University of Virginia Library

JUNE 5—NECESSITY FOR THE CONSTITUTION.

Mr. Madison then arose[63] —(but he spoke so low that his
exordium could not be heard distinctly). I shall not attempt

to make impressions by any ardent professions of zeal for the
public welfare; we know the principles of every man will,
and ought to be judged, not by his professions and declarations,
but by his conduct; by that criterion I mean in common
with every other member to be judged; and should it
prove unfavorable to my reputation; yet, it is a criterion,
from which I will by no means depart. Comparisons have
been made between the friends of this constitution, and those
who oppose it: although I disapprove of such comparisons,
I trust that, in points of truth, honor, candor, and rectitude
of motives, the friends of this system, here, and in other states,
are not inferior to its opponents. But, professions of attachment
to the public good, and comparisons of parties, ought
not to govern or influence us now. We ought, sir, to examine
the constitution on its own merits solely: we are to enquire
whether it will promote the public happiness: its aptitude to
produce this desirable object, ought to be the exclusive subject
of our present researches. In this pursuit, we ought not
to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but
to those understandings and judgments which were selected by
the people of this country, to decide this great question, by
a calm and rational investigation. I hope that gentlemen, in
displaying their abilities, on this occasion, instead of giving
opinions, and making assertions, will condescend to prove
and demonstrate, by a fair and regular discussion. It gives
me pain to hear gentlemen continually distorting the natural
construction of language; for it is sufficient if any human production
can stand a fair discussion. Before I proceed to
make some additions to the reasons which have been adduced
by my honorable friend over the way, I must take the liberty
to make some observations on what was said by another
gentleman [Mr. Henry]. He told us, that this constitution
ought to be rejected, because it endangered the public liberty,
in his opinion, in many instances. Give me leave to make one
answer to that observation: let the dangers which this system
is supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed out; if any
dangerous and unnecessary powers be given to the general
legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not
rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without examination.
If powers be necessary, apparent danger is not a
sufficient reason against conceding them. He has suggested
that licentiousness, has seldom produced the loss of liberty;
but that the tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it.
Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are
more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people,
by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power,
than by violent and sudden usurpations: but, on a candid
examination of history, we shall find that turbulence, violence,
and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the
rights of the minority have produced factions and commotions,
which, in republics, have more frequently than any
other cause, produced despotism. If we go over the whole
history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their
destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If
we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and
what are the sources of that diversity of sentiment which pervades
its inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear, that
the same causes may terminate here, in the same fatal effects,
which they produced in those republics. This danger ought
to be wisely guarded against. Perhaps, in the progress of this
discussion, it will appear, that the only possible remedy for
those evils and means of preserving and protecting the principles
of republicanism, will be found in that very system
which is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression.

I must confess, I have not been able to find his usual consistency,
in the gentleman's argument on this occasion: he
informs us that the people of the country are at perfect
repose, that is, every man enjoys the fruits of his labor,
peaceably and securely, and that every thing is in perfect
tranquility and safety. I wish sincerely, sir, this were true.
If this be their happy situation, why has every state acknowledged
the contrary? Why were deputies from all the states
sent to the general convention? Why have complaints of
national and individual distresses been echoed and re-echoed
throughout the continent? Why has our general government
been so shamefully disgraced, and our constitution violated?
Wherefore have laws been made to authorize a change, and
wherefore are we now assembled here? A federal government
is formed for the protection of its individual members.

Ours has attacked itself with impunity. Its authority has
been disobeyed and despised. I think I perceive a glaring inconsistency
in another of his arguments. He complains of
this constitution, because it requires the consent of at least
three-fourths of the states to introduce amendments which
shall be necessary for the happiness of the people. The
assent of so many, he urges as too great an obstacle, to the
admission of salutary amendments, which he strongly insists,
ought to be at the will of a bare majority—we hear this
argument, at the very moment we are called upon to assign
reasons for proposing a constitution, which puts it in the
power of nine states to abolish the present inadequate, unsafe,
and pernicious confederation! In the first case, he asserts,
that a majority ought to have the power of altering the government,
when found to be inadequate to the security of
public happiness.

In the last case, he affirms that even three-fourths of the
community have not a right to alter a government, which
experience has proved to be subversive of national felicity!
Nay, that the most necessary and urgent alterations, cannot
be made without the absolute unanimity of all the states.
Does not the thirteenth article of the confederation expressly
require, that no alteration shall be made without the unanimous
consent of all the states? Could any thing in theory,
be more perniciously improvident and injudicious, than
this submission of the will of the majority to the most trifling
minority? Have not experience and practice actually
manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be extremely
impolitic? Let me mention one fact, which I conceive must
carry conviction to the mind of any one—the smallest state
in the union has obstructed every attempt to reform the
government—that like member has repeatedly disobeyed and
counteracted the general authority; nay, has even supplied
the enemies of its country with provisions. Twelve states had
agreed to certain improvements which were proposed, being
thought absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of the

general government: but as these improvements, though
really indispensable, could not by the confederation be introduced
into it without the consent of every state, the refractory
dissent of that little state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences
resulting from this requisition, of unanimous
concurrence in alterations in the confederation, must be
known to every member in this convention, it is therefore
needless to remind them of them. Is it not self-evident, that
a trifling minority ought not to bind the majority? Would
not foreign influence be exerted with facility over a small minority?
Would the honorable gentleman agree to continue the
most radical defects in the old system, because the petty
state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them?

He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district
where the seat of government may be fixed. Would he submit
that the representatives of this state should carry on their
deliberations under the control of any one member of the
union? If any state had the power of legislation over the
place where congress should fix the general government, this
would impair the dignity, and hazard the safety of congress.
If the safety of the union were under the control of any
particular state, would not foreign corruption probably
prevail in such a state, to induce it to exert its controlling influence
over the members of the general government? Gentlemen
cannot have forgotten the disgraceful insult which
congress received some years ago. When we also reflect, that
the previous session of particular states is necessary, before
congress can legislate exclusively any where, we must, instead
of being alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it.

But, the honorable member sees great danger in the provision
concerning the militia: this, I conceive, to be an
additional security to our liberty, without diminishing the
power of the states, in any considerable degree; it appears to
me so highly expedient, that I should imagine it would have
found advocates even in the warmest friends of the present
system: the authority of training the militia, and appointing

the officers, is reserved to the states. Congress ought to have
the power of establishing an uniform discipline throughout the
states; and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions; these are the only cases
wherein they can interfere with the militia; and the obvious
necessity of their having power over them in these cases, must
convince any reflecting mind. Without uniformity of discipline,
military bodies would be incapable of action: without
a general controlling power to call forth the strength of the
union, to repel invasions, the country might be over-run, and
conquered by foreign enemies. Without such a power to suppress
insurrections, our liberties might be destroyed by
domestic faction, and domestic tyranny be established.

The honorable member then told us, that there was no
instance of power once transferred, being voluntarily renounced.
Not to produce European examples, which may
probably be done before the rising of this convention, have
we not seen already in seven states (and probably in an eighth
state) legislatures surrendering some of the most important
powers they possessed? But, Sir, by this government, powers
are not given to any particular set of men, they are in the
hands of the people; delegated to their representatives chosen
for short terms; to representatives responsible to the people,
and whose situation is perfectly similar to our own; as long
as this is the case we have no danger to apprehend. When
the gentleman called our recollection to the usual effects of
the concession of powers, and imputed the loss of liberty
generally to open tyranny I wish he had gone on farther.
Upon his review of history he would have found, that the loss
of liberty very often resulted from factions and divisions;
from local considerations, which eternally lead to quarrels,
he would have found internal dissentions to have more frequently
demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition
in rulers, to retain any stipulated powers.

(Here Mr. Madison enumerated the various means whereby
nations had lost their liberties.)

The power of raising and supporting armies is exclaimed
against, as dangerous and unnecessary. I wish there were
no necessity of vesting this power in the general government.
But, suppose a foreign nation to declare war against the
United States, must not the general legislature have the power
of defending the United States? Ought it to be known to
foreign nations, that the general government of the United
States of America has no power to raise and support an army,
even in the utmost danger, when attacked by external enemies?
Would not their knowledge of such a circumstance
stimulate them to fall upon us? If, sir, congress be not invested
with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by
ambition or avarice, will be invited, by our weakness, to attack
us; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans, would certainly
be attended with success, when only opposed by irregular,
undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar
situation of this country, the multiplicity of its excellent
inlets and habours, and the uncommon facility of attacking
it, however much he may regret the necessity of such a power,
cannot hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may
elucidate this argument. In the course of the late war, when
the weak parts of the union were exposed, and many states
were in the most deplorable situation, by the enemy's ravages,
the assistance of foreign nations was thought so urgently
necessary for our protection, that the relinquishment of territorial
advantages, was not deemed too great a sacrifice for
the acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted
with great reluctance, even by those states who expected
advantages from it. The crisis however at length arrived
when it was judged necessary for the salvation of this country,
to make certain cessions to Spain; whether wisely, or otherwise,
is not for me to say; but the fact was, that instructions
were sent to our representative at the court of Spain, to empower
him to enter into negotiations for that purpose.—How
it terminated is well known. This fact shews the extremities
to which nations will go in cases of imminent danger, and

demonstrates the necessity of making ourselves more respectable.
The necessity of making dangerous cessions, and of
applying to foreign aid, ought to be excluded.

The honorable member then told us, that there are heartburnings
in the adopting states, and that Virginia may, if she
does not come into the measure, continue in amicable confederacy
with the adopting states. I wish as seldom as
possible to contradict the assertions of gentlemen, but I can
venture to affirm, without danger of being in an error, that
there is the most satisfactory evidence, that the satisfaction
of those states is increasing every day, and that, in that state,
where it was adopted only by a majority of nineteen, there
is not one-fifth of the people dissatisfied. There are some
reasons which induce us to conclude, that the grounds of
proselytism extend every where; its principles begin to be
better understood; and the inflammatory violence, wherewith
it was opposed by designing, illiberal, and unthinking minds
begins to subside. I will not enumerate the causes from which
in my conception, the heart-burnings, of a majority of its opposers
have originated. Suffice it to say, that in all they were
founded on a misconception of its nature and tendency. Had
it been candidly examined and fairly discussed, I believe, sir,
that but a very inconsiderable minority of the people of the
United States would have opposed it. With respect to the
Swiss, which the honorable gentleman has proposed for our
example, as far as historical authority may be relied on, we
shall find their government quite unworthy of our imitation.
I am sure if the honorable gentleman had adverted to their
history and government, he never would have quoted their
example here; he would have found that instead of respecting
the rights of mankind, their government (at least of several
of their cantons) is one of the vilest aristocracies that ever was
instituted: the peasants of some of their cantons are more
oppressed and degraded than the subjects of any monarch in
Europe: nay, almost as much so, as those of any eastern
despot. It is a novelty in politics, that from the worst of

systems the happiest consequences should ensue. Their aristocratical
rigor, and the peculiarity of their situation, have so
long supported their union: without the closest alliance and
amity, dismemberment might follow, their powerful and ambitious
neighbors would immediately avail themselves of their
least jarrings. As we are not circumstanced like them, no
conclusive precedent can be drawn from their situation. I
trust, the gentleman does not carry his idea so far as to
recommend a separation from the adopting states. This
government may secure our happiness; this is at least as
probable, as that it shall be oppressive. If eight states have,
from a persuasion of its policy and utility, adopted it, shall
Virginia shrink from it, without a full conviction of its danger
and inutility? I hope she will never shrink from any duty:
I trust she will not determine without the most serious reflection
and deliberation.

I confess to you, sir, were uniformity of religion to be introduced
by this system, it would, in my opinion, be ineligible;
but I have no reason to conclude, that uniformity of government
will produce that of religion. This subject is, for the
honor of America, perfectly free and unshackled. The government
has no jurisdiction over it—the least reflection will
convince us, there is no danger to be feared on this ground.

But we are flattered with the probability of obtaining previous
amendments. This calls for the most serious attention
of this house. If amendments are to be proposed by one
state, other states have the same right, and will also propose
alterations. These cannot but be dissimilar, and opposite
in their nature. I beg leave to remark, that the governments
of the different states, are in many respects dissimilar, in their
structure; their legislative bodies are not similar—their executive,
are more different. In several of the states the first
magistrate is elected by the people at large—in others, by
joint ballot of the members of both branches of the legislature
—and in others, in other different manners. This dissimilarity
has occasioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of government,

which will, without many reciprocal concessions, render
a concurrence impossible. Although the appointment of an
executive magistrate, has not been thought destructive to the
principles of democracy in many of the states, yet, in the
course of the debate, we find objections made to the federal
executive: it is urged that the president will degenerate into
a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of the
honorable member, to explain the reasons of proposing this
constitution, and develop its principles; but I shall postpone
my remarks, till we hear the supplement which he has informed
us, he intends to add to what he has already said.

Give me leave to say something of the nature of the government,
and to show that it is safe and just to vest it with the
power of taxation. There are a number of opinions; but the
principal question is, whether it be a federal or consolidated
government: in order to judge properly of the question before
us, we must consider it minutely in its principal parts. I conceive
myself that it is of a mixed nature; it is in a manner
unprecedented; we cannot find one express example in the
experience of the world. It stands by itself. In some respects
it is a government of a federal nature; in others it is of a
consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in
which the constitution is investigated, ratified and made the
act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what
the honorable gentleman has alleged, that this government is
not completely consolidated, nor is it entirely federal. Who
are parties to it? The people—but not the people as composing
one great body; but the people as composing thirteen
sovereignties: were it as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated
government, the assent of a majority of the people would
be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority, have
adopted it already, the remaining states would be bound
by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated
it: were it such a government as it is suggested, it would
be now binding on the people of this state, without having
had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no state is

bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all
the states adopt it, it will be then a government established
by the thirteen states of America, not through the intervention
of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular
respect the distinction between the existing and
proposed governments is very material. The existing system
has been derived from the dependent derivative authority of
the legislatures of the states, whereas this is derived from the
superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in
which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some
degree attended to. By the new system a majority of the
states cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the states
required for that purpose; three-fourths of them must concur
in alterations: in this there is a departure from the federal
idea. The members to the national house of representatives
are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the
numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the
senate, its members are elected by the states in their equal
and political capacity; but had the government been completely
consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by
the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner
as the members of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated
nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found to
exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a
mere confederacy. If Virginia was separated from all the
states, her power and authority would extend to all cases: in
like manner were all powers vested in the general government,
it would be a consolidated government; but the powers of the
federal government are enumerated; it can only operate in
certain cases; it has legislative powers on defined and limited
objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.

But the honorable member has satirised with peculiar
acrimony, the powers given to the general government by this
constitution. I conceive that the first question on this subject
is, whether these powers be necessary; if they be, we are
reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience,

or losing the union. Let us consider the most
important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation
is most generally obejcted to. With respect to the exigencies
of government, there is no question but the most easy mode
of providing for them will be adopted. When, therefore,
direct taxes are not necessary, they will not be recurred to.
It can be of little advantage to those in power, to raise money,
in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult the conveniences
of the people, will cost them nothing, and in many
respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only
be recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other
nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which
many of them labor? Not the expenses of their governments,
but war. If this country should be engaged in war, and I
conceive we ought to provide for the possibility of such a case,
how would it be carried on? By the usual means provided
from year to year? As our imports will be necessary for the
expenses of government and other common exigencies, how
are we to carry on the means of defence? How is it possible
a war could be supported without money or credit? And
would it be possible for a government to have credit without
having the power of raising money? No, it would be impossible
for any government, in such a case, to defend itself.
Then, I say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for
extraordinary exigencies, and give this power to the general
government—for the utter inutility of previous requisitions
on the states is too well known. Would it be possible for
those countries, whose finances and revenues are carried to
the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of Government
on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war,
without an uncontrolled power of raising money? Has it not
been necessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility
of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very often to
this and other extraordinary methods of procuring money?
Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was known
that her power to raise money was limited? Has not France
been obliged, on great occasions, to use unusual means to
raise funds? It has been the case in many countries, and no
government can exist, unless its powers extend to make provisions
for every contingency. If we were actually attacked
by a powerful nation, and our general government had not
the power of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions,
our condition would be truly deplorable—if the revenue
of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct
authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations.
This must be obvious to every member here; I think
therefore, that it is necessary for the preservation of the union,
that this power shall be given to the general government.

But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the
power of direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy
all subordinate authority; that its increasing influence will
speedily enable it to absorb the state governments. I cannot
think this will be the case. If the general government were
wholly independent of the governments of the particular
states, then indeed usurpation might be expected to the fullest
extent: but, sir, on whom does this general government depend?
It derives its authority from these governments, and
from the same sources from which their authority is derived.
The members of the federal government are taken from the
same men from whom those of the state legislatures are taken.
If we consider the mode in which the federal representatives
will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the general, will
never destroy the individual, governments; and this convicion
must be strengthened by an attention to the construction
of the senate. The representatives will be chosen probably
under the influence of the members of the state legislatures:
but there is not the least probability that the election of the
latter will be influenced by the former. One hundred and
sixty members represent this commonwealth in one branch of
the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and must
ever possess more influence than the few men who will be
elected to the general legislature.

The reasons offered on this subject, by a gentleman on the
same side [Mr. Nicholas] were unanswerable, and have been
so full, that I shall add but little more on the subject. Those
who wish to become federal representatives, must depend on
their credit with that class of men who will be the most popular
in their counties, who generally represent the people in the
state governments: they can, therefore, never succeed in any
measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend.
It is almost certain, therefore, that the deliberations of the
members of the federal house of representatives, will be
directed to the interest of the people of America. As to the
other branch, the senators will be appointed by the legislatures,
and though elected for six years, I do not conceive they will
so soon forget the source from whence they derive their political
existence. This election of one branch of the federal by
the state legislatures, secures an absolute dependence of the
former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one third, will
lessen the facility of a combination, and may put a stop to
intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will
attend to the interests of their constituent states. Have not
those gentlemen who have been honored with seats in congress,
often signalized themselves by their attachment to their seats?
I wish this government may answer the expectation of its
friends, and foil the apprehension of its enemies. I hope the
patriotism of the people will continue, and be a sufficient
guard to their liberties. I believe its tendency will be, that
the state governments will counteract the general interest, and
ultimately prevail. The number of the representatives is yet
sufficient for our safety, and will gradually increase—and if we
consider their different sources of information, the number
will not appear too small.