The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 14—ORIGINATING OF MONEY BILLS. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 14—ORIGINATING OF MONEY BILLS.
Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman, the criticism made by the
honorable member, is, that there is an ambiguity in the words,
and that it is not clearly ascertained where the origination of
money bills may take place. I suppose the first part of the
clause is sufficiently expressed to exclude all doubts. The
gentlemen who composed the convention divided in opinion,
concerning the utility of confining this to any particular
branch. Whatever it be in Great Britain, there is a sufficient
difference between us and them to render it inapplicable to
this country. It has always appeared to me, to be a matter
of no great consequence, whether the senate had a right of
originating, or proposing amendments to money bills or not.
To withhold it from them would create disagreeable disputes.
Some American constitutions make no difference. Virginia
and South Carolina, are, I think, the only states, where this
power is restrained. In Massachusetts, and other states, the
power of proposing amendments is vested, unquestionably,
in their senates. No inconvenience has resulted from it. On
the contrary, with respect to South Carolina, this clause is
continually a source of disputes. When a bill comes from
the other house, the senate entirely rejects it, and this causes
contentions. When you send a bill to the senate, without
the power of making any alteration, you force them to reject
the bill altogether, when it would be necessary and advantageous
that it should pass.
The power of proposing alterations, removes this inconvenience,
and does not appear to me at all objectionable. I
such bills. People would see what was done, and it would
add the intelligence of one house to that of the other. It
would be still in the power of the other house to obstruct any
injudicious measure proposed by them. There is no land
mark or constitutional provision in Great Britain, which prohibits
the house of lords from intermeddling with money bills;
but the house of commons have established this rule. Yet
the lords insist on their having a right to originate them, as
they possess great property, as well as the commons, and are
taxed like them. The house of commons object to their
claim, lest they should too lavishly make grants to the crown,
and increase the taxes. The honorable member says, that
there is no difference between the right of originating bills, and
proposing amendments. There is some difference, though
not considerable. If any grievances should happen in consequence
of unwise regulations in revenue matters, the odium
would be divided, which will now be thrown on the house of
representatives. But you may safely lodge this power of
amending with the senate. When a bill is sent with proposed
amendments to the house of representatives, if they find the
alterations defective, they are not conclusive. The house of
representatives are the judges of their propriety, and the
recommendation of the senate is nothing. The experience of
this state justifies this clause. The house of delegates has
employed weeks in forming a money bill; and because the
senate had no power of proposing amendments, the bill was
lost altogether; and a new bill obliged to be again introduced,
when the insertion of one line by the senate would have done.
Those gentlemen who oppose this clause will not object to it,
when they recollect that the senators are appointed by the
states, as the present members of congress are appointed. For,
as they will guard the political interests of the states in other
respects, they will attend to them very probably in their
amendments to money bills. I think this power, for these
considerations, is useful and necessary.
| The writings of James Madison, | |