University of Virginia Library

Monday, June 25. in Convention.

Resolution 4. being taken up.

Mr. Pinkney spoke as follows—[100] The efficacy of
the System will depend on this article. In order
to form a right judgmt. in the case, it will be
proper to examine the situation of this Country
more accurately than it has yet been done. The
people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular
of any we are acquainted with. Among them
there are fewer distinctions of fortune & less of rank,
than among the inhabitants of any other nation.
Every freeman has a right to the same protection
& security; and a very moderate share of property
entitles them to the possession of all the honors and
privileges the Public can bestow: hence arises a
greater equality, than is to be found among the people
of any other Country, and an equality which is

more likely to continue—I say this equality is likely
to continue, because in a new Country, possessing
immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every
temptation is offered to emigration & where industry
must be rewarded with competency, there will be
few poor, and few dependent—Every member of the
Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving
at the supreme offices & consequently of directing
the strength & sentiments of the whole Community.
None will be excluded by birth, & few by fortune,
from voting for proper persons to fill the offices of
Government—the whole community will enjoy in
the fullest sense that kind of political liberty which
consists in the power the members of the State
reserve to themselves, of arriving at the Public
offices, or at least, of having votes in the nomination
of those who fill them.

If this State of things is true & the prospect of its
continuing probable, it is perhaps not politic to
endeavour too close an imitation of a Government
calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose
views ought to be extremely different

Much has been said of the Constitution of G.
Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the
best Constitution in existence; but at the same time
I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be
introduced into this Country, for many centuries.—
If it were proper to go here into a historical dissertation
on the British Constitution, it might easily be
shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing
feature of that Governmt. cannot possibly be introduced

into our System—that its balance between
the Crown & the people cannot be made a part of
our Constitution,—that we neither have nor can
have the members to compose it, nor the rights,
privileges & properties of so distinct a class of Citizens
to guard,—that the materials for forming this
balance or check do not exist, nor is there a necessity
for having so permanent a part of our Legislative,
until the Executive power is so constituted as to have
something fixed & dangerous in its principle—By this
I mean a sole, hereditary, though limited Executive.

That we cannot have a proper body for forming
a Legislative balance between the inordinate power
of the Executive and the people, is evident from a
review of the accidents & circumstances which gave
rise to the peerage of Great Britain—I believe it is
well ascertained that the parts which compose the
British Constitution arose immediately from the
forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment
of Nobility is by no means clearly defined.
Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted
by the titles of dux et comes, was derived from
the old Roman to the German Empire; while others
are of the opinion that they existed among the Germans
long before the Romans were acquainted with
them. The institution however of Nobility is immemorial
among the Nations who may properly be
termed the ancestors of Britain.—At the time they
were summoned in England to become a part of the
National Council, the circumstances which contributed
to make them a Constituent part of that

constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen
who have had industry & curiosity enough to investigate
the subject—The Nobles with their possessions
& dependents composed a body permanent
in their nature and formidable in point of power.
They had a distinct interest both from the King
and the people; an interest which could only be
represented by themselves, and the guardianship
could not be safely intrusted to others.—At the
time they were originally called to form a part of the
National Council, necessity perhaps as much as other
cause, induced the Monarch to look up to them. It
was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in
personal & pecuniary services. The power and possessions
of the Nobility would not permit taxation
from any Assembly of which they were not a part:
& the blending the Deputies of the Commons with
them, & thus forming what they called their parlerment
was perhaps as much the effect of chance as of
any thing else. The Commons were at that time
compleatly subordinate to the nobles, whose consequence
& influence seem to have been the only reasons
for their superiority; a superiority so degrading
to the Commons that in the first summons we find
the peers are called upon to consult the commons to
consent. From this time the peers have composed
a part of the British Legislature, and notwithstanding
their power and influence have diminished &
those of the Commons have increased, yet still they
have always formed an excellent balance agst. either
the encroachments of the Crown or the people.

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this
Country for ages, and that untill the situation of our
people is exceedingly changed no necessity will exist
for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To
illustrate this I have remarked that the people of
the United States are more equal in their circumstances
than the people of any other Country—that
they have very few rich men among them,—by rich
men I mean those whose riches may have a dangerous
influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Europe
—perhaps there are not one hundred such on the
Continent; that it is not probable this number will
be greatly increased; that the genius of the people
their mediocrity of situation & the prospects which
are afforded their industry in a Country which must
be a new one for centuries are unfavorable to the
rapid distinction of ranks. The destruction of the
right of primogeniture & the equal division of
the property of Intestates will also have an effect to
preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect
the manners of a people. On the other hand that
vast extent of unpeopled territory which opens to
the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency
& independence will effectually prevent for a considerable
time the increase of the poor or discontented,
and be the means of preserving that equality
of condition which so eminently distinguishes us.

If equality is as I contend the leading feature of
the U. States, where then are the riches & wealth
whose representation & protection is the peculiar
province of this Permanent body. Are they in the

hands of the few who may be called rich; in the
possession of less than a hundred citizens? Certainly
not. They are in the great body of the people,
among whom there are no men of wealth, and very
few of real poverty.—Is it probable that a change
will be created, and that a new order of men will
arise? If under the British Government, for a century
no such change was probable, I think it may
be fairly concluded it will not take place while even
the semblance of Republicanism remains.—How is
this change to be effected? Where are the sources
from whence it is to flow? From the landed interest?
No. That is too unproductive & too much divided
in most of the States. From the Monied interest?
If such exists at present, little is to be apprehended
from that source. Is it to spring from commerce?
I believe it would be the first instance in which a
nobility sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend
that on this point the policy of the U. States
has been much mistaken. We have unwisely considered
ourselves as the inhabitants of an old instead
of a new country. We have adopted the maxims
of a State full of people & manufactures & established
in credit. We have deserted our true interest, and
instead of applying closely to those improvements in
domestic policy which would have ensured the future
importance of our commerce, we have rashly & prematurely
engaged in schemes as extensive as they are
imprudent. This however is an error which daily
corrects itself & I have no doubt that a few more
severe trials will convince us, that very different
commercial principles ought to govern the conduct
of these States.

The people of this Country are not only very different
from the inhabitants of any State we are
acquainted with in the modern world; but I assert
that their situation is distinct from either the people
of Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted
with among the antients.—Can the orders introduced
by the institution of Solon, can they be found in the
United States? Can the military habits & manners
of Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners?
Are the distinction of Patrician & Plebeian known
among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies,
or can the unwieldy, unmeaning body called
the Germanic Empire, can they be said to possess
either the same or a situation like ours? I apprehend
not.—They are perfectly different, in their distinctions
of rank, their Constitutions, their manners &
their policy.

Our true situation appears to me to be this,—a
new extensive Country containing within itself the
materials for forming a Government capable of extending
to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil &
religious liberty—capable of making them happy at
home. This is the great end of Republican Establishments.
We mistake the object of our Government,
if we hope or wish that it is to make us
respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among
other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object
of republican Systems. If they are sufficiently
active & energetic to rescue us from contempt &

preserve our domestic happiness & security, it is all
we can expect from them,—it is more than almost
any other Government ensures to its citizens.

I believe this observation will be found generally
true:—that no two people are so exactly alike in
their situation or circumstances as to admit the exercise
of the same Government with equal benefit;
that a system must be suited to the habits & genius
of the People it is to govern, and must grow out of
them.

The people of the U. S. may be divided into three
classes—Professional men who must from their particular
pursuits always have a considerable weight
in the Government while it remains popular—Commercial
men, who may or may not have weight as a
wise or injudicious commercial policy is pursued.—
If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive
to be the true one, the merchants of this
Country will not or ought not for a considerable
time to have much weight in the political scale.—
The third is the landed interest, the owners and cultivators
of the soil, who are and ought ever to be
the governing spring in the system.—These three
classes, however distinct in their pursuits are individually
equal in the political scale, and may be
easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence
of each on the other is mutual. The
merchant depends on the planter. Both must in
private as well as public affairs be connected with
the professional men; who in their turn must in
some measure depend on them. Hence it is clear

from this manifest connection, & the equality which
I before stated exists, & must for the reasons then
assign, continue, that after all there is one, but
one great & equal body of Citizens composing the
inhabitants of this Country among whom there are
no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of
fortune.

For a people thus circumstanced are we then to
form a Government & the question is what sort of
Government is best suited to them.

Will it be the British Govt.? No. Why? Because
G. Britain contains three orders of people
distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles.—These orders combined form the great
body of the Nation. And as in national expences
the wealth of the whole community must contribute,
so ought each component part to be properly & duly
represented.—No other combination of power could
form this due representation, but the one that exists.
—Neither the peers or the people could represent the
royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people form
a proper representation for the Peers.—Each therefore
must of necessity be represented by itself, or
the sign of itself; and this accidental mixture has
certainly formed a Government admirably well
balanced.

But the U. States contain but one order that can
be assimilated to the British Nation,—this is the
order of Commons. They will not surely then attempt
to form a Government consisting of three
branches, two of which shall have nothing to

represent. They will not have an Executive &
Senate (hereditary) because the King & Lords of
England are so. The same reasons do not exist and
therefore the same provisions are not necessary.

We must as has been observed suit our Governmt.
to the people it is to direct. These are I believe as
active, intelligent & susceptible of good Governmt.
as any people in the world. The Confusion which
has produced the present relaxed State is not owing
to them. It is owing to the weakness & (defects)
of a Govt. incapable of combining the various interests
it is intended to unite, and destitute of
energy.—All that we have to do then is to distribute
the powers of Govt. in such a manner, and for such
limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree of
permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the
people, the right of election they will not or ought
not frequently to part with.—I am of opinion that
this may easily be done; and that with some amendments
the propositions before the Committee will
fully answer this end.

No position appears to me more true than this;
that the General Govt. cannot effectually exist without
reserving to the States the possession of their
local rights. They are the instruments upon which
the Union must frequently depend for the support
& execution of their powers, however immediately
operating upon the people, and not upon the
States.

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing
the distinction of State Governments, & having

but one general System. Suffer me for a moment
to examine this question.[101]

The mode of constituting the 2d. branch being
under consideration.

The word "national" was struck out, and "United
States" inserted.

Mr. Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the
rule of proportion. He thought there was some
weight in the objections of the small States. If Va.
should have 16. votes & Delre. with several other States
together 16, those from Virga. would be more likely
to unite than the others, and would therefore have an
undue influence. This remark was applicable not
only to States, but to Counties or other districts of
the same State. Accordingly the Constitution of
Massts. had provided that the representatives of the
larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to
their numbers, and experience he thought had
shewn the provision to be expedient.

Mr. Read. The States have heretofore been in
a sort of partnership. They ought to adjust their
old affairs before they open a new account. He
brought into view the appropriation of the com̃on
interest in the Western lands, to the use of particular
States. Let justice be done on this head; let the
fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge
of the general debt, and the smaller States who had
been injured; would listen then perhaps to those
ideas of just representation which had been held
out.

Mr. Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could
interpose in the case. Errors he allowed had been
committed on the subject. But Congs. were now
using their endeavours to rectify them. The best
remedy would be such a Government as would have
vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was
certainly the best chance that could be afforded to
the smaller States.

Mr. Wilson, the question is shall the members of
the 2d. branch be chosen by the Legislatures of the
States? When he considered the amazing extent of
Country—the immense population which is to fill
it, the influence which the Govt. we are to form will
have, not only on the present generation of our
people & their multiplied posterity, but on the whole
Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object.
The project of Henry the 4th. & his Statesmen was but
the picture in miniature of the great portrait to be
exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the
State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was

necessary to observe the twofold relation in which
the people would stand, 1 as Citizens of the Genl.
Govt. 2. as Citizens of their particular State. The
Genl. Govt. was meant for them in the first capacity:
the State Govts. in the second. Both Govts. were
derived from the people—both meant for the people
—both therefore ought to be regulated on the same
principles. The same train of ideas which belonged
to the relation of the Citizens to their State Govts.
were applicable to their relation to the Genl. Govt.
and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the
State Govts. With respect to the province & object
of the Genl. Govt. they should be considered as having
no existence. The election of the 2d. branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests
& local prejudices. The Genl. Govt. is not an assemblage
of States, but of individuals for certain political
purposes—it is not meant for the States; but for the
individuals composing them; the individuals therefore
not the States, ought to be represented in it:
A proportion in this representation can be preserved
in the 2d. as well as in the 1st. branch; and the election
can be made by electors chosen by the people for
that purpose. He moved an amendment to that
effect which was not seconded.

Mr. Elseworth saw no reason for departing from
the mode contained in the Report. Whoever
chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State
he is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act
the same part whether he be appointed by the people

or the Legislature. Every State has its particular
views & prejudices, which will find their way
into the general Councils, through whatever channel
they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics
which it was in contemplation to give the second
branch. Would not more of it issue from the
Legislatures; than from an immediate election by
the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining
the existence, & agency of the States. Without
their co-operation it would be impossible to support
a Republican Govt. over so great an extent of Country.
An army could scarcely render it practicable. The
largest States are the worst Governed. Virga. is
obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her
Govt. to Kentuckey. Massts. cannot keep the peace
one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming
an army for its support. How long Pena. may be
free from a like situation cannot be foreseen. If the
principles & materials of our Govt. are not adequate
to the extent of these single States; how can it be
imagined that they can support a single Govt.
throughout the U. States. The only chance of supporting
a Genl. Govt. lies in grafting it on that of the
individual States.

Docr. Johnson urged the necessity of preserving
the State Govts. which would be at the mercy of the
Genl. Govt. on Mr. Wilson's plan.

Mr. Madison thought it wd. obviate difficulty if the
present resol: were postponed, & the 8th. taken up,
which is to fix the right of suffrage in the 2d. branch.

Docr. Williamson professed himself a friend to such

a system as would secure the existence of the State
Govts. The happiness of the people depended on it.
He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate
untill he knew the number of its members. In order
to ascertain this, he moved to insert these words
after "2d. branch of the Natl. Legislature"—"who
shall bear such proportion to the no. of the 1st. branch
as 1 to—." He was not seconded.

Mr. Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that
an efficient Govt. is necessary that to render it such
it ought to have the faculty of self defence, that to
render its different branches effectual each of them
ought to have the same power of self defence. He
did not wonder that such an agreement should have
prevailed in these points. He only wondered that
there should be any disagreement about the necessity
of allowing the State Govts. the same self-defence.
If they are to be preserved as he conceived to be
essential, they certainly ought to have this power.
And the only mode left of giving it to them, was by
allowing them to appoint the 2d. branch of the Natl.
Legislature.

Mr. Butler observing that we were put to difficulties
at every step by the uncertainty whether an
equality or a ratio of representation wd. prevail finally
in the 2d. branch, moved to postpone the 4th. Resol:
& to proceed to the Resol: on that point. Mr. Madison
seconded him

On the question

Massts. no. Cont. no N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va.ay. N. C.no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7
Resol: ays, Maryd. Va. N. C. S. C. Geo;—Noes, Mass,
Ct. N. Y. N. J. Pa. Del:

On the question to agree "that the members of
the 2d. branch be chosen by the indivl. Legislatures"
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.[102]

On a question on the clause requiring the age of
30 years at least,—it was agreed to unanimously:

On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient
to ensure their independency" after the word
"term" it was agreed to.

That the 2d. branch hold their offices for a term of
seven years, considered

Mr. Ghorum suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be
elected every year.

Mr Randolph, supported the idea of rotation, as
favorable to the wisdom & stability of the Corps,
which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding
the Executive.

And moves after "7 years," to add, "to go out in
fixt proportion" which was agreed to.

Mr. Williamson suggests "6 years," as more convenient
for Rotation than 7 years.

Mr. Sherman seconds him.

Mr. Reed proposed that they sd hold their offices
"during good behaviour. Mr. R. Morris seconds
him.

Genl. Pinkney, proposed "4 years." A longer term
wd. fix them at the seat of Govt. They wd. acquire
an interest there, perhaps transfer their property &
lose sight of the States they represent. Under these
circumstances the distant States wd. labour under
great disadvantages.[103]

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out "7 years "in
order to take questions on the several propositions.

On the question to strike out "seven"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

On the question to insert "6 years ", which failed
5 Sts. being ay. 5 no, & 1 divided

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. no.

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5
agst. it & 1 divided,—Con. N. J. Pa. Del. Va. ay.
Massts. N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo: no. Maryd. divided.

On the question for "5 years" it was lost.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Adjd.