The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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Monday June 18. in Committee of the whole |
 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
Monday June 18. in Committee of the whole
on the propositions of Mr. Patterson & Mr. Randolph
On motion of Mr. Dickinson to postpone the 1st
Resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take
up the following viz—"that the Articles of Confederation
ought to be revised and amended, so as to
render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the
exigencies, the preservation and the prosperity of
the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10
States, Pen: divided.
Mr. Hamilton,[81]
had been hitherto silent on the
business before the Convention, partly from respect
to others whose superior abilities age & experience
rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar
to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation
with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments
as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no
means accede. This crisis however which now
marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any
scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public
safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to
declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was
particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation,
leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On
the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged
the desired blessings from any general sovereignty
that could be substituted.—As to the powers of the
Convention, he thought the doubts started on that
subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings
too subtle. A federal Govt. he conceived to mean an
association of independent Communities into one.
Different Confederacies have different powers, and
exercise them in different ways. In some instances
the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in
others over individuals, as in the German Diet—&
among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude
therefore must be given to the signification of the
term. The plan last proposed departs itself from
the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is
to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed
moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va. (Mr.
R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on this
emergency whatever we should deem essential to its
happiness. The States sent us here to provide for
the exigencies of the Union. To rely on & propose
any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely
because it was not clearly within our powers, would
be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be
said that the States cannot ratify a plan not within
the purview of the article of the Confederation providing
for alterations & amendments. But may not
the States themselves in which no constitutional
authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures,
have had in view a reference to the people
at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was
binding untill it should be referred to the people &
ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice
only, the reason assigned agst. it being, that it might
possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
The great question is what provision shall we
make for the happiness of our Country? He would
first make a comparative examination of the two
plans—prove that there were essential defects in
both—and point out such changes as might render
a national one, efficacious.—The great & essential
principles necessary for the support of Government
are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it.
This principle does not exist in the States in favor
of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high
degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue
internal interests adverse to those of the whole.
They have their particular debts—their particular
plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably
prevail over the requisitions & plans of
Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power.
The same remarks are applicable to this principle.
The States have constantly shewn a disposition
rather to regain the powers delegated by them than
to part with more, or to give effect to what they had
parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the controul of the Genl. Government.
It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not
that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl.
Govt. as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the
latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave
![illustration](https://iiif.lib.virginia.edu/iiif/uva-lib:104344/full/!1600,1600/0/default.jpg")
HAMILTON'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)
degree. Consider what such a State as Virga. will
be in a few years, a few compared with the life of
nations. How strongly will it feel its importance and
self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the
people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of
the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately
enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive
justice, and all those acts which familiarize &
endear a Govt. to a people, are dispensed to them.
4. Force by which may be understood a coercion of
laws or coercion of arms. Congs. have not the former
except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion
is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military
force is absolutely necessary in large communities.
Massts. is now feeling this necessity & making provision
for it. But how can this force be exerted on
the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts
to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also
will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the
confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the
Union will ensue. 5. Influence, he did not mean corruption,
but a dispensation of those regular honors
& emoluments, which produce an attachment to the
Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side
of the States; and must continue so as long as the
States continue to exist. All the passions then we
see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern
most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the
of the Genl Govt. The former therefore will generally
be an overmatch for the Genl. Govt. and render
any confederacy, in its very nature precarious.
Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience.
The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample
powers for general purposes. It had in particular
the power of fining and using force agst. delinquent
members. What was the consequence. Their decrees
were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is
a striking example of it. Philip at length taking
advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself
into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes.
The German Confederacy affords another
lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to
be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal
chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties,
soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments,
which reduced the imperial authority to a
nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded,
which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great
authority independently of his imperial attributes, is
a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated
Governments. Other examples instruct us in
the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any
union at all, and have been more than once at war
with one another.—How then are all these evils to
be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in
the General Govermt. as will turn all the strong principles
& passions abovementioned on its side. Does
the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does
contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect
of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of
others. It gives a direct revenue to Congs. but this
will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied
by requisitions: which experience proves cannot
be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the
mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the
supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve
or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will
invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too
must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce
the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland
with Russia; France or Engd. with other countries
of Europe, Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond
with the relative value of land. Take numbers of
inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison
of different countries, and you will find it to be
equally unjust. The different degrees of industry
and improvement in different Countries render the
first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on situation. Cont. N. Jersey & N.
Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing
to the wealth of the Commercial ones, can never
bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion.
They will & must fail in their duty, their
example will be followed, and the union itself be dissolved.
Whence then is the national revenue to be
drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which
of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These
tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another
destructive ingredient in the plan, is that
equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the
small States. It is not in human nature that Va. &
the large States should consent to it, or if they did
that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much
all ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad
principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in their operation,
and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has
been raised whether Congs. at present have a right
to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans
to the negative. Mr. P's. plan provides no remedy.
—If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization
of Congs. is such that they could never be
properly & effectually exercised. The members of
Congs. being chosen by the States & subject to recall,
represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers
be found effectual, they will from time to time be
heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established.
The general power whatever be its form if
it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers.
Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is
agst. all the principles of a good Government to vest
the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two
Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits.
Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate in a bad
Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore
will not do. What then is to be done? Here
he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to
general Govt. was also formidable; unless there were
such a diminution of expence on the side of the State
Govts. as the case would admit. If they were extinguished,
he was persuaded that great œconomy
might be obtained by substituting a general Govt.
He did not mean however to shock the public opinion
by proposing such a measure. On the other hand
he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce,
revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities
he was aware would be necessary. There
must be district tribunals; corporations for local
purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus
now appertaining to the States. The only
difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him,
was that of drawing representatives from the extremes
to the centre of the Community. What inducements
can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1st branch would only be a
bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts
he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate
he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by
certain undertakers who wish for particular offices
under the Govt. This view of the subject almost led
him to despair that a Republican Govt. could be
established over so great an extent. He was sensible
at the same time that it would be unwise to
propose one of any other form. In his private opinion
he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he
was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good,
that he doubted much whether any thing short of it
would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different
opinions would bear with him in this, and
begged them to recollect the change of opinion on
this subject which had taken place and was still
going on. It was once thought that the power of
Congs. was amply sufficient to secure the end of their
institution. The error was now seen by every one.
The members most tenacious of republicanism, he
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the
vices of democracy. This progress of the public
mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as
well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by
Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that
it is the only Govt. in the world "which unites public
strength with individual security."—In every Com̃unity
where industry is encouraged, there will be a
division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate
interests will arise. There will be debtors &
Creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will
oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they
will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to
have the power, that each may defend itself agst. the
other. To the want of this check we owe our paper
money, instalment laws &c To the proper adjustment
of it the British owe the excellence of their
Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble
institution. Having nothing to hope for by a
change, and a sufficient interest by means of their
property, in being faithful to the national interest,
innovation, whether attempted on the part of the
Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate
will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The
Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much
appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had
the people been unamimous & eager in the late appeal
to them on the subject of a paper emission they
would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing
in such an appeal is a proof of it.—Gentlemen
differ in their opinions concerning the necessary
checks, from the different estimates they form of the
human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient
period to give the senate an adequate firmness,
from not duly considering the amazing violence &
turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great
object of Govt. is pursued, which seizes the popular
passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable.
He appealed to the gentlemen from the
N. England States whether experience had not there
verified the remark.—As to the Executive, it seemed
to be admitted that no good one could be established
on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up
the merits of the question; for can there be a good
Govt. without a good Executive. The English Model
was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary
interest of the King was so interwoven with
that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so
great, that he was placed above the danger of being
corrupted from abroad—and at the same time
was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently
home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their
being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men
of little character, acquiring great power become
easily the tools of intermeddling Neibours. Sweden
was a striking instance. The French & English had
each their parties during the late Revolution which
was effected by the predominant influence of the
former.—What is the inference from all these observations?
That we ought to go as far in order to
attain stability and permanency, as republican principles
will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature
hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour.
Let the Executive also be for life. He
appealed to the feelings of the members present
whether a term of seven years, would induce the
sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of
public trust would require, so as to ensure the services
of the best Citizens. On this plan we should
have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest,
which would answer essential purposes. But
is this a Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if
all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are
filled, by the people, or a process of election originating
with the people. He was sensible that an Executive
constituted as he proposed would have in
fact but little of the power and independence that
might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing
him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought
to have but little power. He would be ambitious,
with the means of making creatures, and as the
is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself
of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation
from his place. An Executive for life has not
this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore
be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an
elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults
which characterize that form of Govt. He wd. reply
that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks
not either the degree or duration of power. If this
Executive Magistrate wd. be a monarch for life—
the other propd. by the Report from the Com̃ittee of
the whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years. The
circumstance of being elective was also applicable to
both. It had been observed by judicious writers
that elective monarchies wd. be the best if they could
be guarded agst. the tumults excited by the ambition
and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that
tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought
this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken
rather from particular cases than from general principles.
The election of Roman Emperors was made
by the Army. In Poland the election is made by
great rival princes within dependent power, and ample
means, of raising commotions. In the German
Empire, The appointment is made by the Electors
& Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting
cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of
election be devised among ourselves as will defend
the community agst. these effects in any dangerous
read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he
shd. prefer to either of those under consideration. He
was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of
doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt
the other plan? At present they will adopt neither.
But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved
—he sees evils operating in the States which must
soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies
—he sees that a great progress has been already
made & is still going on in the public mind. He
thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled
from their prejudices; and whenever that
happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at
stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd. place them,
but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He
did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as
a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only
to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest
the amendments which he should probably propose
to the plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its
future discussion. He read his sketch in the words
following; to wit
"The supreme Legislative power of the United
States of America to be vested in two different bodies
of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the
other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature
of the United States with power to pass all
laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter
mentioned.The Assembly to consist of persons elected by
the people to serve for three years.The Senate to consist of persons elected to
serve during good behaviour; their election to be
made by electors chosen for that purpose by the
people: in order to this the States to be divided into
election districts. On the death, removal or resignation
of any Senator his place to be filled out of
the district from which he came.The supreme Executive authority of the
United States to be vested in a Governour to be
elected to serve during good behaviour—the election
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in
the Election Districts aforesaid—The authorities &
functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have
a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed; to have the direction
of war when authorized or begun; to have with the
advice and approbation of the Senate the power of
making all treaties; to have the sole appointment
of the heads or chief officers of the departments of
Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination
of all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign
Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection
of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning
all offences except Treason; which he shall not
pardon without the approbation of the Senate.On the death resignation or removal of the
Governour his authorities to be exercised by the
President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.The Senate to have the sole power of
196declaring war, the power of advising and approving
all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all
appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of
the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.The supreme Judicial authority to be vested
in——— Judges to hold their offices during good
behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries.
This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes
of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all
causes in which the revenues of the General Government
or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.The Legislature of the United States to
have power to institute Courts in each State for the
determination of all matters of general concern.The Governour Senators and all officers of
the United States to be liable to impeachment for
mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to
be removed from office, & disqualified for holding
any place of trust or profit—All impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief——— or
Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State,
provided such Judge shall hold his place during good
behavior, and have a permanent salary.All laws of the particular States contrary to the
Constitution or laws of the United States to be
utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws
being passed, the Governour or president of each
State shall be appointed by the General Government
and shall have a Negative upon the laws about
to be passed in the State of which he is the Governour
or President.No State to have any forces land or Naval; and
the militia of all the States to be under the sole and
exclusive direction of the United States, the officers
of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory
observations corresponding with the principles
of his introductory reasoning.[82]
Comittee rose & the House Adjourned.
Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was
putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged its fidelity,
without suggesting more than a few verbal alterations which were
made,"—Ante, vol. ii. A brief of the speech from the Hamilton
Papers is given in Lodge's Works of Hamilton, i., 353, where (i., 375)
Yates's report also is quoted.
Copy of a paper communicated to J. M. by Col. Hamilton, about
the close of the convention in Philada., 1787, which he
said delineated the constitution which he would have
wished to be proposed by the convention. He had stated
the principles of it in the course of the deliberations.
The people of the United States of America do ordain & establish
this Constitution for the government of themselves and their posterity.
ARTICLE I
§ 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies of
men, one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate, subject to
the negative hereinafter mentioned.
§ 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter specified,
shall be vested in a President of the United States.
§ 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases otherwise
provided for in this Constitution, shall be vested in a Court to be called
the Supreme Court, to consist of not less than six nor more than twelve
Judges.
ARTICLE II
§ 1. The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called representatives,
who shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male
citizens & inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union,
all of whom of the age of twenty one years & upwards shall be entitled
to an equal vote.
§ 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner prescribed
in the last article and shall consist of one hundred members of
whom N. Hampshire shall have five, Massachusetts thirteen, Rhode
Island two, Connecticut seven, N. York nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsylvania
twelve, Delaware two, Maryland eight, Virginia sixteen, N.
Carolina eight, S. Carolina eight, Georgia four.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Representatives,
apportioning them in each State, from time to time, as
nearly as may be to the number of persons described in the 4§ of the
VII article, so as that the whole number of Representatives shall never
be less than one hundred, nor more than—hundred. There shall be
a Census taken for this purpose within three years after the first meeting
of the Legislature, and within every successive period of ten years.
The term for which Representatives shall be elected shall be determined
by the Legislature but shall not exceed three years. There
shall be a general election at least once in three years; and the time of
service of all the members in each Assembly shall begin, (except in
filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall always end on the same
day.
§ 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed to
business; but their number may be increased by the Legislature, yet
so as never to exceed a majority of the whole number of Representatives.
§ 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other officers,
shall judge of the qualifications & elections of its own members, punish
them, for improper conduct in their capacity of Representatives not
extending to life or limb; and shall exclusively possess the power of
impeachment except in the case of the President of the United States;
but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by less than
two thirds of the Representatives present.
§ 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no Representative
present shall be proxy for more than one who is absent.[83]
§ 7. Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating monies
for the support of fleets and armies, and for paying the salaries of the
officers of Government, shall originate in the Assembly; but may be
altered and amended by the Senate.
§ 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by a
Representative shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.
ARTICLE III
§ 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen, except in the
first instance, by Electors elected for that purpose by the Citizens and
inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union who shall
have in their own right, or in the right of their wifes, an Estate in land
for not less than life, or a term of years, whereof at the time of giving
their votes there shall be at least fourteen years unexpired.
§ 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner prescribed
in the last Article and shall consist of forty members to be called
Senators, of whom N. Hampshire shall have——Massts.— — R.
Island—Connecticut—— N. York — — N. Jersey — — Pena. —
Delaware——Maryd.— — Virga. — — N. Carola. — — S. Carol. — —
Geo.——.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Senators,
for which purpose the States respectively, which have more
than one Senator, shall be divided into convenient districts to which
the Senators shall be apportioned. A State having but one Senator
shall be itself a district. On the death, resignation or removal from
office of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election in the
district from which he came. Upon each election there shall be not
less than six nor more than twelve electors chosen in a district.
§ 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty, nor
shall any State, if the same shall not hereafter be divided, ever have
less than the number allotted to it in the second section of this article;
but the Legislature may increase the whole number of Senators, in the
same proportion to the whole number of Representatives as forty is
to one hundred; and such increase beyond the present number, shall
be apportioned to the respective States in a ratio to the respective
numbers of their representatives.
§ 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of the
boundaries of two or more States shall take place, the Legislature
shall apportion the number of Senators (in elections succeeding such
division or new arrangement) to which the constituent parts were entitled
according to the change of situation, having regard to the number
of persons described in the 4 §. of the VII article.
§ 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good behaviour,
removable only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or
misdemeanor. They shall continue to exercise their offices when impeached
untill a conviction shall take place. Sixteen Senators attending
in person shall be sufficient to make a House to transact business;
but the Legislature may increase this number, yet so as never to exceed
a majority of the whole number of Senators. The Senators may
vote by proxy, but no Senator who is present shall be proxy for more
than two who are absent.
§ 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other officers; shall
judge of the qualifications and elections of its members, and shall
punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of Senators; but
such punishment shall not extend to life or limb, nor to expulsion. In
the absence of their President they may choose a temporary President.
The President shall only have a casting vote when the House is equally
divided.
§ 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring
war. No treaty shall be made without their advice and consent;
which shall also be necessary to the appointment of all officers, except
such for which a different provision is made in this Constitution.
ARTICLE IV
§ 1. The President of the United States of America, (except in the
first instance) shall be elected in the manner following—The Judges
of the Supreme Court shall within sixty days after a vacancy shall
happen, cause public notice to be given in each State, of such vacancy,
appointing therein three several days for the several purposes following,
to wit, a day for commencing the election of electors for the purposes
hereinafter specified, to be called the first electors, which day
shall not be less than forty, nor more than sixty days, after the day
of the publication of the notice in each State—another day for the
meeting of the electors not less [than] forty nor more than ninety days
from the day for commencing their election—another day for the
meeting of electors to be chosen by the first electors, for the purpose
hereinafter specified, and to be called the second Electors, which day
shall be not less than forty nor more than sixty days after the day for
the meeting of the first electors.
§ 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there shall be
chosen in each State a number of persons, as the first electors in the
preceding section mentioned, equal to the whole number of the Representatives
and Senators of such State in the Legislature of the United
States; which electors shall be chosen by the Citizens of such State
having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in land, or a clear
personal estate of the value of one thousand Spanish milled dollars of
the present standard.
§ 3. These first electors shall meet in their respective States at the
time appointed, at one place; and shall proceed to vote by ballot for
a President, who shall not be one of their own number, unless the
Legislature upon experiment should hereafter direct otherwise. They
shall cause two lists to be made of the name or names of the person or
persons voted for, which they or the major part of them shall sign &
certify. They shall then proceed each to nominate openly in the
presence of the others, two persons as for second electors, and out of
the persons who shall have the four highest numbers of nominations,
they shall afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes choose two who
shall be the second electors, to each of whom shall be delivered one
of the lists before mentioned. These second electors shall not be any
of the persons voted for as President. A copy of the same list signed
and certified in like manner shall be transmitted by the first electors
to the Seat of the Government of the United States, under a sealed
cover directed to the President of the Assembly, which after the
meeting of the Second electors shall be opened for the inspection of the
two Houses of the Legislature.
§ 4. The second electors shall meet precisely on the day appointed
and not on another day, at one place. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or if there be no Chief Justice, the Judge senior in office
in such Court, or if there be no one Judge senior in office, some other
Judge of that Court, by the choice of the rest of the Judges or of a
majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall preside at
the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two thirds of the whole number
of the Electors shall constitute a sufficient meeting for the execution
of their trust. At this meeting the lists delivered to the respective
electors shall be produced and inspected, and if there be any person
who has a majority of the whole number of votes given by the first
electors, he shall be the President of the United States; but if there
be no such person, the second electors so met shall proceed to vote, by
ballot for one of the persons named in the lists who shall have the three
highest numbers of the votes of the first electors; and if upon the first
or any succeeding ballot on the day of their meeting, either of those
persons shall have a number of votes equal to a majority of the whole
number of second electors chosen, he shall be the President. But if
no such choice be made on the day appointed for the meeting either
by reason of the non-attendance of the second electors, or their not
agreeing, or any other matter, the person having the greatest number
of votes of the first electors shall be the President.
§ 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some other Judge
of the Supreme Court should not attend in due time, the second electors
shall proceed to the execution of their trust without him.
§ 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice required by
the first section of this article to be given within the time therein
limited, they may nevertheless cause it to be afterwards given; but
their neglect if wilful, is hereby declared to be an offence for which
they may be impeached, and if convicted they shall be punished as in
other cases of conviction on impeachment.
§ 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such further
regulations as may be necessary for the more orderly election of the
President; not contravening the provisions herein contained.
§ 8. The President before he shall enter upon the execution of his
office shall take an oath or affirmation, faithfully to execute the same,
and to the utmost of his Judgment & power to protect the rights of
the people, and preserve the Constitution inviolate. This oath or
affirmation shall be administered by the President of the Senate for
the time being in the presence of both Houses of the Legislature.
§ 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in Session
on the day appointed for the meeting of the second electors and shall
continue sitting till the President take the oath or affirmation of
office. He shall hold his place during good behavior, removeable only
by conviction upon impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor.
§ 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business,
shall convene them together at the place where the Senate shall sit,
and shall communicate to them all such matters as may be necessary
for their information, or as may require their consideration. He may
by message during the Session communicate all other matters which
may appear to him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the
public business shall require it, convene the Senate and Assembly, or
either of them, and may prorogue them for a time not exceeding forty
days at one prorogation; and if they should disagree about their adjournment,
he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think
proper. He shall have a right to negative all bills, Resolutions or acts
of the two Houses of the Legislature about to be passed into laws. He
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall be the
commander in chief of the army and Navy of the United States and of
the Militia within the several States, and shall have the direction of
war when commenced, but he shall not take the actual command in
the field of an army without the consent of the Senate and Assembly.
All treaties, conventions and agreements with foreign nations shall be
made by him, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He
shall have the appointment of the Principal or Chief officer of each
of the departments of war, naval Affairs, Finance and Foreign Affairs;
and shall have the nomination; and by and with the consent of the
Senate, the appointment of all other officers to be appointed under
the authority of the United States, except such for whom different
provision is made by this Constitution; and provided that this shall
not be construed to prevent the Legislature, from appointing by
name, in their laws, persons to special and particular trusts created in
such laws; nor shall be construed to prevent principals in offices
merely ministerial, from constituting deputies.—In the recess of the
Senate he may fill vacancies in offices by appointments to continue in
force until the end of the next Session of the Senate, and he shall
commission all officers. He shall have power to pardon all offences
except treason, for which he may grant reprieves, untill the opinion of
the Senate & Assembly can be had, and with their concurrence may
pardon the same.
§ 11. He shall receive a fixed conpensation for his services to be
paid to him at stated times, and not to be increased nor diminished
during his continuance in office.
§ 12. If he depart out of the United States without the Consent of
the Senate and Assembly, he shall thereby abdicate his office.
§ 13. He may be impeached for any crime or misdemesnor by the
two Houses of the Legislature, two thirds of each House concurring,
and if convicted shall be removed from office. He may be afterwards
tried & punished in the ordinary course of law. His impeachment
shall operate as a suspension from office until the determination
thereof.
§ 14. The President of the Senate shall be vice President of the
United States. On the death, resignation, impeachment, removal
from office, or absence from the United States, of the President thereof,
the Vice President shall exercise all the powers by this Constitution
vested in the President, until another shall be appointed, or untill he
shall return within the United States, if his absence was with the
consent of the Senate and Assembly.
Article V
§ 1. There shall be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who
together with the other Judges thereof, shall hold the office during
good behaviour, removable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor. Each Judge shall have a competent
salary to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be diminished
during his continuance in office.
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all causes in
which the United States shall be a party, in all controversies between
the United States, and a particular State, or between two or more
States, except such as relate to a claim of territory between the United
States, and one or more States, which shall be determined in the mode
prescribed in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign Ministers,
Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction both as to law and
fact in all cases which shall concern the Citizens of foreign nations,
In all questions between the Citizens of different States, and in all
others in which the fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved,
subject to such exceptions as are herein contained and to such
regulations as the Legislature shall provide.
The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the Legislature
shall also hold their places during good behaviour, removeable only
by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor, and
shall have competent salaries to be paid at stated times and not to be
diminished during their continuance in office; but nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from abolishing
such Courts themselves.
All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a Jury of
twelve men; and if they shall have been committed within any State,
shall be tried within such State; and all civil causes arising under this
constitution of the like kind with those which have been heretofore
triable by Jury in the respective States, shall in like manner be tried
by jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think proper to
make different provision, to which provision the concurrence of two
thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.
§ [2] Impeachments of the President and Vice President of the U.
States, members of the Senate, the Governours and Presidents of the
several States, the Principal or Chief Officers of the Departments
enumerated in the 10 §. of the 4th. Article, Ambassadors and other like
Public Ministers, the Judges of the Supreme Court, Generals, and
Admirals of the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of the Judges
of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or first or Senior Judge of
the superior Court of law in each State, of whom twelve shall constitute
a Court. A majority of the Judges present may convict. All
other persons shall be tried on impeachment by a court to consist of
the Judges of the Supreme Court and six Senators drawn by lot, a
majority of whom may convict.
Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence for which
the party accused is to be tried, and judgment on conviction upon the
trial thereof shall be either removal from office singly, or removal
from office and disqualification for holding any future office or place
of trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall prevent prosecution
and punishment in the ordinary course of law; provided that no
Judge concerned in such conviction shall sit as Judge on the second
trial. The Legislature may remove the disabilities incurred by conviction
on impeachment.
Article VI
Controversies about the right of territory between the United States
and particular States shall be determined by a Court to be constituted
in manner following. The State or States claiming in opposition to
the United States as parties shall nominate a number of persons, equal
to double the number of the Judges of the Supreme Court for the time
being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth of the States which are
parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated, and of whom not
more than two shall have their actual residence in one State. Out of
the persons so nominated the Senate shall elect one half, who together
with the Judges of the Supreme Court, shall form the Court. Two
thirds of the whole number may hear and determine the controversy,
by plurality of voices. The States concerned may at their option
claim a decision by the Supreme Court only. All of the members of
the Court hereby instituted shall, prior to the hearing of the Cause
take an oath impartially and according to the best of their judgments
and consciences, to hear and determine the controversy.
Article VII
§ 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to pass
all laws which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and
general welfare of the Union: But no Bill, Resolution, or act of the
Senate and assembly shall have the force of a law until it shall have
received the assent of the President, or of the vice-President when
exercising the powers of the President; and if such assent shall not
have been given within ten days, after such bill, resolution or other
act shall have been presented to him for that purpose, the same shall
not be a law. No bill, resolution or other act not assented to shall be
revived in the same Session of the Legislature. The mode of signifying
such assent, shall be by signing the bill act of [r] resolution, and
returning it so signed to either House of the Legislature.
§ 2. The enacting stile of all laws shall be "Be it enacted by the
people of the United States of America."
§ 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law;
nor shall any title of nobility be granted by the United States, or by
either of them; nor shall any person holding an office or place of trust
under the United States without the permission of the Legislature
accept any present, emolument office or title from a foreign prince or
State. Nor shall any Religious Sect, or denomination, or religious
test for any office or place, be ever established by law.
§ 4. Taxes on lands, houses and other real estate, and capitation
taxes shall be proportioned in each State by the whole number of free
persons, except Indians not taxed, and by three fifths of all other
persons.
§ 5. The two Houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot appoint
a Treasurer of the United States. Neither House in the Session of both
Houses, without the consent of the other shall adjourn for more than
three days at a time. The Senators and Representatives, in attending,
going to and coming from the Session of their respective houses
shall be privileged from arrest, except for crimes and breaches of the
peace. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat of Government
which shall be fixed by law.
§ 6. The laws of the United States, and the treaties which have
been made under the articles of the confederation, and which shall
be made under this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Land,
and shall be so construed by the Courts of the several States.
§ 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each year,
which unless otherwise provided for by law, shall be on the first Monday
in December.
§ 8. The members of the two Houses of the Legislature shall receive
a reasonable compensation for their services, to be paid out of the
Treasury of the United States and ascertained by law. The law for
making such provision shall be passed with the concurrence of the
first Assembly and shall extend to succeeding Assemblies; and no
succeeding assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision,
so as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be always a
law in existence for making such provision.
ARTICLE VIII
§ 1. The Governour or President of each State shall be appointed
under the authority of the United States, and shall have a right to
negative all laws about to be passed in the State of which he shall be
Governour or President, subject to such qualifications and regulations,
as the Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He shall in
other respects have the same powers only which the Constitution of
the State does or shall allow to its Governour or President, except as
to the appointment of Officers of the Militia.
§ 2. Each Governour or President of a State shall hold his office
until a successor be actually appointed, unless he die, or resign or be
removed from office by conviction on impeachment. There shall be
no appointment of such Governor or President in the Recess of the
Senate.
The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the time of
the ratification of this Constitution shall continue in office in the same
manner and with the same powers as if they had been appointed pursuant
to the first section of this article.
The officers of the Militia in the several States may be appointed
under the authority of the U. States; the Legislature whereof may
authorize the Governors or Presidents of States to make such appointments
with such restrictions as they shall think proper.
ARTICLE IX
§ 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the
United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter
be born a Citizen of the United States.
§ 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or Representative unless
at the time of his election he be a Citizen and inhabitant of the
State in which he is chosen; provided that he shall not be deemed to
be disqualified by a temporary absence from the State.
§ 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or to be
elected President of the United States, or a Senator or Representative
in the Legislature thereof, shall be disqualified but by the conviction
of some offence for which the law shall have previously ordained the
punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature may by law
provide that persons holding offices under the United States or either
of them shall not be eligible to a place in the Assembly or Senate, and
shall be during their continuance in office suspended from sitting in
the Senate.
§ 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the United
States shall without permission of the Legislature accept any present
emolument office or title from any foreign Prince or State.
§ 5. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the rights privileges
and immunities of Citizens in every other State; and full faith
and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of another.
§ 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be found in
another shall be delivered up on the application of the State from
which they fled.
§ 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of another, or
by the junction of two or more States, without the concurrent consent
of the Legislatures of the United States and of the States concerned.
The Legislature of the United States may admit new States into the
Union.
§ 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guarantee
to each State a Republican form of Government, and to protect
each State as well against domestic violence as foreign invasion.
§ 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United States
of America under the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union,
shall have equal validity under this Constitution.
§ 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or contract with
another, or with a foreign power without the consent of the United
States.
§ 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States and of
each State, and all officers Executive & Judicial of the one and of the
other shall take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of
the United States.
§ 12. This Constitution may receive such alterations and amendments
as may be proposed by the Legislature of the United States,
with the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses,
and ratified by the Legislatures of, or by Conventions of deputies
chosen by the people in, two thirds of the States composing the Union.
Article X
This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of Conventions
in the several States, the members whereof shall be chosen
by the people of such States respectively under the direction of their
respective Legislatures. Each Convention which shall ratify the same,
shall appoint the first representatives and Senators from such State
according to the rule prescribed in the——§ of the— — article. The
representatives so appointed shall continue in office for one year only.
Each Convention so ratifying shall give notice thereof to the Congress
of the United States, transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives
and Senators chosen. When the Constitution shall have
been duly ratified, Congress shall give notice of a day and place for
the meeting of the Senators and Representatives from the several
States; and when these or a majority of them shall have assembled
according to such notice, they shall by joint ballot, by plurality of
votes, elect a President of the United States; and the Constitution
thus organized shall be carried into effect.—Mad. MSS.
"Col: Hamilton did not propose in the Convention any plan of a
Constitution. He had sketched an outline which he read as part of a
speech; observing that he did not mean it as a proposition, but only
to give a more correct view of his ideas.
"Mr. Patterson regularly proposed a plan which was discussed &
voted on."—Madison to John Quincy Adams, Montpellier, Nov. 2,
1818, Dept. of State MSS., Miscellaneous Letters.
| The writings of James Madison, | |