The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 12—POWER TO LAY TAXES—JEFFERSON'S VIEWS—RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM—TREATY-MAKING POWER. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 12—POWER TO LAY TAXES—JEFFERSON'S VIEWS—RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM—TREATY-MAKING POWER.
Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman, pardon me for making a few
remarks on what fell from the honorable gentleman last up
[Henry]. I am sorry to follow the example of gentlemen in
deviating from the rule of the house.—But as they have taken
the utmost latitude in their objections, it is necessary that
those who favor the government should answer them. But I
wish as soon as possible to take up the subject regularly. I
will therefore take the liberty to answer some observations
which have been irregularly made, though they might be
more properly answered when we come to discuss those parts
of the constitution to which they respectively refer. I will,
however, postpone answering some others till then. If there
be that terror in direct taxation, that the states would comply
with requisitions to guard against the federal legislature; and
if, as gentlemen say, this state will always have it in her power
to make her collections speedily and fully, the people will be
compelled to pay the same amount as quickly and punctually
as if raised by the general government.
It has been amply proved, that the general government can
lay taxes as conveniently to the people as the state governments,
by imitating the state systems of taxation. If the
general government have not the power of collecting its own
revenues, in the first instance, it will be still dependent on the
state governments in some measure: and the exercise of this
power, after refusal, will be inevitably productive of injustice
and confusion, if partial compliances be made before it is
in the smallest degree, the alternative proposed will impair
the efficacy of the government, and will perpetually endanger
the tranquillity of the union.
The honorable member's objection with respect to requisitions
of troops will be fully obviated at another time. Let it
suffice now to say, that it is altogether unwarrantable, and
founded upon a misconception of the paper before you. But
the honorable member, in order to influence our decision, has
mentioned the opinion of a citizen [Jefferson] who is an ornament
to this state. When the name of this distinguished
character was introduced, I was much surprised. Is it come
to this, then, that we are not to follow our own reason? Is
it proper to introduce the opinions of respectable men, not
within these walls? If the opinion of an important character
were to weigh on this occasion, could we not adduce a character
equally great on our side? Are we, who (in the honorable
gentleman's opinion) are not to be governed by an erring
world, now to submit to the opinion of a citizen beyond the
Atlantic? I believe, that were that gentleman now on this
floor, he would be for the adoption of this constitution. I
wish his name had never been mentioned. I wish every
thing spoken here, relative to his opinion, may be suppressed
if our debates should be published. I know that the delicacy
of his feelings will be wounded, when he will see in print what
has and may be said, concerning him on this occasion. I am,
in some measure, acquainted with his sentiments on this
subject. It is not right for me to unfold what he has informed
me. But I will venture to assert, that the clause now discussed,
is not objected to by Mr. Jefferson. He approves of it,
because it enables the government to carry on its operations.
—He admires several parts of it, which have been reprobated
with vehemence in this house. He is captivated with the
equality of suffrage in the senate, which the honorable gentleman
[Mr. Henry] calls the rotten part of this constitution.
But, whatever be the opinion of that illustrious citizen,
introducing it here.
The honorable member has introduced the subject of religion.
Religion is not guarded—there is no bill of rights
declaring that religion should be secure. Is a bill of rights a
security for religion? Would the bill of rights, in this state,
exempt the people from paying for the support of one particular
sect, if such sect were exclusively established by law? If
there were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would be a
poor protection for liberty. Happily for the states, they
enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom arises
from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and
which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any
society. For where there is such a variety of sects, there
cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute
the rest. Fortunately for this commonwealth, a majority of
the people are decidedly against any exclusive establishment
—I believe it to be so in the other states. There is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle
with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most
flagrant usurpation. I can appeal to my uniform conduct on
this subject, that I have warmly supported religious freedom.
It is better that this security should be depended upon from
the general legislature, than from one particular state. A
particular state might concur in one religious project. But
the United States abound in such a variety of sects, that it is
a strong security against religious persecution, and it is sufficient
to authorise a conclusion, that no one sect will ever be
able to outnumber or depress the rest.
I will not travel over that extensive tract, which the
honorable member has traversed. I shall not now take notice
of all his desultory objections. As occasions arise, I shall
answer them.
It is worthy of observation, on this occasion, that the
honorable gentleman himself, seldom fails to counteract the
arguments of gentlemen on that side of the question. For
from the number of its members, will make an addition to
the public expense, too formidable to be borne, and yet he
and other gentlemen on the same side, object that the number
of representatives is too small, though ten men are more than
we are entitled to under the existing system! How can these
contradictions be reconciled? If we are to adopt any efficient
government at all, how can we discover or establish such a
system, if it be thus attacked? Will it be possible to form a
rational conclusion upon contradictory principles? If arguments
of a contradictory nature were to be brought against
the wisest and most admirable system to the formation of
which human intelligence is competent it never could stand
them.
He has acrimoniously inveighed against the government,
because such transactions as congress think require secrecy,
may be concealed; and particularly those which relate to
treaties. He admits that when a treaty is forming, secrecy is
proper; but urges that when actually made, the public ought
to be made acquainted with every circumstance relative to it.
The policy of not divulging the most important transactions,
and negociations of nations, such as those which relate to warlike
arrangements and treaties, is universally admitted. The
congressional proceedings are to be occasionally published,
including all receipts and expenditures of public money, of
which no part can be used but in consequence of appropriations
made by law. This is a security which we do not enjoy
under the existing system. That part which authorises the
government to withhold from the public knowledge what
in their judgement may require secrecy, is imitated from
the confederation; that very system which the gentleman
advocates.
No treaty has been formed, and I will undertake to say.
that none will be formed under the old system, which will
secure to us the actual enjoyment of the navigation of the
Mississippi. Our weakness precludes us from it. We are
that we shall be able to avail ourselves fully of that right.
I most conscientiously believe, that it will be far better
secured under the new government, than the old, as we will
be more able to enforce our right. The people of Kentucky
will have an additional safeguard from the change of system.
The strength and respectability of the union will secure them
in the enjoyment of that right, till that country becomes
sufficiently populous. When this happens, they will be able
to retain it in spite of every opposition.
I can never admit that seven states are disposed to surrender
that navigation. Indeed it never was the case. Some
of their most distinguished characters are decidedly opposed
to its relinquishment. When its cession was proposed by the
southern states, the northern states opposed it. They still
oppose it. New Jersey directed her delegates to oppose it,
and is strenuously against it. The same sentiments pervade
Pennsylvania: at least I am warranted to say so from the
best information which I have. Those states, added to the
southern states, would be a majority against it.
The honorable gentleman, to obviate the force of my observations
with respect to concurrent collection of taxes under
different authorities, said, that there was no interference between
the concurrent collections of parochial, county, and
state taxes, because they all irradiated from the same centre,
but that this was not the case with the general government.
To make use of the gentleman's own terms, the concurrent
collections under the authorities of the general government
and state governments, all irradiate from the people at large.
The people is their common superior. The sense of the people
at large, is to be the predominating spring of their actions.
This is a sufficient security against interference.
Our attention was called to our commercial interest, and at
the same time the landed interest was said to be in danger. If
those ten men who were to be chosen, be elected by landed
men, and have land themselves, can the electors have any
why are we alarmed about the carrying trade? Why is it
said, that the carrying states will preponderate, if commerce
be in danger? With respect to speculation, I will remark that
stock-jobbing has prevailed, more or less, in all countries,
and ever will, in some degree, notwithstanding any exertions
to prevent it. If you judge from what has happened under
the existing system, any change would render a melioration
probable.
| The writings of James Madison, | |