University of Virginia Library

SPEECHES IN THE FIRST CONGRESS—SECOND SESSION,
1790.

FEBRUARY 3. NATURALIZATION OF ALIENS[132]

When we are considering the advantages that may result
an easy mode of naturalization, we ought also to consider
the cautions necessary to guard against abuses. It is

no doubt very desirable that we should hold out as many
inducements as possible for the worthy part of mankind to
come and settle amongst us, and throw their fortunes into
a common lot with ours. But why is this desirable? Not
merely to swell the catalogue of people. No, sir, it is to increase
the wealth and strength of the community; and those
who acquire the rights of citizenship, without adding to the
strength or wealth of the community, are not the people we
are in want of. And what is proposed by the amendment is,
that they shall take nothing more than an oath of fidelity,
and declare their intention to reside in the United States.
Under sueh terms, it was well observed by my colleague, aliens
might acquire the right of citizenship, and return to the
country from which they came, and evade the laws intended
to encourage the commerce and industry of the real citizens
and inhabitants of America, enjoying at the same time all
the advantages of citizens and aliens.

I should be exceedingly sorry, sir, that our rule of naturalization
excluded a single person of good fame that really
meant to incorporate himself into our society; on the other
hand, I do not wish that any man should acquire the privilege,
but such as would be a real addition to the wealth or strength
of the United States.

It may be a question of some nicety, how far we can make
our law to admit an alien to the right of citizenship, step by
step; but there is no doubt we may, and ought to require
residence as an essential.[133]

FEBRUARY 11. PUBLIC DEBT[135]

No gentleman, Mr. Chairman, has expressed more strongly
than I feel, the importance and difficulty of the subject before
us. Although I have endeavored to view it under all its
aspects, and analyze it in all its principles, yet have I kept

my mind open, and been anxious to aid my own reflections
by the reflected light to be expected from gentlemen on this
floor who enter into the discussion. For this purpose, I
have chosen hitherto rather to be a hearer than a speaker on
the subject, and should even at this moment have continued
in my seat, but that the turn which the business has taken,
renders it requisite for me now, if at all, to trouble the committee
with my reflections, and the opinion in which they have
terminated.

It has been said, by some gentlemen, that the debt itself
does not exist in the extent and form which is generally supposed.
I confess, sir, I differ altogether from the gentlemen
who take that ground. Let us consider, first, by whom the
debt was contracted, and then let us consider to whom it is
due. The debt was contracted by the United States, who,
with respect to that particular transaction, were in a national
capacity. The Goverment was nothing more than the agent
or organ, by which the whole body of the people acted. The
change in the Government which has taken place has enlarged
its national capacity, but it has not varied the national obligation,
with respect to the engagements entered into by that
transaction. For, in like manner, the present Government is
nothing more than the organ, or agent, of the public. The
obligation which they are under, is precisely the same with
that under which the debt was contracted; although the

Government has been changed, the nation remains the same.
There is no change in our political duty, nor in the moral or
political obligation. The language I now use, sir, is the language
of the Constitution itself; it declares that all debts
shall have the same validity against the United States, under
the new, as under the old form of Government. The obligation
remains the same, though I hope experience will prove
that the ability has been favorably varied.

The next question is, to what amount the public are at
present indebted? I conceive the question may be answered
in a few words. The United States owe the value they received,
which they acknowledge, and which they have promised
to pay: what is that value? It is a certain sum in
principal, bearing an interest of six per cent. No logic, no
magic, in my opinion, can diminish the force of the obligation.

The only point on which we can deliberate is, to whom the
payment is really due; for this purpose, it will be proper to
take notice of the several descriptions of people who are
creditors of the Union, and lay down some principles respecting,
them, which may lead us to a just and equitable decision.
As there is a small part of the debt yet unliquidated, it may
be well to pass it by and come to the great mass of the liquidated
debt. It may here be proper to notice four classes into
which it may be divided:

First. Original creditors, who have never alienated their
securities.

Second. Original creditors who have alienated.

Third. Present holders of alienated securities.

Fourth. Intermediate holders, through whose hands securities
have circulated.

The only principles that can govern the decision on their
respective pretensions, I take to be, 1. Public Justice; 2.
public Faith; 3. Public Credit; 4. Public Opinion.

With respect to the first class, there can be no difficulty.
Justice is in their favor, for they have advanced the value
which they claim; public faith is in their favor, for the written

promise is in their hands; respect for public credit is in their
favor, for if claims so sacred are violated, all confidence must
be at an end; public opinion is in their favor, for every honest
citizen cannot but be their advocate.

With respect to the last class, the intermediate holders,
their pretensions, if they have any, will lead us into a labyrinth,
for which it is impossible to find a clew. This will be
the less complained of, because this class were perfectly free,
both in becoming and ceasing to be creditors; and because,
in general, they must have gained by their speculations.

The only rival pretensions then are those of the original
creditors, who have assigned, and of the present holders of
the assignments.

The former may appeal to justice, because the value of the
money, the service, or the property advanced by them, has
never been really paid to them.

They may appeal to good faith, because the value stipulated
and expected, is not satisfied by the steps taken by the
Government. The certificates put into the hands of the
creditors, on closing their settlements with the public, were
of less real value than was acknowledged to be due; they
may be considered as having been forced, in fact, on the
receivers. They cannot, therefore, be fairly adjudged an extinguishment
of the debt. They may appeal to the motives
for establishing public credit, for which justice and faith
form the natural foundation. They may appeal to the precedent
furnished by the compensation allowed to the army
during the late war, for the depreciation of bills, which nominally
discharged the debts. They may appeal to humanity,
for the sufferings of the military part of the creditors can
never be forgotten, while sympathy is an American virtue.
To say nothing of the singular hardship, in so many mouths,
of requiring those who have lost four-fifths or seven-eighths
of their due, to contribute the remainder in favor of those
who have gained in the contrary proportion.

On the other hand, the holders by assignment, have claims,

Which I by no means wish to depreciate. They will say, that
whatever pretensions others may have against the public,
these cannot effect the validity of theirs. That if they gain
by the risk taken upon themselves, it is but the just reward
of that risk. That as they hold the public promise, they have
an undeniable demand on the public faith. That the best
foundation of public credit is that adherence to literal engagements
on which it has been erected by the most flourishing
nations. That if the new Government should swerve from
so essential a principle, it will be regarded by all the world as
inheriting the infirmities of the old. Such being the interfering
claims on the public, one of three things must be done;
either pay both: reject wholly one or the other, or make a
composition between them on some principle of equity. To
pay both is perhaps beyond the public ability; and as it
would far exceed the value received by the public, it will not
be expected by the world, nor even by the creditors themselves.
To reject wholly the claims of either is equally inadmissible;
such a sacrifice of those who possess the written
engagements would be fatal to the proposed establishment of
public credit; it would moreover punish those who had put
their trust in the public promises and resources. To make
the Other class the sole victims is an idea at which human
nature recoils.

A composition, then, is the only expedient that remains;
let it be a liberal one in favor of the present holders, let them
have the highest price which has prevailed in the market;
and let the residue belong to the original sufferers. This will
not do perfect justice; but it will do more real justice, and
perform more of the public faith, than any other expedient
proposed. The present holders, where they have purchased
at the lowest price of the securities, will have a profit that
cannot reasonably be complained of; where they have purchased
at a higher price, the profit will be considerable; and
even the few who have purchased at the highest price cannot
well be losers, with a well funded interest of six per cent.

The original sufferers will not be fully indemnified; but they
will receive, from their country, a tribute due to their merits,
which, if it does not entirely heal their wounds, will assuage
the pain of them. I am aware, that many plausible objections
will lie against what I have suggested, some of which
I foresee and will take some notice of. It will be said, that
the plan is impracticable; should this be demonstrated, I am
ready to renounce it; but it does not appear to me in that
light. I acknowledge that such a scale as has often been a
subject of conversation, is impracticable.

The discrimination proposed by me, requires nothing more
than a knowledge of the present holders, which will be shown
by the certificates; and of the original holders, which the
office documents will show. It may be objected, that if the
Government is to go beyond the literal into the equitable
claims against the United States, it ought to go back to every
case where injustice has been done. To this the answer is
obvious: the case in question is not only different from others
in point of magnitude and of practicability, but forces itself
on the attention of the committee, as necessarily involved in
the business before them. It may be objected, that public
credit will suffer, especially abroad; I think this danger will
be effectually obviated by the honesty and disinterestedness
of the Government displayed in the measure, by a continuance
of the punctual discharge of foreign interest, by the full
provision to be made for the whole foreign debt, and the
equal punctuality I hope to see in the future payments on the
domestic debts. I trust also, that all future loans will be
founded on a previous establishment of adequate funds; and
that a situation, like the present, will be thereby rendered
impossible.

I cannot but regard the present ease as so extraordinary,
in many respects, that the ordinary maxims are not strictly
applicable to it. The fluctuations of stock in Europe, so often
referred to, have no comparison with those in the United
States. The former never exceeded 50, 60, or 70 per cent;

can it be said, that because a Government thought this evil
insufficient to justify an interference, it would view in the
same light a fluctuation amounting to seven or eight hundred
per cent.?

I am of opinion, that were Great Britain, Holland, or any
other country, to fund its debts precisely in the same situation
as the American debt, some equitable interference of the
Government would take place. The South Sea scheme, in
which a change, amounting to one thousand per cent. happened
in the value of stock, is well known to have produced
an interference, and without any injury whatever to the
subsequent credit of the nation. It is true, that in many
respects, the case differed from that of the United States;
but, in other respects, there is a degree of similitude, which
warrants the conjecture. It may be objected, that such a
provision as I propose will exceed the public ability: I do
not think the public unable to discharge honorably all its
engagements, or that it will be unwilling, if the appropriations
shall be satisfactory. I regret, as much as any member,
the unavoidable weight and duration of the burdens to be
imposed; having never been a proselyte to the doctrine, that
public debts are public benefits. I consider them, on the
contrary, as evils which ought to be removed as fast as honor
and justice will permit, and shall heartily join in the means
necessary for that, purpose. I conclude with declaring, as my
opinion, that if any case were to happen among individuals,
bearing an analogy to that of the public, a Court of Equity
would interpose for its redress; or that if a tribunal existed
on earth, by which nations could be compelled to do right,
the United States would be compelled to do something not
dissimilar in its principles to what I have contended for.

FEBRUARY l8. PUBLIC DEBT

Mr. Madison said, that the opponents of his proposition
had imposed on its friends not only a heavy task, by the
number of their objections, but a delicate one by the nature

of some of them. It had been arraigned as an embarrassing
measure which ought to be facilitated, and producing discussions
which might end in disagreeable consequences. However
painful it might be to contradict the wishes of gentlemen
whom he respected, he could promise nothing more in the
present case than his endeavors to disappoint their apprehensions.
When his judgment could not yield to the propositions
of others, the right to make and support his own, was
a right which he could never suffer to be contested. In exercising
it, he should study to maintain that moderation and
liberality which were due to the greatness of the subject
before the committee. He felt pleasure in acknowledging
that the like spirit had, in general, directed the arguments on
the other side. Free discussions, thus conducted, are not
only favorable to a right decision, but to a cheerful acquiescence
of the mistaken opponents of it. They might have
the further advantage of recommending the results to the
public, by fully explaining the grounds of it. If the pretensions
of a numerous and meritorious class of citizens be not
well founded, or cannot be complied with, let them see that
this is the case, and be soothed, under their disappointment,
with the proof that they have not been overlooked by their
country.

He would proceed now to review the grounds on which the
proposition had been combated; which he should do without
either following those who had Wandered from the field of
fair argument, or avoiding those who had kept within its
limits.

It could not have escaped the committee, that the gentlemen
to whom he was opposed, had reasoned on this momentous
question as on an ordinary case in a Court of Law; that
they had equally strained all the maxims that could favor the
purchasing, or be adverse to the original holder; and that
they had dwelt with equal pleasure on every circumstance
which could brighten the pretensions of the former, or discredit
those of the latter. He had not himself attempted, nor

did he mean to undervalue the pretensions of the actual
holders. In stating them, he had even used as strong terms
as they themselves could have dictated; but beyond a certain
point he could not go. He must renounce every sentiment
which he had hitherto cherished, before his complaisance
could admit that America ought to erect the monuments of
her gratitude, not to those who saved her liberties, but to
those who had enriched themselves in her funds.

All that he wished was, that the claims of the original
holders, not less than those of the actual holders, should be
fairly examined and justly decided. They had been invalidated
by nothing yet urged. A debt was fairly contracted;
according to justice and good faith, it ought to have been
paid in gold or silver; a piece of paper only was substituted.
Was this paper equal in value to gold or silver? No. It was
worth, in the market, which the argument for the purchasing
holders makes the criterion, no more than one-eighth or one-seventh
of that value. Was this depreciated paper freely accepted?
No. The Government offered that or nothing. The
relation of the individual to the Government, and the circumstances
of the offer, rendered the acceptance a forced, not a
free one. The same degree of constraint would vitiate a
transaction between man and man before any Court of Equity
on the face of the earth. There are even cases where consent
cannot be pretended; where the property of the planter or
farmer had been taken at the point of the bayonet, and a
certificate presented in the same manner. But why did the
creditors part with their acknowledgment of the debt? In
some instances, from necessity; in others, from a well-founded
distrust of the public. Whether from the one or the other,
they had been injured; they had suffered loss, through the
default of the debtor; and the debtor cannot, in justice or
honor, take advantage of the default.

Here, then, was a debt acknowledged to have been once
due, and which was never discharged; because the payment
was forced and defective. The balance, consequently, is still

due, and is of as sacred a nature as the claims of the purchasing
holder can be; and if both are not to be paid in the whole,
is equally entitled to payment in part. He begged gentlemen
would not yield too readily to the artificial niceties of
forensic reasoning; that they would consider not the form,
but the substance—not the letter, but the equity—not the
bark, but the pith of the business. It was a great and an
extraordinary case; it ought to be decided on the great and
fundamental principles of justice. He had been animadverted
upon for appealing to the heart as well as the head: he would
be bold, nevertheless, to repeat, that, in great and unusual
questions of morality, the heart is the best judge.

It had been said, by a member from Massachusetts, that
the proposition was founded on a new principle in Congress.
If the present Congress be meant, that is not strange, for
Congress itself is new; if the former Congress be meant, it is
not true, for the principle is found in an act which had been
already cited. After the pay of the army had, during the
war, been nominally and legally discharged in depreciated
paper, the loss was made up to sufferers.

It had been said, by a member from New York, that this
case was not parallel, there being no third party like the
present holders of certificates. This objection could not be
valid. The Goverment paid ten dollars worth in fact, but
only one to the soldier. The soldier was then the original
holder. The soldier assigned it to the citizen; the citizen then
became the actual holder. What was the event? The loss
of the original holder was repaired, after the actual holder
had been settled with, according to the highest market value
of his paper.

He did not mean, however, to decide on the whole merits
of this last transaction; or to contend for a similitude, in all
respects, between the two kinds of paper. One material difference
was, that the bills of credit, by more frequent transfers,
and by dividing the change of value among a greater
number of hands, rendered the effect of less consequence to

individuals, and less sensible to the public mind. But this
difference, whatever force it might give to the claims of the
purchasing holder of certificates, could diminish nothing from
the claims of the original holders who assigned them.

It had been said, by another member from Massachusetts,
that the old Government did every thing in its power. It
made requisitions, used exhortations, and in every respect
discharged its duty; but it was to be remembered, that the
debt was not due from the Government, but the United
States. An attorney, with full powers to form, without the
means to fulfil engagements, could never, by his ineffectual
though honest efforts, exonerate his principal.

He had been repeatedly reminded of the address of Congress
in 1783, which rejected a discrimination between original
and purchasing holders. At that period, the certificates
to the army, and citizens at large, had not been issued. The
transfers were confined to loan-office certificates, were not
numerous, and had been, in great part, made with little loss to
the original creditor. At present, the transfers extend to a
vast proportion of the whole debt, and the loss to the original
holders has been immense. The injustice which has taken
place has been enormous and flagrant, and makes redress a
great national object. This change of circumstances destroys
the argument from the act of Congress referred to; but if
implicit regard is to be paid to the doctrines of that act, any
modification of the interest of the debt will be as inadmissible
as a modification of the principal.

It had been said, that if the losses of the original creditors
are entitled to reparation, Congress ought to repair those
suffered from paper money—from the ravages of war, and
from the act of barring claims not produced within a limited
time. As to the paper money, either the case is applicable,
or it is not; if not applicable, the argument fails; if applicable,
either the depreciated certificates ought to be liquidated
by a like scale, as was applied to the depreciated money; or
the money, even if the whole mass of it was still in circulation,

ought now to be literally redeemed, like the certificates.
Leaving the gentleman to make his own choice of these
dilemmas, he would only add, himself, that if there were no
other difference between the cases, the manifest impossibility
of redressing the one, and the practicability of redressing the
other, was a sufficient answer to the objection. With respect
to the towns burnt, and other devastations of war, it was
taught, by the writers on the law of nations, that they were
to be numbered among the inevitable calamities of mankind.
Still, however, a Government owed them every alleviation
which it could conveniently afford; but no authority could
be found that puts on the same footing with those calamities,
such as proceed from a failure to fulfil the direct and express
obligations of the public. The just claims barred by the act
of limitation, were, in his opinion, clearly entitled to redress.
That act was highly objectionable. The public, which was
interested in shortening the term, undertook to decide, that
no claim, however just, should be admitted, if not presented
within nine months. The act made none of the exceptions
usual in such acts, not even in favor of the most distant parts
of the Union. In many instances, it had been absolutely impossible
for the persons injured to know of the regulation.
Some of these instances were within his own knowledge. To
limit the duration of a law to a period, within which it could
not possibly be promulgated, and then take advantage of
the impossibility, would be imitating the Roman tyrant, who
posted up his edicts so high that they could not be read, and
then punished the people for not obeying them.

It has been said that if the purchased certificates were
funded at the rate proposed, they would fall in the market,
and the holders be injured. It was pretty certain, that the
greater part, at least, would be gainers. He believed that
the highest market price, especially with the arrears of interest
incorporated, well funded at six per cent. would prevent
every loss that could justify complaint.

But foreigners had become purchasers, and ought to be

particularly respected. Foreigners, he remarked, had themselves
made a difference between the value of the foreign and
domestic debt; they would, therefore, the less complain of a
difference made by Government here. It was his opinion
that the terms stated in the proposition would yield a greater
profit to the foreign purchasers than they could have got for
their money if advanced by them in any of the funds of
Europe.

The proposition had been charged with robbing one set of
men to pay another. If there were robbery in the case, it
had been committed on the original creditors. But, to speak
more accurately, as well as more moderately, the proposition
would do no more than withhold a part from each of two
creditors, where both were not to be paid the whole.

A member from New York has asked, whether an original
creditor, who had assigned his certificate, could, in conscience,
accept a reimbursement in the manner proposed? He would
not deny that assignments might have been made with such
explanations, or under such circumstances, as would have
that effect; but, in general, the assignments have been made
with reference merely to the market value, and the uncertainty
of the steps that might be taken by the Government.
The bulk of the creditors had assigned under circumstances
from which no scruple could arise. In all cases where a
scruple existed, the benefit of the provision might be renounced.
He would, is turn, ask the gentleman, whether
there was not more room to apprehend that the present holder,
who had got his certificate of a distressed and meritorious
fellow-citizen for one-eighth, or one-tenth its ultimate value,
might not feel some remorse in retaining so unconscionable
an advantage?

Similar propositions, it was said, had been made and rejected
in the State Legislatures. This was not a fact. The propositions
made in the State Legislatures were not intended to
do justice to the injured, but to seize a profit to the public.

But no petitions for redress had come from the sufferers.

Was merit, then, to be the less regarded, because it was
modest? Perhaps, however, another explanation ought to
be given. Many of the sufferers were poor and uninformed.
Those of another description were so dispersed, that their interests
and efforts could not be brought forward. The case
of the purchasing holders was very different.

The Constitutionality of the proposition had been drawn
into question. He asked whether words could be devised
that would place the new Government more precisely in the
same relation to the real creditors with the old? The power
was the same; the obligation was the same. The means only
were varied.

An objection had been drawn from the article prohibiting
ex post facto laws. But as ex post facto laws relate to criminal,
not civil cases, the Constitution itself requires this definition,
by adding to a like restriction on the States an express one
against retrospective laws of a civil nature.

It had been said that foreigners had been led to purchase,
by their faith in the article of the Constitution, relating to the
public debts. He would answer this objection by a single
fact: Foreigners had shown, by the market price in Europe,
that they trusted the nature of foreign debt more under the
old Government, than the nature of the domestic debt under
the new Government.

Objections to the measure had been drawn from its supposed
tendency to impede public credit. He thought it, on
the contrary, perfectly consistent with the establishment of
public credit. It was in vain to say, that Government ought
never to revise measures once decided. Great caution on this
head ought, no doubt, to be observed: but there were situations
in which, without some Legislative interposition, the
first principles of justice, and the very ends of civil society,
would be frustrated. The gentlemen themselves had been
compelled to make exceptions to the general doctrine: they
would probably make more before the business was at an end.

It had been urged, that if Government should interpose in

the present case, as interposition would be authorized in any
case whatever where the stock might fluctuate, the principle
would apply as well to a fall of sixty or seventy per cent. as
to a fall of six hundred or seven hundred per cent. He could
not admit this inference. A distinction was essential between
an extreme case, and a case short of it. The line was difficult
to be drawn; but it was no more incumbent on him than on
his opponents to draw it. They themselves could not deny
that a certain extremity of the evil would have justified the
interposition. Suppose that the distress of the alienating
creditors had been ten times as great as it was; that instead
of two, three, or four shillings in the pound, they had received
a farthing only in the pound; and that the certificates lay
now in the hands of the purchasers in that state, or even at a
less value, was there a member who would rise up and say,
that the purchasers ought to be paid the entire nominal sum,
and the original sufferer be entitled to no indemnification
whatever?

Gentlemen had triumphed in the want of a precedent to
the measure. No Government, it was said, had interposed to
redress fluctuations in its public paper. But where was the
Government that had funded its debts under the circumstances
of the American debt? If no government had done
so, there could be no precedent either for or against the
measure, because the occasion itself was unprecedented.
And if no similar occasion had before existed in any country,
the precedent to be set would at least be harmless, because
no similar occasion would be likely to happen in this.

If gentlemen persisted, however, in demanding precedents,
he was happy in being able to gratify them with two, which,
though not exactly parallel, were, on that account, of the
greater force, since the interposition of Government had
taken place where the emergency could less require them.

The first was the case of the Canada bills. During the war
which ended in 1763, and which was attended with a revolution
of the Government in Canada, the supplies obtained for

the French army in that province were paid for in bills of
exchange and certificates. This paper depreciated, and was
bought up chiefly by British merchants. The sum and the
depreciation were so considerable as to become a subject of
negotiation between France and Great Britain at the peace.
The negotiations produced a particular article, by which it
was agreed by France that the paper ought to be redeemed,
and admitted by Great Britain that it should be redeemed at
a liquidated value. In the year 1766 this article was accordingly
carried into effect by Ministers from the two Courts,
which reduced the paper in the hands of the British holders,
in some instances, as much as seventy-five per cent. below its
nominal value. It was stated, indeed, by the reporter of the
case, that the holders of the paper had themselves concurred
in the liquidation; but it was not probable that the concurrence
was voluntary. If it was voluntary, it shows that they
themselves were sensible of the equity of the sacrifice.

The other case was of still greater weight, as it had no relation
to war or treaty, and took place in the nation which has
been held up as a model with respect to public credit. In the
year 1713, the civil list of Great Britain had fallen into arrears
to the amount of £500,000. The creditors who had furnished
supplies to the Government, had, instead of money, received
debentures only from the respective officers. These had depreciated.
In that state, they were assigned in some instances;
in others, covenanted to be assigned. When the
Parliament appropriated funds for satisfying these arrears,
they inserted an express provision in the act, that the creditors
who had been obliged, by the default of Government, to dispose
of their paper at a loss, might redeem it from the assignees
by repaying the actual price, with an interest of six
per cent., and that all agreements and covenants to assign
should be absolutely void. Here then was an interposition
on the very principle, that a Government ought to redress the
wrongs, sustained by its default, and on an occasion trivial
when compared to that under consideration; yet it does

not appear that the public credit of the nation was injured
by it.

The best source of confidence in Government was the apparent
honesty of its views. The proposition could not
possibly be ascribed to any other motive than this, because
the public was not to gain a farthing by it. The next source
was an experienced punctuality in the payments due from
the Government. For this support to public credit, he relied
on what had been experienced by a part of the foreign creditors;
on the provision to be made for the residue; and on the
punctuality which, he flattered himself, would be observed in
all future payments of the domestic creditors. He was more
apprehensive of injury to public credit from such modifications
of the interest of the public debt as some gentlemen
seemed to have in view. In these the public would be the
gainer, and the plea of inability the more alarming, because
it was so easy to set up, so difficult to be disproved, and for
which, consequently, the temptations would be so alluring.

The impracticability of the measure was the remaining
ground on which it had been attacked. He did not deny that
it would be attended with difficulties and that perfect justice
would not be done. But these were not the questions. It
was sufficient that a grievous injustice would be lessened, and
that the difficulties might be surmounted. What he had in
view was, that for the conveniency of claimants some authority
should be provided, and properly distributed through
the Union, in order to investigate and ascertain the claims:
and that, for the security of the public, the burden of proof
should be thrown on the claimants. A scrutiny on this plan,
aided by original settlements in the books of the army department,
and the State commissioners, and other office
documents, would be a remedy, at once, for all the difficulties
stated with regard to fictitious names, certificates issued as
money by commissaries and quartermasters, due bills, &c.

For some particular cases, special provisions might be requisite.
The case of loan-office certificates, alienated at early

periods, before they were much depreciated, fell under this
description. Legacies might be another. He would have no
objection to some special regulation, as to the payments of
debts in certificates to persons within the British lines, said
to have been authorized by the laws of New York; though he
presumed few such payments had been made, and that of
this few the greater part had, by this time, passed from the
creditors into other hands. There might be a few other cases
equally entitled to some particular attention in the details of
the provision. As to the merchants who had compounded
for their debts in certificates, or persons who had exchanged
bonds for them, it could not be doubted that the transactions
had reference to the market value of the paper, and therefore
had nothing peculiar in them.

The expense incident to such a plan of investigation ought
to form no difficulty. It bears no proportion to the expense
already incurred by commissioners, &c., for effecting a less
proportion of justice. Rather than justice should not be
done, the expense might be taken out of the portion to the
original sufferers.

The danger of frauds and perjuries had been worked up
into a formidable objection. If these had always been
equally alarming, no provision could ever have been made
for the settlement or discharge of public debts. He reminded
the committee of the frauds and perjuries for which a door
had been opened by the final settlements, &c., of the frauds
and perjuries inseparable from the collection of imposts and
excises; yet these were all submitted to as necessary evils,
because justice could not be done without them. The frauds
and perjuries incident to this supplementary provision for justice
must be very inconsiderable in number; and still more so,
when compared either with the object to be obtained, or with
the like evils already encountered in pursuit of a like object.

Great ingenuity and information had been exerted by the
gentlemen on the other side in raising difficulties. He was
sure that, after an adoption of the proposition, the same

exertion would be used in removing them, and with such aid,
the idea of impracticability would vanish.

FEBRUARY 24. ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBTS

Mr. Madison observed on the measure, that the principle
of it is in favor of the United States, so far as it may tend to
bring about a final settlement and payment of all the accounts
between the United States and the individual States. I believe
this to be, however, a work of amazing difficulty, though
not absolutely impossible. If it should be accomplished, it
must go at least hand in hand with the Secretary's plan; and
if it can be accomplished, it will do more honor to the revolution
in our Government than almost any other measure.

I acknowledge that I cannot subscribe to all the reasons
which some gentlemen urge. I am far from thinking that
the assumption of the State debts will be the means of keeping
the debts dispersed throughout the States. The assumption
of those debts will give them, immediately, the character of
debts of the United States; they will be embarked in the
same bottom; they will take the same course, and, of consequence,
will arrive at the same place where it is acknowledged
the domestic debts of the United States, by degrees, have
assembled. Whether they will remain in this place, or flow
out of the United States altogether, is a question which time
will decide. I look for such a revolution of the debt as will
place the greatest part of it in foreign hands.

Neither do I subscribe to the opinion of the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Stone) that the United States can raise more
revenue by the exercise of a sole authority, than by the concurrent
operation of the General and State Governments.
There are, I conceive, objects of taxation of three kinds: The
first is that which can only be operated upon by the United
States; the second, which can be operated upon by the United
States and individual States jointly; and, in the last place,
such as can be best operated upon by the individual States
only.

An impost or excise can be best regulated by the sole authority
of the United States. Some taxes can be collected
by the two Governments, without any interference: the land
tax generally falls under this description; but in some particular
cases, the local authority alone can make the proper
provision. I conclude, therefore, that the authority of the
United States and individual States, taken together, will draw
more revenue than either can separately draw from the same
sources.

But if we can accomplish the great object of doing full justice
in so complicated a case, perhaps it will reward us for all
the difficulties and sacrifices we shall be compelled to make;
but, in order to accomplish it, we must go much further than
the object of the proposition on the table.

Some gentlemen have made the passage of this resolution
a condition of providing for the acknowledged debt of the
United States. I think this a preposterous condition, and a
language improper to be held, after the decision which has
taken place. In priority of time and obligation, we ought to
provide for the acknowledged debt. Before we determine to
enter into a new obligation, we should see how far we are
able to discharge those positively due by us. The connexion
between these resolutions is not such as to require or justify
the condition. The plan of the Secretary draws a distinction
between the two debts.

If we are to make a common stock of the debts of the States,
not yet discharged, it can only be justified by Securing provision
for those which are discharged; with this view, therefore
I will now move to add to the resolution these words: "that
effectual provision be, at the same time made for liquidating
and crediting to the States, the whole of their expenditure
during the war, as the same hath been or may be stated for
the purpose: and, in such liquidation, the best evidence shall
be received that the nature of the case will permit."

It may be said, that this is a superfluous condition; because
there is a Board in existence charged with the trust; but, sir,

their power does not reach the great object contemplated.
The limitation act has already barred a great number of
equitable claims of one State; perhaps there are other States
in the same predicament. I do not know whether the power
of the Board has a latitude sufficient to receive such evidence
as the nature of the case will permit; and if adequate provision
is not made on this head, a great deal more injustice will
be done than by a refusal to assume the State debts.[136]

I hope I shall be excused for connecting these provisions;
because I think it impossible to separate them, in justice of
propriety. If, by providing for the first, we can secure a provision
for the last, we may do great honor to the councils of
America, and establish its character for equity and justice.
If we do not wish to decide precipitately on the question, I
shall be content to delay it; and perhaps gentlemen may be
impressed with the propriety of doing so till they take a view
of the funds which are in contemplation, and see how effective
and adequate they are likely to prove.