James Wilson Gouv Morris
Delaware	Geo: Read Gunning Bedford jun John Dickinson Richard Bassett Jaco: Broom
Maryland	James McHenry Dan of St Thos. Jenifer Danl Carroll.
Virginia	John Blair— James Madison Jr.
North Carolina	Wm.. Blount Richd. Dobbs Spaight. Hu Williamson
South Carolina	J. Rutledge Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Charles Pinckney Pierce Butler.
Georgia	William Few Abr Baldwin

In Convention Monday September 17th. 1787.

Present
The States of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia.

Resolved,

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards
be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under
the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their
Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give
Notice thereof to the United States in Congress
assembled.

Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors
should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a Day on which the
Electors should assemble to vote for the President,
and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings
under this Constitution. That after such Publication
the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators
and Representatives elected: That the Electors
should meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the
President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires,
to the Secretary of the United States in Congress
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives
should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the

First page of the Constitution (reduced)

President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute
this Constitution.

By the Unanimous Order of the Convention