The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 14—POWER OVER PURSE AND SWORD. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 14—POWER OVER PURSE AND SWORD.
Mr MADISON—Mr Chairman, the honorable gentleman has
laid much stress on the maxim, that the purse and sword
out the impropriety of vesting this power in the general government.
But it is totally inapplicable to this question.
What is the meaning of this maxim? Does it mean that the
sword and purse ought not to be trusted in the hands of the
same government? This cannot be the meaning. For there
never was, and I can say there never will be an efficient government,
in which both are not vested. The only rational
meaning, is, that the sword and purse are not to be given to
the same member. Apply it to the British government,
which has been mentioned. The sword is in the hands of
the British king. The purse in the hands of the parliament.
It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist. Would
the honorable member say, that the sword ought to be put in
the hands of the representatives of the people, or in other
hands independent of the government altogether? If he says
so, it will violate the meaning of that maxim. This would
be a novelty hitherto unprecedented. The purse is in the
hands of the representatives of the people. They have the
appropriation of all monies. They have the direction and
regulation of land and naval forces. They are to provide for
calling forth the militia—and the president is to have the
command; and, in conjunction with the senate, to appoint
the officers. The means ought to be commensurate to the
end. The end is general protection. This cannot be effected
without a general power to use the strength of the union.
We are told that both sides are distinguished by these great
traits, confidence and distrust. Perhaps there may be a less
or greater tincture of suspicion on one side, than the other.
But give me leave to say, that where power can be safely
lodged, if it be necessary, reason commands its cession. In
such case it is imprudent and unsafe to withhold it. It is universally
admitted that it must be lodged in some hands or
other. The question then is, in what part of the government
it ought to be placed; and not whether any other political
body independent of the government should have it or not.
government. If the honorable member, or any other person,
conceives that my attachment to this system arises from a
different source, he is greatly mistaken. From the first moment
that my mind was capable of contemplating political
subjects, I never, till this moment, ceased wishing success to
a well regulated republican government. The establishment
of such in America was my most ardent desire. I have considered
attentively (and my consideration has been aided by
experience) the tendency of a relaxation of laws, and a licentiousness
of manners.
If we review the history of all republics, we are justified by
the supposition, that if the bands of the government be relaxed,
confusion will ensue. Anarchy ever has, and I fear ever
will, produce despotism. What was the state of things that
preceded the wars and revolutions in Germany? Faction
and confusion. What produced the disorders and commotions
of Holland? The like causes. In this commonwealth,
and every state in the union, the relaxed operation of the government
has been sufficient to alarm the friends of their
country. The rapid increase of population in every state is
an additional reason to check dissipation and licentiousness.
Does it not strongly call for the friends of republican government
to endeavor to establish a republican organization? A
change is absolutely necessary. I can see no danger in submitting
to practice an experiment which seems to be founded
on the best theoretic principles.
But the honorable member tells us, there is not an equal
responsibility delineated on that paper, to that which is in
the English government. Calculations have been made here,
that when you strike off those entirely elected by the influence
of the crown, the other part does not bear a greater proportion
to the number of their people, than the number fixed in that
paper, bears to the number of inhabitants in the United
States. If it were otherwise, there is still more responsibility
in this government. Our representatives are chosen for two
citizen may be elected here. In Great Britain no one can be
elected to represent a county, without having an estate of the
value of £600, sterling a year, nor to represent a corporation
without an annual estate of £300. Yet we are told, there is
no sympathy or fellow-feeling between the people here, and
their representatives; but that in England they have both:—
A just comparison will show, that if confidence be due to the
government there, it is due ten fold here.
(Mr Madison made many other observations, but spoke so
very low that he could not be distinctly heard.)
| The writings of James Madison, | |