University of Virginia Library

Wednesday July 25. In Convention

Clause relating to the Executive being again under
consideration[11]

Mr. Elseworth moved "that the Executive be appointed
by the Legislature," except when the magistrate
last chosen shall have continued in office the
whole term for which he was chosen, & be reeligible,
in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed
by the Legislatures of the States for that
purpose. By this means a deserving magistrate
may be reelected without making him dependent on
the Legislature.

Mr. Gerry repeated his remark that an election at
all by the Natl. Legislature was radically and incurably
wrong; and moved that the Executive be
appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the
States, with advice of their Councils, and where
there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the
Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following
proportions: viz—

Mr. Madison. There are objections agst. every mode
that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election
must be made either by some existing authority
under the Natl. or State Constitutions—or by some
special authority derived from the people—or by the

people themselves.—The two Existing authorities
under the Natl. Constitution wd. be the Legislative &
Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the
question. The former was in his Judgment liable to
insuperable objections. Besides the general influence
of that mode on the independence of the Executive,
1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would
agitate & divide the legislature so much that the
public interest would materially suffer by it. Public
bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions,
but into more violent ones by such occasions
than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue
with the Legislature, would derive his appointment
from the predominant faction, and be apt
to render his administration subservient to its views.
3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and
would make use of, the opportunity to mix their
intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as
the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object
of great moment with the great rival powers of
Europe who have American possessions, to have at
the head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective
politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps
expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature
an appointmt. favorable to their wishes. Germany
& Poland are witnesses of this danger. In
the former, the election of the Head of the Empire,
till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all
Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference.
In the latter, altho' the elective Magistrate
has very little real power, his election has at all times
produced the most eager interference of forign
princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into
foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States
are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment
of the Natl. Executive by the first was
objectionable in many points of view, some of which
had been already mentioned. He would mention
one which of itself would decide his opinion. The
Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity
to a variety of pernicious measures. One
object of the Natl. Legislre. was to controul this propensity.
One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as
it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul
the Natl. Legislature so far as it might be infected
with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt. of
the Natl. Executive to the State Legislatures, and
this controuling purpose may be defeated. The
Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular
plan, and will promote the appointmt. of a man who
will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should
a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election
have the same object, or different objects of the
same kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered
subservient to them.—An appointment by the State
Executives, was liable among other objections to this
insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they
could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the
Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers
of foreign powers. The State Judiciary had not &
he presumed wd. not be proposed as a proper source
of appointment. The option before us then lay
between an appointment by Electors chosen by the
people—and an immediate appointment by the
people. He thought the former mode free from
many of the objections which had been urged agst. it,
and greatly preferable to an appointment by the
Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen
for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed
immediately to an appointment, there would be very
little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a
further precaution, it might be required that they
should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of
Govt. and even that no person within a certain distance
of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This
Mode however had been rejected so recently & by so
great a majority that it probably would not be proposed
anew. The remaining mode was an election
by the people or rather by the qualified part of them,
at large: With all its imperfections he liked this
best. He would not repeat either the general argumts.
for or the objections agst. this mode. He would only
take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to
have weight. The first arose from the disposition in
the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and
the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller States.
Great as this objection might be he did not think it
equal to such as lay agst. every other mode which had
been proposed. He thought too that some expedient
might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second
difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified
voters in the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages
which this mode would throw on the latter. The
answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion
would be continually decreasing under the influence
of the Republican laws introduced in the S.
States, and the more rapid increase of their population.
2. That local considerations must give way
to the general interest. As an individual from the
S. States, he was willing to make the sacrifice.

Mr. Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different
sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The
Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer
the candidate within the State; and the largest
States wd. invariably have the man.

Question on Mr. Elseworth's motion as above.

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature
be qualified with a proviso that no person be
eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve years.
He thought this would have all the advantage & at
the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency,
of an absolute ineligibility a 2d. time.

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction
of experience in the instance of Congs. and some
of the Executives of the States. It rendered the
Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility
after his first election, and opened the way at
the same time for the advantage of his future services.
He preferred on the whole the election by the
Natl. Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit,
that there was great danger of foreign influence,

as had been suggested. This was the most serious
objection with him that had been urged.

Mr. Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are
cabal at home, & influence from abroad. It will be
difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by
the Natl. Legislature. On the other hand. The
Govt. should not be made so complex & unwieldy as
to disgust the States. This would be the case, if the
election shd. be referred to the people. He liked best
an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of
the States. He was agst. a re-eligibility at all events.
He was also agst. a ratio of votes in the States. An
equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for
departing from it do not hold in the case of the
Executive as in that of the Legislature.

Mr. Gerry approved of Mr. Pinkney's motion as lessening
the evil.

Mr. Govr. Morris was agst. a rotation in every case.
It formed a political School, in wch. we were always
governed by the scholars, and not by the Masters.
The evils to be guarded agst. in this case are. 1. the
undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability of
Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst.
the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a
rotation which produces instability of Councils. To
avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men
is ever followed by a change of measures. We see
this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves,
particularly in the State of Pena. The self-sufficiency
of a victorious party scorns to tread in
the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not

imitate Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not
prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature.
The man in office will look forward to the period at
which he will become re-eligible. The distance of
the period, the improbability of such a protraction of
his life will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of
man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for
wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence to be
limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were
to live for ever. But taking another supposition,
the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If
the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election
to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep
in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature
itself. He will have little objection then to an
extension of power on a theatre where he expects to
act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling
to take any step that may endanger his popularity
with the Legislature, on his influence over which the
figure he is to make will depend. 3. To avoid the
third evil, impeachments will be essential. And
hence an additional reason agst. an election by the
Legislature. He considered an election by the
people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst,
mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but
favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture
of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal &
dependence.

Mr. Williamson was sensible that strong objections
lay agst. an election of the Executive by the Legislature,
and that it opened a door for foreign influence.

The principal objection agst. an election by the people
seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would
place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for
this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates,
one of them he observed would be probably
of his own State, the other 2. of some other States;
and as probably of a small as a large one.

Mr. Govr. Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an
amendment that each man should vote for two persons
one of whom at least should not be of his own
State.

Mr. Madison also thought something valuable
might be made of the suggestion with the proposed
amendment of it. The second best man in this case
would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection
which occurred was that each Citizen after
havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, wd.
throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of
another State, in order to ensure the object of his
first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that
the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of
having their favorite elected, as not to give their
second vote with sincerity to the next object of their
choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of
the smaller States that the Executive should not be
eligible more than—times in—years from the
same State.

Mr. Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically
vicious. The ignorance of the people would
put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed
through the Union & acting in Concert to delude

them into any appointment. He observed that such
a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati.
They are respectable, united, and influential.
They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every
instance, if the election be referred to the people.
His respect for the characters composing this Society
could not blind him to the danger & impropriety
of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr. Dickinson. As far as he could judge from the
discussions which had taken place during his attendance,
insuperable objections lay agst. an election of
the Executive by the Natl. Legislature; as also by
the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had
long leaned towards an election by the people which
he regarded as the best & purest source. Objections
he was aware lay agst. this mode, but not so great he
thought as agst. the other modes. The greatest difficulty
in the opinion of the House seemed to arise
from the partiality of the States to their respective
Citizens. But might not this very partiality be
turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each
State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know
the most eminent characters of their own States, and
the people of different States will feel an emulation in
selecting those of which they will have the greatest
reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus
selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen
either by the Natl. Legislature, or by Electors appointed
by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing
Mr. Pinkney's motion, in order to make way for some

such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. Williamson
& others, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On Mr. Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve
in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it
passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

On a motion that the members of the Committee
be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was
so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House
might take copies of the Resolutions which had been
agreed to; which passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no—
Geo. no.

Mr. Gerry & Mr. Butler moved to refer the resolution
relating to the Executive (except the clause
making it consist of a single person) to the Com̃ittee
of detail

Mr. Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the
System wd. not be committed untill a general principle
shd. be fixed by a vote of the House.

Mr. Langdon. was for the commitment—Adjd.