University of Virginia Library

JUNE 14—POWER OVER THE MILITIA.

Mr Madison.—Mr Chairman, I most cordially agree with
the honorable member last up [Mason], that a standing army
is one of the greatest mischiefs that can possibly happen. It
is a great recommendation for this system, that it provides
against this evil more than any other system known to us,
and particularly more than the old system of confederation.
The most effectual way to guard against a standing army, is
to render it unnecessary. The most effectual way to render
it unnecessary, is to give the general government full power
to call forth the militia, and exert the whole natural strength
of the union when necessary. Thus you will furnish the people
with sure and certain protection, without recurring to this
evil; and the certainty of this protection from the whole, will
be a strong inducement to individual exertion. Does the
organization of the government warrant a belief, that this
power will be abused? Can we believe that a government of
a federal nature, consisting of many coequal sovereignties,
and particularly having one branch chosen from the people,
would drag the militia unnecessarily to an immense distance?
This, Sir, would be unworthy the most arbitrary despot.
They have no temptation whatever to abuse this power;
such abuse could only answer the purpose of exciting the
universal indignation of the people, and drawing on themselves
the general hatred and detestation of their country.

I cannot help thinking that the honorable gentleman has
not considered in all its consequences, the amendment he has
proposed. Would this be an equal protection, Sir? Or
would it not be a most partial provision? Some states have
three or four states in contact. Were this state invaded, as
it is bounded by several states, the militia of three or four
states would, by this proposition, be obliged to come to our
aid; and those from some of the states would come a far
greater distance than those of others. There are other states,
which if invaded, could be assisted by the militia of one state
only, there being several states which border but on one state.

Georgia and New-Hampshire would be infinitely less safe than
those of the other states. Were we to adopt this amendment,
we should set up those states as butts for invasions, invite foreign
enemies to attack them, and expose them to peculiar
hardships and dangers. Were the militia confined to any
limited distance from their respective places of abode, it
would produce equal, nay, more, inconveniences. The principles
of equality, and reciprocal aid, would be destroyed in
either case.

I cannot conceive that this constitution, by giving the
general government the power of arming the militia, takes it
away from the state governments. The power is concurrent,
and not exclusive. Have we not found from experience, that
while the power of arming and governing of the militia has
been solely vested in the state legislatures, they were neglected
and rendered unfit for immediate service? Every state neglected
too much this most essential object. But the general
government can do it more effectually. Have we not also
found, that the militia of one state were almost always insufficient
to succour its harrassed neighbor? Did all the states
furnish their quotas of militia with sufficient promptitude?
The assistance of one state will be of little avail to repel invasion.
But the general head of the whole union can do it
with effect, if it be vested with power to use the aggregate
strength of the union. If the regulation of the militia were
to be committed to the executive authority alone, there might
be reason for providing restrictions. But, Sir, it is the legislative
authority that has this power. They must make a
law for the purpose.

The honorable member is under another mistake. He
wishes martial law to be exercised only in time of war, under
an idea that congress can establish it in time of peace. The
states are to have the authority of training the militia according
to the congressional discipline; and of governing them at
all times, when not in the service of the union.—Congress is to
govern such part of them as may be employed in the actual

service of the United States; and such part only can be subject
to martial law. The gentlemen in opposition have drawn
a most tremendous picture of the constitution in this respect.
Without considering that the power was absolutely indispensible,
they have alarmed us with the possible abuse of it,
but have shewn no inducement or motive to tempt them to
such abuse. Would the legislature of the state drag the
militia of the eastern shore to the western frontiers, or those
of the western frontiers to the eastern shore, if the local militia
were sufficient to effect the intended purpose? There is something
so preposterous, and so full of mischief in the idea of
dragging the militia unnecessarily from one end of the continent
to the other, that I think there can be no ground of
apprehension. If you limit their power over the militia you
give them a pretext for substituting a standing army. If you
put it in the power of the state governments to refuse the
militia, by requiring their consent, you destroy the general
government, and sacrifice particular states. The same principles
and motives which produce disobedience to requisitions,
will produce refusal in this case.

The restrictions which the honorable gentleman mentioned
to be in the British constitution, are all provisions against the
power of the executive magistrate. But the house of commons
may, if they be so disposed, sacrifice the interest of their
constituents in all those cases. They may prolong the duration
of mutiny bills, and grant supplies to the king to carry
on an impolitic war. But they have no motives to do so.
For they have strong motives to do their duty. We have
more ample security than the people of Great Britain. The
powers of the government are more limited and guarded, and
our representatives are more responsible than the members of
the British house of commons.