University of Virginia Library

Saturday June 9th.[64] Mr. Luther Martin from
Maryland took his seat. In Committee of the
Whole

Mr. Gerry, according to previous notice given by

him, moved "that the national Executive should
be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion
of votes should be the same with that allowed
to the States in the election of the Senate." If the
appointmt. should be made by the Natl. Legislature,
it would lessen that independence of the Executive
which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue
and corruption between the Executive & Legislature
previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive
afterwards to the friends who promoted him.
Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary.
He proposed that of appointing by the State
Executives as most analogous to the principle observed
in electing the other branches of the Natl.
Govt.; the first branch being chosen by the people of
the States, & the 2d. by the Legislatures of the States,
he did not see any objection agst. letting the Executive
be appointed by the Executives of the States.
He supposed the Executives would be most likely to
select the fittest men, and that it would be their
interest to support the man of their own choice.

Mr. Randolph, urged strongly the inexpediency of
Mr. Gerry's mode of appointing the Natl Executive.
The confidence of the people would not be secured
by it to the Natl. magistrate. The small States
would lose all chance of an appointmt. from within
themselves. Bad appointments would be made;
the Executives of the States being little conversant
with characters not within their own small spheres.
The State Executives too notwithstanding their constitutional
independence, being in fact dependent on

the State Legislatures will generally be guided by
the views of the latter, and prefer either favorites
within the States, or such as it may be expected will
be most partial to the interests of the State. A
Natl. Executive thus chosen will not be likely to
defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the National
rights agst. State encroachments. Vacancies
also must happen. How can these be filled? He
could not suppose either that the Executives would
feel the interest in supporting the Natl. Executive
which had been imagined. They will not cherish
the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry
shrubs.

On the question for referring the appointment of
the Natl. Executive to the State Executives as propd.
by Mr. Gerry Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no.
N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. drvd. Md. no. Va. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no.[65]

Mr. Patterson moves that the Committee resume
the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Natl
Legislature.

Mr. Brearly[66] seconds him. He was sorry he said
that any question on this point was brought into
view. It had been much agitated in Congs. at the

time of forming the Confederation, and was then
rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State
an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must
have been destroyed instead of being saved. The
substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness
on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was
unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the
States by the quota of Congs., Virga. would have 16
votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to
the others will make the whole number ninety.
There will be 3 large states, and 10 small ones. The
large States by which he meant Massts. Pena. & Virga.
will carry every thing before them. It had been
admitted, and was known to him from facts within
N. Jersey that where large & small counties were
united into a district for electing representatives for
the district, the large counties always carried their
point, and Consequently that the large States would
do so. Virga. with her sixteen votes will be a solid column
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia
with her Solitary vote, and the other little States will
be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the
scale of some large one, in order to have any weight
at all. He had come to the convention with a view
of being as useful as he could in giving energy and
stability to the federal Government. When the
proposition for destroying the equality of votes came
forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it
fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have
an equal vote with Virga.? He would not say it was.
What remedy then? One only, that a map of the
U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries
be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be
made into 13 equal parts.

Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a
proportional representation as striking at the existence
of the lesser States. He wd. premise however to
an investigation of this question some remarks on
the nature structure and powers of the Convention.
The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of
an Act of Congs. that this act was recited in several
of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. which
he required to be read: that the amendment of the
Confederacy was the object of all the laws and Commissions
on the subject: that the articles of the Confederation
were therefore the proper basis of all the
proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep
within its limits, or we should be charged by our
Constituents with usurpation, that the people of
America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived.
But the Commissions under which we acted were
not only the measure of our power, they denoted also
the sentiments of the States on the subject of our
deliberation. The idea of a National Govt. as contradistinguished
from a federal one, never entered
into the mind of any of them, and to the public
mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have
no power to go beyond the federal Scheme, and if we
had the people are not ripe for any other. We must
follow the people; the people will not follow us.—
The proposition could not be maintained whether
considered in reference to us as a nation, or as a confederacy.

A confederacy supposes sovereignty in
the members composing it & sovereignty supposes
equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all
State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must
be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division
is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation.
He held up Virga. Massts. & Pa. as the
three large States, and the other ten as small ones;
repeating the calculations of Mr. Brearly, as to the
disparity of votes which wd. take place, and affirming
that the small States would never agree to it. He
said there was no more reason that a great individual
State contributing much, should have more votes
than a small one contributing little, than that a rich
individual citizen should have more votes than an
indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to
that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have
40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle
would never be admitted, and if it were admitted
would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has
more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute
more for the common protection. The same
may be said of a large State wch. has more to be protected
than a small one. Give the large States an
influence in proportion to their magnitude, and what
will be the consequence? Their ambition will be
proportionally increased, and the small States will
have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by
Galloway & some others that America should be
represented in the British Parlt. and then be bound
by its laws. America could not have been entitled
to more than 1/3 of the no. of Representatives which
would fall to the share of G. B. Would American
rights & interests have been safe under an authority
thus constituted? It has been said that if a Natl.
Govt. is to be formed so as to operate on the people,
and not on the States, the representatives ought to
be drawn from the people. But why so? May not
a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures operate
on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or
may not a practicable coercion be found. He admitted
that there was none such in the existing
System.—He was attached strongly to the plan of
the existing Confederacy, in which the people chuse
their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures
their federal representatives. No other amendments
were wanting than to mark the orbits of the
States with due precision, and provide for the use of
coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to
the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson of the
necessity to which the large States might be reduced
of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of
the others to concur. Let them unite if they please,
but let them remember that they have no authority
to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will never
confederate on the plan before the Committee. She
would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a
monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would
not only oppose the plan here but on his return home
do every thing in his power to defeat it there.

Mr. Wilson, hoped if the Confederacy should be
dissolved, that a majority, that a minority of the

States would unite for their safety. He entered
elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation,
stating for his first position that as all
authority was derived from the people, equal numbers
of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives,
and different numbers of people different
numbers of representatives. This principle had been
improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to
the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case
of A. & B. stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed that
in districts as large as the States, the number of
people was the best measure of their comparative
wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were
to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr. P. admitted
persons, not property to be the measure of
suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pena. equal to those
of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to
balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different
districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion
to each other, as their respective Constituents
hold to each other. If the small States will not
confederate on this plan, Pena. & he presumed some
other States, would not confederate on any other.
We have been told that each State being sovereign,
all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign
over himself, and all men are therefore naturally
equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes
a member of Civil Government. He can not. As
little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a
member of a federal governt. If N. J. will not part
with her sovereignty it is vain to talk of Govt. A new
partition of the States is desirable, but evidently &
totally impracticable.

Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison
of the different States, to Counties of different
sizes within the same State; observing that proportional
representation was admitted to be just in the
latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested
in the former.

The Question being about to be put Mr. Patterson
hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be
thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow,
which was done, nem. con.

The Come. rose & the House adjourned.