The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 14—COMPENSATION OF CONGRESS. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 14—COMPENSATION OF CONGRESS.
Mr Madison—Mr Chairman, let me ask those who oppose
this part of the system, whether any alteration would not
make it equally, or more liable to objections? Would it be
better to fix their compensations? Would not this produce
inconveniences? What authorises us to conclude, that the
value of coins will continue always the same? Would it be
prudent to make them dependent on the state governments
for their salaries—on those who watch them with jealous eyes,
and who consider them as encroaching, not on the people, but
on themselves? But the worthy member supposes, that
congress will fix their wages so low, that only the rich can fill
the offices of senators and representatives. Who are to appoint
them? The rich? No, sir, the people are to choose
them. If the members of the general government were to
reduce their compensations to a trifle, before the evil suggested
could happen, the people could elect other members
in their stead, who would alter that regulation. The people
do not choose them for their wealth. If the state legislatures
choose such men as senators, it does not influence the people
at large in their election of representatives.—They can choose
those who have the most merit and least wealth. If Congress
reduce their wages to a trifle, what shall prevent the states
from giving a man of merit, so much as will be an adequate
compensation? I think the evil very remote, and if it were
now to happen, the remedy is in our own hands, and may, by
ourselves, be applied.
Another gentleman seems to apprehend infinite mischief
to an office, although he ceases to be a member the
moment he accepts it. What will be the consequence of precluding
them from being so appointed? If you have in your
country, one man whom you could in time of danger trust
above all others, with an office of high importance, he cannot
undertake it till two years expire if he be a representative; or
till the six years elapse, if a senator. Suppose America was
engaged in war, and the man of the greatest military talents
and approved fidelity, was a member of either house—would
it be right that this man, who could lead us to conquer, and
who could save his country from destruction, could not be
made general till the term of his election expired? Before
that time, we might be conquered by our enemies. This will
apply to civil as well as military officers. It is impolitic to
exclude from the service of his country, in any office, the man
who may be most capable of discharging its duties, when they
are most wanting.
The honorable gentleman said, that those who go to Congress,
will look forward to offices as a compensation for their
services, rather than salaries. Does he recollect that they
shall not fill offices created by themselves? When they go to
congress, the old offices will be filled.—They cannot make
any probable calculation that the men in office will die, or
forfeit their offices As they cannot get any new offices, one
of those contingencies must happen, before they can get any
office at all. The chance of getting an office is, therefore, so
remote, and so very distant, that it cannot be considered as
a sufficient reason to operate on their minds, to deviate from
their duty.
Let any man calculate in his own mind, the improbability
of a member of the general government getting into an office,
when he cannot fill any office newly created, and when he finds
all the old offices filled at the time he enters into congress.
Let him view the danger and impolicy of precluding a member
of congress from holding existing offices, and the danger of
find that both clauses deserve applause.
The observations made by several honorable members, illustrate
my opinion, that it is impossible to devise any system
agreeable to all.—When objections so contradictory are
brought against it, how shall we decide? Some gentlemen
object to it, because they may make their wages too high—
others object to it, because they may make them too low. If
it is to be perpetually attacked by principles so repugnant,
we may cease to discuss. For what is the object of our discussion?
Truth, sir. To draw a true and just conclusion.
Can this be done without rational premises, and syllogistic
reasoning?
As to the British parliament, it is nearly as he says. But
how does it apply to this case? Suppose their compensations
had been appointed by the state governments, or fixed in the
constitution—would it be a safe government for the union,
if its members depended on receiving their salaries from other
political bodies at a distance, and fully competent to withhold
them? Its existence would, at best, be but precarious. If
they were fixed in the constitution, they might become extremely
inadequate, and produce the very evil which gentlemen
seem to fear.—For then a man of the highest merit could
not act unless he were wealthy. This is the most delicate
part in the organization of a republican government. It is the
most difficult to establish on unexceptionable grounds. It
appears to me most eligible as it is. The constitution has
taken a medium between the two extremes, and perhaps with
more wisdom than either the British or the state governments,
with respect to their eligibility to offices. They can fill no
new offices created by themselves, nor old ones of which they
increased the salaries. If they were excluded altogether, it
is possible that other disadvantages might accrue from it,
besides the impolicy and injustice of depriving them of a common
privilege. They will not relinquish their legislative, in
order to accept other offices. They will more probably confer
it is incident to all governments. After having
heard a variety of principles developed, I thought that on
which it is established the least exceptionable, and it appears
to me sufficiently well guarded.
| The writings of James Madison, | |