University of Virginia Library

TO WILLIAM WIRT.[75]

Dear Sir,—I have been several weeks in possession
of your favor of the 29th of August. As it appeared
that you were on an excursion from Richmond,
perhaps behind the mountains, I have not been in
a hurry to acknowledge it. From the present advance
of the season, I infer your probable return to
that place.

From whatever motives information such as that
in your letter might proceed, it ought not to be unwelcome.
The friendly ones by which I well know
you were governed entitle it to my sincere thanks,
which I pray you to accept.

I have not been unaware of the disappointment
and discontent gaining ground with respect to the
war on Canada, or of the use to which they were
turned against the Administration. I have not
been less aware that success alone would put an end
to them. This is the test by which public opinion
decides more or less in all cases, and most of all,
perhaps, in that of military events, where there is
the least opportunity of judging by any other. No
stimulus, therefore, has been wanting to the exertions
necessary to render our arms successful in the
quarter where they have failed.

How far these exertions will prevail remains to
be seen; and how far past failure is to be ascribed to
the difficulties incident to the first stages of a war
commenced as the present necessarily was; to the
personal faults of those entrusted with command;
to the course pursued by the National Legislature;
or to mismanagements by the Executive Department,
must be left to those who will decide impartially,
and on fuller information than may now exist.

Without meaning to throw undue blame elsewhere,
or to shun whatever blame may be justly chargeable
on the Executive, I will, in the confidence with which
we both write, intimate the plan for giving effect to
the war, originally entertained by that branch of the
Government. As it was obvious that advantage
ought to be taken of our chusing the time for commencing,
or rather retorting, hostilities, and of the
pains taken to make the British Government believe
that they were not to be resorted to by the United

States; and as it was foreseen that there would be
great delay, if not impossibility, in raising a large
army for a long term of service, it was thought best
to limit our first attempts to such a force as might
be obtained in a short time, and be sufficient to
reduce Canada, from Montreal upwards, before the
enemy would be prepared to resist its progress;
trusting to the impression to be made by success,
and to the time that would be afforded, for such an
augmentation of the durable force as would be able
to extend as well as secure our conquests. With
these views, it was recommended to Congress to
provide immediately and effectually for compleating
the existing establishment of 10,000 men; to provide
for a like number to be enlisted for a shorter term
of 2 or 3 years; and for volunteers, of whom an adequate
number, as was represented, would be readily
furnished by the enthusiasm of the frontiers of New
York and Vermont. With this arrangement was
combined the expedition conducted by Hull against
the upper and weaker part of the Province.

Of the issue of this part of the plan, and its distressing
consequences, it is needless to speak. The
other part, not coinciding with the ideas adopted by
Congress, was not brought to an experiment. It
was there thought best to commence with the addition
of 25,000 regulars to the existing establishment
of 10,000. And to the delays in passing the laws for
this purpose; to the deficiency in the bounty and pay
allowed recruits; to the necessity of selecting 1,000
officers, to be drawn from every part of the Union;

and to the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of
procuring, at a crisis of such scarcity, supplies for
such an army, and of distributing them over such a
surface in the worst season of the year; may reasonably
be ascribed the loss of the first year of the land
war. It unfortunately happened, also, that the
first provision of the two vital Departments, the
Commissary's and Quarter Master's, was so inadequate,
that the War office, otherwise overcharged,
was obliged for some time to perform the functions
of both. It was only after repeated failures and a
lapse of months that a Commissary General could be
obtained on the terms offered by the law. Nor
ought it to be omitted that the recommendation
of a greater number of General Officers, though
complied with at the last session of Congress, was
rejected in the first instance. The same may be
remarked as to two auxiliary appointments in the
War office, now substantially provided for under
other names in the organization of the military
establishment. The utter inexperience of nearly
all the new officers was an inconvenience of the most
serious kind, but inseparable, as it always must be,
from a Country among whose blessings it is to have
long intervals of peace, and to be without those large
standing armies which even in peace are fitted for
war.

These observations will be allowed less weight
in the present than in the first year of the war. But
they will justly mitigate the lateness, to say nothing
of the thinness of the ranks notwithstanding the

augmented inducements to enlist, attending the
operations by which the character of the campaign
is to be decided. My anxiety for the result is
great, but not unmingled with hopes that it will
furnish topics better than the past on which the
Censorious adversaries and criticising friends of the
Administration are to be met.

Accept, dear Sir, the assurances of my regard.