University of Virginia Library

Tuesday, June 26. in Convention

The duration of the 2d. branch under consideration.
Mr. Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six
years," one third of the members to go out every
second year.

Mr. Wilson 2ded. the motion.

Genl. Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four
years. The States he said had different interests.
Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina in particular
were different from the Northern. If the Senators
should be appointed for a long term, they wd. settle
in the State where they exercised their functions;
and would in a little time be rather the representatives
of that than of the State appointg them.

Mr. Reed movd. that the term be nine years. This
wd. admit of a very convenient rotation, one third
going out triennially. He wd. still prefer "during
good behaviour," but being little supported in that
idea, he was willing to take the longest term that
could be obtained.

Mr. Broome 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be
given to this institution, it will be proper to take a
view of the ends to be served by it. These were
first to protect the people agst. their rulers; secondly

to protect the people agst. the transient impressions
into which they themselves might be led. A people
deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the
experience of other nations before them, on the plan
of Govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would
first be aware, that those chargd. with the public
happiness might betray their trust. An obvious
precaution agst. this danger wd. be to divide the trust
between different bodies of men, who might watch
& check each other. In this they wd. be governed
by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing
the subordinate departments of Govt., where
all business liable to abuses is made to pass thro'
separate hands, the one being a check on the other.
It wd. next occur to such people, that they themselves
were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of
information as to their true interest, and that men
chosen for a short term, & employed but a small
portion of that in public affairs, might err from the
same cause. This reflection wd. naturally suggest
that the Govt. be so constituted as that one of its
branches might have an oppy. of acquiring a competent
knowledge of the public interests. Another
reflection equally becoming a people on such an
occasion, wd. be that they themselves, as well as a
numerous body of Representatives, were liable to
err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary
fence agst. this danger would be to select a portion of
enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and
firmness might seasonably interpose agst. impetuous
councils. It ought finally to occur to a people
deliberating on a Govt. for themselves, that as different
interests necessarily result from the liberty meant
to be secured, the major interest might under sudden
impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the
minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall
into different classes havg. a real or supposed difference
of interests. There will be creditors & debtors;
farmers, merchts. & manufacturers. There will be
particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was
true as had been observd. (by Mr. Pinkney) we had
not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the
ancient Govts. as well as the modern States of
Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty
which characterize the latter. We cannot however
be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous
mass, in which every thing that affects a part will
affect in the same manner the whole. In framing
a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd. not
lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.
An increase of population will of necessity increase
the proportion of those who will labour under all
the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal
distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber
those who are placed above the feelings of
indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage,
the power will slide into the hands of the former.
No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this
Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we
have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain
quarters, to give notice of the future danger.
How is this danger to be guarded agst. on the republican
principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be
guarded agst.? Among other means by the establishment
of a body in the Govt. sufficiently respectable
for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies,
the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight
into that scale. Such being the objects of the
second branch in the proposed Govt. he thought a
considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did
not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten
any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas
on the subject, he should require that the long term
allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till
such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification
to be re-elected little inconvenient either
in a public or private view. He observed that as it
was more than probable we were now digesting a plan
which in its operation wd. decide for ever the fate of
Republican Govt. we ought not only to provide every
guard to liberty that its preservation cd. require, but
be equally careful to supply the defects which our
own experience had particularly pointed out.

Mr. Sherman. Govt. is instituted for those who
live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted
as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The
more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the
good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give
permanency to the Government, by preserving that
good behavior, because it ensures their re-election.

In Connecticut elections have been very frequent,
yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons
& measures have been experienced from its original
establishmt. to the present time; a period of more
than a 130 years. He wished to have provision
made for steadiness & wisdom in the system to be
adopted; but he thought six or four years would be
sufficient. He shd. be content with either.

Mr. Read wished it to be considered by the small
States that it was their interest that we should become
one people as much as possible; that State
attachments shd. be extinguished as much as possible;
that the Senate shd. be so constituted as to have
the feelings of Citizens of the whole.

Mr. Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly
into the subject. He concurred with Mr. Madison
in thinking we were now to decide forever the
fate of Republican Government; and that if we did
not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it
would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced
& lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged
himself not to think favorably of Republican
Government; but addressed his remarks to those
who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail
on them to tone their Government as high as possible.
He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate
for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted
he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed
as to the form in which it was most eligible.—
He concurred also in the general observations of
(Mr. Madison) on the subject, which might be supported

by others if it were necessary. It was certainly
true that nothing like an equality of property
existed; that an inequality would exist as long as
liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result
from that very liberty itself. This inequality of
property constituted the great & fundamental distinction
in Society. When the Tribunitial power
had levelled the boundary between the patricians
& plebeians, what followed? The distinction between
rich & poor was substituted. He meant
not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose
principally to remark that (Mr. Sherman) seemed
not to recollect that one branch of the proposed
Govt. was so formed, as to render it particularly the
guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to
have adverted to the true causes of the stability
which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the
great powers appertaining to Govt. particularly all
those relating to foreign Nations were not in the
hands of the Govt. there. Their internal affairs also
were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes
many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of
late the Governmt. had entirely given way to the
people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary
functions in order to prevent those turbulent
scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. S.
whether the State at this time dare impose & collect
a tax on ye. people? To these causes & not to the
frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed
ought to be chiefly ascribed.

Mr. Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas
concerning a permanent Govt. All aim at the same
end, but there are great differences as to the means.
One circumstance He thought should be carefully
attended to. There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow
citizens who were not agst. every approach towards
Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which
seems to make such an approach. The Convention
ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold
out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed
will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect
to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from
an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan
should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent
opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion
will ensue, and it is even possible that we may
become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny
the position of Mr. Madison, that the majority will
generally violate justice when they have an interest
in so doing: But did not think there was any such
temptation in this Country. Our situation was different
from that of G. Britain; and the great body
of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very
much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the
symptoms of injustice which had marked many of
our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far
as not to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient
sense of justice & virtue for the purpose of Govt.
He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of
elections; and would agree to give the Senate a
duration of four or five years. A longer term would

defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the
people.

Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen
from others, but wd. add an observation or two which
he believed had not yet been suggested. Every
nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its
own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore
not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has
wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The
Senate will probably be the depository of the powers
concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to
be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations.
The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened
to a commercial treaty with us has been, because
she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of
our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide
these desirable qualities; and give our Govt an
advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In
a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper
of the man. In such a body, the personal character
will be lost in the political. He wd add another
observation. The popular objection agst. appointing
any public body for a long term was that it might
by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a
body for life, and finally become a hereditary one.
It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection
that as 1/3 would go out triennially, there would be
always three divisions holding their places for unequal
times, and consequently acting under the influence
of different views, and different impulses.—
On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

On the question for 6 years,[104] 1/3 to go out biennially

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be
compensated for their services" considered.

General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should
be allowed." As this (the Senatorial) branch was
meant to represent the wealth of the Country, it
ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if
no allowance was to be made the wealthy alone
would undertake the service. He moved to strike
out the clause.

Doctr. Franklin seconded the motion. He wished
the Convention to stand fair with the people. There
were in it a number of young men who would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments
should be recommended we might be chargeable
with having carved out places for ourselves.
On the question,—Masts. Connecticut[105] Pa. Md. S.
Carolina ay. N. Y. N. J. Del. Virga. N. C. Geo. no.

Mr. Williamson moved to change the expression
into these words to wit "to receive a compensation

for the devotion of their time to the public service."
The motion was seconded by Mr. Elseworth, and
agreed to by all the States except S. Carola. It
seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word
"fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the
provision on this point.

Mr. Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid
out of the Natil. Treasury" and insert "to be paid
by their respective States." If the Senate was meant
to strengthen the Govt. it ought to have the confidence
of the States. The States will have an interest
in keeping up a representation, and will make such
provision for supporting the members as will ensure
their attendance.

Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from a
fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended
by allowing the Senate a duration of 6 years.
They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold
their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of
the State Legislatures. One great end of the institution
was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body,
it might not only give stability to the Genl Govt. in
its operations on individuals, but hold an even
balance among different States. The motion would
make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents &
Advocates of State interests & views, instead of
being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice
and the general Good. Congs. had lately by the establishment
of a board with full powers to decide on
the mutual claims between the U. States & the
individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves

to be unfit for discharging this part of the business
referred to them by the Confederation.

Mr. Dayton[106] considered the payment of the Senate
by the States as fatal to their independence, he
was decided for paying them out of the Natl. Treasury.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be
left to the States as moved by Mr. Elseworth.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion,
but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for
consideration. One important object in constituting
the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To
give them weight & firmness for this purpose, a
considerable duration in office was thought necessãy.
But a longer term than 6 years, would be of
no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be
appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety of
annexing to the office a qualification of property.
He thought this would be very practicable; as the
rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring
the degree of wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken whether the words
"to be paid out of the public treasury," should
stand.

Massts. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of
Senators to State offices.

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[107]

Mr. Wilson remarked the additional dependance
this wd create in the Senators on the States. The
longer the time he observed allotted to the Officer,
the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists
at all.[108]

Genl. Pinkney was for making the States as much
as could be conveniently done, a part of the Genl.
Govt. If the Senate was to be appointed by the
States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be
paid by the States: and the States ought not to be
barred from the opportunity of calling members of
it into offices at home. Such a restriction would
also discourage the ablest men from going into the
Senate.

Mr. Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to
admit of the two following questions, 1. whether the

members of the Senate should be ineligible to &
incapable of holding offices under the U. States

2. Whether &c. under the particular States.

On the Question to postpone in order to consider
Williamson's Resoln. Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y.
no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry & Mr. Madison move to add to Mr. Williamson's
1. Quest: "and for 1 year thereafter."
On this amendt.

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

On Mr. Will[iam]son's 1 Question as amended. vz,
inelig: & incapable &c. &c. for 1 year &c. agd. to
unãmously.

On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State
offices,

Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right
of originating acts," was agreed to nem. con.

Adjd.