The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 14—POWER OVER ELECTIONS. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 14—POWER OVER ELECTIONS.
Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, I cannot think that the explanation
of the gentleman last up, is founded in reason. It
does not say that the militia shall be called out in all cases,
but in certain cases. There are cases in which the execution
of the laws may require the operation of militia, which cannot
be said to be an invasion or insurrection. There may be a
resistance to the laws which cannot be termed an insurrection.
My honorable friend over the way has opened a new source
of argument. He has introduced the assertions of gentlemen
out of doors. If we thus depart from regularity, we will never
be able to come to a decision.
If there be any gentleman who is a friend to the government,
and says, that the elections may, or ought to be held in
one place, he is an enemy to it on that ground. With respect
to the time, place, and manner of elections, I cannot think,
notwithstanding the apprehensions of the honorable gentleman,
that there is any danger, or if abuse should take place,
that there is not sufficient security. If all the people, of the
United States should be directed to go to elect in one place,
the members of the government would be execrated for the
infamous regulation. Many would go to trample them under
foot for their conduct—and they would be succeeded by men
hatred and detestation of the people, and run the risk
of the certain dreadful consequences. We must keep within
the compass of human probability. If a possibility be the
cause of objection, we must object to every government in
America. But the honorable gentleman may say, that better
guards may be provided. Let us consider the objection.
The power of regulating the time, place, and manner of
elections, must be vested some where. It could not be fixed
in the constitution without involving great inconveniences.
They could then have no authority to adjust the regulation
to the changes of circumstances. The question then is,
whether it ought to be fixed unalterably in the state governments,
or subject to the control of the general government.
Is it not obvious, that the general government would be
destroyed without this control? It has already been demonstrated
that it will produce many conveniences. Have we
not sufficient security against abuse? Consider fully the
principles of the government. The sum of the powers given
up by the people of Virginia is divided into two classes: One
to the federal and the other to the state government. Each
is subdivided into three branches. These may be kept independent
of each other in the one as well as the other. In this
system they are as distinct as is consistent with good policy.
This, in my opinion, instead of diminishing, increases the
security of liberty more than any government that ever was.
For the powers of government which in every other country
are given to one body, are here given to two; and are favorable
to public liberty. With respect to secrecy, if every thing in
which it is necessary, could be enumerated, I would have no
objection to mention them. All the state legislatures can keep
secret what they think ought to be concealed. The British
house of commons can do it. They are in this respect under
much less restraint than congress. There never was any
legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing
important transactions, the publication of which might be
as long as the government is constructed on such principles.
He objects also to the clause respecting adjournment that
neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days. It was before remarked, that if a
difference should take place between the houses about the
time of adjournment, the president could still determine it:
from which no danger could arise, as he is chosen in a secondary
degree by the people, and would consequently fix no time
which would be repugnant to the sense of the representatives
of the people. Another, and more satisfactory answer is this:
suppose the senate wished to chain down the house of representatives,
what is to hinder them from going home? How
bring them back again? It would be contrary to the spirit
of the constitution to impede the operations of the government,
perhaps at a critical period. I cannot conceive that
such difference will often happen. Were the senate to attempt
to prevent an adjournment, it would but serve to
irritate the representatives, without having the intended
effect, as the president could adjourn them. There will not
be occasion for the continual residence of the senators at the
seat of government. What business have they more than
the house of representatives? The appointment of officers
and treaties. With respect to the appointment of officers,
a law may be made to grant it to the President alone. It
must be supposed there will be but few and subordinate
officers to be appointed, as the principal offices will be filled.
It is observed that the President, when vacancies happen
during the recess of the senate, may fill them till it meets.
With respect to treaties, the occasions of forming them will
not be many, and will mean but a small proportion of the
time of session.
| The writings of James Madison, | |