University of Virginia Library

Tuesday July 24. in Convention

The appointment of the Executive by Electors
reconsidered.

Mr. Houston moved that he be appointed by the
"Natl. Legislature," instead of "Electors appointed
by the State Legislatures" according to the last decision
of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability,
that capable men would undertake the
service of Electors from the more distant States.

Mr. Spaight seconded the motion.

Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no
ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr.
Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate
will be considered as of vast importance and will
create great earnestness. The best men, the Governours
of the States will not hold it derogatory from
their character to be the electors. If the motion
should be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the
Executive ineligible a 2d. time, in order to render him
independent of the Legislature; which was an idea
extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.

Mr. Strong supposed that there would be no necessity,
if the Executive should be appointed by the
Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d time; as new
elections of the Legislature will have intervened;
and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the
same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had
been suggested that gratitude for his past appointment
wd. produce the same effect as dependence for
his future appointment. He thought very differently.
Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors
who would be objects of gratitude as well as the
Legislature. It was of great importance not to make
the Govt. too complex which would be the case if a

new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced
into it. He thought also that the first characters
in the States would not feel sufficient motives to
undertake the office of Electors.

Mr. Williamson was for going back to the original
ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render
him ineligible a 2d. time. The proposed Electors
would certainly not be men of the 1st. nor even of the
2d. grade in the States. These would all prefer a
seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the
Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive.
He had wished the Executive power to be
lodged in three men taken from three districts into
which the States should be divided. As the Executive
is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there
is an essential difference of interests between the N.
& S. States, particularly in the carrying trade, the
power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be
taken from part of the Union, to the part from which
he is not taken. The case is different here from what
it is in England; where there is a sameness of interests
throughout the Kingdom. Another objection
agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective
King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare
no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay
a train for the succession of his children. It was
pretty certain he thought that we should at some
time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution
to be omitted that might postpone the event
as long as possible.—Ineligibility a 2d. time appeared
to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution

he had no objection to a longer term than 7
years. He would go as far as 10 or 12 years.

Mr. Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the States
should vote by ballot for the Executive in the same
proportions as it had been proposed they should
chuse electors; and that in case a majority of the
votes should not centre on the same person, the 1st.
branch of the Natl. Legislature should chuse two out
of the 4 candidates having most votes, and out
of these two, the 2d. branch should chuse the Executive.

Mr. King seconded the motion—and on the Question
to postpone in order to take it into consideration.
The noes were so predominant, that the States
were not counted.

Question on Mr. Houston's motion that the Executive
be appd. by the Nal. Legislature.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Mr. L. Martin & Mr. Gerry moved to re-instate the
ineligibility of the Executive a 2d. time.

Mr. Elseworth. With many this appears a natural
consequence of his being elected by the Legislature.
It was not the case with him. The Executive he
thought should be reelected if his conduct proved him
worthy of it. And he will be more likely to render
himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The
most eminent characters also, will be more willing to
accept the trust under this condition, than if they
foresee a necessary degradation at a fixt period.

Mr. Gerry. That the Executive shd. be independent
of the Legislature is a clear point. The longer
the duration of his appointment the more will his
dependence be diminished. It will be better then
for him to continue 10. 15. or even 20. years and be
ineligible afterwards.

Mr. King was for making him re-eligible. This is
too great an advantage to be given up for the small
effect it will have on his dependence, if impeachments
are to lie. He considered these as rendering
the tenure during pleasure.

Mr. L Martin, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility,
moved "that the appointmt. of the Executive
shall continue for Eleven years.

Mr. Gerry suggested fifteen years.

Mr. King twenty years. This is the medium life
of princes.[9]

Mr. Davie eight years.

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties & perplexities into
which the House is thrown proceed from the election
by the Legislature which he was sorry had been reinstated.
The inconveniency of this mode was such
that he would agree to almost any length of time in
order to get rid of the dependence which must result
from it. He was persuaded that the longest term
would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election,
unless indeed it should be during good behaviour.
It seemed to be supposed that at a certain
advance of life, a continuance in office would cease

to be agreeable to the officer, as well as desirable to
the public. Experience had shewn in a variety of
instances that both a capacity & inclination for public
service existed in very advanced stages. He
mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was
elected after he was 80 years of age. The Popes
have generally been elected at very advanced periods,
and yet in no case had a more steady or a better
concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of
Rome. If the Executive should come into office at
35 years of age, which he presumes may happen &
his continuance should be fixt at 15 years, at the age
of 50. in the very prime of life, and with all the aid
of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless
hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British
Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50.
been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or
readiness to serve the public. The great luminary
(Ld. Mansfield) held his seat for thirty years after
his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had
been done he could not but hope that a better mode
of election would yet be adopted; and one that
would be more agreeable to the general sense of the
House. That time might be given for further deliberation
he wd. move that the present question be
postponed till tommorrow.

Mr. Broom seconded the motion to postpone.

Mr. Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on
this head. He would suggest whether it would not
be advisable to refer the clause relating to the Executive
to the Committee of detail to be appointed.

Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that
may unite the various opinions which have been
thrown out.

Mr. Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to spring
from the mode of election, he wd. suggest a mode
which had not been mentioned. It was that the
Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number,
not more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who
should retire immediately and make the election
without separating. By this mode intrigue would be
avoided in the first instance, and the dependence
would be diminished. This was not he said a digested
idea and might be liable to strong objections.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Of all possible modes of appointment
that by the Legislature is the worst. If the
Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach or to influence
the impeachment, the Executive will be the
mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the
impeachment but was now convinced that impeachments
must be provided for, if the appt. was to be of
any duration. No man wd. say, that an Executive
known to be in the pay of an Enemy, should not be
removable in some way or other. He had been
charged heretofore (by Col. Mason) with inconsistency
in pleading for confidence in the Legislature on
some occasions, & urging a distrust on others. The
charge was not well founded. The Legislature is
worthy of unbounded confidence in some respects,
and liable to equal distrust in others. When their
interest coincides precisely with that of their Constituents,

as happens in many of their Acts, no
abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a strong
personal interest happens to be opposed to the general
interest, the Legislature cannot be too much
distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties.
The Executive will necessarily be more connected
with one than with the other. There will be
a personal interest therefore in one of the parties to
oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much
had been said of the intrigues, that will be practised
by the Executive to get into office. Nothing had
been said on the other side of the intrigues to get him
out of office. Some leader of a party will always
covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will
cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting
him. This was the way in which the King
of England was got out, he meant the real King, the
Minister. This was the way in which Pitt (Ld.
Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for
pushing the matter still farther. If he had carried
his India bill, which he was very near doing, he
would have made the Minister, the King in form
almost as well as in substance. Our President will
be the British Minister, yet we are about to make
him appointable by the Legislature. Something had
been said of the danger of Monarchy. If a good
government should not now be formed, if a good
organization of the Executive should not be provided,
he doubted whether we should not have something
worse than a limited monarchy. In order to
get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a
2d. time had been devised. This was as much as to
say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and
then deprive ourselves of the use of it. But make
him ineligible a 2d. time—and prolong his duration
even to 15 years, will he by any wonderful interposition
of providence at that period cease to be a man?
No he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the
road to his object thro' the Constitution will be shut;
he will be in possession of the sword, a civil war will
ensue, and the Com̃ander of the victorious army
on which ever side, will be the despot of America.
This consideration renders him particularly anxious
that the Executive should be properly constituted.
The vice here would not, as in some other parts of
the system be curable. It is the most difficult of
all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too
weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers. Make
him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature.
He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a
different mode of election. A long period would prevent
an adoption of the plan: it ought to do so. He
shd. himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared
to decide on Mr. Wilson's mode of election just hinted
by him. He thought it deserved consideration. It
would be better that chance shd. decide than intrigue.

On a question to postpone the consideration of the
Resolution on the subject of the Executive

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. divd. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson then moved that the Executive be
chosen every—years by—Electors to be
taken by lot from the Natl. Legislature who shall
proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive
and not separate until it be made."

Mr. Carrol 2ds. the motion

Mr. Gerry. this is committing too much to
chance. If the lot should fall on a sett of unworthy
men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on the
Country. He thought it had been demonstrated
that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature
could be a good one.

Mr. King. The lot might fall on a majority from
the same State which wd. ensure the election of a
man from that State. We ought to be governed by
reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be
satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed

Mr. Wilson did not move this as the best mode.
His opinion remained unshaken that we ought to
resort to the people for the election. He seconded
the postponement.

Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the chances were
almost infinite agst. a majority of Electors from the
same State.

On a question whether the last motion was in
order, it was determined in the affirmative: 7. ays.
4 noes.

On the question of postponemt. it was agreed to
nem. con.

Mr. Carrol took occasion to observe that he considered
the clause declaring that direct taxation on

the States should be in proportion to representation,
previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very
objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the
right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee
of detail should leave it in the plan.

Mr. Govr. Morris hoped the Committee would strike
out the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation
to representation. He had only meant it as a
bridge[10] to assist us over a certain gulph; having
passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness,
liable to strong objections

On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution
conformable to the Resolutions passed by the
Convention, the members chosen were

Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Elseworth,
Mr. Wilson—

On motion to discharge the Come. of the whole
from the propositions submitted to the Convention
by Mr. C. Pinkney as the basis of a constitution, and
to refer them to the Committee of detail just appointed,
it was agd. to nem: con

A like motion was then made & agreed to nem:
con: with respect to the propositions of Mr. Patterson.

Adjourned.