University of Virginia Library

TO JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Your dispatches by Lt. Lewis were delivered on the 8th
inst.

It is regretted that the interval between his arrival and
the date of your letter to Mr. Champagny, during which I
presume some verbal intercommunication must have taken
place, had produced no indication of a favorable change in
the views of the French Government with respect to its decrees;
and still more that instead of an early and favorable
answer to your letter, it should have been followed by such a
decree as is reported to have been issued on the 22d April at
Bayonne. The decree has not yet reached the United States;
and therefore its precise import cannot be ascertained. But
if it should be, as it is represented, a sweeping stroke at all
American vessels on the high seas, it will not only extend our
demands of reparation, but is rendered the more ominous
with respect to the temper and views of the Emperor towards
the United States, by the date of the measure.

The arrival of Mr. Baker with my letter of May 2nd, of
which a copy is herewith sent, will have enabled you to resume
the subject of the Decrees with the fairest opportunity
that could be given to the French Government for a change
of the unjust and unwise course which has been pursued;
and I assure myself that you will not have failed to turn the
communications with which you are furnished to the best
account. If France does not wish to throw the United States
into the War against her for which it is impossible to find a
rational or plausible inducement, she ought not to hesitate
a moment, in revoking at least so much of her decrees as violate
the rights of the sea, and furnish to her adversary the
pretext for his retaliating measures. It would seem as if the
Imperial Cabinet had never paid sufficient attention to the
smallness of the sacrifice which a repeal of that portion of its
system would involve, if an Act of justice is to be called a
sacrifice.

The information by the return of the Osage from England,
is not more satisfactory than that from France. Nothing
was said on the subject of the Chesapeake, nor anything done
or promised as to the orders in Council. It is probable that
further accounts from the United States were waited for, and
that the arrival of the St. Michael will have led to a manifestation
of the real views of that Government, on those and other
subjects. In the mean time it cannot be doubted that hopes
were cherished there of some events in this Country favorable
to the policy of the orders, and particularly that the offensive
language and proceedings of France, would bring on a hostile
resistance from the United States; in which case the British
Government would be able to mould every thing to its satisfaction.
There is much reason to believe that if the British
Government should not concur in a mutual abolition of the
orders and of the Embargo, it will result from an unwillingness
to set an example which might be followed, and might
consequently put an end to the irritating career of her enemy
on which the insidious calculation is built. Might not use

be made of this view of the matter, in those frank and friendly
conversations which sometimes best admit topics of a delicate
nature, and in which pride and prejudice can be best managed
without descending from the necessary level? In every view
it is evidently proper, as far as respect to the National honor
will allow, to avoid a stile of procedure which might co-operate
with the policy of the British Govt, by stimulating the passions
of the French.

In an interview which Genl. Turreau asked about a month
ago, he complained of the disposition here, as indicated by
certain publications, (such as the circular letter of Mr. Burwell
and the report of the Committee of the Senate, both of which
will be seen by you) to put France au même ligne with Great
Britain in aggressions on the United States, insisting that
the latter must at least be regarded as the prior as well as the
greater wrong doer. He dwelt at the same time on the disposition
of his Government to cultivate friendship with this,
and added that he was particularly charged to receive any
communications or explanations it might be disposed to
make, which would evince a corresponding disposition; wishing
it, however, to be understood, that he had no allusion to any
propositions tending even to an alliance, or any positive arrangements
between the two Countries. After this preface,
he expatiated on the exclusion of England from the continent
of Europe, which would soon be completed by the issue of the
Swedish War; and the probability, as an effect of that state
of things, and of what was passing in Spain, that her attention
would be turned to this continent, to South America, as a
Commercial substitute for her loss, and to North America,
which could so easily give facilities or obstructions to her
revolutionary plans.

It was observed to him, that without discussing the priority
of the wrongs we had suffered from the belligerents, they were
of sufficient amount from both, to justify the complaints made
on our part; that it afforded pleasure nevertheless to find by
his assurances that his Government was in so friendly a disposition

towards the United States, and that he might be
assured that proofs of theirs would keep a reasonable pace
with such as might be found in the conduct of his Government
towards them; that with respect to declarations or propositions
we had none to make different from the explanations which
had been from time to time given of our fair neutrality, and
of the justice and redress to which we were entitled, particularly
in relation to the French Decrees. His observations
with respect to the policy of England, resulting from the
State of things in Europe, were allowed their full weight and
it was equally admitted that the United States would become
peculiarly important to G. Britain, from such a change in her
system, but a continuance of their neutrality became for the
same reason of the greater importance to France and Spain;
the more so, as the disposition of the Spanish provinces to
look to the auspices of the United States, was so well understood.
He was left under the impression, however, that the
principles and policy of the United States would sufficiently
restrain them from becoming parties against any nation whose
just and friendly conduct should leave them to their pacific
cause.

I have no doubt that the language he held with respect to
manifestations of our friendship was the version made by his
prudence of the propositions contained in your letter by Capt.
Haley, and that his remarks on the subject of So America
grew out of the views given latterly in the Newspapers of the
interest G. Britain had in making Spanish America the primary
object of her operations. His remarks however shew the
light in which the subject strikes a French mind, and it is not
improbable, especially if the condition of Spain should second
the purpose, that you will be able to turn the co-operation
which the United States could afford towards a revolution in
South America, into a motive to guard against it by a compliance
with their reasonable expectations.

In all the conversations which have been held with the
French Legation here it has appeared that much juster views

are taken by it, of the true interest of France in relation to
the United States, than have prevailed in the French Government,
and I think it probable that their correspondence has
imparted those views. Of late much solicitude seems to have
been felt by Genl. Turreau to promote a change in the tone
of language as well as of measures, employed towards the
United States. As the most likely mode of succeeding in it,
Mr. Petrie is about to take, if he can find, a passage to France,
where he will be able by personal intercourse, to make impressions
not otherwise communicable. . . .[3]