The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 12—POWER TO LAY TAXES. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 12—POWER TO LAY TAXES.
Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman, finding, Sir, that the clause
more immediately under consideration still meets with the
disapprobation of the honorable gentleman over the way [Mr.
Grayson] and finding that the reasons of the opposition as
farther developed, are not satisfactory to myself and others
who are in favor of the clause, I wish that it may meet with
the most thorough and complete investigation. I beg the attention
of the committee, in order to obviate what fell from
the honorable gentleman. He set forth, that by giving up the
insist on requisitions being made on the states, and then, if
they be not complied with, congress shall lay direct taxes, by
way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma which arises
from this doctrine. Either requisitions will be efficacious or
they will not. If they will be efficacious, then I say, Sir, we
gave up every thing as much as by direct taxation.
The same amount will be paid by the people as by direct
taxes. If they be not efficacious, where is the advantage of
this plan? In what respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences
which we have experienced from requisitions? The
power of laying direct taxes by the general government is
supposed by the honorable gentleman to be chimerical and
impracticable. What is the consequence of the alternative
he proposes? We are to rely upon this power to be ultimately
used as a penalty to compel the states to comply. If it be
chimerical and impracticable, in the first instance, it will be
equally so when it will be exercised as a penalty. A reference
was made to concurrent executions as an instance of the possibility
of interference between the two governments.
(Here Mr. Madison spoke so low that he could not be distinctly
heard.)
This has been experienced under the state governments
without involving any inconvenience. But it may be answered,
that under the state governments, concurrent executions
cannot produce the inconvenience here dreaded, because
they are executed by the same officer. It is not in the power
of the general government to employ the state officers. Is
nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every thing
be immutably fixed in the constitution? Where exclusive
power is given to the union, there can be no interference.
Where the general and state legislatures have concurrent
power, such regulations will be made, as shall be found necessary
to exclude interferences and other inconveniences. It
will be their interest to make regulations.
It has been said, that there is no similarity between petty
points of view there is a great dissimilarity, but in others, there
is a striking similarity between them, which illustrates what
is before us. Have we not seen in our own country (as
has been already suggested in the course of the debates)
concurrent collections of taxes going on at once, without producing
any inconvenience? We have seen three distinct collections
of taxes, for three distinct purposes. Has it not been
possible for collections of taxes, for parochial, county and
state purposes, to go on at the same time? Every gentleman
must know, that this is now the case, and though there be a
subordination in these cases which will not be in the general
government, yet in practice it has been found, that these
different collections have been concurrently carried on, with
convenience to the people, without clashing with one another,
and without deriving their harmony from the circumstance
of being subordinate to one legislative body. The taxes will
be laid for different purposes. The members of the one government
as well as of the other, are the agents of, and subordinate
to, the people. I conceive that the collections of the
taxes of the one will not impede those of the other, and that
there can be no interference. This concurrent collection appears
to me neither chimerical nor impracticable.
He compares resistance of the people to collectors, to refusal
of requisitions. This goes against all government. It is as
much as to urge, that there should be no legislature. The
gentlemen who favored us with their observations on this
subject, seemed to have reasoned on a supposition, that the
general government was confined by the paper on your table
to lay general uniform taxes. Is it necessary that there
should be a tax on any given article throughout the United
States? It is represented to be oppressive, that the states
who have slaves and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these
for federal wants, when other states who have them not, would
escape. But does the constitution on the table admit of this?
On the contrary, there is a proportion to be laid on each state
be selected in each state. If one article in any state should
be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our state is
secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate
to its population. This is a constitutional scale, which
is an insuperable bar against disproportion, and ought to
satisfy all reasonable minds. If the taxes be not uniform, and
the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of
which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal?
Does not the same principle hold in our state government in
some degree? It has been found inconvenient to fix on uniform
objects of taxation in this state, as the back parts are
not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In
both cases the reciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition
in one part to oppress the other. My honorable
friend seems to suppose that congress, by the possession of
this ultimate power as a penalty, will have as much credit
and will be as able to procure any sums, on any emergency,
as if they were possessed of it in the first instance, and that
the votes of congress will be as competent to procure loans, as
the votes of the British commons. Would the votes of the
British house of commons have that credit which they now
have, if they were liable to be retarded on their operation,
and perhaps, rendered ultimately nugatory, as those of congress
must be by the proposed alternative? When their
vote passes, it usually receives the concurrence of the other
branch, and it is known that there is sufficient energy in the
government, to carry it into effect.
But here the votes of congress are in the first place dependent
on the compliance of thirteen different bodies, and after
non-compliance, are liable to be opposed and defeated, by the
jealousy of the states against the exercise of this power, and
by the opposition of the people which may be expected, if this
power be exercised by congress after partial compliances.
These circumstances being known, congress could not command
one shilling. My honorable friend seems to think that
burdens upon posterity. I will not contest the equity of this
reasoning, but I must say that good policy as well as views of
economy, strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply
with our most solemn engagements. We must make effectual
provision for the payment of the interest of our public debts.
In order to do justice to our creditors, and support our credit
and reputation, we must lodge power some where or other for
this purpose. As yet the United States have not been able
by any energy contained in the old system, to accomplish
this end.
Our creditors have a right to demand the principal, but
would be satisfied with a punctual payment of the interest.
If we have been unable to pay the interest, much less shall we
be able to discharge the principal. It appears to me that the
whole reasoning used on this occasion shews, that we ought
to adopt this system to enable us to throw our burdens on
posterity. The honorable member spoke of the decemviri at
Rome as having some similitude to the ten representatives
who are to be appointed by this state. I can see no point of
similitude here, to enable us to draw any conclusion. For
what purpose were the decemviri appointed? They were
invested with a plenipotentiary commission to make a code
of laws. By whom were they appointed? By the people at
large? My memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were
appointed by the senate, I believe in the name of the people.
If they were appointed by the senate, and composed of the
most influential characters among the nobles, can any thing
be inferred from that against our federal representatives?
Who made a discrimination between the nobles and the people?
The senate.
Those men totally perverted the powers which were given
them for the purpose above specified, to the subversion of the
public liberty. Can we suppose that a similar usurpation
might be made, by men appointed in a totally different manner?
As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I conceive that
I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of
my honorable friend, when he tells us, that the federal government
will predominate, and that the state interest will be
lost, when at the same time he tells us, that it will be a faction
of seven states. If seven states will prevail, as states, I
conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence
under the present feeble government has prevailed, I think
that a remedy ought to be introduced, by giving the general
government power to suppress it.
He supposed that my argument with respect to a future
war between Great Britain and France was fallacious. The
other nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality, while
Great Britain opposed it. We need not expect in case of such
a war, that we should be suffered to participate in the profitable
emoluments of the carrying trade, unless we were in a
respectable situation. Recollect the last war. Was there
ever a war in which the British nation stood opposed to so
many nations? All the belligerent nations in Europe, with
nearly one half of the British empire, were united against it.
Yet that nation, though defeated, and humbled beyond any
previous example, stood out against this. From her firmness
and spirit in such desperate circumstances, we may divine
what her future conduct may be.
I did not contend that it was necessary for the United States
to establish a navy for that sole purpose, but instanced it as
one reason, out of several, for rendering ourselves respectable.
I am no friend to naval or land armaments in time of peace,
but if they be necessary, the calamity must be submitted to.
Weakness will invite insults. A respectable government will
not only entitle us to a participation of the advantages which
are enjoyed by other nations but will be a security against
attacks and insults. It is to avoid the calamity of being
obliged to have large armaments that we should establish this
government. The best way to avoid danger, is to be in a
capacity to withstand it.
The impost, we are told, will not diminish, because the emigrations
to the westward will prevent the increase of population.
He has reasoned on this subject justly to a certain
degree. I admit that the imposts will increase, till population
becomes so great, as to compel us to recur to manufactures.
The period cannot be very far distant, when the unsettled
parts of America will be inhabited. At the expiration of
twenty-five years hence, I conceive that in every part of the
United States, there will be as great a population as there is
now in the settled parts. We see already, that in the most
populous parts of the union, and where there is but a medium,
manufactures are beginning to be established. Where this is
the case the amount of importation will begin to diminish.
Although the impost may even increase during the term of
twenty-five years, yet when we are preparing a government
for perpetuity, we ought to found it on permanent principles
and not on those of a temporary nature.
Holland is a favorite quotation with honorable members on
the other side of the question. Had not their sentiments been
discovered by other circumstances, I should have concluded
from their reasonings on this occasion, that they were friends
of the constitution. I should suppose that they had forgotten
which side of the question they were on. Holland has
been called a republic, and a government friendly to liberty.
Though it may be greatly superior to some other governments
in Europe, still it is not a republic, or a democracy.
Their legislature consists in some degree of men who legislate
for life. Their councils consist of men who hold their offices
for life, who fill up offices and appoint their salaries themselves.
The people have no agency mediate or immediate in the government.
If we look at their history we shall find, that every
mischief which has befallen them, has resulted from the existing
confederacy. If the stadtholder has been productive of
mischiefs—if we ought to guard against such a magistrate
more than any evil, let me beseech the honorable gentleman
to take notice of what produced that, and those troubles
The weakness of their confederacy produced both.
When the French arms were ready to overpower their republic,
and were feeble in the means of defence, which was
principally owing to the violence of parties, they then appointed
a stadtholder, who sustained them. If we look at
more recent events, we shall have a more pointed demonstration
that their political infelicity arises from the imbecility
of their government. In the late disorders the states were
almost equally divided, three provinces on one side, three on
the other, and the other divided. One party inclined to the
Prussians, and the other to the French. The situation of
France did not admit of their interposing immediately in
their disputes by an army, that of the Prussians did. A powerful
and large army marched into Holland and compelled the
other party to surrender. We know the distressing consequences
to the people. What produced those disputes and
the necessity of foreign interference, but the debility of their
confederacy? We may be warned by their example, and
shun their fate, by removing the causes which produced their
misfortunes. My honorable friend has referred to the transaction
of the federal council, with respect to the navigation
of the Mississippi. I wish it was consistent with delicacy
and prudence to lay a complete view of the whole matter before
this committee. The history of it is singular and curious,
and perhaps its origin ought to be taken into consideration.
I will touch on some circumstances, and introduce nearly
the substance of most of the facts relative to it, that I may
not seem to shrink from explanation. It was soon perceived,
sir, after the commencement of the war with Britain, that
among the various objects that would affect the happiness
of the people of America, the navigation of the Mississippi
was one. Throughout the whole history of foreign negotiation,
great stress was laid on its preservation. In the time
of our greatest distresses, and particularly when the southern
states were the scene of war, the southern states cast their
supposed that assistance might be obtained for the relinquishment
of that navigation. It was thought that for so substantial
a consideration, Spain might be induced to afford
decisive succour. It was opposed by the northern and
eastern states. They were sensible that it might be dangerous
to surrender this important right, particularly to the inhabitants
of the western country. But so it was, that the southern
states were for it, and the eastern states opposed to it. Since
obtaining that happy peace, which secures to us all our
claims, this subject has been taken again into consideration,
and deliberated upon in the federal government. A temporary
relinquishment has been agitated. Several members
from the different states, but particularly from the northern,
were for a temporary surrender, because it would terminate
disputes, and at the end of the short period for which it was
to be given, the right would revert, of course, to those who
had given it up. And for this temporary surrender some
commercial advantages were offered. For my part, I consider
this measure, though founded on considerations plausible and
honorable, was yet not justifiable, but on grounds of inevitable
necessity. I must declare in justice to many characters who
were in congress, that they declared that they never would
enter into the measure, unless the situation of the United
States was such as could not prevent it.
I suppose that the adoption of this government will be
favorable to the preservation of the right to that navigation.
Emigration will be made from those parts of the United
States which are settled, to those parts which are unsettled.
If we afford protection to the western country, we will see it
rapidly peopled. Emigrations from some of the northern
states have been lately increased. We may conclude, as has
been said, by a gentleman on the same side [Mr. Nicholas],
that those who emigrate to that country, will leave behind
them all their friends and connections as advocates for this
right
What was the cause of those states being the champions of
this right when the southern states were disposed to surrender
it? The preservation of this right will be for the general interest
of the union. The western country will be settled from
the north as well as the south, and its prosperity will add
to the strength and security of the union. I am not able to
recollect all those circumstances which would be necessary to
give gentlemen a full view of the subject. I can only add,
that I conceive that the establishment of the new government
will be the best possible means of securing our rights as well
in the western parts, as elsewhere. I will not sit down till I
make one more observation on what fell from my honorable
friend. He says, that the true difference between the states
lies in this circumstance—that some are carrying states, and
others productive, and that the operation of the new government
will be, that there will be a plurality of the former to
combine against the interest of the latter, and that consequently
it will be dangerous to put it in their power to do so.
I would join with him in sentiments, if this were the case.
Were this within the bounds of probability, I should be
equally alarmed, but I think that those states, which are contradistinguished
as carrying states, from the non-importing
states, will be but few. I suppose the southern states will be
considered by all, as under the latter description. Some other
states have been mentioned by an honorable member on the
same side, which are not considered as carrying states. New
Jersey and Connecticut can by no means be enumerated
among the carrying states. They receive their supplies
through New York. Here then is a plurality of non-importing
states. I could add another, if necessary. Delaware,
though situated upon the water, is upon the list of non-carrying
states. I might say that a great part of New Hampshire is
so. I believe a majority of the people of that state receive
their supplies from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
Might I not add all those states which will be admitted
hereafter into the union? These will be non-carrying
will attempt to combine against the rest. This objection
must therefore fall to the ground. My honorable friend has
made several other remarks, but I will defer saying any more
till we come to those parts to which his objections refer.
| The writings of James Madison, | |