University of Virginia Library

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—I have recd yours of the 10th, and
return as you request, the letter of Mr. Higginbotham.
He will probably have understood from Col: Monroe
that the Consulate of Lisbon is the object of numerous
& respectable candidates.

The seditious opposition in Mass & Cont. with
the intrigues elsewhere insidiously co-operating with
it, have so clogged the wheels of the war that I fear

the campaign will not accomplish the object of it.
With the most united efforts, in stimulating volunteers,
they would have probably fallen much short
of the number required by the deficiency of regular
enlistments. But under the discouragements substituted,
and the little attraction contained in the
volunteer Act, the two classes together, leave us
dependent for every primary operation, on militia,
either as volunteers or draughts for six months. We
are nevertheless doing as well as we can, in securing
the maritime frontier, and in providing for an effective
penetration into Upper Canada. It would
probably have been best, if it had been practicable
in time, to have concentrated a force which could
have seized on Montreal, & thus at one stroke, have
secured the upper Province, and cut off the sap that
nourished Indian hostilities. But this could not
be attempted, without sacrificing the Western &
N. W. Frontier, threatened with an inundation of
savages under the influence of the British establishment
near Detroit. Another reason for the expedition
of Hull was that the unanimity and ardor of
Kentucky & Ohio, promised the requisite force at
once for that service, whilst it was too distant from
the other points to be assailed. We just learn, but
from what cause remains to be known, that the important
post of Machilimackinac has fallen into the
hands of the Enemy. If the reinforcement of about
2000 ordered from the Ohio, and on the way to Hull,
should not enable him to take Malden, and awe the
savages emboldened by the British success, his situation
will be very ineligible. It is hoped that he will
either be strong eno' as he has cannon & mortars, to
reduce that Fort, or to leave a force that will justify
him in passing on towards the other end of Lake Erie,
and place the British troops there, between him, and
those embodied under arrangements of Dearborn &
Tomkins at Niagara, for the purpose of occupying the
central part of Upper Canada. In the mean time the
preparations agst Montreal are going on, and perhaps
may furnish a feint towards it, that may conspire with
the other plan. I find that Kingston at the East End
of L. Ontario is an object with Genl D. The multiplication
of these offensive measures has grown out of the
defensive precautions for the Frontiers of N. York.

We have no information from England since the
war was known there, or even, seriously suspected,
by the public. I think it not improbable that the
sudden change in relation to the Orders in Council,
first in yielding to a qualified suspension, & then a
repeal, was the effect of apprehensions in the Cabinet
that the deliberations of Congs. would have that
issue, and that the Ministry could not stand agst the
popular torrent agst the Orders in Council, swelled
as it would be by the addition of a war with the U.
S. to the pressure of the non-importation Act. What
course will be taken when the declaration here, shall
be known, is uncertain, both in reference to the
American shipments instituted under the repeal of
the Orders, and to the question between vindictive
efforts for pushing the war agst us, and early advances
for terminating it. A very informal & as it has

turned out erroneous communication of the intended
change in the Orders, was hurried over, evidently
with a view to prevent a declaration of war, if it
should arrive in time. And the communication was
accompanied by a proposal from the local authorities
at Halifax sanctioned by Foster, to suspend hostilities
both at sea & on land. The late message of Prevost
to Dearborn, noticed in the Newspapers has this
for its object. The insuperable objections to a concurrence
of the Executive in the project are obvious.
Without alluding to others, drawn from a limited
authority, & from the effect on patriotic ardor, The
advantage over us in captures wd. be past, before it
could take effect. As we do not apprehend invasion
by land, and preparations on each side were to be
unrestrained, nothing could be gained by us, whilst
arrangements & reinforcements adverse to Hull
might be decisive; and on every supposition the Indians
wd. continue to be active agst. our frontiers, the
more so in consequence of the fall of Machilimackinac.
Nothing but triumphant operations on the Theatre
which forms their connection with the Enemy will
controul their bloody inroads.

I have been indulging my hopes of getting away
from this place, in the course of the present week.
It is quite possible however that my stay here may
be indispensable. As yet I have less of bilious sensations
than I could have expected.

Your two letters to Kosciuzco have been duly
attended to.