University of Virginia Library

Thursday July. 26. in Convention.[12]

Col. Mason. In every stage of the Question relative
to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and
the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared.
Nor have any of the modes of constituting
that department been satisfactory. 1. It has been
proposed that the election should be made by the
people at large; that is that an act which ought to
be performed by those who know most of Eminent
characters, & qualifications, should be performed by
those who know least. 2. that the election should be
made by the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the
Executives of the States. Agst. these modes also
strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been
proposed that the election should be made by Electors
chosen by the people for that purpose. This
was at first agreed to: But on further consideration
has been rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of
Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote
for several candidates has been proposed. This
seemed like many other propositions, to carry a
plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to

fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as
Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment
into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the
members of which he had a great respect, but which
he never wished to have a preponderating influence
in the Govt. 6. Another expedient was proposed
by Mr. Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable &
material an inconvenience that he had little doubt
of its being by this time rejected by himself. It
would exclude every man who happened not to be
popular within his own State; tho' the causes of his
local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to
recommend him to the States at large. 7. Among
other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But
as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand,
it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore
need be said on that subject. After reviewing
all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that
an election by the Natl. Legislature as originally proposed,
was the best. If it was liable to objections,
it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived
at the same time that a second election ought
to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary
object for the pole-star of his political conduct, the
preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as
an essential point, as the very palladium of civil
liberty, that the Great officers of State, and particularly
the Executive should at fixed periods return to
that mass from which they were at first taken, in
order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests,
Which are again to be personally valuable to
them. He concluded with moving that the constitution
of the Executive as reported by the Come. of
the whole be reinstated, viz. "that the Executive be
appointed for seven years, & be ineligible a 2d. time."

Mr. Davie seconded the motion.

Docr. Franklin. It seems to have been imagined
by some that the returning to the mass of the people
was degrading the magistrate. This he thought was
contrary to republican principles. In free Governments
the rulers are the servants, and the people
their superiors & sovereigns. For the former therefore
to return among the latter was not to degrade
but to promote them. And it would be imposing an
unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always
in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become
again one of the Masters.

Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which
passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Massts. not on floor. Ct. no. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris was now agst. the whole paragraph.
In answer to Col. Mason's position that a periodical
return of the great officers of the State into the mass
of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he
wd. observe that on the same principle the Judiciary
ought to be periodically degraded; certain it was
that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no
one had proposed, or conceived that the members
of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Docr.
Franklin, that a return into the mass of the people

would be a promotion, instead of a degradation, he
had no doubt that our Executive like most others
would have too much patriotism to shrink from the
burthen of his office, and too much modesty not to
be willing to decline the promotion.

On the question on the whole resolution as
amended in the words following—"that a National
Executive be instituted—to consist of a single person
—to be chosen by the Natl. legislature—for the
term of seven years—to be ineligible a 2d time—with
power to carry into execution the natl. laws—to appoint
to offices in cases not otherwise provided for—
to be removable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty—to receive a fixt
compensation for the devotion of his time to the
public service, to be paid out of the Natl. treasury"
—it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mass. not on floor. Ct. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. divd. Mr. Blair & Col.
Mason ay. Genl. Washington & Mr. Madison no. Mr.
Randolph happened to be out of the House. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Mason moved "that the Com̃ittee of detail be
instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications
of landed property & citizenship of the U.
States, in members of the Legislature, and disqualifying
persons having unsettled Accts. with or being indebted
to the U. S., from being members of the Natl.
Legislature."—He observed that persons of the latter
descriptions had frequently got into the State
Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might

shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had
crept into Congs. if Report was to be regarded.

Mr. Pinckney seconded the motion

Mr. Govr. Morris. If qualifications are proper, he
wd. prefer them in the electors rather than the elected.
As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to
persons having unsettled accounts he believed them
to be pretty many. He thought however that
such a discrimination would be both odious & useless,
and in many instances, unjust & cruel. The
delay of settlemt. had been more the fault of the
Public than of the individuals. What will be done
with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or
services or property to their Country, without having
been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims?
Are they to be excluded?

Mr. Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature the
providing agst. such abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications
adopted in the Reign of Queen Anne, which
he said had met with universal approbation.

Mr. Madison had witnessed the zeal of men having
accts. with the public, to get into the Legislatures for
sinister purposes. He thought however that if any
precaution were taken for excluding them, the one
proposed by Col. Mason ought to be new modelled.
It might be well to limit the exclusion to persons who
had recd. money from the public, and had not accounted
for it.

Mr. Govr. Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity
as well as of high authority that we should

not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought
to be equally on our guard agst. being wise overmuch.
The proposed regulation would enable the Governt. to
exclude particular persons from office as long as they
pleased. He mentioned the case of the Com̃ander in
Chief's presenting his account for secret services,
which he said was so moderate that every one was
astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt could
arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to
delay the settlement, how easily he might have
effected it, & how cruel wd. it be in such a case to keep
a distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary
disability & disfranchisement. He mentioned
this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature
of the proposition. He was opposed to such
minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary
qualifications quoted by Col. Mason,
had been disregarded in practice; and was but a
scheme of the landed agst. the monied interest.

Mr. Pinckney & Genl. Pinckney moved to insert by
way of amendmt. the words Judiciary & Executive
so as to extend the qualifications to those departments
which was agreed to nem con.

Mr. Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding
a few worthy individuals who might be public debtors
or have unsettled accts. ought not to be put in
the scale agst. the public advantages of the regulation,
and that the motion did not go far enough.

Mr. King observed that there might be great
danger in requiring landed property as a qualification
since it would exclude the monied interest,

whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies
to the public safety.

Mr. Dickinson, was agst. any recital of qualifications
in the Constitution. It was impossible to make
a compleat one, and a partial one wd. by implication
tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying
the omissions. The best defence lay in the freeholders
who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst
this Source should remain pure, the Public interest
would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no little
expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the
policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution
a veneration for wealth. He had always understood
that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were
the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed
improper that any man of merit should be subjected
to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood
to form the great title to public trust, honors
& rewards.

Mr. Gerry if property be one object of Government,
provisions to secure it cannot be improper.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the word landed,
before the word "qualifications." If the proposition
sd. be agreed to he wished the Committee to be at
liberty to report the best criterion they could devise.
Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real
wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who
were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust
Laws of the States had proceeded more from
this class of men, than any others. It had often happened
that men who had acquired landed property

on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view
of promoting an unjust protection agst. their Creditors.
In the next place, if a small quantity of land
should be made the standard, it would be no security;
if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives
of those classes of Citizens who were not
landholders. It was politic as well as just that the
interests & rights of every class should be duly represented
& understood in the public Councils. It was
a provision every where established that the Country
should be divided into districts & representatives
taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly
might equally understand & sympathize with the
rights of the people in every part of the Community.
It was not less proper that every class of Citizens
should have an opportunity of making their rights
be felt & understood in the public Councils. The
three principal classes into which our citizens were
divisible, were the landed the commercial, & the
manufacturing. The 2d. & 3d. class, bear as yet a
small proportion to the first. The proportion however
will daily increase. We see in the populous
Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter.
These classes understand much less of each others
interests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting
different districts. It is particularly requisite
therefore that the interests of one or two of them
should not be left entirely to the care, or impartiality
of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications
should be required; few of the mercantile,
& scarcely any of the manufacturing class chusing
whilst they continue in business to turn any part of
their Stock into landed property. For these reasons
he wished if it were possible that some other criterion
than the mere possession of land should be devised.
He concurred with Mr. Govr. Morris in thinking that
qualifications in the Electors would be much more
effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate
between real & ostensible property in the
latter; But he was aware of the difficulty of forming
any uniform standard that would suit the different
circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different
States.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion.

On the Question for striking out "landed"

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On Question on 1st. part of Col. Masons proposition
as to qualification of property & citizenship," as so
amended

N. H. ay. Masts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

"The 2d. part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons
having unsettled accounts," being under consideration.

Mr. Carrol moved to strike out "having unsettled
accounts"

Mr. Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that
it would put the commercial & manufacturing part of
the people on a worse footing than others as they

would be most likely to have dealings with the public.

Mr. L. Martin. if these words should be struck out,
and the remaining words concerning debtors retained,
it will be the interest of the latter class to
keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

Mr. Wilson was for striking them out. They put
too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who
might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in
order to prolong the disqualifications of particular
men. We should consider that we are providing a
Constitution for future generations, and not merely
for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The
time has been, and will again be, when the public
safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals
which will necessarily open accts. with the
public, and when such accts. will be a characteristic
of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of
cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying
odious & dangerous characters.

Mr. Langdon[13] was for striking out the whole clause
for the reasons given by Mr. Wilson. So many exclusions
he thought too would render the system unacceptable
to the people.

Mr. Gerry. If the argumts. used today were to prevail,
we might have a Legislature composed of Public
debtors, pensioners, placemen & contractors. He
thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing

to the people. They will be considered as a
security agst. unnecessary or undue burdens being
imposed on them. He moved to add "pensioners"
to the disqualified characters which was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. no. N. C. divided. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The last clause, relating to public
debtors will exclude every importing merchant.
Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as possible,
from trade. Duties of course will be bonded,
and the Merchts. will remain debtors to the public.
He repeated that it had not been so much the fault
of individuals as of the public that transactions between
them had not been more generally liquidated
& adjusted. At all events to draw from our short &
scanty experience rules that are to operate through
succeeding ages, does not savour much of real wisdom.

On question for striking out, "persons having unsettled
accounts with the U. States."

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

Mr. Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder
of the clause disqualifying Public debtors; and for
leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature and the
virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst. such
evils. Is the smallest as well as the largest debtor
to be excluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify.
Besides how is it to be known to the
people when they elect who are or are not public

debtors. The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in
Engld. is founded on a consideration not existing here.
As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown,
they tend to increase its influence.

Mr. Pinkney sd he was at first a friend to the proposition,
for the sake of the clause relating to qualifications
of property; but he disliked the exclusion of
public debtors; it went too far. It wd. exclude persons
who had purchased confiscated property or
should purchase Western territory of the public, and
might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying
public debtors

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason, observed that it would be proper, as
he thought, that some provision should be made in
the Constitution agst. choosing for the Seat of the
Genl. Govt. the City or place at which the Seat of any
State Govt. might be fixt. There were 2 objections
agst. having them at the same place, which without
mentioning others, required some precaution on the
subject. The 1st. was that it tended to produce disputes
concerning jurisdiction. The 2d. & principal
one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures
tended to give a provincial tincture to ye Natl.
deliberations. He moved that the Come. be instructed
to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the
Natl. Govt. being in the same City or town with
the Seat of the Govt. of any State longer than untill
the necessary public buildings could be erected.

Mr. Alex. Martin 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris did not dislike the idea, but was
apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies
of Philada. & N. York which had expectations of
becoming the Seat of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. Langdon approved the idea also: but suggested
the case of a State moving its seat of Govt. to
the natl. Seat after the erection of the Public buildings.

Mr. Ghorum. The precaution may be evaded by
the Natl. Legislre. by delaying to erect the Public
buildings.

Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the genl. sense of
America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor
any large commercial City should be the seat of the
Genl. Govt.

Mr. Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how
much the passions of men were agitated by this
matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst. the
System. He apprehended also that an evasion,
might be practised in the way hinted by Mr. Ghorum.

Mr. Pinkney thought the Seat of a State Govt.
ought to be avoided; but that a large town or its
vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the Genl.
Govt.

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at
this time, nor to excite any hostile passions agst. the
system. He was content to withdraw the motion
for the present.

Mr. Butler was for fixing by the Constitution the
place, & a central one, for the seat of the Natl. Govt.

The proceedings since Monday last were referred
unanimously to the Come. of detail, and the Convention
then unanimously adjourned till Monday,
Augst. 6. that the Come. of detail might have time to
prepare & report the Constitution. The whole proceedings
as referred are as follow [14] :

                                                                           

June 20.	I. Resolved, That the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive.
June 21.	II. Resolved, That the legislature consist of two branches.
	III. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states, for the term of two years; to be
June 22.	paid out of the publick treasury; to receive an adequate compensation for their services; to be of the age of twenty-five
June 23.	years at least; to be ineligible and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the
	functions of the first branch) during the term of service of the first branch.
June 25.	IV. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of
June 26.	the age of thirty years at least; to hold their offices for six years, one third to go out biennally; to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the publick service; to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any office, under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter.
	V. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.
	VI. Resolved, That the national legislature
Postponed 27.	ought to possess the
July 16.	legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and
July 17.	moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests
	of the union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.
	VII. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states,
July 17	or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary, notwithstanding.
July 16.	VIII. Resolved, That in the original formation of the legislature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members; of which number
	New Hampshire shall send  three,  Massachusetts  eight,  Rhode Island  one,  Connecticut  five,  New York  six,  New Jersey  four,  Pennsylvania  eight,  Delaware  one,  Maryland  six,  Virginia  ten,  North Carolina  five,  South Carolina  five,  Georgia  three.  But as the present situation of the states may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature of the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of representatives; and in case any of the states shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more states united, or any new states created within the limits of the United States, the legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of representatives,
	in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely—Provided always, that representation ought to be proportioned to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the states—
	IX. Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.
	X. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of
	the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the publick treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch.
	XI. Resolved, That in the second branch of the legislature of the United States, each state shall have an equal vote.
July 26.	XII. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and conviction of mal-practice or neglect or duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to the publick service; to be paid out of the publick treasury.
July 21.	XIII. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature.
July 18.	XIV. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be
July 21.	appointed by the second branch of the national legislature; to
July 18.	hold their offices during good behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution.
	XV. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.
	XVI. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature; and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony.
	XVII. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.
	XVIII. Resolved, That a republican form of government shall be guarantied to each state; and that each state shall be protected against foreign and domestick violence.
July 23.	XIX. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.
	XX. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states, and of the national government, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.
	XXI. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of
	Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
	XXII. Resolved, That the representation in the second branch of the legislature of the United States consist of two members from each state, who shall vote per capita.
July 26.	XXIII. Resolved, That it be an instruction to the committee, to whom were referred the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the United States, for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both branches of the legislature of the United States.

With the above resolutions were referred the
propositions offered by Mr. C. Pinckney on the 29th. of
May, & by Mr. Patterson on the 15th. of June.[15]

Monday August 6th. in Convention

Mr. John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his
seat.

Mr. Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee

of detail as follows: a printed copy being at
the same time furnished to each member [16] :

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia North-Carolina,
South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain,
declare, and establish the following Constitution for
the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.

Article I

The stile of the Government shall be, "The United
States of America."

II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.

III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress,
to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men,
a House of Representatives and a Senate; each of
which shall in all cases have a negative on the other.
The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in
December in every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives
shall be chosen every second year, by the
people of the several States comprehended within
this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall
be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors
in the several States, of the most numerous
branch of their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives
shall be of the age of twenty five years at
least; shall have been a citizen in the United States
for at least three years before his election; and shall
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State
in which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at
its first formation, and until the number of citizens
and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner hereinafter
described, consist of sixty-five Members, of
whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire,
eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in
New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania,
one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia,
five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina,
and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different
States will alter from time to time; as some of
the States may hereafter be divided; as others may
be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more
States may be united; as new States will be erected
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature
shall, in each of these cases, regulate the number of
representatives by the number of inhabitants, according
to the provisions herein after made, at the
rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives,
and shall not be altered or amended by
the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the
Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations
that shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have
the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its
Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives
shall be supplied by writs of election from the
executive authority of the State, in the representation
from which they shall happen.

V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be
chosen by the Legislatures of the several States.
Each Legislature shall chuse two members. Vacancies
may be supplied by the Executive until the next
meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have
one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six
years; but immediately after the first election they
shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly
as may be, numbered one, two and three. The
seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated
at the expiration of the second year, of the
second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of
the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so
that a third part of the members may be chosen every
second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of
the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a
citizen in the United States for at least four years
before his election; and shall be, at the time of his
election, a resident of the State for which he shall
be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President
and other officers.

VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of
holding the elections of the members of each House
shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State;
but their provisions concerning them may, at any
time, be altered by the Legislature of the United
States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications
of the members of each House, with regard
to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem
expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members
shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

Sect 4. Each House shall be the judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its own
members.

Sect 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the
Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in
any Court or place out of the Legislature; and the
members of each House shall, in all cases, except
treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at Congress,
and in going to and returning from it.

Sect 6. Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour; and may expel a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the
Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity,

shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and
shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas
and nays of the members of each House, on any
question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the
members present, be entered on the journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of
the other, shall adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that at which the two
Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not
extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the
powers mentioned in the—article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible
to, and incapable of holding any office under
the authority of the United States, during the time
for which they shall respectively be elected: and
the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and
incapable of holding any such office for one year
afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive
a compensation for their services, to be ascertained
and paid by the State, in which they shall be
chosen.

Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the
United States shall be, "Be it enacted by the Senate
and Representatives in Congress assembled."

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of
originating bills, except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before
it become a law, be presented to the President
of the United States for his revision: if, upon

such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his
approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision,
it shall appear to him improper for being passed
into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections
against it, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large
on their journal and proceed to reconsider the bill.
But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that
House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the
President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his
objections, be sent to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a
law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses
shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the
names of the persons voting for or against the bill
shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively.
If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within seven days after it shall have been
presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature,
by their adjournment, prevent its return; in
which case it shall not be a law.

VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization
throughout the United States;

To coin money;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices;

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of
the United States;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and
water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment
of counterfeiting the coin of the United States,
and of offences against the law of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application
of its legislature;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to
execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution,
in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall
consist only in levying war against the United States,
or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies of

the United States, or any of them. The Legislature
of the United States shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted
of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses.
No attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of
the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall
be regulated by the whole number of white and other
free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and
condition, including those bound to servitude for a
term of years, and three fifths of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except
Indians not paying taxes) which number shall,
within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature,
and within the term of every ten years afterwards,
be taken in such manner as the said Legislature
shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature
on articles exported from any State; nor on
the migration or importation of such persons as the
several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall
Such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the Census hereinbefore directed to be
taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without
the assent of two thirds of the members present
in each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any
title of Nobility.

VIII

The acts of the Legislature of the United States
made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all
treaties made under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the several States,
and of the citizens and inhabitants; and the judges
in the several States shall be bound thereby in
their decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or
laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.

IX

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall
have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors,
and Judges of the Supreme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now
subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between
two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory,
the Senate shall possess the following powers.
Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority,
or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with
another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the
matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice
of such memorial and application shall be given by
order of the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive
authority of the other State in Controversy.
The Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance
of the parties, by their agents, before the House.
The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint
consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a
Court for hearing and determining the matter in

question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate
shall name three persons out of each of the several
States; and from the list of such persons each
party shall alternately strike out one, until the number
shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that
number not less than seven nor more than nine
names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence,
be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose
names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall
be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine
the controversy; provided a majority of the
Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the determination.
If either party shall neglect to attend at
the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons
for not attending, or being present shall refuse to
strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three
persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate
shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing.
If any of the parties shall refuse to submit
to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear
to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the
Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment.
The judgment shall be final and conclusive.
The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President
of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the
public records for the security of the parties concerned.
Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in
Judgment, take an oath, to be administered by one
of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of
the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and
truly to hear and determine the matter in question
according to the best of his judgment, without favor,
affection, or hope of reward."

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands
claimed under different grants of two or more States,
whose jurisdictions, as they respect such lands, shall
have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such
grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the
Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in
the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding
controversies between different States.

X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United
States shall be vested in a single person. His stile
shall be, "The President of the United States of
America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency."
He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He
shall hold his office during the term of seven years;
but shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information
to the Legislature, of the state of the Union:
he may recommend to their consideration such measures
as he shall judge necessary, and expedient: he
may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In
case of disagreement between the two Houses, with
regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take
care that the laws of the United States be duly and
faithfully executed: he shall commission all the
officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers
in all cases not otherwise provided for by this

Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and
may correspond with the supreme Executives of the
several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons; but his pardon shall not be
pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be
commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several
States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his
services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased
nor diminished during his continuance in
office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his
department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation,
"I—solemnly swear, (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States of America." He shall be removed
from his office on impeachment by the House of
Representatives, and conviction in the Supreme
Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of
his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability
to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those
powers and duties, until another President of the
United States be chosen, or until the disability of the
President be removed.

XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time
to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the
United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and
of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during
good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed
by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of
the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two
or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory
or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of
another State, between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and
foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment,
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate,
with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature
may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned
(except the trial of the President of the United
States) in the manner, and under the limitations
which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except
in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where
they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment,
shall not extend further than to removal from office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honour, trust or profit, under the United States.
But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment
according to law.

XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of
marque and reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty,
alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of
Nobility.

XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature
of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or
make any thing but specie a tender in payment of
debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor
enter into any agreement or compact with another
State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any
war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies,
or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to
admit of a delay, until the Legislature of the United
States can be consulted.

XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States.

XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high
misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice,
and shall be found in any other State, shall, on
demand of the Executive power of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts
of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial
proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every
other State.

XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established
within the limits of the United States may be admitted,
by the Legislature, into this government;
but to such admission the consent of two thirds of
the members present in each House shall be necessary.
If a new State shall arise within the limits of
any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures
of such States shall be also necessary to its
admission. If the admission be consented to, the
new States shall be admitted on the same terms with
the original States. But the Legislature may make
conditions with the new States, concerning the Public
debt which shall be then subsisting.

XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State
a Republican form of Government; and shall protect

each State against foreign invasions, and, on
the application of its Legislature, against domestic
violence.

XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a convention for that purpose.

XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive
and Judicial officers of the United States, and
of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support
this Constitution.

XXI

The ratification of the Conventions of—States
shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United
States in Congress Assembled, for their approbation;
and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it
should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature,
in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion
of this Convention, that each assenting Convention

should notify its assent and ratification to the United
States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after
receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions
of—States, should appoint and publish a
day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution;
that after such publication, the Legislatures of the
several States should elect members of the Senate,
and direct the election of members of the House of
Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature
should meet at the time and place assigned by
Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their
meeting, choose the President of the United States,
and proceed to execute this Constitution."

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in
order to give leisure to examine the Report; which
passed in the negative—N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no.
Pa. ay. Md. ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.

The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.

Tuesday August 7th.[17] In Convention

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken
up,
Mr. Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee
of the whole. This was strongly opposed by

Mr. Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce
unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware
Maryd. & Virga. only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem.
con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety
of giving each branch a negative on the other
"in all cases." There were some cases in which it
was he supposed not intended to be given as in the
case of balloting for appointments.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert "legislative acts"
instead of "all cases."

Mr. Williamson 2ds. him.

Mr. Sherman. This will restrain the operation of
the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a
mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he
hoped would take place.

Mr. Ghorum contended that elections ought to be
made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be
made for the President, and the two branches should
be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention
& confusion may ensue. These inconveniences
have been felt in Masts. in the election of officers of
little importance compared with the Executive of

the U. States. The only objection agst. a joint ballot
is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight;
but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to
the public tranquility & welfare.

Mr. Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases
at least; particularly in the choice of the President,
and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between
the two Houses during & concerng. the vacancy
of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of Mr. Govr.
Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent
part declared to be laws, they will therefore
be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be
made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed
that the mutual negative should be restrained
to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two
Houses.

Mr. Govr. Morris thought this but a repetition of the
same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent,
being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought
were not laws.

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the words "each
of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the
other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the
preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative
power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the
respective powers and mode of exercising them were
fully delineated in a subsequent article.

Genl. Pinkney 2ded. the motion.

On question for inserting legislative Acts as
moved by Mr. Govr. Morris

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to Mr. M's motion to
strike out & c.—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison wished to know the reasons of the
Come. for fixing by ye. Constitution the time of Meeting
for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be
required only that one meeting at least should be
held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied
by law.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the sentence.
It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular
time, or even to require a meeting every year.
The public business might not require it.

Mr. Pinkney concurred with Mr. Madison.

Mr. Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution,
disputes will arise in the Legislature; and
the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the
times of their elections. In the N. England States
the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by
their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconveniencey
had resulted. He thought it necessary that there
should be one meeting at least every year as a check
on the Executive department.

Mr. Elseworth was agst. striking out the words. The
Legislature will not know till they are met whether
the public interest required their meeting or not. He
could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention
could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

Mr. Wilson thought on the whole it would be best
to fix the day.

Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity
for a meeting every year. A great vice in our
system was that of legislating too much. The most
numerous objects of legislation belong to the States.
Those of the Natl. Legislature were but few. The
chief of them were commerce & revenue. When
these should be once settled alterations would be
rarely necessary & easily made.

Mr. Madison thought if the time of meeting should
be fixed by a law it wd. be sufficiently fixed & there
would be no difficulty then as had been suggested,
on the part of the States in adjusting their elections
to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate
strongly agst. fixing a time by the Constitution.
It might happen that the Legislature might be called
together by the public exigencies & finish their Session
but a short time before the annual period. In
this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble
so quickly & without the least necessity.
He thought one annual meeting ought to be required;
but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing
the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting
ought to be required as essential to the preservation
of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will
supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature,
besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers,
which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.

Mr. Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as
well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body.
Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two
Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be
changeable—frequent meetings of Parliament were
required at the Revolution in England as an essential
safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings
in most of the American charters & constitutions.
There will be business eno' to require it. The Western
Country, and the great extent and varying
state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

Mr. Randolph was agst. fixing any day irrevocably;
but as there was no provision made any where in
the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting,
and some precise time must be fixed, untill the
Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree
to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which
he moved to add the words following—"unless a
different day shall be appointed by law."

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out Decr. & insert
May. It might frequently happen that our measures
ought to be influenced by those in Europe,
which were generally planned during the Winter and
of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion, he preferred May to
Decr. because the latter would require the travelling
to & from the seat of Govt. in the most inconvenient
seasons of the year.

Mr. Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient
season for business.

Mr. Elseworth. The summer will interfere too
much with private business, that of almost all the
probable members of the Legislature being more or
less connected with agriculture.

Mr. Randolph. The time is of no great moment
now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into
the Constitutions of the States, he found that the
times of their elections with which the election of
the Natl. Representatives would no doubt be made
to coincide, would suit better with Decr. than May.
And it was advisable to render our innovations as
little incommodious as possible.

On the question for "May" instead of "Decr."

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Read moved to insert after the word "Senate,"
the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter
provided." His object was to give an absolute
Negative to the Executive—He considered this as so
essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of
liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled
him to make the Motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that
an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made
necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from
doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion,

"Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem.
con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd. to
nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power
shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate
& distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps. & a Senate.
The Legislature shall meet at least once in
every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1st.
Monday in Decr. unless a different day shall be appointed
by law."

"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the last member
of the section beginning with the words "qualifications
of Electors," in order that some other
provision might be substituted which wd. restrain
the right of suffrage to freeholders.

Mr. Fitzsimons 2ded. the motion

Mr. Williamson was opposed to it.

Mr. Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered
by the Committee, and he did not think it
could be changed for the better. It was difficult to
form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the
States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too
should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable
for the same persons at the same time, to
vote for representatives in the State Legislature and
to be excluded from a vote for those in the Natl.
Legislature.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Such a hardship would be neither
great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it
and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States.

In some the qualifications are different for the choice
of the Govr. & Representatives; In others for different
Houses of the Legislature. Another objection
agst. the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications
of the Natl. Legislature depend on the will
of the States, which he thought not proper.

Mr. Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the
electors stood on the most proper footing. The
right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly
guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The
people will not readily subscribe to the Natl. Constitution
if it should subject them to be disfranchised.
The States are the best Judges of the circumstances
& temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not
attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations
on this point. Eight or nine States have
extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders.
What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised.
A power to alter the qualifications
would be a dangerous power in the hands of the
Legislature.

Mr. Butler. There is no right of which the people
are more jealous than that of suffrage Abridgments
of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland
where they have at length thrown all power into
the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves,
and form a rank aristocracy.

Mr. Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency
of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders
of the Country. He considered them as the

best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the
right to them as a necessary defence agst. the dangerous
influence of those multitudes without property
& without principle with which our Country like all
others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity
of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical.
The great mass of our Citizens is composed
at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased
with it.

Mr. Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined?
Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote
for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his
money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers,
who will bear a full share of the public burthens
be not allowed a voice in the imposition
of them. Taxation & representation ought to go
together.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He had long learned not to be
the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore
had no effect on him. It was the thing, not
the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his
principal objections to the Constitution as it is now
before us, is that it threatens this Country with an
aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the
House of Representatives. Give the votes to people
who have no property, and they will sell them to the
rich who will be able to buy them. We should not
confine our attention to the present moment. The
time is not distant when this Country will abound
with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive
their bread from their employers. Will such men be

the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they
be the impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was
as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation
& Representation." The man who does not
give his vote freely is not represented. It is the
man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote.
Why? because they want prudence, because they
have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent
can be as little trusted with the public
interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining
"freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that
the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people
are at present freeholders and these will certainly be
pleased with it. As to Merchts. &c. if they have
wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not
they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains
of antient prejudices, and view things too much
through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification
in England, & hence it is imagined to be the
only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was
that every man having evidence of attachment to &
permanent common interest with the Society ought
to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this
qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no
other kind of property but land evidence a common
interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides
property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the
merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number
of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his
own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters,

and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights
of their fellow Citizens

Mr. Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one
of the fundamental articles of republican Government,
and ought not to be left to be regulated by the
Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has
been the mode in which aristocracies have been
built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the
Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold,
would with him depend much on the probable reception
such a change would meet with in States
where the right was now exercised by every description
of people. In several of the States a freehold
was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in
its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country
would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.
In future times a great majority of the people
will not only be without landed, but any other sort
of property. These will either combine, under the
influence of their common situation: in which case,
the rights of property & the public liberty, will not
be secure in their hands: or which is more probable,
they will become the tools of opulence & ambition,
in which case there will be equal danger on another
side. The example of England has been misconceived
(by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of
the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders.
The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs,
in many of which the qualification of suffrage
is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and
it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the

Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence
of the Crown on elections was most dangerously
exerted.[18]

Docr. Franklin. It is of great consequence that we
shd. not depress the virtue & public spirit of our

common people; of which they displayed a great deal
during the war, and which contributed principally to
the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable
refusal of the American seamen who were carried
in great numbers into the British Prisons during the
war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek
their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the
Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism
with a contemporary instance in which the
British seamen made prisoners by the Americans,
readily entered on the ships of the latter on being
promised a share of the prizes that might be made
out of their own Country. This proceeded he said
from the different manner in which the common
people were treated in America & G. Britain. He
did not think that the elected had any right in any
case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He
quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth
the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that
pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons
having freeholds of a certain value; observing that
this Statute was soon followed by another under the
succeeding Parliamt. subjecting the people who had
no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was
persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed
would give great uneasiness in the populous
States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being
themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at
being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons
of that description.

Mr. Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in
many points, but in none more than the present.
He objected to the footing on which the qualification
was put, but particularly to the mode of election by
the people. The people can not know & judge of the
characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice
will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in
Virga. as an example in point. The people in Towns
can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by
that means always prevail over the people of the
Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes
among a variety of candidates.

Mr. Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the
right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised
one. It would create division among the people &
make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by Mr.
Govr. Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the
end of the III article

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not
prest.

Adjourned