University of Virginia Library

Thursday July 19. in Convention.

On reconsideration of the vote rendering the
Executive re-eligible a 2d. time, Mr. Martin moved to
re-instate the words, "to be ineligible a 2d. time."

Mr. Governeur Morris. It is necessary to take into
one view all that relates to the establishment of the
Executive; on the due formation of which must depend
the efficacy & utility of the Union among the
present and future States. It has been a maxim in
Political Science that Republican Government is not
adapted to a large extent of Country, because the
energy of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the
extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive
one. We must either then renounce the blessings of
the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient
vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject
was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged
in an extensive view of it. One great object

of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The
Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize &
perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical
moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion
for that purpose. It is necessary then that the
Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of the
people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative
tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in the
course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative
body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind to
nourish its love of power, and to stimulate it to
oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of
the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch
was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations
of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the
propensity in the 1st. branch to legislate too much to
run into projects of paper money & similar expedients.
It is no check on Legislative tyranny. On
the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st. branch
can be seduced may find the means of success. The
Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to
be the great protector of the Mass of the people.—
It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers
& to command the forces of the Republic: to
appoint 1. ministerial officers for the administration
of public affairs. 2. officers for the dispensation of
Justice. Who will be the best Judges whether these
appointments be well made? The people at large,
who will know, will see, will feel the effects of them.
Again who can judge so well of the discharge of military
duties for the protection & security of the
people, as the people themselves who are to be protected
& secured? He finds too that the Executive
is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this have?
1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit public
esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded
with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous
turn to one of the strongest passions in the human
breast. The love of fame is the great spring to
noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road to
Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the
sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the most of
the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate
wealth and provide for his friends. 3. It will produce
violations of the very constitution it is meant
to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried
abilities and established character of a favorite
magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of
the Constitution. The Executive is also to be impeachable.
This is a dangerous part of the plan.
It will hold him in such dependence that he will be
no check on the Legislature, will not be a firm guardian
of the people and of the public interest. He
will be the tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue
in the Legislature. These then are the faults
of the Executive establishment as now proposed.
Can no better establishmt. be devised? If he is to be
the Guardian of the people let him be appointed by
the people? If he is to be a check on the Legislature
let him not be impeachable. Let him be of
short duration, that he may with propriety be reeligible.
It has been said that the candidates for
this office will not be known to the people. If they
be known to the Legislature, they must have such
a notoriety and eminence of Character, that they
cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large.
It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently
distinguished himself to merit this high trust
without having his character proclaimed by fame
throughout the Empire. As to the danger from an
Unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it as
formidable. There must be certain great Officers of
State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign
affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their
functions in subordination to the Executive, and will
be amenable by impeachment to the Public Justice.
Without these ministers the Executive can do
nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial
election of the Executive at the time of electing the
1st. branch, and the Executive to hold over, so as to
prevent any interregnum in the administration. An
election by the people at large throughout so great
an extent of country could not be influenced by
those little combinations and those momentary lies,
which often decide popular elections within a narrow
sphere. It will probably, be objected that the election
will be influenced by the members of the Legislature;
particularly of the 1st. branch, and that it will
be nearly the same thing with an election by the
Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such
an influence would exist. But it might be answered
that as the Legislature or the candidates for it would
be divided, the enmity of one part would counteract
the friendship of another; that if the administration
of the Executive were good, it would be unpopular
to oppose his re-election, if bad it ought to be opposed
& a reappointmt. prevented; and lastly that
in every view this indirect dependence on the favor
of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a
direct dependence for his appointment. He saw no
alternative for making the Executive independent of
the Legislature but either to give him his office for
life, or make him eligible by the people. Again, it
might be objected that two years would be too short
a duration. But he believes that as long as he should
behave himself well, he would be continued in his
place. The extent of the Country would secure his
re-election agst. the factions & discontents of particular
States. It deserved consideration also that such an
ingredient in the plan would render it extremely
palatable to the people. These were the general ideas
which occurred to him on the subject, and which led
him to wish & move that the whole constitution of
the Executive might undergo reconsideration.

Mr. Randolph urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin
for restoring the words making the Executive ineligible
a 2d. time. If he ought to be independent,
he should not be left under a temptation to court a
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by
the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary
power will be of no avail. He had always
thought & contended as he still did that the danger
apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but
those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly

anxious for the motion. If the Executive be appointed,
as has been determined, by the Legislature,
he will probably be appointed either by joint ballot
of both houses, or be nominated by the 1st. and
appointed by the 2d. branch. In either case the
large States will preponderate. If he is to court the
same influence for his re-appointment, will he not
make his revisionary power, and all the other functions
of his administration subservient to the views
of the large States. Besides, is there not great
reason to apprehend that in case he should be reeligible,
a false complaisance in the Legislature
might lead them to continue an unfit man in office
in preference to a fit one. It has been said that a
constitutional bar to re-appointment will inspire unconstitutional
endeavours to perpetuate himself. It
may be answered that his endeavours can have no
effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree
as to render all precautions hopeless; to which may
be added that this argument supposes him to be
more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments
which have been used, admit, and consequently calls
for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought an
election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be
elected a second time would be more acceptable to the
people than the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought
there was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman,
that he who has proved himself most fit for an Office,
ought not to be excluded by the constitution from
holding it. He would therefore prefer any other

reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was
much disposed to think that in such cases the people
at large would chuse wisely. There was indeed some
difficulty arising from the improbability of a general
concurrence of the people in favor of any one man.
On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment
by electors chosen by the people for the purpose,
would be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided he said with
those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive
should be appointed by Electors to be chosen
by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector
to the smallest and three to the largest States.

Mr. Wilson. It seems to be the unanimous sense
that the Executive should not be appointed by the
Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d.
time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was
gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately
by the people.

Mr. Madison. If it be a fundamental principle of
free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary
powers should be separately exercised, it is equally
so that they be independently exercised. There is
the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive
shd. be independent of the Legislature, than why
the Judiciary should. A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous
to public liberty. It is essential then that
the appointment of the Executive should either be
drawn from some source, or held by some tenure
that will give him a free agency with regard to the

Legislature. This could not be if he was to be appointable
from time to time by the Legislature. It
was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance
even with an ineligibility afterwards would not establish
an improper connection between the two departments.
Certain it was that the appointment
would be attended with intrigues and contentions
that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He
was disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment
to some other source. The people at large was
in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as
likely as any that could be devised to produce an
Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character.
The people generally could only know & vote for
some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an
object of general attention & esteem. There was
one difficulty however of a serious nature attending
an immediate choice by the people. The right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern
than the Southern States; and the latter could have
no influence in the election on the score of the
Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this
difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to
fewest objections.

Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by
the Legislature he certainly ought not to be reeligible.
This would make him absolutely dependent.
He was agst. a popular election. The people
are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment
of the Executive by Electors to be chosen

by the State Executives. The people of the States
will then choose the 1st. branch; the legislatures of
the States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature,
and the Executives of the States, the National
Executive. This he thought would form a strong
attachmt. in the States to the National System. The
popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would
certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so
elected & should do his duty, he will be turned out
for it like Govr. Bowdoin in Massts. & President Sullivan
in N. Hamshire.

On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider
generally the Constitution of the Executive

Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. & all the others ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved to strike out the appointmt.
by the Natl. Legislature, and to insert, to be chosen
by electors appointed by the Legislatures of the
States in the following ratio; to wit—one for each
State not exceeding 200,000[1] inhabts. two for each
above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000. and three
for each State exceeding 300,000.—Mr. Broome 2ded.
the motion.[2]

Mr. Rutlidge was opposed to all the modes, except
the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature. He will be
sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible.

Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to

an appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, or by the
people; tho' not to an appt. by the State Executives.
He moved that the electors proposed by Mr. E.
should be 25 in number, and allotted in the following
proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to Cont.
2. to N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C.
2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.

The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being
divided, on the 1st. part shall ye. Natl. Executive be
appointed by Electors?

Mas. divd Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On 2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by the
State Legislatures?

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The part relating to the ratio in which the States
sd. chuse electors was postponed nem. con.

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible
a 2d. time.

Mr. Williamson, 2ds. the motion. He had no great
confidence in Electors to be chosen for the special
purpose. They would not be the most respectable
citizens; but persons not occupied in the high
offices of Govt. They would be liable to undue influence,
which might the more readily be practised
as some of them will probably be in appointment 6
or 8 months before the object of it comes on.

Mr. Elseworth supposed any persons might be appointed
Electors, excepting, solely, members of the
Natl. Legislature.

On the question Shall he be ineligible a 2d. time?

Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On the question Shall the Executive continue for
7 years? It passed in the negative

Mas. divd., Cont. ay.[3] N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. King was afraid we shd. shorten the term too
much.

Mr. Govr. Morris was for a short term, in order to
avoid impeachts. which wd. be otherwise necessary.

Mr. Butler was agst. the frequency of the elections.
Geo. & S. C. were too distant to send electors often.

Mr. Elseworth was for 6. years. If the elections
be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm eno.
There must be duties which will make him unpopular
for the moment. There will be outs as well as
ins. His administration therefore will be attacked
and misrepresented.

Mr. Williamson was for 6 years. The expence will
be considerable & ought not to be unnecessarily repeated.
If the Elections are too frequent, the best
men will not undertake the service and those of an
inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.

On the question for 6 years?

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adjourned.