University of Virginia Library

JUNE 11—POWER TO LAY TAXES.[64]

Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman, it was my purpose to resume
before now, what I had left unfinished, concerning the necessity
of a radical change of our system. The intermission
which has taken place discontinued the progress of the argument,
and has given opportunity to others to advance arguments
on different parts of the plan. I hope we shall steer
our course in a different manner from what we have hitherto
done. I presume that vague discourses and mere sports of
fancy, not relative to the subject at all, are very improper on
this interesting occasion. I hope these will be no longer attempted,
but that we shall come to the point. I trust we
shall not go out of order, but confine ourselves to the clause
under consideration. I beg gentlemen would observe this
rule. I shall endeavor not to depart from it myself.

The subject of direct taxation is perhaps one of the most

important that can possibly engage our attention, or that can
be involved in the discussion of this question. If it be, to be
judged by the comments made upon it, by the opposers and
favorers of the proposed system, it requires a most clear and
critical investigation. The objections against the exercise of
this power by the general government as far as I am able to
comprehend them, are founded upon the supposition of its
being unnecessary, impracticable, unsafe and accumulative of
expense. I shall therefore consider, 1st, how far it may be
necessary; 2d, how far it may be practicable; 3dly, how far
it may be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at
large, as to the state legislatures; and 4thly, with respect to
economy. First, then, is it necessary? I must acknowledge
that I concur in opinion with those gentlemen who told you
that this branch of revenue was essential to the salvation of
the union. It appears to me necessary, in order to secure that
punctuality which is necessary in revenue matters. Without
punctuality individuals will give it no confidence, without
which it cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to consider
the situation of this country, if unhappily the government
were to be deprived of this power. Let us suppose for a
moment that one of those powers which may be unfriendly to
us, should take advantage of our weakness, which they will be
more ready to do when they know the want of this resource
in our government. Suppose it should attack us, what forces
could we oppose to it? Could we find safety in such forces as
we could call out? Could we call forth a sufficient number,
either by draughts, or any other way, to repel a powerful
enemy? The inability of the government to raise and support
regular troops, would compel us to depend on militia.

It would be then necessary to give this power to the government,
or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm
belief, that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the
United States, it would flash conviction on the minds of the
citizens of the United States, of the necessity of vesting
the government with this power, which alone can enable it to
protect the community. I do not wish to frighten the members
into a concession of this power, but to bring to their
minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity.
If we were secured from the possibility, or probability of
danger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that concourse
of dangers which may probably arise at remote periods
of futurity, nor all those which we have immediately to
apprehend, for this would lead me beyond the bounds which
I prescribed myself. But I will mention one single consideration,
drawn from fact itself. I hope to have your attention.

By the treaty between the United States and his most
Christian majesty, among other things it is stipulated, that
the great principle on which the armed neutrality in Europe
was founded, should prevail in case of future wars. The
principle is this, that free ships shall make free goods, and
that vessels and goods shall be both free from condemnation.
Great Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was
against her, she held out without acting to it. It has been
considered for sometime past, that the flames of war already
kindled, would spread, and that France and England were
likely to draw those swords which were so recently put up.

This is judged probable. We should not be surprised in a
short time, to consider ourselves as a neuteral nation—
France on one side, and Great Britain on the other. What
is the situation of America? She is remote from Europe, and
ought not to engage in her politics or wars. The American
vessels, if they can do it with advantage, may carry on the
commerce of the contending nations. It is a source of wealth
which we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, Sir, is there
not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution we shall
be drawn into the war? If American vessels have French
property on board, Great Britain will seize them. By this
means we shall be obliged to relinquish the advantage of a
neutral nation, or be engaged in a war.

A neutral nation ought to be respectable, or else it will be
insulted and attacked. America in her present impotent
situation would run the risk of being drawn in as a party in
the war, and lose the advantage of being neutral. Should it
happen that the British fleet should be superior, have we not
reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that nation
to us and to all the world, that we should be insulted in our
own ports, and our vessels seized? But if we be in a respectable
situation—if it be known that our government can command
the whole resources of the union, we shall be suffered to
enjoy the great advantages of carrying on the commerce of
the nations at war: for none of them would be willing to add
us to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more on
this point, there being others which merit your consideration.

The expedient proposed by the gentlemen opposed to this
clause, is, that requisitions shall be made, and if not complied
with in a certain time, that then taxation shall be recurred to.
I am clearly convinced, that whenever requisitions shall be
made, they will disappoint those who put their trust in them
One reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the
states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of delinquency
in others. States will be governed by the motives
that actuate individuals.

When a tax is in operation in a particular state, every
citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to enforce payment,
and that every other citizen is performing his duty, will
cheerfully discharge his duty; but were it known that the citizens
of one district were not performing their duty, and that
it was left to the policy of the government to make them
come up with it, the other districts would be very supine and
careless in making provisions for payment. Our own experience
makes the illustration more natural. If requisitions be
made on thirteen different states, when one deliberates on the
subject, she will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it
also. This, Sir, has been a principal cause of the inefficacy of
requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce the same
evil. If the legislatures are to deliberate on this subject, (and
the honorable gentleman opposed to this clause, thinks their
deliberation necessary) is it not presumable, that they will
consider peculiar local circumstances? In the general council,
on the contrary, the sense of all America would be drawn to a
single point. The collective interest of the union at large,
will be known and pursued. No local views will be permitted
to operate against the general welfare. But when propositions
would come before a particular state, there is every
reason to believe, that qualifications of the requisitions would
be proposed—compliance might be promised, and some instant
remittances might be made. This will cause delays,
which in the first instance will produce disappointment. This
also will make failures every where else. This I hope will be
considered with the attention it deserves. The public creditors
will be disappointed, and more pressing. Requisitions will
be made for purposes equally pervading all America; but the
exertions to make compliances, will probably be not uniform
in the states. If requisitions be made for future occasions,
for putting the states in a state of military defence, or to
repel an invasion, will the exertions be uniform and equal in
all the states? Some parts of the United States are more
exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert

themselves equally? We know that the most exposed will
be more immediately interested, and will make less sacrifices
in making exertions. I beg gentlemen to consider that this
argument will apply with most effect to the states which are
most defenceless and exposed. The southern states are most
exposed, whether we consider their situation, or the smallness
of their population. And there are other circumstances which
render them still more vulnerable, which do not apply to the
northern states. They are therefore more interested in giving
the government a power to command the whole strength of
the union in cases of emergency. Do not gentlemen conceive
this mode of obtaining supplies from the states, will keep alive
animosities between the general government and particular
states? Where the chances of failures are so numerous as
thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment in the first
place, and consequent animosity must inevitably take place.

Let us consider the alternatives proposed by gentlemen, instead
of the power of laying direct taxes. After the states
shall have refused to comply, weigh the consequences of the
exercise of this power by congress. When it comes in the form
of a punishment, great clamours will be raised among the
people against the government; hatred will be excited against
it. It will be considered as an ignominious stigma on the
state. It will be considered at least in this light by the state
where the failure is made, and these sentiments will no doubt
be diffused through the other states. Now let us consider the
effect, if collectors are sent where the state governments refuse
to comply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition of
mankind not to stop at one violation of duty. I conceive that
every requisition that will be made on my part of America,
will kindle a contention between the delinquent member, and
the general government. Is there no reason to suppose divisions
in the government (for seldom does any thing pass with
unanimity) on the subject of requisitions? The parts least
exposed will oppose those measures which may be adopted
for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to

presume, that the representatives from the delinquent state
will be more likely to foster disobedience to the requisitions of
the government, than study to recommend them to the public?

There is in my opinion, another point of view in which this
alternative will produce great evil. I will suppose, what is
very probable, that partial compliances will be made. A
difficulty here arises which fully demonstrates its impolicy.
If a part be paid, and the rest withheld, how is the general
government to proceed? They are to impose a tax, but how
shall it be done in this case? Are they to impose it by way of
punishment, on those who have paid, as well as those who
have not? All these considerations taken into view (for they
are not visionary or fanciful speculations) will, perhaps, produce
this consequence. The general government to avoid
those disappointments which I first described, and to avoid
the contentions and embarrassments which I last described,
will in all probability, throw the public burdens on those
branches of revenue which will be more in their power. They
will be continually necessitated to augment the imposts. If
we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side, shall we
not discourage commerce; and suffer many political evils?
Shall we not increase that disproportion on the southern states,
which for sometime will operate against us? The southern
states, from having fewer manufactures, will import and consume
more. They will therefore pay more of the imposts.
The more commerce is burdened, the more the disproportion
will operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed with
other taxes, it will be in the power of the general government
to lessen that inequality. But this inequality will be increased
to the utmost extent, if the general government have not this
power.

There is another point of view in which this subject affords
us instruction. The imports will decrease in time of war.
The honorable gentleman who spoke yesterday, said, that
the imposts would be so productive, that there would be no
occasion of laying taxes. I will submit two observations to

him and the committee. First: in time of war the imposts
will be less, and as I hope we are considering a government
for a perpetual duration, we ought to provide for every future
contingency. At present our importations bear a full proportion
to the full amount of our sales, and to the number of
our inhabitants; but when we have inhabitants enough, our
imposts will decrease; and as the national demands will increase
with our population, our resources will increase as our
wants increase. The other consideration which I will submit
on this part of the subject is this:—I believe that it will be
found in practice, that those who fix the public burdens, will
feel a greater degree of responsibility when they are to impose
them on the citizens immediately, than if they were to say
what sum should be paid by the states. If they exceed the
limits of propriety, universal discontent and clamour will arise.
Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from the citizens
of America—would they not consider their circumstances?
Would they not attentively consider what could be done by
the citizens at large? Were they to exceed in their demands,
what were reasonable burdens, the people would impute it to
the right source, and look on the imposers as odious.

When I consider the nature of the various objections
brought against this clause, I should be led to think, that the
difficulties were such, that gentlemen would not be able to
get over them, and that the power, as defined in the plan of
the convention, was impracticable. I shall trouble them with,
a few observations on that point:

It has been said that ten men deputed from this state, and
others in proportion from other states, will not be able to
adjust direct taxes, so as to accommodate the various citizens
in thirteen states.

I confess I do not see the force of this observation. Could not
ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts from this state,
lay direct taxes on a few objects in the most judicious manner?
It is to be conceived, that they would be acquainted with the
situation of different citizens of this country. Can any one

divide this state into ten districts so as not to contain men of
sufficient information? Could not one man of knowledge be
found in a district? When thus selected, will they not be able
to carry their knowledge into the general council? I may say
with great propriety, that the experience of our own legislature
demonstrates the competency of congress to lay taxes wisely.
Our assembly consists of considerably more than a hundred;
yet from the nature of the business, it devolves on a much
smaller number. It is through their sanction, approved of
by all the others. It will be found that there are seldom
more than ten men who rise to high information on this subject.
Our federal representatives, as has been said by the
gentleman [Mr. Marshall] who entered into the subject with
a great deal of ability, will get information from the state
governments. They will be perfectly well informed of the
circumstances of the people of the different states, and the
mode of taxation that would be most convenient for them,
from the laws of the states. In laying taxes, they may even
refer to the state system of taxation. Let it not be forgotten,
that there is a probability, that that ignorance which is complained
of in some parts of America, will be continually
diminishing. Let us compare the degree of knowledge which
the people had in time past to their present information.
Does not our own experience teach us, that the people are
better informed than they were a few years ago? The citizen
of Georgia knows more now of the affairs of New Hampshire,
than he did before the revolution, of those of South Carolina.
When the representatives from the different states are collected
together, to consider this subject, they will interchange
their knowledge with one another, and will have the laws of
each state on the table. Besides this, the intercourse of the
states will be continually increasing. It is now much greater
than before the revolution. My honorable friend, over the
way [Mr. Monroe] yesterday, seemed to conceive, as an insuperable
objection, that if land were made the particular
object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would exonerate
the commercial part of the community—that if it were laid on
trade, it would be unjust in discharging the landholders; and
that any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair.
If the general government were tied down to one object, I
confess the objection would have some force in it. But if this
be not the case, it can have no weight. If it should have a
general power of taxation, they could select the most proper
objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner, as that
they should fall in a due degree on every member of the
community. They will be limited to fix the proportion of
each state, and they must raise it in the most convenient and
satisfactory manner to the public.

The honorable member considered it as another insuperable
objection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen
states, and that dissonance would produce inconvenience and
oppression. Perhaps it may not be found, on due enquiry,
to be so impracticable as he supposes. But were it so, where
is the evil of different states, to raise money for the general
government? Where is the evil of such laws? There are
instances in other countries, of different laws operating in
different parts of the country, without producing any kind of
opposition. The revenue laws are different in England and
Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to customs
excises and trade, are similar; but those respecting direct
taxation are dissimilar. There is a land tax in England, and
a land tax in Scotland, but the laws concerning them are not
the same. It is much heavier in proportion in the former
than in the latter. The mode of collection is different—yet
this is not productive of any national inconvenience. Were
we to conclude from the objections against the proposed plan,
this dissimilarity, in that point alone, would have involved
those kingdoms in difficulties. In England itself, there is a
variety of different laws operating differently in different
places. I will make another observation on the objection of
my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that concurrent
collections under different authorities, were not reducible

to practice. I agree that were they independent of the people,
the argument would be good. But they must serve one common
master. They must act in concert, or the defaulting
party must bring on itself the resentment of the people. If
the general government be so constructed, that it will not
dare to impose such burdens, as will distress the people, where
is the evil of its having a power of taxation concurrent with
the states? The people would not support it, were it to impose
oppressive burdens. Let me make one more comparison
of the state governments, to this plan. Do not the states impose
taxes for local purposes? Does the concurrent collection
of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general purposes, and
of levies laid by the counties for parochial and county purposes,
produce any inconvenience or oppression? The collection
of these taxes is perfectly practicable, and consistent
with the views of both parties. The people at large are the
common superior of the state governments, and the general
government. It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid
interferences for two causes—to avoid public oppression, and
to render the collections more productive. I conceive they
will be more likely to produce disputes, in rendering it
convenient for the people, than run into interfering regulations.

In the third place I shall consider, whether the power of
taxation to be given the general government be safe: and first,
whether it be safe as to the public liberty in general. It would
be sufficient to remark, that they are, because I conceive, the
point has been clearly established by more than one gentleman
who has spoken on the same side of the question. In the
decision of this question, it is of importance to examine,
whether elections of representatives by great districts of freeholders
be favorable to fidelity in representatives. The greatest
degree of treachery in representatives, is to be apprehended
where they are chosen by the least number of electors; because
there is a greater facility of using undue influence, and
because the electors must be less independent. This position

is verified in the most unanswerable manner, in that country
to which appeals are so often made, and sometimes instructively.

Who are the most corrupt members in parliament? Are
they not the inhabitants of small towns and districts? The
supporters of liberty are from the great counties. Have we
not seen that the representatives of the city of London, who
are chosen by such thousands of voters, have continually
studied and supported the liberties of the people, and opposed
the corruption of the crown? We have seen continually that
most of the members in the ministerial majority are drawn
from small circumscribed districts. We may therefore conclude,
that our representatives being chosen by such extensive
districts, will be upright and independent. In proportion
as we have security against corruption in representatives we
have security against corruption from every other quarter
whatsoever.

I shall take a view of certain subjects which will lead to
some reflections, to quiet the minds of those gentlemen who
think that the individual governments will be swallowed up
by the general government. In order to effect this, it is
proper to compare the state governments to the general government,
with respect to reciprocal dependence, and with
respect to the means they have of supporting themselves, or
of encroaching on one another. At the first comparison we
must be struck with these remarkable facts. The general
government has not the appointment of a single branch of the
individual governments, or of any officers within the states, to
execute their laws. Are not the states integral parts of the
general government? Is not the president chosen under the
influence of the state legislatures? May we not suppose that
he will be complaisant to those from whom he has his appointment,
and from whom he must have his re-appointment?
The senators are appointed altogether by the legislatures.

My honorable friend apprehended a coalition between the
president, senate, and house of representatives, against the

states. This could be supposed only from a similarity of
the component parts.

A coalition is not likely to take place, because its component
parts are heterogeneous in their nature. The house of representatives
is not chosen by the state governments, but under
the influence of those who compose the state legislature. Let
us suppose ten men appointed to carry the government into
effect, there is every degree of certainty, that they would be
indebted for their re-election to the members of the legislatures.
If they derive their appointment from them, will they
not execute their duty to them? Besides this, will not the
people (whose predominant interest will ultimately prevail)
feel great attachment to the state legislatures? They have
the care of all local interests—those familiar domestic objects,
for which men have the strongest predilection. The general
government on the contrary, has the preservation of the
aggregate interest of the union—objects, which being less
familiar, and more remote from men's notice have a less
powerful influence on their minds. Do we not see great and
natural attachments arising from local considerations? This
will be the case in a much stronger degree in the state governments,
than in the general government. The people will be
attached to their state legislatures from a thousand causes;
and into whatever scale the people at large will throw themselves,
that scale will preponderate.

Did we not perceive, in the early stages of the war, when
congress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the
object most dear to America, that they were attached to their
states? Afterwards the whole current of their affection was
to the states, and would be still the case, were it not for the
alarming situation of America.

At one period of the congressional history, they had the
power to trample on the states. When they had that fund
of paper money in their hands, and could carry on all their
measures without any dependence on the states, was there
any disposition to debase the state governments? All that

municipal authority which was necessary to carry on the
administration of the government, they still retained unimpaired.
There was no attempt to diminish it.

I am led by what fell from my honorable friend yesterday
to take this supposed combination in another view. Is it supposed,
that the influence of the general government will
facilitate a combination between the members? Is it supposed,
that it will preponderate against that of the state governments?
The means of influence consist in having the
disposal of gifts and emoluments, and in the number of persons
employed by, and dependent upon a government. Will any
gentleman compare the number of persons, which will be
employed in the general government, with the number of those
which will be in the state governments? The number of
dependants upon the state governments will be infinitely
greater than those on the general government. I may say
with truth, that there never was a more economical government
in any age or country, nor which will require fewer
hands, or give less influence.

Let us compare the members composing the legislative,
executive and judicial powers in the general government, with
these in the states, and let us take into view the vast number
of persons employed in the states; from the chief officers to
the lowest, we will find the scale preponderating so much in
favor of the states, that while so many persons are attached
to them, it will be impossible to turn the balance against them.
There will be an irresistible bias towards the state governments.

Consider the number of militia officers, the number of justices
of the peace, the number of the members of the legislatures,
and all the various officers for districts, towns and corporations,
all intermixing with, and residing among the people at
large. While this part of the community retains their affection
to the state governments, I conceive that the fact will be,
that the state governments, and not the general government,
will preponderate. It cannot be contradicted that they have

more extensive means of influence. I have my fears as well
as the honorable gentleman—but my fears are on the other
side. Experience, I think, will prove (though there be no
infallible proof of it here) that the powerful and prevailing
influence of the states, will produce such attention to local
considerations, as will be inconsistent with the advancement
of the interest of the union. But I choose rather to indulge
my hopes than fears, because I flatter myself, if inconveniences
should result from it, that the clause which provides
amendments, will remedy them. The combination of powers
vested in those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of the
states.

The powers of the general government relate to external
objects, and are but few. But the powers in the states relate
to those great objects which immediately concern the prosperity
of the people. Let us observe also, that the powers
in the general government are those which will be exercised
mostly in time of war, while those of the state governments
will be exercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of
war will be little, compared to that of peace. I should not complete
the view which ought to be taken of this subject, without
making this additional remark, that the powers vested in
the proposed government, are not so much an augmentation
of powers in the general government, as a change rendered
necessary, for the purpose of giving efficacy to those which
were vested in it before. It cannot escape any gentleman,
that this power in theory, exists in the confederation as fully
as in this constitution. The only difference is this, that now
they tax states, and by this plan they will tax individuals.
There is no theoretic difference between the two. But in practice
there will be an infinite difference between them. The
one is an ineffectual power: the other is adequate to the purpose
for which it is given. This change was necessary for the
public safety.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that the acts of congress
requiring money from the states, had been as effectual as the

paper on the table—suppose all the laws of congress had
complete compliance, will any gentleman say, that as far as
we can judge from past experience, the state governments
would have been debased, and all consolidated and incorporated
in one system? My imagination cannot reach it. I
conceive, that had those acts that effect which all laws ought
to have, the states would have retained their sovereignty.

It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new expenses
and burdens on the people. I believe it is not necessary here
to make a comparison between the expenses of the present
and of the proposed government. All agree that the general
government ought to have power for the regulation of commerce.
I will venture to say, that very great improvements,
and very economical regulations will be made. It will be a
principal object to guard against smuggling, and such other
attacks on the revenue as other nations are subject to. We
are now obliged to defend against those lawless attempts, but
from the interfering regulations of different states, with little
success. There are regulations in different states which are
unfavorable to the inhabitants of other states, and which
militate against the revenue. New York levies money from
New Jersey by her imposts. In New Jersey, instead of cooperating
with New York, the legislature favors violations
on her regulations. This will not be the case when uniform
regulations will be made.

Requisitions, though ineffectual, are unfriendly to economy.
When requisitions are submitted to the states, there are near
2,500 or 3,000 persons deliberating on the mode of payment.
All these, during their deliberation, receive public pay. A
great proportion of every session, in every state, is employed
to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode.
Let us suppose 1500 persons are deliberating on this subject.
Let any one make a calculation—it will be found that a very
few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public
money, than one year of that general legislature. This is not
all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers will be vested in

the general government, there will be less of that mutability
which is seen in the legislation of the states. The consequence
will be a great saving of expense and time. There is another
great advantage which I will but barely, mention. The
greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject,
is a vicissitude of laws, and continual shifting and changing
from one object to another, which must expose the people to
various inconveniences. This has a certain effect, of which
sagacious men always have, and always will make an advantage.
From whom is advantage made? From the industrious
farmers and tradesmen who are ignorant of the means
of making such advantages. The people will not be exposed
to these inconveniences under an uniform and steady course
of legislation. But they have been so heretofore. The history
of taxation of this country is so fully and well known to every
member of this committee, that I shall say no more of it.

We have hitherto discussed the subject very irregularly. I
dare not dictate to any gentleman, but I hope we shall pursue
that mode of going through the business, which the house
resolved. With respect to a great variety of arguments made
use of, I mean to take notice of them when we come to those
parts of the constitution to which they apply. If we exchange
this mode, for the regular way of proceeding, we can finish it
better in one week than one month.