University of Virginia Library

Saturday, July 14. In Convention.

Mr. L. Martin called for the question on the whole
report, including the parts relating to the origination
of money bills, and the equality of votes in the 2d.
branch.

Mr. Gerry, wished before the question should be

put, that the attention of the House might be turned
to the dangers apprehended from Western States.
He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not
for putting ourselves in their hands. They will if
they acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will
oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the
Western Country. To guard agst. these consequences,
he thought it necessary to limit the number of new
States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner,
that they should never be able to outnumber
the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that
in order to secure the liberties of the States already
confederated, the number of Representatives in the
1st. branch, of the States which shall hereafter be established,
shall never exceed in number, the Representatives
from such of the States as shall accede
to this Confederation.

Mr. King, seconded the motion.

Mr. Sherman, thought there was no probability that
the number of future States would exceed that of the
Existing States. If the event should ever happen,
it was too remote to be taken into consideration at
this time. Besides We are providing for our posterity,
for our children & our grand Children; who
would be as likely to be citizens of new Western
States, as of the old States. On this consideration
alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as
was proposed by the motion.

Mr. Gerry. If some of our children should remove,
others will stay behind, and he thought it incumbent
on us to provide for their interests. There was a

rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the
Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining
behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants. Besides
foreigners are resorting to that Country, and it
is uncertain what turn things may take there.—On
the question for agreeing to the Motion of Mr. Gerry,
it passed in the negative.

Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Rutlidge proposed to reconsider the two propositions
touching the originating of money bills in
the first & the equality of votes in the second branch.

Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole at
once. It was he said a conciliatory plan, it had been
considered in all its parts, a great deal of time had
been spent upon it, and if any part should now be
altered, it would be necessary to go over the whole
ground again.

Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He
did not like many parts of it. He did not like having
two branches, nor the inequality of votes in the 1st.
branch. He was willing however to make trial of the
plan, rather than do nothing.

Mr. Wilson traced the progress of the report
through its several stages, remarking yt. when on the
question concerning an equality of votes, the House
was divided, our Constituents had they voted as
their representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 agst.
the equality, and 1/3 only in favor of it. This fact
would ere long be known, and it will appear that this
fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 agst. 2/3.

What hopes will our Constituents entertain when
they find that the essential principles of justice have
been violated in the outset of the Governmt. As to
the privilege of originating money bills, it was not
considered by any as of much moment, and by many
as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses wd. be
reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of
such critical importance, that every opportunity
ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting
the mind of the Convention upon it.

Mr. L. Martin denies that there were 2/3 agst. the
equality of votes. The States that please to call
themselves large, are the weekest in the Union. Look
at Masts. Look at Virga. Are they efficient States?
He was for letting a separation take place if they desired
it. He had rather there should be two Confederacies,
than one founded on any other principle
than an equality of votes in the 2d. branch at least.

Mr. Wilson was not surprised that those who say
that a minority is more than a majority should say
the minority is stronger than the majority. He supposed
the next assertion will be that they are richer
also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted
in when the States shall be called on for taxes
& troops.

Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martins remarks
on the weakness of Masts. He favored the reconsideration
with a view not of destroying the
equality of votes; but of providing that the States
should vote per Capita, which he said would prevent
the delays & inconveniences that had been experienced

in Congs. and would give a national aspect &
Spirit to the management of business. He did not
approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to
money bills. It was of great consequence. It was
the corner stone of the accommodation. If any
member of the Convention had the exclusive privilege
of making propositions, would any one say that it
would give him no advantage over other members.
The Report was not altogether to his mind. But he
would agree to it as it stood rather than throw it out
altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to

Mr. Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of
votes, the States should be represented in the 2d.
branch as follows: N. H. by 2 members. Mass. 4.
R. I. 1. Cont. 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. Pa. 4. Del. 1; Md.
3. Virga. 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the
whole 36.

Mr. Wilson seconds the motion

Mr. Dayton. The smaller States can never give up
their equality. For himself he would in no event
yield that security for their rights.

Mr. Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so
much as a Security for the small States; as for the
State Govts. which could not be preserved unless they
were represented & had a negative in the Genl. Government.
He had no objection to the members in
the 2d. b. voting per capita, as had been suggested by
(Mr. Gerry).

Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinkney
as a reasonable compromise.

Mr. Gerry said he should like the motion, but could
see no hope of success. An accommodation must
take place, and it was apparent from what had been
seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion.
He was utterly against a partial confederacy,
leaving other States to accede or not accede, as had
been intimated.

Mr. King said it was always with regret that he
differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to
differ from (Mr. Gerry) on this occasion. He considered
the proposed Government as substantially
and formally, a General and National Government
over the people of America. There never will be a
case in which it will act as a federal Government on
the States and not on the individual Citizens. And
is it not a clear principle that in a free Govt. those
who are to be the objects of a Govt. ought to influence
the operations of it? What reason can be assigned
why the same rule of representation sd. not prevail in
the 2d. branch as in the 1st? He could conceive none.
On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented
itself, seemed to require it. Two objections
had been raised agst. it, drawn 1. from the terms of the
existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the
smaller States.—As to the first objection he thought
it inapplicable. According to the existing Confederation,
the rule by which the public burdens is to be
apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the
proposed Governt. it cannot be fixed, because indirect
taxation is to be substituted. The Legislature
therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in

such modes & proportions as they may judge expedient.
As to the 2d. objection, he thought it of as
little weight. The Genl. Governt. can never wish to intrude
on the State Governts. There could be no temptation.
None had been pointed out. In order to
prevent the interference of measures which seemed
most likely to happen, he would have no objection to
throwing all the State debts into the federal debt,
making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of
dollars, and leaving it to be discharged by the Genl.
Govt. According to the idea of securing the State
Govts. there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 2d. was admitted to be necessary, and
was actually meant, to check the 1st. branch, to give
more wisdom, system, & stability to the Govt. and
ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to
be proportioned to them. For the third purpose of
securing the States, there ought then to be a 3d. branch,
representing the States as such, and guarding by
equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not
pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate
Constituents as his colleagues, but it was his
firm belief that Masts. would never be prevailed on to
yield to an equality of votes. In N. York, (he was
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that
State in the absence of its representatives, but the
occasion required it), in N. York he had seen that the
most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents
to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was
pointed agst. the vicious constitution of Congs. with
regard to representation & suffrage. He was sure
that no Govt. could last that was not founded on just
principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an
allowance of an equal vote to all the States. It
would be better he thought to submit to a little more
confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an
evil. It was difficult to say what the views of different
Gentlemen might be. Perhaps there might be
some who thought no Governmt. co-extensive with
the U. States could be established with a hope of its
answering the purpose. Perhaps there might be
other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we
are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid
that Gentlemen should speak out that we might
understand one another.

Mr. Strong. The Convention had been much divided
in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences
of it, an accommodation had been proposed.
A Committee had been appointed: and though some
of the members of it were averse to an equality of
votes, a Report had been made in favor of it. It is
agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an
end. If no Accommodation takes place, the Union
itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested
that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a Scheme
of Government. But will the small States in that
case ever accede it. Is it probable that the large
States themselves will under such circumstances embrace
and ratify it. He thought the small States
had made a considerable concession in the article of
money bills, and that they might naturally expect

some concessions on the other side. From this view
of the matter he was compelled to give his vote for
the Report taken altogether.

Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the
proper foundation of Governmt. was destroyed, by
substituting an equality in place of a proportional
Representation, no proper superstructure would be
raised. If the small States really wish for a Government
armed with the powers necessary to secure
their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger
members as well as themselves he could not help
thinking them extremely mistaken in their means.
He reminded them of the consequences of laying the
existing Confederation on improper principles. All
the principal parties to its compilation joined immediately
in mutilating & fettering the Governmt. in
such a manner that it has disappointed every hope
placed in it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments
used by themselves on a former occasion. It
had been very properly observed by (Mr. Patterson)
that Representation was an expedient by which the
meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary;
And that the representatives ought
therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which
their constituents if convened would respectively
have Was not this remark as applicable to one
branch of the Representation as to the other? But
it had been said that the Governt. would in its operation
be partly federal, partly national; that altho' in
the latter respect the Representatives of the people
ought to be in proportion to the people; yet in the

former it ought to be according to the number of
States. If there was any solidity in this distinction
he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it
ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Genl.
Governmt is to act on the people, let the people be
represented and the votes be proportional. In all
cases where the Governt. is to act on the States as
such in like manner as Congs. now acts on them, let
the States be represented & the votes be equal.
This was the true ground of compromise if there was
any ground at all. But he denied that there was any
ground. He called for a single instance in which the
Genl. Govt. was not to operate on the people individually.
The practicability of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had
been exploded on all hands. He observed that the
people of the large States would in some way or
other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to
the importance accruing from their superior numbers.
If they could not effect it by a proportional representation
in the Govt. they would probably accede to
no Govt. which did not in a great measure depend for
its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation; in which
case they would indirectly secure their object. The
existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of
the Genl. Govt. were to be executed by the particular
Govts. the latter had a weight in proportion to their
importance. No one would say that either in Congs.
or out of Congs. Delaware had equal weight with
Pennsylva. If the latter was to supply ten times as
much money as the former, and no compulsion could
be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she
should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch
confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal.
But Holland which supplies about half the money,
governed the whole republic. He enumerated the
objections agst. an equality of votes in the 2d. branch,
notwithstanding the proportional representation in
the first, 1. the minority could negative the will of
the majority of the people. 2. they could extort
measures by making them a condition of their assent
to other necessary measures. 3. they could
obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the
peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate.
4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would increase
with every new State that should be admitted,
as they must all be admitted on the principle of
equality. 5. the perpetuity it would give to the
preponderance of the Northn. agst. the Southn. Scale
was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be
pretty well understood that the real difference of interests
lay, not between the large & small but between
the N. & Southn. States. The institution of
slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination.
There were 5 States on the South, 8 on
the Northn. side of this line. Should a proport1. representation
take place it was true, the N. side would still
outnumber the other; but not in the same degree, at
this time; and every day would tend towards an
equilibrium.

Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If equality
in the 2d. branch was an error that time would

correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it being
sensible that perfection was unattainable in any
plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual
error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in
the Representation, like an error in the first concoction,
must be followed by disease, convulsions,
and finally death itself. The justice of the general
principle of proportional representation has not in
argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is
said that a departure from it so far as to give the
States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature
is essential to their preservation. He had considered
this position maturely, but could not see its application.
That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.
But does it follow that an equality of votes
is necessary for the purpose? Is there any reason to
suppose that if their preservation should depend
more on the large than on the small States the security
of the States agst. the Genl. Government would be
diminished? Are the large States less attached to
their existence more likely to commit suicide, than
the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as
far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections
to this insuperable one: The great fault of
the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has
never been a complaint agst. Congs. that they governed
over much. The complaint has been that they
have governed too little. To remedy this defect we
were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing
an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this
very equality carries us directly to Congress; to the
system which it is our duty to rectify. The small
States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality,
but they may controul the Govt. as they have done
in Congs. This very measure is here prosecuted by a
minority of the people of America. Is then the object
of the Convention likely to be accomplished in
this way? Will not our Constituents say? we sent
you to form an efficient Govt. and you have given
us one more complex indeed, but having all the
weakness of the former governt. He was anxious
for uniting all the States under one Governt. He
knew there were some respectable men who preferred
three confederacies, united by offensive & defensive
alliances. Many things may be plausibly
said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such
a project. He could not however concur in it himself;
but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad
first principles.

Mr. Elseworth asked two questions, one of Mr. Wilson,
whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in
Congs. for want of a majority of States in its favor?
He had himself never known such an instance: the
other of Mr. Madison whether a negative lodged with
the majority of the States even the smallest, could
be more dangerous than the qualified negative proposed
to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate,
who must be taken from some one State?

Mr. Sherman, signified that his expectation was
that the Genl. Legislature would in some cases act on
the federal principle, of requiring quotas. But he
thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own

plans into execution, if the States should fail to
supply their respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinkney's motion
for allowing N. H. 2. Mas. 4. &c—it passed in
the negative,

Mass. no. Mr. King ay. Mr. Ghorum absent. Cont.
no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Adjourned.[126]