The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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TO JAMES HILLHOUSE. |
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![]() | The writings of James Madison, | ![]() |
TO JAMES HILLHOUSE.
Dear Sir—I have received your letter of the
10th inst: with the pamphlet containing the proposed
amendments of the Constitution of the U. States,
on which you request my opinion & remarks.[112]
Whatever pleasure might be felt in a fuller compliance
with your request, I must avail myself of the
pleas of the age I have reached, and of the controul of
other engagements, for not venturing on more than
the few observations suggested by a perusal of what
you have submitted to the public.
I readily acknowledge the ingenuity which devised
the plan you recommend, and the strength of reasoning

but regard it as liable to the following remarks:
The first that occurs is, that the large States
would not exchange the proportional agency they
now have in the appointment of the Chief Magistrate,
for a mode placing the largest & smallest States on
a perfect equality in that cardinal transaction. N.
York has in it, even now more than 13 times the
weight of several of the States, and other States according
to their magnitudes wd. decide on the
change with correspondent calculations & feelings.The difficulty of reconciling the larger States to the
equality in the Senate is known to have been the
most threatning that was encountered in framing
the Constitution. It is known also that the powers
committed to that body, comprehending, as they do,
Legislative, Ex. & Judicial functions, was among the
most serious objections, with many, to the adoption
of the Constitution.- As the President elect would generally be
without any previous evidence of national confidence,
and have been in responsible relations only to a
particular State, there might be danger of State
partialities, and a certainty of injurious suspicions
of them. - Considering the ordinary composition of the
Senate, and the number (in a little time nearly 50)
out of which a single one was to be taken by pure
chance; it must often happen, that the winner of the
prize would want some of the qualities necessary
to command the respect of the nation, and possibly be
368marked with some of an opposite tendency. On
a review of the composition of that Body thro' the
successive periods of its existence, (antecedent to
the present which may be an exception) how often
will names present themselves, which would be
seen with mortified feelings at the head of the
nation. It might happen, it is true, that, in the
choice of Senators, an eventual elevation to that
important trust might produce more circumspection
in the State Legislatures. But so remote a contingency
could not be expected to have any great
influence; besides that there might be States not
furnishing at the time, characters which would
satisfy the pride and inspire the confidence of the
States & of the People. - A President not appointed by the nation and
without the weight derived from its selection &
confidence, could not afford the advantage expected
from the qualified negative on the act of the Legislative
branch of the Govt. He might either shrink
from the delicacy of such an interposition, or it
might be overruled with too little hesitation by the
body checked in its career. - In the vicissitudes of party, adverse views &
feelings will exist between the Senate & President.
Under the amendments proposed, a spirit of opposition
in the former to the latter would probably be
more frequent than heretofore. In such a state of
things, how apt might the Senate be to embarrass the
President, by refusing to concur in the removal of
an obnoxious officer; how prone would be a refractory
369officer, having powerful friends in the Senate,
to take shelter under that authority, & bid defiance
to the President; and, with such discord and anarchy
in the Ex. Department, how impaired would
be the security for a due execution of the Laws! - On the supposition that the above objection
would be overbalanced by the advantage of reducing
the power and the patronage now attached
to the Presidential office; it has generally been
admitted, that the Heads of Depts. at least who
are at once the associates & the organs of the
Chief Magistrate, ought to be well disposed towards
him, and not independent of him. What would
be the situation of the President, and what might
be the effect on the Executive business, if those
immediately around him, and in daily consultation
with him, could, however adverse to him in their
feelings & their views, be fastened upon him, by a
Senate disposed to take side with them? The
harmony so expedient between the P. & Heads of
Departments, and among the latter themselves, has
been too liable to interruption under an organization
apparently so well providing against it.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
I am aware that some of these objections might
be mitigated, if not removed; but not I suspect in a
degree to render the proposed modification of the
Executive Department an eligible substitute for the
one existing. At the same time, I am duly sensible
of the evils incident to the existing one, and
that a solid improvement of it is a desideratum that
ought to be welcomed by all enlightened patriots.

In the mean time, I cannot feel all the alarm you
express at the prospect for the future as reflected from
the mirror of the past. It will be a rare case that the
Presidential contest will not issue in a choice that
will not discredit the station, and not be acquiesced
in by the unsuccessful party, foreseeing, as it must
do, the appeal to be again made at no very distant
day to the will of the nation. As long as the country
shall be exempt from a military force powerful in
itself and combined with a powerful faction, liberty
& peace will find safeguards in the elective resource
and the spirit of the people. The dangers which
threaten our political system least remote are
perhaps of other sorts and from other sources.
I will only add to these remarks, what is indeed
sufficiently evident, that they are too hasty & too
crude for any other than a private, and that an
indulgent eye.
Mrs. M. is highly gratified by your kind expressions
towards her, & begs you to be assured that she still
feels for you that affectionate friendship with which
you impressed her many years ago. Permit me
to join her in best wishes for your health & every
other happiness.
The pamphlet was; Propositions for amending the Constitution of
the United States, providing for the election of President and Vice-President,
and guarding against the undue exercise of Executive influence,
patronage and power. Washington, 1830. It was a revival of Hillhouse's
proposed amendments to the constitution offered in the Senate
in 1808.
![]() | The writings of James Madison, | ![]() |