APPENDIX.
Containing Thoughts on some preceding
Subjects.
In looking over this volume, it strikes
me that by introducing Teague to the
levee, I may be thought to mean a burlesque
on the President. It is not so; I
meant a burlesque on Teague. As to
levee-holding, I do not know whether it
is right or wrong; nor do I care. Because,
be it as it may, I believe it can do
little harm, and is one of those insipidities
in the affairs of men which are of no account.
Universal prudence is a characteristic
of the President, with a capacity of
attending to substantial business, and being
able at the same time to accommodate
himself to forms and ceremonies.
As all mankind are not philosophers, perhaps
it is well to possess this talent, in
order to please them:
As to what I have said on the subject of
certificates, it may be asked what the induction
of shewing that by the municipal
law the transfer might be set aside in
equity? Just this; that if a court of equity
could act with such latitude, the people
themselves, in a national capacity, might
with as much. I never had an idea that
after these securities, became the subject
of traffic, and had acquired a fixed value,
for this was nearly the case through all the
states, that any means would have been
adopted to disturb them. If any means
had been adopted, I had expected that at
least a scale would have been formed to ascertain
their value; as in the case of the
continental money; and I would have
wanted nothing more than the letter of
John Adams to the Count de Vergennes,
in the case of the continental money, to
justify the like step in the case of the certificates.
At any rate the transferees
would have been contented, nay, thought
themselves very happy with a French
crown in the pound, certain payment, or
with less; and if it should be said that the
original holders had no claim, having parted
with their right, let the mass of the people
be the gainers, in which case the originalholders
would gain something, not having
so much of the very debt to discharge
which was originally due to themselves.
But at the same time that I arraign the policy
of the system, I do not call in question
the integrity or patriotism of the authors of
it. I consider it as an error in judgment,
and as I have already hinted, flowing from
the excess of integrity itself: doing too
much, from a fear of falling short of doing
enough. But as the system now exists,
it must be supported; all retreat is
impracticable, and we must advance.
As to peace with the Indians; in order
to effect it, my first step would be, to establish
a post at Presqu'isle; build and equip
vessels on the lake; transport troops, and
establish a second post at the rapids of the
Miami river: from this last post, make
an advance to the Miami towns. It will
doubtless be necessary to fight the Indians
once; but only once, if beaten; for
seeing themselves thus cut off from the
British, their resolution will as certainly
die, as a plant cut from the root, and left
to wither in the mid-day sun.
A step of this nature will convince the
British that we mean to hold the western
country, and will hold it; and losing the
hope which they entertain of possessing it
themselves, they will be checked in their
instigation of the savages against us.
It is a strange thing that ideas of treating
under present circumstances, cannot possibly
be eradicated from the minds of the
public. I have conversed abundantly with
men who know the Indians, and have been
much amongst them since the conclusion
of the war with the British. I do not
draw my inferences as men in government
do, from persons interested in having treaties
brought about: I have conversed
with traders that have been in the woods,
and not at the seat of government, that
have as much sense, and more truth, than
Indian negociators who, unless treaties
are set on foot, are of no use. What
has been the result of my information?
I will give the very language of the Indians.
“You are learned, (speaking of
us) you think yourselves wise; and can
get our land by giving your goods. Our
chiess are not learned, but are more wise;
for they can take your goods, and keep
our land too.” They are positively astonished
at our simplicity; for they have no
idea of faith and honour in the case. The
greater fraud, the more honour, if it can
be committed with impunity.
They must be made to dread us: that
is the truth of it. Is this practicable?
Easily. Discard treaties; increase, or
at least fill up, the establishment of
troops, under the command of General
Wayne. Let him have an opportunity
of giving them at least one blow.
This will do more good than a thousand
fires kindled, and ten thousand bales of
goods given. We are now in a fair way
to be able to beat them. Our troops,
not the best materials it is true, the best
men not always enlisting as soldiers, at the
low pay stipulated; but from the great
exertions of the Commander in Chief, in
the course of the last summer, and the present
winter, they are certainly in a good
state of discipline. It would be a pity that
all this expence in raising troops, and exertions
in training them, should evaporate
in the smoke of a treaty.
