University of Virginia Library

THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON.

JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1787.

Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the
meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising
the federal System of Government. On that day
a small number only had assembled. Seven States
were not convened till,

Friday 25 of May, when the following members
appeared to wit:

From Massachusetts, Rufus King. N. York, Robert
Yates,[1] Alexr. Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly,
William Churchill Houston, William Patterson. Pennsylvania,
Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James

Wilson, Governeur Morris. Delaware, George Read,
Richard Basset,[2] Jacob Broome. Virginia, George
Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair,[3] James
Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James
McClurg. N Carolina, Alexander Martin, William
Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh
Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler.
Georgia, William Few.[4]

Mr. Robert Morris[5] informed the members assembled

FIRST PAGE OF THE JOURNAL, SHOWING NOTE ON A SEPARATE SLIP OF PAPER INSERTED WHERE MADISON INDICATED IT SHOULD GO.
(Actual size.)

that by the instruction & in behalf, of the
deputation of Pena. he proposed George Washington,
Esqr. late Commander in chief for president
of the Convention. Mr. Jno. Rutlidge seconded the
motion; expressing his confidence that the choice
would be unanimous, and observing that the presence
of Genl. Washington forbade any observations
on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.

General Washington[6] was accordingly unanimously
elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by
Mr. R. Morris and Mr. Rutlidge; from which in a
very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention
for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded
them of the novelty of the scene of business in which
he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications,
and claimed the indulgence of the House

towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience
might occasion.

(The nomination came with particular grace from
Peñna, as Docr. Franklin alone could have been
thought of as a competitor. The Docr. was himself
to have made the nomination of General Washington,
but the state of the weather and of his health confined
him to his house.)

Mr. Wilson[7] moved that a Secretary be appointed,
and nominated Mr. Temple Franklin.

Col Hamilton[8] nominated Major Jackson.

On the ballot Majr. Jackson had 5 votes & Mr.
Franklin 2 votes.

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was
noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited
from changing the Article in the Confederation
establishing an equality of votes among the States.[9]

The appointment of a Committee, consisting of
Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton & C. Pinckney, on the
motion of Mr. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules
& orders was the only remaining step taken on this
day.

Monday May 28.—

From Massts. Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From
Connecticut Oliver Elseworth. From Delaware,
Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James Mc Henry.
From Penna. B. Franklin, George Clymer, Ths. Mifflin
& Jared Ingersol, took their seats.[10]

Mr. Wythe[11] from the Committee for preparing
rules made a report which employed the deliberations
of this day.

Mr. King[12] objected to one of the rules in the Report
authorizing any member to call for the yeas &
nays and have them entered on the minutes. He
urged that as the acts of the Convention were not
to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to
exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper
as changes of opinion would be frequent in the
course of the business & would fill the minutes with
contradictions.

Col. Mason[13] seconded the objection; adding that
such a record of the opinions of members would be
an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and
in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish
handles to the adversaries of the Result of the
Meeting.

The proposed rule was rejected nem. contrad
certe. The standing rules[14] agreed to were as follows:[15]

Viz.

A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies
of not less than seven States; and all questions
shall be decided by the greater number of these

which shall be fully represented; but a less number
than seven may adjourn from day to day.

Immediately after the President shall have taken
the chair, and the members their seats, the minutes
of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary.

Every member, rising to speak, shall address the
President; and whilst he shall be speaking, none
shall pass between them, or hold discourse with
another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed
or manuscript—and of two members rising at the
same time, the President shall name him who shall
be first heard.

A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without
special leave, upon the same question; and not
the second time, before every other, who had been
silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak
upon the subject.

A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated,
and if written, as it shall be when any member shall
so require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it
shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any
time, before the vote upon it shall have been declared.

Orders of the day shall be read next after the
minutes, and either discussed or postponed, before
any other business shall be introduced.

When a debate shall arise upon a question, no
motion, other than to amend the question, to commit
it, or to postpone the debate shall be received.

[16] A question which is complicated, shall, at the

request of any member, be divided, and put separately
on the propositions of which it is compounded.

The determination of a question, altho' fully debated,
shall be postponed, if the deputies of any
State desire it until the next day.

A writing which contains any matter brought on
to be considered, shall be read once throughout for
information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and
again, with the amendments, if any, made on the
second reading; and afterwards the question shall
be put on the whole, amended, or approved in its
original form, as the case shall be.

Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the
members who have the greatest number of ballots,
altho' not a majority of the votes present, shall be
the Committee. When two or more members have
an equal number of votes, the member standing first
on the list in the order of taking down the ballots,
shall be preferred.

A member may be called to order by any other
member, as well as by the President; and may be
allowed to explain his conduct or expressions supposed
to be reprehensible. And all questions of
order shall be decided by the President without
appeal or debate.

Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which
may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the
question shall be put without a debate.

When the House shall adjourn, every member
shall stand in his place, until the President pass him.

A letter from sundry persons of the State of
Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable The Chairman
of the General Convention was presented to
the Chair by Mr. Govr. Morris,[17] and being read,[18] was

ordered to lie on the table for further consideration.

Mr. Butler[19] moved that the House provide agst
interruption of business by absence of members, and

against licentious publications of their proceedings
—to which was added by—Mr. Spaight[20] —a motion
to provide that on the one hand the House might
not be precluded by a vote upon any question, from
revising the subject matter of it, When they see cause,
nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a
decision, which was the result of mature discussion.
—Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be
referred for the consideration of the Committee appointed
to draw up the standing rules and that the
Committee make report thereon.

Adjj. till tomorrow 10. OClock.

Tuesday May 29.

John Dickenson and Elbridge Gerry, the former
from Delaware, the latter from Massts. took their
seats. The following rules were added, on the report
of Mr. Wythe from the Committee—

That no member be absent from the House, so as
to interrupt the representation of the State, without
leave.

That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall
be or ought to be, sitting.

That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal
during the sitting of the House without leave of the
House.

That members only be permitted 10 inspect the
journal.

That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or
otherwise published or communicated without leave.

That a motion to reconsider a matter which has
been determined by a majority, may be made, with
leave unanimously given, on the same day on which
the vote passed; but otherwise not without one
day's previous notice: in which last case, if the
House agree to the reconsideration, some future day
shall be assigned for that purpose.

Mr. C. Pinkney[21] moved that a Committee be appointed
to superintend the Minutes.

Mr. Govr. Morris objected to it. The entry of the
proceedings of the Convention belonged to the
Secretary as their impartial officer. A committee
might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry
according to their opinions and wishes.

The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.

Mr. Randolph[22] then opened the main business.[23]

He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him,
rather than those, who were of longer standing in
life and political experience, to open the great subject
of their mission. But, as the convention had
originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed
that some proposition was expected from
them, they had imposed this task on him.

He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis,
and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the
prophecies of the American downfal.

He observed that in revising the fœderal system
we ought to inquire 1. into the properties, which
such a government ought to possess, 2. the defects
of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation
& 4. the remedy.

1.

• The Character of such a government ought
  to secure 1. against foreign invasion: 2. against
  dissensions between members of the Union, or seditions
  in particular States: 3. to procure to the
  several States various blessings, of which an isolated
  situation was incapable: 4. to be able to defend
  

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  itself against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount
  to the state constitutions.

2.

• In speaking of the defects of the confederation
  he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered
  them as having done all that patriots could
  do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions,
  & of confederacies,—when the inefficiency of
  requisitions was unknown—no commercial discord
  had arisen among any States—no rebellion had appeared
  as in Massts—foreign debts had not become
  urgent—the havoc of paper money had not been
  foreseen—treaties had not been violated—and perhaps
  nothing better could be obtained from the
  jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.

  He then proceeded to enumerate the defects, I.
  that the confederation produced no security against
  foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to
  prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority
  —Of this he cited many examples; most of
  which tended to shew, that they could not cause
  infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be
  punished: that particular states might by their conduct
  provoke war without controul; and that
  neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on
  such occasions, enlistments only could be successful,
  and these could not be executed without money.

  2, that the fœderal govemment could not check
  the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any,
  not having constitutional power nor means to interpose
  accordingly to the exigency.

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  17

  
  
  

  3, that there were many advantages, which the
  U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under
  the confederation—such as a productive impost—— —
  counteraction of the commercial regulations of other
  nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum,—&c &c.

  4, that the foederal government could not defend
  itself against encroachments from the states.

  5, that it was not even paramount to the state
  constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the states.

3.

• He next reviewed the danger of our situation,
  appealed to the sense of the best friends of the U. S.
  the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government
  every where; and to other considerations.

4.

• He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of
  which he said must be the republican principle.

He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following
resolutions, which he explained one by one.

1.

• Resolved that the articles of Confederation
  ought to be so corrected & enlarged as to accomplish
  the objects proposed by their institution; namely,
  "common defence, security of liberty, and general
  welfare."

2.

• Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the
  National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the
  Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free
  inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
  best in different cases.

3.

• Resd. that the National Legislature ought to
  consist of two branches.

4.

• Resd. that the members of the first branch of
  the National Legislature ought to be elected by the
  

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  people of the several States every——— for the
  term of———; to be of the age of— — years at
  least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may
  be compensated for the devotion of their time to the
  public service; to be ineligible to any office established
  by a particular State, or under the authority
  of the United States, except those peculiarly belong
  to the functions of the first branch, during the term
  of service, and for the space of——— after its
  expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the
  space of —— after the expiration of their term of
  service, and to be subject to recall.

5.

• Resold. that the members of the second branch
  of the National Legislature ought to be elected by
  those of the first, out of a proper number of persons
  nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of
  the age of——years at least; to hold their offices
  for a term sufficient to ensure their independency;
  to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be
  compensated for the devotion of their time to the
  public service; and to be ineligible to any office
  established by a particular State, or under the
  authority of the United States, except those peculiarly
  belonging to the functions of the second
  branch, during the term of service; and for the
  space of——— after the expiration thereof.

6.

• Resolved that each branch ought to possess
  the right of originating Acts; that the National
  Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
  Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation
  & moreover to legislate in all cases to
  

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  which the separate States are incompetent, or in
  which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted
  by the exercise of individual Legislation;
  to negative all laws passed by the several States
  contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
  the articles of Union; and to call forth the
  force of the Union agst. any member of the Union
  failing to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof.

7.

• Resd. that a National Executive be instituted;
  to be chosen by the National Legislature for the
  term of——— years, to receive punctually at stated
  times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered,
  in which no increase or diminution shall be made
  so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of
  increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second
  time; and that besides a general authority to execute
  the national laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive
  rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.

8.

• Resd. that the Executive and a convenient
  number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose
  a Council of revision with authority to examine
  every act of the National Legislature before it shall
  operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before
  a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the
  dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection,
  unless the Act of the National Legislature be
  again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be
  again negatived by——— of the members of each
  branch.

9.

• Resd. that a National Judiciary be established
  to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of
  

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  inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature,
  to hold their offices during good behaviour;
  and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation
  for their services, in which no increase or
  diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
  actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
  That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals
  shall be to hear & determine in the first instance,
  and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine
  in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the
  high seas, captures from an enemy: cases in which
  foreigners or Citizens of other States applying to
  such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect
  the collection of the National revenue; impeachments
  of any national officers, and questions
  which may involve the national peace and harmony.

10.

• Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for
  the admission of States lawfully arising within the
  limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary
  junction of Government & Territory or otherwise,
  with the consent of a number of voices in the
  National Legislature less than the whole.

11.

• Resd. that a Republican Government & the
  territory of each State, except in the instance of a
  voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought
  to be guarantied by the United States to each State.

12.

• Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
  continuance of Congress and their authorities and
  privileges, until a given day after the reform of the
  articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion
  of all their engagements.

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21





13.

• Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
  amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it
  shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National
  Legislature ought not to be required thereto.

14.

• Resd. that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary
  powers within the several States ought to be
  bound by oath to support the articles of "Union.

15.

• Resd. that the amendments which shall be
  offered to the Confederation, by the Convention
  ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation
  of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or
  assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the
  several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the
  people to consider & decide thereon.

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer
the present opportunity of establishing general
peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U. S.
to pass away unimproved.[24]

It was then Resolved—That the House will tomorrow
resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole
House to consider of the state of the American
Union—and that the propositions moved by Mr.
Randolph be referred to the said Committee.

Mr. Charles Pinkney laid before the House the
draft of a federal Government which he had prepared,
to be agreed upon between the free and

independent States of America.[25] —Mr. P. plan ordered
that the same be referred to the Committee
of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the
American Union.[26]

CHARLES PINCKNEY'S LETTER.
(Reduced.)

We the People of the States of New Hampshire
Massachusetts Rhode Island & Providence Plantations

Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania
Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina
South Carolina & Georgia do ordain, declare &

THE PINCKNEY DRAFT.
(Reduced.)

establish the following Constitution for the government
of ourselves & Posterity.

Article I:

The Style of this Government shall be The United
States of America & the Government shall consist of
supreme legislative Executive & judicial Powers.

2

The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress
to consist of two separate Houses—one to be
called the House of Delegates & the other the
Senate who shall meet on the———— — — Day
of——— every year.

3

The members of the House of Delegates shall be
chosen every——— year by the people of the
several States & the qualification of the electors
shall be the same as those of the electors in the
several States for their legislatures—each member
shall have been a citizen of the United States for
———years; and shall be of— — — years
of age & a resident in the State he is chosen for———
Until a census of the people shall be taken in the
manner herein after mentioned the House of Delegates
shall consist of———— — — to
be chosen from the different States in the following
proportions: for New Hampshire,———; for
Massachusetts——— for Rhode Island,— — —
for Connecticut,——— for New York— — —
for New Jersey,——— for Pennsylvania,— — —
for Delaware,——— for Mary1d.,— — —
for Virginia,——— for North Carolina,— — —

for South Carolina,——— for Georgia,— — —
& the Legislature shall hereafter regulate the number
of delegates by the number of inhabitants according
to the Provisions herein after made, at the rate
of one for every——— thousand.— All money bills
of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates
& shall not be altered by the Senate. The House
of Delegates shall exclusively possess the power of
impeachment & shall choose it's own officers &
vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive
authority of the State in the representation from
which they shall happen.

4

The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House
of Delegates which House immediately after their
meeting shall choose by ballot——— Senators
from among the Citizens & residents of New Hampshire
———from among those of Massachusetts
—from among those of Rhode Island———
from among those of Connecticut——— from
among those of New York——— from among
those of New Jersey—from among those of
Pennsylvania——— from among those of Delaware
———from among those of Maryland— — —
from among those of Virginia——— from among
those of North Carolina——— from among those
of South Carolina &——— from among those of
Georgia———

The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts
Rhode Island & Connecticut shall form one

class—those from New York New Jersey Pennsylvania
& Delaware one class—& those from Maryland
Virginia North Carolina South Carolina &
Georgia one class.

The House of Delegates shall number these Classes
one two & three & fix the times of their service by
Lot—the first class shall serve for—— — years — the
second for—years & the third for—— —
years—as their times of service expire the House
of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for
———years & they shall fill all vacancies that
arise from death or resignation for the time of service
remaining of the members so dying or resigning.

Each Senator shall be——— years of age at least
—shall have been a Citizen of the United States 4
years before his election & shall be a resident of the
State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose
its own Officers.

5

Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of
holding elections by the People for the house of
Delegates & the House of Delegates shall be the
judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of
their members.

In each house a Majority shall constitute a
Quorum to do business—Freedom of Speech &
Debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or
Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of
both Houses shall in all cases except for Treason
Felony or Breach of the Peace be free from arrest

during their attendance at Congress & in going to
& returning from it—Both Houses shall keep journals
of their Proceedings & publish them except on secret
occasions & the yeas & nays may be entered thereon
at the desire of one——of the members present.
Neither house without the consent of the other
shall adjourn for more than——— days nor to
any Place but where they are sitting.

The members of each house shall not be eligible
to or capable of holding any office under the Union
during the time for which they have been respectively
elected nor the members of the Senate for one
year after.

The members of each house shall be paid for their
services by the States which they represent.

Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature
shall be presented to the President of the United
States for his revision—if he approves it he shall
sign it—but if he does not approve it he shall return
it with his objections to the house it originated in,
which house if two thirds of the members present,
notwithstanding the President's objections agree to
pass it, shall send it to the other house with the
President's objections, where if two thirds of the
members present also agree to pass it, the same shall
become a law—& all bills sent to the President &
not returned by him within——— days shall be
laws unless the Legislature by their adjournment
prevent their return in which case they shall not be
laws.

6th

The Legislature of the United States shall have
the power to lay & collect Taxes Duties Imposts &
excises

To regulate Commerce with all nations & among
the several States.

To borrow money & emit bills of Credit

To establish Post offices.

To raise armies

To build & equip Fleets

To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining
the Militia of the United States

To subdue a rebellion in any State on application
of its legislature

To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins
& fix the Standard of Weights & measures

To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect
such fortifications as may be necessary for the
United States & to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction
therein

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court

To establish Post & military Roads

To establish & provide for a national University
at the Seat of the Government of the United States

To establish uniform rules of Naturalization

To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government
for the United States not exceeding———
miles square in which they shall have exclusive
jurisdiction

To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy

To declare the law & Punishment of piracies &
felonies at sea & of counterfeiting Coin & of all
offences against the Laws of Nations

To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the
laws of the Union enforce treaties suppress insurrections
and repel invasions

And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing
powers into execution.

The Legislature of the United States shall have
the Power to declare the Punishment of Treason
which shall consist only in levying War against the
United States or any of them or in adhering to their
Enemies. No person shall be convicted of Treason
but by the testimony of two witnesses.

The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated
by the whole number of inhabitants of every
description which number shall within——— years
after the first meeting of the Legislature & within
the term of every——— year after be taken in the
manner to be prescribed by the legislature

No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from
the States—nor capitation tax but in proportion to
the Census before directed

All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the
assent of two thirds of the members present in each
house—The United States shall not grant any title
of Nobility—The Legislature of the United States
shall pass no Law on the subject of Religion, nor
touching or abridging the Liberty of the Press nor

shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever
be suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.

All acts made by the Legislature of the United
States pursuant to this Constitution & all Treaties
made under the authority of the United States shall
be the supreme Law of the land & all Judges shall
be bound to consider them as such in their decisions.

7

The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power
to declare War & to make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors
& other Ministers to foreign nations &
Judges of the Supreme Court.

They shall have the exclusive power to regulate
the manner of deciding all disputes & controversies
now subsisting or which may arise between the States
respecting Jurisdiction or Territory.

8

The Executive Power of the United States shall
be vested in a President of the United States of
America which shall be his style & his title shall
be His Excellency. He shall be elected for———
years & shall be reeligible.

He shall from time to time give information to
the Legislature of the state of the Union & recommend
to their consideration the measures he may
think necessary—he shall take care that the laws of
the United States be duly executed: he shall commission
all the officers of the United States & except
as to Ambassadors other ministers and Judges of

the Supreme Court he shall nominate & with the
consent of the Senate appoint all other officers of the
United States. He shall receive public Ministers
from foreign nations & may correspond with the
Executives of the different States. He shall have
power to grant pardons & reprieves except in impeachments
—He shall be Commander in chief of
the army & navy of the United States & of the
Militia of the several States & shall receive a compensation
which shall not be increased or diminished
during his continuance in office. At entering on the
Duties of his office he shall take an oath faithfully
to execute the duties of a President of the United
States.—He shall be removed from his office on impeachment
by the house of Delegates & Conviction
in the Supreme Court of Treason bribery or Corruption
—In case of his removal death resignation or
disability the President of the Senate shall exercise
the duties of his office until another President be
chosen—& in case of the death of the President of the
Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall
do so.

9

The Legislature of the United States shall have
the Power and it shall be their duty to establish
such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as shall
be necessary—The Judges of the Courts shall hold
their offices during good behaviour & receive a compensation,
which shall not be increased or diminished
during their continuance in office—One of these

Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose
jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the
laws of the United States or affecting ambassadors
other public Ministers & Consuls—to the trial of impeachment
of officers of the United States—to all
cases of Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction—In cases
of impeachment affecting ambassadors and other
public Ministers this Jurisdiction shall be original &
in all other cases appellate———

All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment)
shall be tried in the State where they shall be
committed—the trials shall be open & public &
shall be by Jury.

10

Immediately after the first census of the people
of the United States the House of Delegates shall
apportion the Senate by electing for each State out
of the citizens resident therein one Senator for every
———members each State shall have in the House
of Delegates—Each State shall be entitled to have
at least one member in the Senate.

11

No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal
or enter into treaty or alliance or confederation nor
grant any title of nobility nor without the Consent
of the Legislature of the United States lay any
impost on imports—nor keep troops or Ships of War
in time of peace—nor enter into compacts with other
States or foreign powers or emit bills of Credit or

make any thing but Gold Silver or Copper a tender
in payment of debts nor engage in War except for
self defence when actually invaded or the danger
of invasion be so great as not to admit of a delay until
the Government of the United States can be informed
thereof—& to render these prohibitions effectual
the Legislature of the United States shall have
the power to revise the laws of the several States
that may be supposed to infringe the Powers exclusively
delegated by this Constitution to Congress
& to negative & annul such as do.

12

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges & immunities of Citizens in the several
States—Any person charged with Crimes in any
State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand
of the Executive of the State from which he fled be
delivered up & removed to the State having jurisdiction
of the offence.

13

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts
of the Legislature & to the records & judicial Proceedings
of the Courts & magistrates of every State.

14

The Legislature shall have power to admit new
States into the Union on the same terms with the
original States provided two thirds of the members
present in both Houses agree.

15

On the application of the legislature of a State
the United States shall protect it against domestic
insurrection.

16

If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States
apply for the same the Legislature of the United
States shall call a Convention for the purpose of
amending the Constitution—or should Congress,
with the Consent of two thirds of each house, propose
to the States amendments to the same—the
agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments
parts of the Constitution.

The Ratification of the conventions of———
States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.[27]

Adjourned.

Wednesday May 30.

Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on
the State of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to
the Chair by Ballot.

The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been
referred to the Com̃ittee being taken up. He moved
on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first
of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the
articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed
by their institution; namely, common defence,
security of liberty, and general welfare,—should be
postponed, in order to consider the 3 following:

1.

• that a union of the States merely federal will
  not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles
  of Confederation, namely common defence, security
  of liberty, & genl welfare.

2.

• that no treaty or treaties among the whole or
  

  ---

  38

  
  
  
  part of the States, as individual Sovereignties, would
  be sufficient.

3.

• that a national Government ought to be established
  consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive
  & Judiciary.

The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr.
Govr. Morris and unanimously agreed to.

Some verbal criticisms were raised agst. the first
proposition, and it was agreed on motion of Mr.
Butler seconded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on to
the third, which underwent a discussion, less however
on its general merits than on the force and
extent of the particular terms national & supreme.

Mr. Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr. Randolph,
whether he meant to abolish the State Governts.
altogether. Mr. R. replied that he meant by
these general propositions merely to introduce the
particular ones which explained the outlines of the
system he had in view.

Mr. Butler said he had not made up his mind on the
subject, and was open to the light which discussion
might throw on it. After some general observations
he concluded with saying that he had opposed the
grant of powers to Congs. heretofore, because the
whole power was vested in one body. The proposed
distribution of the powers into different bodies
changed the case, and would induce him to go great
lengths.

Genl. Pinkney[28] expressed a doubt whether the act

of Congs recom̃ending the Convention, or the Commissions
of the Deputies to it, could authorize a
discussion of a system founded on different principles
from the federal Constitution.

Mr. Gerry[29] seemed to entertain the same doubt.

Mr. Govr. Morris explained the distinction between
a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former
being a mere compact resting on the good faith of
the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive
operation. He contended that in all Communities
there must be one supreme power, and one
only.

Mr. Mason observed that the present confederation
was not only deficient in not providing for
coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but
argued very cogently that punishment could not in
the nature of things be executed on the States collectively,
and therefore that such a Govt. was necessary
as could directly operate on individuals, and would
punish those only whose guilt required it.

Mr. Sherman[30] who took his seat today, admitted
that the Confederation had not given sufficient power
to Congs. and that additional powers were necessary;
particularly that of raising money which he said
would involve many other powers. He admitted
also that the General & particular jurisdictions ought
in no case to be concurrent. He seemed however
not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the
existing system; intimating as one reason, that it
would be wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting
such as would not be agreed to by the States.

It was moved by Mr. Read,[31] . 2ded. by Mr. Chs.

Cotesworth Pinkney, to postpone the 3d. proposition
last offered by Mr. Randolph viz that a national
Government ought to be established consisting of a
supreme Legislative Executive and Judiciary, in
order to take up the following,—viz. "Resolved
that in order to carry into execution the Design of
the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish
the objects proposed by the Confederation
a more effective Government consisting of a Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary, ought to be established."
The motion to postpone for this purpose
was lost:

Yeas Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S.
Carolina—4 Nays. N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina—4.

On the question as moved by Mr. Butler, on the
third proposition it was resolved in Committee of
whole that a national governt. ought to be established
consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive &
Judiciary,—Massts. being ay—Connect. — no. N.
York divided (Col. Hamilton ay Mr. Yates no) Pena
ay. Delaware ay. Virga. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.

The following Resolution, being the 2d. of those proposed
by Mr. Randolph was taken up, viz.—" that the
rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought
to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution,
or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or
the other rule may seem best in different cases."

Mr. Madison[32] observing that the words, "or to the

number of free inhabitants," might occasion debates
which would divert the Committee from the general
question whether the principle of representation
should be changed, moved that they might be struck
out.

Mr. King observed that the quotas of contribution
which would alone remain as the measure of
representation, would not answer, because waving
every other view of the matter, the revenue might
hereafter be so collected by the General Govt. that
the sums respectively drawn from the States would
not appear, and would besides be continually varying.

Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the observation,
and that some better rule ought to be
found.

Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as
to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number
of free inhabitants." Mr. Spaight 2ded. the motion.

It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed,
which was agreed to.

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the
following resolution—" that the rights of suffrage in
the national Legislature ought to be proportioned."

It was moved and 2ded. to amend it by adding
"and not according to the present system"—which
was agreed to.

It was then moved & 2ded. to alter the resolution
so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in
the national Legislature ought not to be according
to the present system."

It was then moved & 2ded. to postpone the Resolution
moved by Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison,
which being agreed to:

Mr. Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties,
the following resolution—" that the equality
of suffrage established by the articles of Confederation
ought not to prevail in the national Legislature,
and that an equitable ratio of representation ought
to be substituted." This was 2ded. by Mr. Govr.
Morris, and being generally relished, would have
been agreed to; when,

Mr. Reed moved that the whole clause relating
to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding
the Come. that the deputies from Delaware
were restrained by their com̃ission from assenting
to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case
such a change should be fixed on, it might become
their duty to retire from the Convention.

Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the valuable assistance

of those members could not be lost without
real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in
the Convention as the secession of a State, would
add much to the regret; that the change proposed
was however so fundamental an article in a national
Govt., that it could not be dispensed with.

Mr. Madison observed that whatever reason might
have existed for the equality of suffrage when the
Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it
must cease when a National Govenmt. should be
put into the place. In the former case, the acts of
Congs. depended so much for their efficacy on the
cooperation of the States, that these had a weight
both within & without Congress, nearly in proportion
to their extent and importance. In the latter case,
as the acts of the Genl. Govt. would take effect without
the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from
a small State wd. have the same efficacy & importance
as a vote from a large one, and there was the same
reason for different numbers of representatives from
different States, as from Counties of different extents
within particular States. He suggested as an expedient
for at once taking the sense of the members
on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from
embarrassment, that the question should be taken
in Committee, and the clause on report to the
House, be postponed without a question there.
This however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read.

By several it was observed that no just construction
of the Act of Delaware, could require or justify
a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were

to be carried thro' the House as well as the Committee.
It was finally agreed however that the
clause should be postponed: it being understood that
in the event the proposed change of representation
would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty
being started from any other quarter than
from Delaware.

The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed
to,

The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported
progress, and the House having resolved to
resume the subject in Committee to-morrow,

Adjourned to 10 O Clock.

Thursday May 31[33]

William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[34]

In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's
propositions.

The 3d. Resolution "that the national Legislature

ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to
without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania,
given probably from complaisance to Docr.
Franklin who was understood to be partial to a
single House of Legislation.

Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the
first branch of the National Legislature ought to be
elected by the people of the several States," being
taken up,

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people,
insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures.
The people he said, immediately should have
as little to do as may be about the Government.
They want information and are constantly liable to
be misled.

Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from
the excess of democracy. The people do not want
virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In
Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience
that they are daily misled into the most baneful
measures and opinions by the false reports circulated
by designing men, and which no one on the spot
can refute. One principal evil arises from the
want of due provision for those employed in the
administration of Governmt. It would seem to
be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants.
He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts.
for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on
that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican
heretofore: he was still however republican,

but had been taught by experience the danger of
the levelling spirit.

Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the
larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand
depository of the democratic principle of the Govt.
It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons—
It ought to know & sympathize with every part of
the community; and ought therefore to be taken
not only from different parts of the whole republic,
but also from different districts of the larger
members of it, which had in several instances particularly
in Virga., different interests and views arising
from difference of produce, of habits &c &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic but
was afraid we sd. incautiously run into the opposite
extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every
class of the people. He had often wondered at the
indifference of the superior classes of society to this
dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however
affluent their circumstances, or elevated their
situations, might be, the course of a few years, not
only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity
throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment,
ought to recommend such a system of policy
as would provide no less carefully for the rights and
happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of
Citizens.

Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the
most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately
from the people. He was for raising the federal

pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that
reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible.
No government could long subsist without the confidence
of the people. In a republican Government
this confidence was peculiarly essential. He
also thought it wrong to increase the weight of
the State Legislatures by making them the electors
of the national Legislature. All interference between
the general and local Governmts. should be
obviated as much as possible. On examination it
would be found that the opposition of States to
federal measures had proceeded much more from
the officers of the States, than from the people at
large.

Mr. Madison considered the popular election of
one branch of the national Legislature as essential
to every plan of free Government. He observed that
in some of the States one branch of the Legislature
was composed of men already removed from the
people by an intervening body of electors. That if
the first branch of the general legislature should be
elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch
elected by the first—the Executive by the second
together with the first; and other appointments
again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive,
the people would be lost sight of altogether;
and the necessary sympathy between them and their
rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate
for the policy of refining the popular appointments
by successive filtrations, but thought it might
be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be

resorted to only in the appointment of the second
branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive &
judiciary branches of the Government. He thought
too that the great fabric to be raised would be more
stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid
foundation of the people themselves, than if it should
stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.

Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people.
The maxims taken from the British Constitution
were often fallacious when applied to our situation
which was extremely different. Experience he said
had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately
from the people did not always possess their
confidence. He had no objection however to an
election by the people if it were so qualified that
men of honor & character might not be unwilling
to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to
think the people might nominate a certain number
out of which the State legislatures should be bound
to choose.[35]

Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an
impracticable mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch
of the national Legislature, by the people,

Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey
no. Pena. ay. Delawr. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Georga. ay.

The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4th relating

to the qualifications of members of the National
Legislature, being pospd. nem. con., as entering too
much into detail for general propositions;

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that
the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National
Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch
out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."

Mr. Spaight contended that the 2d. branch
ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and
moved an amendment to that effect.[36]

Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many
powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed,
tended to destroy all that balance and security
of interests among the States which it was
necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph
the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent
of his ideas, and particularly the number of members
he meant to assign to this second branch.

Mr. Randf. observed that he had at the time of
offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as
the nature of general propositions required; that
details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps
with propriety have been introduced. If he
was to give an opinion as to the number of the second
branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first; so small as to be
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which

numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that
the general object was to provide a cure for the
evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing
these evils to their origin every man had found it in
the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some
check therefore was to be sought for agst. this tendency
of our Governments: and that a good Senate
seemed most likely to answer the purpose.[37]

Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice
of the second branch as proposed (by Mr. Spaight)
viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable,
unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea
of proportion among the States was to be disregarded.
According to this idea, there must be 80
or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice
of one of them.—Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion.

Mr.Wilson opposed both a nomination by the
State Legislatures, and an election by the first
branch of the national Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter, ought to be independent
of both. He thought both branches of the National
Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but
was not prepared with a specific proposition. He
suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York
to wit of uniting several election districts for one
branch, in chusing members for the other branch,
as a good model.

Mr. Madison observed that such a mode would

destroy the influence of the smaller States associated
with larger ones in the same district; as the latter
would chuse from within themselves, altho' better
men might be found in the former. The election
of Senators in Virga. where large & small counties
were often formed into one district for the purpose,
had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality,
would often prefer a resident within the County or
State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out
of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more
known throughout his own State.[38]

Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member
by each of the State Legislatures.[39]

Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination
by the State Legislatures;" on this question.

[40] Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena.

no. Del. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no Georg
no.

On the whole question for electing by the first
branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures,
Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no.
Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C, ay,
Ga. no.

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in
this part of the plan.

The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which
the national Legislature ought to legislate was next
taken into discussion: On the question whether
each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous
affirmative without debate. On the question
for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing
Congs. to this Assembly, there was also a
silent affirmative nem. con.

On the proposition for giving "Legislative power
in all cases to which the State Legislatures were
individually incompetent,"

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Rutledge[41] . objected to the
vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they
could not well decide how to vote until they should

see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended
by this definition.[42]

Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were running
into an extreme in taking away the powers of the
States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent
of his meaning.

Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give
indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring
that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad
on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think
any considerations whatever could ever change his
determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.

Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him

into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an
enumeration and definition of the powers necessary
to be exercised by the national Legislature;
but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability.
His wishes remained unaltered; but his
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion
might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he
should shrink from nothing which should be found
essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide
for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community.
This being the end of all our deliberations,
all the necessary means for attaining it must, however
reluctantly, be submitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to
which the States are not competent—Massts. ay.
Cont. divd. (Sherman no Elseworth ay) N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
Carolina ay. Georga. ay.

The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve
harmony among the States to negative all
State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat.
Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause,
(the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority
of the Union," being added after the words
"contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on
motion of Dr. Franklin) were agreed to witht. debate
or dissent.

The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an
exertion of the force of the whole agst. a delinquent
State came next into consideration.

Mr. Madison, observed that the more he reflected

on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability,
the justice and the efficacy of it when applied
to people collectively and not individually.—A
union of the States containing such an ingredient
seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use
of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration
of war, than an infliction of punishment, and
would probably be considered by the party attacked
as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it
might be bound. He hoped that such a system
would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary,
and moved that the clause be postponed.
This motion was agreed to, nem. con.

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned.[43]

Friday June 1st. 1787

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution

7. "that a national Executive be instituted, to
be chosen by the national Legislature for the term
Of—years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to
possess the Executive powers of Congress &c."

Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was
afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress
might extend to peace & war &c which would render
the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit
an elective one.

Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a
single person. Mr C. Pinkney seconded the motion,
so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist of a
single person, be instituted.

A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman[44]
asking if he should put the question, Docr. Franklin

observed that it was a point of great importance and
wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.

Mr. Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen
on this and other subjects. He said it
looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards
changing them, which he did not take to be at
all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive
power in a single person, tho' he was not for
giving him the power of war and peace. A single
man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer
the public affairs best.

Mr. Sherman said he considered the Executive
magistracy as nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that
the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the
depository of the supreme will of the Society. As
they were the best judges of the business which
ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to
time for doing it, he wished the number might
not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at
liberty to appoint one or more as experience might
dictate.

Mr.Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving

most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office.
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British
Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative
nature. Among others that of war & peace
&c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive
were those of executing the laws, and appointing
officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the
Legislature.[45]

Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council
to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire
confidence.[46]

Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the
Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the fœtus
of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed
by the British Govenmt. as our prototype.
He did not mean however to throw censure on that
Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy
it he did not know that he should be opposed to it;

but the fixt genius of the people of America required
a different form of Government. He could not see
why the great requisites for the Executive department,
vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be
found in three men, as well as in one man. The
Executive ought to be independent. It ought
therefore in order to support its independence to
consist of more than one.

Mr. Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead
of being the fetus of monarchy would be the
best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that
he was not governed by the British Model which
was inapplicable to the situation of this Country;
the extent of which was so great, and the manners so

republican, that nothing but a great confederated
Republic would do for it.

Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was
postponed by common consent, the Committee
seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the
first part of the clause agreed to, viz—"that a National
Executive be instituted."[47]

Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a
choice shd. be made between a unity and a plurality
in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive
authority; that as certain powers were in their
nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt.
whether administered by one or more persons,
a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be
safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly
moved that so much of the clause before the Committee
as related to the powers of the Executive shd.
be struck out & that after the words "that a national
Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted
the words following viz. "with power to carry
into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices
in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute
such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary
in their nature," as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words
"not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were
added to the proposed amendment, in consequence

of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper
powers might otherwise be delegated.

Mr. Wilson seconded this motion.

Mr. Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by
striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute
such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary
in their nature as may from time to time be delegated."
He said they were unnecessary, the object
of them being included in the "power to carry into
effect the national laws."

Mr. Randolph seconded the motion.

Mr. Madison did not know that the words were
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words,
"to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps
included in the first member of the proposition. He
did not however see any inconveniency in retaining
them, and cases might happen in which they might
serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the
question on Mr. Madison's motion was divided; and
the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney struck out;
by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pena., Del.,
N. C., & Geo. agst. Mass., Virga. & S. Carolina the
preceding part of the motion being first agreed to;
Connecticut divided all the other States in the
affirmative.

The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the
mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive
being under consideration,

Mr. Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare
the mode which he wished to take place, being

apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He
would say however at least that in theory he was for
an election by the people. Experience, particularly
in N. York & Massts, shewed that an election of the
first magistrate by the people at large, was both
a convenient & successful mode. The objects of
choice in such cases must be persons whose merits
have general notoriety.

Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent
on that body, as it was the will of that which was
to be executed. An independence of the Executive
on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the
very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

Mr. Wilson moves that the blank for the term of
duration should be filled with three years, observing
at the same time that he preferred this short period,
on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided
for.

Mr. Pinkney moves for seven years.

Mr. Sherman was for three years, and agst. the
doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men
best qualified to execute its duties.

Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for
prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both
for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on
the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters;
and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

Mr. Bedford[48] was strongly opposed to so long a

term as seven years. He begged the Committee to
consider what the situation of the Country would be,
in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it
for such a period and it should be found on trial that
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him,
or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment
he said would be no cure for this evil,
as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only,
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and
for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.

On the question for seven years,

Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geor. no.

There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 divd., a question was
asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative?
The President decided that it was an affirmative
vote.

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next
question.

Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an
appointment by the people. He wished to derive
not only both branches of the Legislature from the
people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures
but the Executive also; in order to make them
as independent as possible of each other, as well as
of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable.

He wishes however that Mr. Wilson might
have time to digest it into his own form.—the clause,
"to be chosen by the National Legislature "—was
accordingly postponed.—

Mr. Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive
by the second branch only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.

Saturday June 2d. In Committee of whole

William Saml. Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel
of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryd., & John Lansing
Jr. from N. York, took their seats.

It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr.
Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take
up the 2d. branch of the Legislature; which being
negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo:
agst. N. Y. Pena. Maryd. The mode of appointing
the Executive was resumed.

Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted
for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's
resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall
be elected in the following manner: That the States
be divided into——— districts: & that the persons
qualified to vote in each district for members of the
first branch of the national Legislature elect———
members for their respective districts to be electors
of the Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors
of the Executive magistracy meet at————

and they or any——— of them so met shall proceed
to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body
———person— in whom the Executive authority
of the national Government shall be vested."

Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an
election without the intervention of the States. He
supposed too that this mode would produce more
confidence among the people in the first magistrate,
than an election by the national Legislature.

Mr. Gerry, opposed the election by the National
legislature. There would be a constant intrigue
kept up for the appointment. The Legislature &
the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another's
hands, votes would be given by the former under
promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing
them by services to members of the Legislature
or to their friends. He liked the principle of
Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm & give
a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede
altogether the State authorities. He thought
the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States
of their powers, even such as might not be requisite
for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people
should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed
to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead
of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate,
and the electors appoint. He was not clear
that the people ought to act directly even in the
choice of electors, being too little informed of personal
characters in large districts, and liable to
deceptions.

Mr. Williamson[49] could see no advantage in the introduction
of Electors chosen by the people who
would stand in the same relation to them as the State
Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended
with great trouble and expence.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's substitute,
it was negatived: Massts. no. Cont. no. N.
Y.[50] no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geoa. no.

On the question for electing the Executive by the
national Legislature for the term of seven years, it
was agreed to, Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay.
Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Docr. Franklin moved that what related to the
compensation for the services of the Executive be
postponed, in order to substitute—"whose necessary
expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive
no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for
their services." He said that being very sensible
of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling
to trust to that for the observations which
seemed to support his motion and had reduced them
to writing, that he might with the permission of
the Committee read instead of speaking them. Mr.
Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was

accepted. The following is a literal copy of the
paper:

Sir,

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation
of any one article of the plan for which
we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman
who laid it before us. From its first reading I have
borne a good will to it, and in general wished it
success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive
branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion
may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a
persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty
that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my
reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment
may possibly change mine.—I think I see inconveniences
in the appointment of salaries; I see
none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great
advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful
influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition
and avarice; the love of power, and the love of
money. Separately each of these has great force in
prompting men to action; but when united in view
of the same object, they have in many minds the
most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such
men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time
a place of profit, and they will move heaven and
earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places
it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous.
The struggles for them are the true
sources of all those factions which are perpetually

dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying
sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars,
and often compelling a submission to dishonorable
terms of peace.

And of what kind are the men that will strive for
this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle
of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual
abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters?
It will not be the wise and moderate, the
lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for
the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in
their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves
into your Government and be your rulers.—And
these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness
of their situation: For their vanquished competitors
of the same spirit, and from the same motives will
perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration,
thwart their measures, and render
them odious to the people.

Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the
beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that
such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will
never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And
there will always be a party for giving more to the
rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us,
there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant
kind of warfare between the Governing & Governed;
the one striving to obtain more for its support, and
the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned

great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in
dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point,
the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and
we see that they are never satisfied, but always in
want of more. The more the people are discontented
with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the
prince has of money to distribute among his partizans
and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure.
There is scarce a king in an hundred who would not,
if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first
all the people's money, then all their lands, and then
make them and their children servants for ever. It
will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination
in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes
relieves them from Aristocratic domination.
They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred.
It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive
therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government
of these States, may in future times, end in
a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be
long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by
making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do,
I fear that tho' we do employ at first a number, and
not a single person, the number will in time be set
aside, it will only nourish the fœtus of a King, as
the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over
us.

It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian
Idea, and that we can never find men to serve
us in the Executive department, without paying
them well for their services. I conceive this to be
a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves
to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable
office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive
and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is
executed and well executed, and usually by some of
the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France,
the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased
at a high price: There are indeed fees on the
law proceedings, which are divided among them, but
these fees do not amount to more than three Per
Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as
legal interest is there at five PerCt. they in fact pay
two PerCt. for being allowed to do the Judiciary
business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely
exempt from the burden of paying them any
salaries for their services. I do not however mean
to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary
department. I only bring the instance to
shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their
Country and the respect such conduct entitles them
to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give
up a great portion of their time to the Public, without
the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.

Another instance is that of a respectable Society
who have made the experiment, and practised it
with success more than one hundred years. I mean
the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that
they are not to go to law; but in their controversies
they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with
patience to hear the parties, and spend much time
in composing their differences. In doing this, they
are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect
paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it is never made profitable by salaries,
fees or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of Public
service the less the profit the greater the honor.

To bring the matter nearer home, have we not
seen, the great and most important of our offices,
that of General of our armies executed for eight
years together without the smallest salary, by a
Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other
praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in
common with the other brave men his military
friends & companions, and the constant anxieties
peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding
three or four men in all the U. States, with public
spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for
perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our
civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed.
Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country.
I think we shall never be without a sufficient number
of wise and good men to undertake and execute well
and faithfully the office in question.

Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first
be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent
mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend.
And therefore it is, that I move the
amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I
must be contented with the satisfaction of having
delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.

The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with
the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a
proposition before the Committee, and which was
besides enforced by arguments that had a certain
degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition
was postponed for the consideration of the
members. It was treated with great respect, but
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent
conviction of its expediency or practicability.

Mr. Dickinson moved,[51] "that the Executive be
made removable by the National Legislature on the
request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual
States." It was necessary he said to place the power
of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan
of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did

not know how provision could be made for removal
of them in a better mode than that which he had
proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State
Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined
to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion
required considerable powers to be left in the hands
of the States.

Mr. Bedford seconded the motion.

Mr. Sherman contended that the national Legislature
should have power to remove the Executive
at pleasure.

Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit
magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility
of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility
of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly
the making the Executive the mere creature of the
Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle
of good Government.

Mr. Madison & Mr. Wilson observed that it would
leave an equality of agency in the small with the
great States; that it would enable a minority of the
people to prevent ye. removal of an officer who had
rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a
majority; that it would open a door for intrigues
agst. him in States where his administration tho' just
might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay
court to particular States whose leading partizans
he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans.
They both thought it bad policy to introduce such
a mixture of the State authorities, where their
agency could be otherwise supplied.

Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so important
that no man ought to be silent or reserved.
He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of
which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary
departments ought to be made as independt.
as possible; but that such an Executive as some
seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent
with a republic: that a firm Executive could only
exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt.
itself the weight of the Executive arises from the
attachments which the Crown draws to itself, &
not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In
place of these attachments we must look out for
something else. One source of stability is the
double branch of the Legislature. The division of
the Country into distinct States formed the other
principal source of stability. This division ought
therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers
to be left with the States. This was the ground of
his consolation for the future fate of his Country.
Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the
States into one great Republic, we might read its
fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy
he considered as one of the best Governments
in the world. It was not certain that the same
blessings were derivable from any other form. It
was certain that equal blessings had never yet
been derived from any of the republican form.
A limited Monarchy however was out of the
question. The spirit of the times—the state of
our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were

desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature
of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were
less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential
to such a Govt. could these be created by a breath,
or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the
growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication
of circumstances none of which existed in
this Country. But though a form the most perfect
perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair.
If antient republics have been found to flourish for
a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves
that they were badly constituted; and that we
ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases.
One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental
lucky division of this Country into distinct
States; a division which some seemed desirous to
abolish altogether.

As to the point of representation in the national
Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes,
he said it must probably end in mutual concession.
He hoped that each State would retain an equal
voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature,
and supposed the sums paid within each
State would form a better ratio for the other branch
than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum
of property.[52]

A motion being made to strike out, "on request

by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual
States," and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: &
Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on Mr.
Dickinson's motion for making Executive removable
by Natl. Legislature at request of majority of State
Legislatures was also rejected all the States being
in the negative Except Delaware which gave an
affirmative vote.

The Question for making ye. Executive ineligible
after seven years, was next taken and agreed to:
Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. Pa. divd. Del. ay.
Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[53]

Mr. Williamson 2ded. by Mr. Davie[54] moved to add
to the last clause, the words—"and to be removable
on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or
neglect of duty"—which was agreed to.

Mr. Rutlidge & Mr. C. Pinkney moved that the
blank for the n°. of persons in the Executive be
filled with the words "one person." He supposed
the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor
of one that no member would oppose the motion.

Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness,
declaring that he should not do justice to the Country
which sent him if he were silently to suffer the
establishmt. of a Unity in the Executive department.
He felt an opposition to it which he believed he

should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged
1. that the permanent temper of the people was
adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2.
that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being
equally competent to all the objects of the department.
3. that the necessary confidence would never
be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments
would generally be in favor of some
inhabitant near the center of the Community, and
consequently the remote parts would not be on an
equal footing. He was in favor of three members
of the Executive to be drawn from different portions
of the country.

Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate
as most likely to answer the purpose of the
remote parts. If one man should be appointed he
would be responsible to the whole, and would be
impartial to its interests. If three or more should
be taken from as many districts, there would be a
constant struggle for local advantages. In Military
matters this would be particularly mischievous.
He said his opinion on this point had been formed
under the opportunity he had had of seeing the
manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted
Holland when threatened with invasion by
the imperial troops. One man was for directing the
force to the defence of this part, another to that
part of the Country, just as he happened to be
swayed by prejudice or interest.

The motion was then postpd., the Committee rose
& the House Adjd.

Monday June 4. In Committee of the Whole

The Question was resumed on motion of Mr. Pinkney,
2ded. by Mr. Wilson, "shall the blank for the
number of the Executive be filled with a single person?"

Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had
been opposed by the gentleman from Virga. (Mr. Randolph)
but the arguments used had not convinced
him. He observed that the objections of Mr. R.
were levelled not so much agst. the measure itself,
as agst. its unpopularity. If he could suppose that
it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which
it should form a part, though the part were an important
one, yet he would give it up rather than lose
the whole. On examination he could see no evidence
of the alledged antipathy of the people. On
the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist.
All know that a single magistrate is not a King.
One fact has great weight with him. All the 13
States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance,
agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of
the Governt. The idea of three heads has taken
place in none. The degree of power is indeed different;
but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition
to his former reasons for preferring a Unity,
he would mention another. The tranquility not
less than the vigor of the Govt. he thought would be
favored by it. Among three equal members, he
foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, &
violent animosities; which would not only interrupt

the public administration; but diffuse their poison
thro' the other branches of Govt., thro' the States,
and at length thro' the people at large. If the
members were to be unequal in power the principle
of opposition to the Unity was given up. If equal,
the making them an odd number would not be
a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides
only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive
departmts. questions have commonly many sides.
Each member therefore might espouse a separate
one & no two agree.[55]

Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance
and ought to be well considered before it is determined.
Mr. Wilson he said had observed that in
each State a single magistrate was placed at the
head of the Govt. It was so he admitted, and properly
so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in
the federal Govt. But then it should be also remarked
that in all the States there was a Council of
advice, without which the first magistrate could not
act. A council he thought necessary to make the
establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G.
B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints
it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and
attracts the Confidence of the people.

Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson whether he means
to annex a Council.

Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which
oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.

Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of
three members for the Executive. It wd. be extremely
inconvenient in many instances, particularly
in military matters, whether relating to the militia,
an army, or a navy. It would be a general with
three heads.

On the question for a single Executive it was
agreed to Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. Pena.
ay. Del. no. Maryd. no. Virga. ay. (Mr. R. & Mr.
Blair no—Docr McCg. Mr M. & Gen. W. ay. Col.
Mason being no, but not in the house, Mr. Wythe ay
but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Georga. ay.

First Clause of Proposition 8th. relating to a Council
of Revision taken into consideration.

Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to
form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check
agst. encroachments on their own department by their
exposition of the laws, which involved a power of
deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States
the Judges had actually set aside laws as being agst.
the Constitution. This was done too with general
approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature
of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures. He moves to postpone the clause in
order to propose "that the National Executive shall
have a right to negative any Legislative act which
shall not be afterwards passed by——— parts of
each branch of the national Legislature."

Mr. King seconds the motion, observing that the

Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it
should come before them, free from the bias of having
participated in its formation.

Mr. Wilson thinks neither the original proposition
nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative
Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent,
The Executive ought to have an absolute
negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature
can at any moment sink it into non-existence.
He was for varying the proposition in such a manner
as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute
negative.

On the question to postpone in order to take Mr.
Gerry's proposition into consideration it was agreed
to, Masss. ay. Cort. no. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Maryd. no. Virga. no. N. C ay. S. C. ay. Ga. ay.

Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before Committee,
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Hamilton move that the
last part of it (viz. "wch. S1. not be afterwds. passed
"unless by——— parts of each branch of the National
legislature") be struck out, so as to give the
Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There
was no danger they thought of such a power being
too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col:
Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his
negative since the Revolution.

Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul
over the legislature as the best men in the Community
would be comprised in the two branches of it.

Docr. Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from
his colleague for whom he had a very great respect,

on any occasion, but he could not help it on this.
He had had some experience of this check in the
Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary
Government of Pena. The negative of the Governor
was constantly made use of to extort money. No
good law whatever could be passed without a private
bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or
some donation, was always made a condition; till
at last it became the regular practice, to have orders
in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with
the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive
the former before he should sign the latter.
When the Indians were scalping the western people,
and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor
in the means of self-defence could not be got,
till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted
from taxation: so that the people were to fight for
the security of his property, whilst he was to bear
no share of the burden. This was a mischevous
sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council,
such a power would be less objectionable. It
was true, the King of G. B. had not, as was said, exerted
his negative since the Revolution; but that
matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments
now given to the members of parliament rendered
it unnecessary, every thing being done according
to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative
should be given as proposed, that more power
and money would be demanded, till at last eno' would
be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a
compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.

Mr. Sherman was agst. enabling any one man to
stop the will of the whole. No one man could be
found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He
thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom
in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule
the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.

Mr. Madison supposed that if a proper proportion
of each branch should be required to overrule the
objections of the Executive, it would answer the
same purpose as an absolute negative. It would
rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted
as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness eno'
to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain
part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all
his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand
ye. unanimous and eager wishes of both houses
of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would
certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country;
its present temper at least.

Mr. Wilson believed as others did that this power
would seldom be used. The Legislature would
know that such a power existed, and would refrain
from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its
silent operation would therefore preserve harmony
and prevent mischief. The case of Pena. formerly
was very different from its present case. The Executive
was not then as now to be appointed by the
people. It will not in this case as in the one cited
be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated
by a different & sometimes opposite interest.
The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the

Constitution, or if Dr. F.'s idea should be adopted all
salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large
proportion of each House to overrule the Executive
check might do in peaceable times; but there might
be tempestuous moments in which animosities may
run high between the Executive and Legislative
branches, and in which the former ought to be able
to defend itself.

Mr. Butler had been in favor of a single Executive
Magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea
that a compleat negative on the laws was to be given
him he certainly should have acted very differently.
It had been observed that in all countries the Executive
power is in a constant course of increase.
This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen
seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend
from an abuse of the Executive power. But why
might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this
Country as well as in others.

Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the
Legislature, even the Council of Revision first proposed.
He thought it would be sufficient to mark out
in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative
Authority, which would give all the requisite security
to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives
of the people were the best Judges of what
was for their interest, and ought to be under no external
controul whatever. The two branches would produce
a sufficient controul within the Legislature itself.

Col. Mason observed that a vote had already
passed he found [he was out at the time] for vesting

the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain
cases. The probable abuses of a negative had
been well explained by Dr. F. as proved by experience,
the best of all tests. Will not the same door
be opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent
to necessary measures till new appointments
shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed
these into all his own hands, the American
Executive, like the British, will by bribery & influence,
save himself the trouble & odium of exerting
his negative afterwards. We are Mr. Chairman
going very far in this business. We are not indeed
constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous
monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing
a new principle into our system, and not
necessary as in the British Govt. where the Executive
has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen
mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do
they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent
to such an innovation? If they do I venture to
tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will
consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of
delay, and the still greater danger of a rejection, not
for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be
proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppression
& injustice experienced among us from democracy;
the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the
genius of the people must be consulted. He could
not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved
by the appointment of this Convention to
devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward
to the dangerous interval between extinction
of an old, and the establishment of a new Governmt.
and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue.
He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever
be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions
had carried the people through the late
Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive
to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be
coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled
by a greater majority than was required in the first
instance. He never could agree to give up all the
rights of the people to a single magistrate: If more
than one had been fixed on, greater powers might
have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped
this attempt to give such powers would have its
weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the
number of the Executive.

Docr. Franklin. A Gentleman from S. C., (Mr.
Butler) a day or two ago called our attention to the
case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the gentleman
had been a little fuller, and had gone back to
the original of that Govt. The people being under
great obligations to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom
and bravery had saved them, chose him for the
Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences
however were felt from his powers; which growing
more & more oppressive, they were at length set
aside. Still however there was a party for the P. of
Orange, which descended to his son who excited insurrections,
spilt a great deal of blood, murdered the

de Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder.
Afterwards another Prince had power to
excite insurrections & make the Stadtholdership
hereditary. And the present Stadthder. is ready to
wade thro' a bloody civil war to the establishment
of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance
of appointing officers. He knew how
that point would be managed. No new appointment
would be suffered as heretofore in Pensa. unless it be
referred to the Executive; so that all profitable offices
will be at his disposal. The first man put at the helm
will be a good one. No body knows what sort may
come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing
here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.

On the question for striking out so as to give
Executive an absolute negative,—Massts. no. Cont.
no. N. Y. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Georga. no.

Mr. Butler moved that the Resoln. be altered so as
to read—"Resolved that the National Executive
have a power to suspend any Legislative act for the
term of———."

Doctr. Franklin seconds the motion.

Mr. Gerry observed that a power of suspending
might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative
of useful laws; without answering the salutary purpose
of checking unjust or unwise ones.

On question "for giving this suspending power"
all the States, to wit Massts. Cont. N. Y. Pa. Del.
Maryd. Virga. N. C. S. C. Georgia, were No.

On a question for enabling two thirds of each

branch of the Legislature to overrule the revisionary
cheek, it passed in the affirmative sub silentio; and
was inserted in the blank of Mr. Gerry's motion.

On the question on Mr. Gerry's motion which gave
the Executive alone without the Judiciary the revisionary
controul on the laws unless overruled by
2/3 of each branch; Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay.
Pa. ay. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay.

It was moved by Mr. Wilson 2ded. by Mr. Madison—
that the following amendment be made to the last
resolution—after the words "National Ex." to add
"& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."[56]

An Objection of order being taken by Mr. Hamilton
to the introduction of the last amendment at
this time, notice was given by Mr. W. & Mr. M., that
the same wd. be moved to-morrow,—whereupon Wednesday
(the day after) was assigned to reconsider
the amendment of Mr. Gerry.

It was then moved & 2ded. to proceed to the consideration
of the 9th. resolution submitted by Mr.
Randolph—when on motion to agree to the first
clause namely "Resolved, that a National Judiciary
be established," It passed in the affirmative nem.
con.

It was then moved & 2ded. to add these words to
the first clause of the ninth resolution namely—"to
consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more
inferior tribunals," which passed in the affirmative.

The Comme. then rose and the House

Adjourned.

Tuesday June 5. In Committee of the Whole

Governor Livingston from New Jersey, took his
seat.

The words, "one or more" were struck out before
"inferior tribunals" as an amendment to the last
clause of Resoln 9th. The Clause—"that the National
Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature,"
being under consideration.

Mr. Wilson opposed the appointmt of Judges by
the National Legisl: Experience shewed the impropriety

of such appointmts. by numerous bodies.
Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
consequences. A principal reason for unity in
the Executive was that officers might be appointed
by a single, responsible person.

Mr. Rutlidge was by no means disposed to grant
so great a power to any single person. The people
will think we are leaning too much towards Monarchy.
He was against establishing any national tribunal
except a single supreme one. The State
tribunals are most proper to decide in all cases in the
first instance.

Docr. Franklin observed that two modes of chusing
the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature
and by the Executive. He wished such other
modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen;
it being a point of great moment. He
would mention one which he had understood was
practised in Scotland. He then in a brief and entertaining
manner related a Scotch mode, in which the
nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always
selected the ablest of the profession in order to get
rid of him, and share his practice among themselves.
It was here he said the interest of the electors to
make the best choice, which should always be made
the case if possible.

Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by
the Legislature or any numerous body. Besides the
danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members
were not judges of the requisite qualifications.
The Legislative talents which were very different

from those of a Judge, commonly recommended
men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was
known too that the accidental circumstances of
presence and absence, of being a member or not a
member, had a very undue influence on the appointment.
On the other hand He was not satisfied with
referring the appointment to the Executive. He
rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as
numerous eno' to be confided in—as not so numerous
as to be governed by the motives of the other branch;
and as being sufficiently stable and independent to
follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this
only and moved that the appointment by the Legislature
might be struck out, & a blank left to be
hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson
second it. On the question for striking out, Massts.
ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future
day move for a reconsideration of that clause which
respects "inferior tribunals."

Mr. Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting
the appointment of the Judiciary should
again come before the Committee he should move to
restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."

The following clauses of Resol: 9. were agreed to
viz "to hold their offices during good behaviour, and
to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation
for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons

actually in office at the time of such increase or
diminution."

The remaining clause of Resolution 9. was posponed.

Resolution 10 was agreed to,—viz—that provision
ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully
arising within the limits of the U. States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government & territory,
or otherwise with the consent of a number of
voices in the National Legislature less than the
whole.

The 11. Propos: "for guaranteeing to States Republican
Govt. & territory" &c. being read Mr. Patterson[57]
wished the point of representation could be
decided before this clause should be considered, and
moved to postpone it, which was not opposed, and
agreed to,—Connecticut & S. Carolina only voting
agst. it.

Propos. 12 "for continuing Congs. till a given day and
for fulfilling their engagements," produced no debate.

On the question, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay.
N. J.[58] ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.

Propos: 13. "that provision ought to be made for hereafter
amending the system now to be established, without
requiring the assent of the Natl. Legislature", being
taken up,

Mr. Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity
of it.

Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of
the experiment requires periodical revision. The
prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate
stability to the Govt. Nothing had yet happened
in the States where this provision existed to
prove its impropriety.—The proposition was postponed
for further consideration: the votes being,
Mas: Con. N. Y. Pa. Del. Ma. N. C. ay Virga.
S. C. Geo. no.

Propos. 14. "requiring oath from the State officers
to support National Govt." was postponed after a
short uninteresting conversation: the votes. Con.
N. Jersey Md. Virg. S. C. Geo. ay N. Y. Pa. Del.
N. C. no Massachusetts divided.

Propos. 15. for "recommending Conventions under
appointment of the people to ratify the new Constitution"
&c. being taken up,

Mr. Sherman thought such a popular ratification
unnecessary: the articles of Confederation providing
for changes and alterations with the assent of Congs.
and ratification of State Legislatures.

Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. The
articles of Confedn. themselves were defective in this
respect, resting in many of the States on the Legislative
sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts

of the States, and of Congs. especially where the
former are of posterior date, and the decision is to
to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must
necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision
in favor of the State authority. He suggested
also that as far as the articles of Union were to be
considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort,
among the Governments of Independent States, the
doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one
article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties
from the whole obligation. For these reasons as
well as others he thought it indispensable that the
new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable
form, and by the supreme authority
of the people themselves.

Mr. Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the
Confedn. had been sanctioned by the people themselves.
He seemed afraid of referring the new system
to them. The people in that quarter have at
this time the wildest ideas of Government in the
world. They were for abolishing the Senate in
Massts. and giving all the other powers of Govt. to
the other branch of the Legislature.

Mr. King supposed that the last article of ye Confedn.
Rendered the legislature competent to the ratification.
The people of the Southern States where
the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures
only, had since impliedly given their sanction
to it. He thought notwithstanding that there might
be policy in varying the mode. A Convention being
a single house, the adoption may more easily be

carried thro' it, than thro' the Legislatures where
there are several branches. The Legislatures also
being to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections.
The people having already parted with the
necessary powers it is immaterial to them, by which
Government they are possessed, provided they be
well employed.

Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee
by a train of observations to the idea of not suffering
a disposition in the plurality of States to confederate
anew on better principles, to be defeated
by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few
States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would
be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial
union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.[59]

Mr. Pinkney hoped that in case the experiment
should not unanimously take place, nine States
might be authorized to unite under the same Governmt.

The propos. 15. was postponed nem. cont.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Rutlidge moved that to-morrow
be assigned to reconsider that clause of
Propos: 4: which respects the election of the first
branch of the National Legislature—which passed in
affirmative,—Con.: N. Y., Pa. Del. Md., Va., ay—
6 Mas.: N. J.: N. C.: S. C.: Geo.: no. 5.

Mr. Rutlidge havg. obtained a rule for reconsideration
of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals

under the national authority, now moved that that
part of the clause in the propos. 9. should be expunged:
arguing that the State tribunals might and
ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance
the right of appeal to the supreme national
tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights
& uniformity of Judgmts: that it was making an unnecessary
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the
States and creating unnecessary obstacles to their
adoption of the new system. Mr. Sherman 2ded. the
motion.

Mr. Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals
were dispersed throughout the Republic with final
jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied
to a most oppressive degree; that besides,
an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy.
What was to be done after improper Verdicts in
State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions
of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an
undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new
trial would answer no purpose. To order a new
trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to
bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the
seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment
commensurate to the legislative authority, was
essential. A Government without a proper Executive
& Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body,
without arms or legs to act or move.

Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds.
He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given
wholly to the national Government, as it related to

cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states,
& to a scene in which controversies with foreigners
would be most likely to happen.

Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He
dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having
a new set of Courts, when the existing State
Courts would answer the same purpose.

Mr. Dickinson contended strongly that if there
was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be
a national Judiciary, and that the former ought to
have authority to institute the latter.

On the question for Mr. Rutlidge's motion to strike
out "inferior tribunals"

Massts. divided. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Madison then moved, in pursuance
of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson,
to add to the Resol: 9. the words following "that
the National Legislature be empowered to institute
inferior tribunals." They observed that there was
a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely,
and giving a discretion to the Legislature
to establish or not establish them. They repeated
the necessity of some such provision.

Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such innovations.
The States will revolt at such encroachments.
Supposing such an establishment to be useful,
we must not venture on it. We must follow the
example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best
Govt. he could devise, but the best they wd. receive.

Mr. King remarked as to the comparative expence,
that the establishment of inferior tribunals wd. cost
infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented
by them.

On this question as moved by Mr. W. & Mr. M.
Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. divd. N. J.[60] ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
ay.

The Committee then rose & the House adjourned
to 11 OC tomw.

Wednesday June 6th. In Committee of the
Whole.

Mr. Pinkney according to previous notice & rule
obtained, moved "that the first branch of the national
Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures,
and not by the people;" contending that the
people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that
the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the
adoption of the new Government, if they were to be
excluded from all share in it.

Mr. Rutlidge 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Gerry.[61] Much depends on the mode of election.
In England the people will probably lose
their liberty from the smallness of the proportion
having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from

the opposite extreme: hence in Massts. the worst men
get into the Legislature. Several members of that
Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes.
Men of indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare no
pains, however dirty to carry their point agst. men
who are superior to the artifices practised. He was
not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much
principled as ever agst. aristocracy and monarchy.
It was necessary on the one hand that the people
should appoint one branch of the Govt. in order to
inspire them with the necessary confidence. But
he wished the election on the other to be so modified
as to secure more effectually a just preference of
merit. His idea was that the people should nominate
certain persons in certain districts, out of whom
the State Legislatures shd. make the appointment.

Mr. Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Govt., but
he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately
from the legitimate source of all authority.
The Govt. ought to possess not only 1st. the force, but
2dly. the mind or sense of the people at large. The
Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of
the whole Society. Representation is made necessary
only because it is impossible for the people to
act collectively. The opposition was to be expected
he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens
of the States. The latter had parted as was observed
(by Mr. King) with all the necessary powers; and it
was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised,
if well exercised. The State officers were to
be the losers of power. The people he supposed

would be rather more attached to the national Govt.
than to the State Govts. as being more important in
itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is
no danger of improper elections if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of
the districts which give an opportunity to bad men
to intrigue themselves into office.

Mr. Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the
State Govts. the elections ought to be by the people.
If the State Govts. are to be continued, it is necessary
in order to preserve harmony between the National
& State Govtts. that the elections to the former shd. be
made by the latter. The right of participating in
the National Govt. would be sufficiently secured to
the people by their election of the State Legislatures.
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, 1.
defence agst. foreign danger, 2 agst. internal disputes
& a resort to force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations
4 regulating foreign commerce, & drawing revenue
from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone
rendered a Confederation of the States necessary.
All other matters civil & criminal would be much
better in the hands of the States. The people are
more happy in small than in large States. States
may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby
be too subject to faction. Some others were perhaps
too large, the powers of Govt. not being able to
pervade them. He was for giving the General
Govt. power to legislate and execute within a defined
province.

Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy,

Congs. represent the States and not the people of the
States: their acts operate on the States, not on the
individuals. The case will be changed in the new
plan of Govt. The people will be represented; they
ought therefore to choose the Representatives. The
requisites in actual representation are that the Reps.
should sympathize with their constituents; shd.
think as they think, & feel as they feel; and that for
these purposes shd. even be residents among them.
Much he sd. had been alledged agst. democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said; but
it was to be considered that no Govt. was free from
imperfections & evils; and that improper elections
in many instances were inseparable from Republican
Govts. But compare these with the advantage
of this Form in favor of the rights of the people, in
favor of human nature. He was persuaded there
was a better chance for proper elections by the people,
if divided into large districts, than by the State
Legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the
latter when the former were against it. Was it to
be supposed that the State Legislatures then wd. not
send to the Natl. legislature patrons of such projects,
if the choice depended on them.

Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch
at least of the Legislature by the people immediately,
as a clear principle of free Govt. and that this mode
under proper regulations had the additional advantage
of securing better representatives, as well as of
avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments
in the General one. He differed from the

member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking
the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones
that required a National Govt. Those were certainly
important and necessary objects; but he combined
with them the necessity of providing more effectually
for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation
of Justice. Interferences with these were
evils which had more perhaps than anything else,
produced this convention. Was it to be supposed
that republican liberty could long exist under the
abuses of it practised in some of the States. The
gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted that in a
very small State, faction & oppression wd. prevail.
It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed
the State was too small. Had they not prevailed
in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less
than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished
to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature
of the Govt. would Admit. This was the only defence
agst. the inconveniences of democracy consistent
with the democratic form of Govt. All civilized
Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions,
& interests, as they happened to consist of
rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed the
manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants
of this district or that district, the followers
of this political leader or that political leader—
the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious
Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a
common interest or passion, the rights of the minority
are in danger. What motives are to restrain
them? A prudent regard to the maxim that honesty
is the best policy is found by experience to be as little
regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect
for character is always diminished in proportion
to the number among whom the blame or praise
is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie
is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large
numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides,
Religion itself may become a motive to persecution
& oppression. These observations are verified by
the Histories of every country antient & modern.
In Greece & Rome the rich & poor, the Creditors &
debtors, as well as the patricians & plebeians alternately
oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.
What a source of oppression was the relation
between the parent cities of Rome, Athens & Carthage,
& their respective provinces; the former
possessing the power, & the latter being sufficiently
distinguished to be separate objects of it? Why was
America so justly apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice?
Because G. Britain had a separate interest
real or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted,
could have pursued that interest at our expence.
We have seen the mere distinction of colour
made in the most enlightened period of time, a
ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised
by man over man. What has been the source
of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves?
Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the
major number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors.
The landed interest has borne hard on the
mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of
property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on
the holders of another species. The lesson we are to
draw from the whole is that where a majority are
united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity,
the rights of the minor party become insecure.
In a Republican Govt. the majority if
united have always an opportunity. The only
remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide
the community into so great a number of interests &
parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be
likely at the same moment to have a common interest
separate from that of the whole or of the minority;
and in the 2d place that in case they shd have such
an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the
pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to try
this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican
system on such a scale & in such a form as will
controul all the evils wch. have been experienced.

Mr. Dickinson considered it essential that one
branch of the Legislature shd. be drawn immediately
from the people; and as expedient that the other shd.
be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This
combination of the State Govts. with the national
Govt. was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the
formation of the Senate we ought to carry it through
such a refining process as will assimilate it as nearly
as may be to the House of Lords in England. He
repeated his warm eulogiums on the British Constitution.
He was for a strong National Govt. but
for leaving the States a considerable agency in the

System. The objection agst. making the former dependent
on the latter might be obviated by giving
to the Senate an authority permanent & irrevocable
for three, five or seven years. Being thus independent
they will check & decide with becoming freedom.

Mr. Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to
the State Governts. We must look beyond their continuance.
A national Govt. must soon of necessity
swallow all of them up. They will soon be reduced
to the mere office of electing the National Senate.
He was agst. patching up the old federal System: he
hoped the idea wd. be dismissed. It would be like
putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation
was founded on temporary principles. It
cannot last: it can not be amended. If we do not
establish a good Govt. on new principles, we must
either go to ruin, or have the work to do over again.
The people at large are wrongly suspected of being
averse to a Genl. Govt. The aversion lies among interested
men who possess their confidence.

Mr. Pierce[62] was for an election by the people as to
the 1st. branch & by the States as to the 2d. branch;

by which means the Citizens of the States wd. be represented
both individually & collectively.

General Pinkney wished to have a good National
Govt. & at the same time to leave a considerable
share of power in the States. An election of either
branch by the people scattered as they are in many
States, particularly in S. Carolina was totally impracticable.
He differed from gentlemen who
thought that a choice by the people wd. be a better
guard agst. bad measures, than by the Legislatures.
A majority of the people in S. Carolina were notoriously
for paper-money as a legal tender; the Legislature
had refused to make it a legal tender. The
reason was that the latter had some sense of character
and were restrained by that consideration. The
State Legislatures also he said would be more jealous,
& more ready to thwart the National Govt., if excluded
from a participation in it. The Idea of abolishing
these Legislatures wd. never go down.

Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for
what had fallen from Mr. Read; namely, that the
idea of preserving the State Govts. ought to be abandoned.
He saw no incompatibility between the
national & State Govts. provided the latter were
restrained to certain local purposes; nor any probability
of their being devoured by the former. In
all confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse
had happened; the Generality being destroyed
gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing
it.

On the question for electing the 1st. branch by the

State Legislatures as moved by Mr. Pinkney: it was
negatived:

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding
the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the
laws, and to add after "National Executive" the
words "with a convenient number of the national
Judiciary;" remarking the expediency of reinforcing
the Executive with the influence of that Department.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion. He observed that
the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent
to its own defence arose from the nature of
Republican Govt. which could not give to an individual
citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes
of the rest, that weight of property, that personal
interest agst. betraying the national interest, which
appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a Republic
personal merit alone could be the ground of
political exaltation, but it would rarely happen that
this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce
universal acquiescence. The Executive Magistrate
would be envied & assailed by disappointed competitors:
His firmness therefore wd. need support.
He would not possess those great emoluments from
his station, nor that permanent stake in the public
interest which wd. place him out of the reach of
foreign corruption. He would stand in need therefore
of being controuled as well as supported. An

association of the Judges in his revisionary function
wd. both double the advantage and diminish the danger.
It wd. also enable the Judiciary Department
the better to defend itself agst. Legislative encroachments.
Two objections had been made 1st. that the
Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a
participation in the making of laws might give in
the exposition of them. 2dly. that the Judiciary Departmt.
ought to be separate & distinct from the
other great Departments. The 1st. objection had
some weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting
that a small proportion of the laws coming
in question before a Judge wd. be such wherein he
had been consulted; that a small part of this proportion
wd. be so ambiguous as to leave room for his
prepossessions; and that but a few cases wd. probably
arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous
passages. How much good on the other hand
wd. proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness,
and the systematic character wch. the Code of laws wd.
receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2d. objection,
it either had no weight, or it applied with
equal weight to the Executive & to the Judiciary
revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection
was founded required a separation of the Executive
as well as the Judiciary from the Legislature
& from each other. There wd. in truth however be
no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the
present case. In England, whence the maxim itself
had been drawn, the Executive had an absolute
negative on the laws; and the Supreme tribunal of
Justice (the House of Lords) formed one of the other
branches of the Legislature. In short whether the
object of the revisionary power was to restrain the
Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate
Departments, or on the rights of the people at
large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle,
or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing
the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive
seemed incontestable.

Mr. Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing
alone wd. be more impartial than when he cd. be covered
by the sanction & seduced by the sophistry of
the Judges.

Mr. King. If the Unity of the Executive was
preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of
it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the executive
power.

Mr. Pinkney had been at first in favor of joining
the heads of the principal departmts. the Secretary at
War, of foreign affairs &c—in the council of revision.
He had however relinquished the idea from a consideration
that these could be called on by the Executive
Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult
them. He was opposed to the introduction of the
Judges into the business.

Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to
the revisionary institution. The Executive power
ought to be well secured agst. Legislative usurpations
on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get
into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.

Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are
not the principal properties reqd. in the Executive.
Important as these are, that of responsibility is more
so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it singly
to discharge its functions. He thought too a junction
of the Judiciary to it, involved an improper
mixture of powers.

Mr. Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required
belonged to his Executive duties. The revisionary
duty was an extraneous one, calculated for
collateral purposes.

Mr. Williamson, was for substituting a clause requiring
2/3 for every effective act of the Legislature,
in place of the revisionary provision.

On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive
in the re visionary business,

Mass. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Mr. Pinkney gave notice that tomorrow he should
move for the reconsideration of that clause in the
sixth Resolution adopted by the Comme. which vests
a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of
the several States.

The Come rose & the House adjd. to 11 OC.

Thursday June 7th. 1787—In Committee of the
whole

Mr. Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider
the clause respecting the negative on State

laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow for fixed
the purpose.

The Clause providing for ye. appointment of the
2d. branch of the national Legislature, having lain
blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it,
to wit, by the 1st. branch, Mr. Dickinson now moved
"that the members of the 2d. branch ought to be
chosen by the individual Legislatures."

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion; observing that
the particular States would thus become interested
in supporting the National Govenmt. and that a due
harmony between the two Governments would be
maintained. He admitted that the two ought to
have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that
they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting
each other.

Mr. Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed
one Senator only, the number will be too
great, there will be 80 at least.

Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion.
1, because the sense of the States would be better
collected through their Governments; than immediately
from the people at large; 2. because he
wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished
characters, distinguished for their rank in
life and their weight of property, and bearing as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as
possible; and he thought such characters more
likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than
in any other mode. The greatness of the number
was no objection with him. He hoped there would

be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should
be small, the popular branch could not be balanced
by them. The legislature of a numerous people
ought to be a numerous body.

Mr. Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators,
but wished that each State should have at
least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient number.
The different modes of representation in the
different branches, will serve as a mutual check.

Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation
before he gave any opinion.

Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a national
Government, that Government ought to flow from
the people at large. If one branch of it should be
chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the
people, the two branches will rest on different foundations,
and dissensions will naturally arise between
them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the
people as well as the other branch, the people might
be divided into proper districts for the purpose &
moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson,
in order to take up one of that import.

Mr. Morris 2ded. him.

Mr. Read proposed "that the Senate should be
appointed by the Executive Magistrate out of a
proper number of persons to be nominated by the
individual legislatures." He said he thought it his
duty, to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he
hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing
short of this approach towards a proper model of
Government would answer the purpose, and he

thought it best to come directly to the point at once.
—His proposition was not seconded nor supported.

Mr. Madison, if the motion (of Mr. Dickinson)
should be agreed to, we must either depart from the
doctrine of proportional representation; or admit
into the Senate a very large number of members.
The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust.
The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate
is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness,
with more system, & with more wisdom, than the
popular branch. Enlarge their number and you
communicate to them the vices which they are meant
to correct. He differed from Mr. D. who thought
that the additional number would give additional
weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared
to him that their weight would be in an inverse
ratio to their number. The example of the Roman
Tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence
and power, in proportion as their number was
augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious:
They were appointed to take care of the popular
interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people
by reason of their numbers could not act in concert;
were liable to fall into factions among themselves,
and to become a prey to their aristocratic
adversaries. The more the representatives of the
people therefore were multiplied, the more they
partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the
more liable they became to be divided among themselves
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices
of the opposite faction, and of course the less

capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight
of a set of men depends merely on their personal
characters; the greater the number the greater the
weight. When it depends on the degree of political
authority lodged in them the smaller the number
the greater the weight. These considerations might
perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but
the latter was the material one.

Mr. Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate
have been mentioned. 1. by the 1st branch of the
National Legislature. This would create a dependance
contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the
National Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy
that few will think of. 3. by the people. The
people have two great interests, the landed interest,
and the commercial including the stockholders.
To draw both branches from the people will leave
no security to the latter interest; the people being
Chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously
supposing, that the other interests are adverse
to it. 4 by the Individual Legislatures. The elections
being carried thro' this refinement, will be
most likely to provide some check in favor of the
Commercial interest agst. the landed; without which
oppression will take place, and no free Govt can last
long where that is the case. He was therefore in
favor of this last.

Mr. Dickenson.[63] The preservation of the States

in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It
will produce that collision between the different
authorities which should be wished for in order to
check each other. To attempt to abolish the States
altogether, would degrade the Councils of our
Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous.
He compared the proposed National System to the
Solar System, in which the States were the planets,
and ought to be left to move freely in their proper
orbits. The Gentleman from Pa. (Mr. Wilson)
wished he said to extinguish these planets. If the
State Governments were excluded from all agency
in the national one, and all power drawn from the
people at large, the consequence would be that the
national Govt. would move in the same direction as
the State Govts. now do, and would run into all the
same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13
small streams into one great current pursuing the
same course without any opposition whatever. He
adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be
composed of a large number, and that their influence
from family weight & other causes would be
increased thereby. He did not admit that the
Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as their no.
was augmented and gave a historical sketch of this
institution. If the reasoning of (Mr. Madison) was
good it would prove that the number of the Senate
ought to be reduced below ten, the highest no. of the
Tribunitial corps.

Mr. Wilson. The subject it must be owned is
surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we
must surmount them. The British Governmt. cannot
be our model. We have no materials for a
similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition
of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of
the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the
danger of the States being devoured by the Nationl.
Govt. On the contrary, he wished to keep them
from devouring the national Govt. He was not however
for extinguishing these planets as was supposed
by Mr. D.—neither did he on the other hand,
believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun.
Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered
to act for subordinate purposes, for which their
existence is made essential by the great extent of
our Country. He could not comprehend in what
manner the landed interest wd. be rendered less predominant
in the Senate, by an election through the
medium of the Legislatures than by the people
themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained,
sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest,
what reason was there to expect such a
choice from them as would defeat their own views.
He was for an election by the people in large districts
which wd. be most likely to obtain men of intelligence
& uprightness; subdividing the districts
only for the accommodation of voters.

Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what
manner family weight, as desired by Mr. D. would
be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through

elections by the State Legislatures, than in some
other modes. The true question was in what mode
the best choice wd. be made? If an election by the
people, or thro' any other channel than the State
Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a
preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity
for an appointment by those Legislatures.
Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would
be derived thro' that channel than from the people
thro' some other. The great evils complained of
were that the State Legislatures run into schemes
of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people,
& sometimes without even the sanction of the people.
Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity
in the National Legislature, may be expected
to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory
than to say that the Natl. Legislature witht. a proper
check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures,
& in the same breath, that the State
Legislatures are the only proper check.

Mr. Sharman opposed elections by the people in
districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as
elections by the State Legislatures.

Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied
interest wd. be more secure in the hands of the State
Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former
have more sense of character, and will be restrained
by that from injustice. The people are for
paper money when the Legislatures are agst. it. In
Massts. the County Conventions had declared a wish
for a depreciating paper that wd. sink itself. Besides,

in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature,
one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There
wd. therefore be so far a better chance of refinement in
the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three
powerful objections agst. elections by districts, 1. it
is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to
one place for the purpose; and whether brought to
the same place or not, numberless frauds wd. be unavoidable.
2. small States forming part of the same
district with a large one, or large part of a large one,
wd. have no chance of gaining an appointment for its
citizens of merit. 3 a new source of discord wd. be
opened between different parts of the same district.

Mr. Pinkney thought the 2d. branch ought to be
permanent & independent; & that the members of
it wd. be rendered more so by receiving their appointment
from the State Legislatures. This mode wd.
avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the
election by districts. He was for dividing the States
into three classes according to their respective sizes,
& for allowing to the 1st. class three members, to the
2d. two, & to the 3d. one.

On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's
motion referring the appointment of the Senate to
the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's
for referring it to the people

Mass. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary
for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must necessarily

be left in the States. It is impossible for one
power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so
as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures
also ought to have some means of defending
themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In
every other department we have studiously endeavoured
to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave
the States alone unprovided with the means for this
purpose? And what better means can we provide
than the giving them some share in, or rather to
make them a constituent part of, the Natl. Establishment.
There is danger on both sides no doubt; but
we have only seen the evils arising on the side
of the State Govts. Those on the other side remain
to be displayed. The example of Congs. does not
apply. Congs. had no power to carry their acts into
execution, as the Natl. Govt. will have.

On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of
the Senate by the State Legislatures,

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry gave notice that he wd. tomorrow move
for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the
Natl. Executive in order to substitute an appointmt.
by the State Executives

The Committee rose & The House adjd.

Friday June 8th. In Committee of the Whole.

On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Natl.
Legislature a negative on such laws of the States as

might be contrary to the articles of Union, or Treaties
with foreign nations,

Mr. Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature
shd. have authority to negative all laws which
they shd. judge to be improper." He urged that such
a universality of the power was indispensably necessary
to render it effectual; that the States must be
kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the
States were left to act of themselves in any case, it
wd. be impossible to defend the national prerogatives,
however extensive they might be on paper; that the
acts of Congress had been defeated by this means;
nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations:
that this universal negative was in fact the corner
stone of an efficient national Govt.; that under the
British Govt. the negative of the Crown had been
found beneficial, and the States are more one nation
now, than the Colonies were then.

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He could not
but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative
acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a
perfect System. Experience had evinced a constant
tendency in the States to encroach on the federal
authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe
the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the
weaker party within their respective jurisdictions.
A negative was the mildest expedient that could be
devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence
of such a check would prevent attempts to commit
them. Should no such precaution be engrafted,
the only remedy wd. lie in an appeal to coercion. Was

such a remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could
the national resources, if exerted to the utmost enforce
a national decree agst. Massts. abetted perhaps
by several of her neighbours? It wd. not be possible.
A small proportion of the Community, in a
compact situation acting on the defensive, and at
one of its extremities, might at any time bid defiance
to the National authority. Any Govt. for the U.
States formed on the supposed practicability of
using force agst. the unconstitutional proceedings of
the States, wd. prove as visionary & fallacious as the
Govt. of Congs. The negative wd. render the use of
force unnecessary. The States cd. of themselves pass
no operative act, any more than one branch of a
Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed
without the other. But in order to give the
negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases. A
discrimination wd. only be a fresh source of contention
between the two authorities. In a word, to
recur to the illustrations borrowed from the planetary
system. This prerogative of the General Govt.,
is the great pervading principle that must controul
the centrifugal tendency of the States; which, without
it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits
and destroy the order & harmony of the political
System.

Mr. Williamson was agst. giving a power that might
restrain the States from regulating their internal
police.

Mr. Gerry cd. not see the extent of such a power,
and was agst. every power that was not necessary. He

thought a remonstrance agst unreasonable acts of the
States wd. reclaim them. If it shd. not force might
be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize
a negative to paper money and similar measures.
When the confederation was depending before Congress,
Massachusetts was then for inserting the power
of emitting paper money amg. the exclusive powers
of Congress. He observed that the proposed negative
wd. extend to the regulations of the Militia, a
matter on which the existence of a State might
depend. The Natl. Legislature with such a power
may enslave the States. Such an idea as this will
never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or
conceived among the people. No speculative projector,
and there are eno' of that character among us,
in politics as well as in other things, has in any pamphlet
or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States
too have different interests and are ignorant of each
other's interests. The Negative therefore will be
abused. New States too having separate views
from the old States will never come into the Union.
They may even be under some foreign influence;
are they in such case to participate in the negative
on the will of the other States?

Mr. Sherman thought the cases in which the negative
ought to be exercised, might be defined. He
wished the point might not be decided till a trial at
least shd. be made for that purpose

Mr. Wilson would not say what modifications of
the proposed power might be practicable or expedient.
But however novel it might appear the

principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye,
is right. There is no instance in which the laws
say that the individual shd. be bound in one case, &
at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey
in another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the
power over the individual person may happen as
well as over the individual States. Federal liberty is
to the States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals,
and States are not more unwilling to purchase
it, by the necessary concession of their political
sovereignty, that the savage is to purchase Civil
liberty by the surrender of the personal sovereignty,
which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition
of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised,
is impracticable. A discretion must be left on
one side or the other? will it not be most safely
lodged on the side of the Natl. Govt.? Among the first
sentiments expressed in the first Congs. one was that
Virga. is no more, that Massts. is no [more], that Pa. is
no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren.
We must bury all local interests & distinctions. This
language continued for some time. The tables at
length began to turn. No sooner were the State
Govts. formed than their jealousy & ambition began
to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a
slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel,
till at length the confederation became frittered
down to the impotent condition in which it now
stands. Review the progress of the articles of Confederation
thro' Congress & compare the first & last
draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of
this convention. One of its vices is the want of an
effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What
danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily
sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the
whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the
general interest be continually sacrificed to local
interests?

Mr. Dickenson deemed it impossible to draw a line
between the cases proper & improper for the exercise
of the negative. We must take our choice of
two things. We must either subject the States to
the danger of being injured by the power of the Natl.
Govt. or the latter to the danger of being injured by
that of the States. He thought the danger greater
from the States. To leave the power doubtful,
would be opening another spring of discord, and he
was for shutting as many of them as possible.

Mr. Bedford In answer to his colleague's question,
where wd. be the danger to the States from this power,
would refer him to the smalness of his own State
which may be injured at pleasure without redress.
It was meant he found to strip the small States of
their equal right of suffrage. In this case Delaware
would have about 1/90 for its share in the General Councils,
whilst Pa. & Va. would possess 1/3 of the whole. Is
there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce,
of manufactures? Will not these large States
crush the small ones whenever they stand in the way
of their ambitious or interested views. This shews
the impossibility of adopting such a system as that
on the table, or any other founded on a change in the

priñple of representation. And after all, if a State
does not obey the law of the new System, must not
force be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in
this as in any other system. It seems as if Pa. &
Va. by the conduct of their deputies wished to provide
a system in which they would have an enormous
& monstrous influence. Besides, How can it
be thought that the proposed negative can be exercised?
Are the laws of the States to be suspended
in the most urgent cases until they can be sent seven
or eight hundred miles, and undergo the deliberation
of a body who may be incapable of Judging of them?
Is the National Legislature too to sit continually in
order to revise the laws of the States?

Mr. Madison observed that the difficulties which
had been started were worthy of attention and ought
to be answered before the question was put. The
case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for
by some emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt.
into each State so far as to give a temporary assent
at least. This was the practice in the Royal Colonies
before the Revolution and would not have been
inconvenient if the supreme power of negativing had
been faithful to the American interest, and had possessed
the necessary information. He supposed that
the negative might be very properly lodged in the
senate alone, and that the more numerous & expensive
branch therefore might not be obliged to sit
constantly. He asked Mr. B. what would be the
consequence to the small States of a dissolution of
the Union wch. seemed likely to happen if no effectual

substitute was made for the defective System existing,
and he did not conceive any effectual system
could be substituted on any other basis than that of
a proportional suffrage? If the large States possessed
the Avarice & ambition with which they were
charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood,
be more secure when all controul of a Genl.
Govt. was withdrawn.

Mr. Butler was vehement agst. the Negative in the
proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice
to the distant States. The people there would
not he was sure give it a hearing.

On the question for extending the negative power
to all cases as proposed by (Mr. P. & Mr. M.) Mass.
ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del.
divd. Mr. Read & Mr. Dickenson ay. Mr. Bedford &
Mr. Basset no. Maryd. no. Va. ay. Mr. R. Mr.
Mason no. Mr. Blair, Docr. Mc. Cg. Mr. M. ay. Genl.
W. not consulted N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo no.

On motion of Mr. Gerry and Mr. King tomorrow
was assigned for reconsidering the mode of appointing
the National Executive: the reconsideration being
voted for by all the States except Connecticut
& N. Carolina.

Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Rutlidge moved to add to
the Resoln. 4. agreed to by the Come. the following,
viz. "that the States be divided into three classes,
the 1st. class to have 3 members, the 2d. two, & the 3d.
one member each, that an estimate be taken of the
comparative importance of each State at fixed periods,
so as to ascertain the number of members they

may from time to time be entitled to." The Committee
then rose and the House adjourned.

Saturday June 9th.[64] Mr. Luther Martin from
Maryland took his seat. In Committee of the
Whole

Mr. Gerry, according to previous notice given by

him, moved "that the national Executive should
be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion
of votes should be the same with that allowed
to the States in the election of the Senate." If the
appointmt. should be made by the Natl. Legislature,
it would lessen that independence of the Executive
which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue
and corruption between the Executive & Legislature
previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive
afterwards to the friends who promoted him.
Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary.
He proposed that of appointing by the State
Executives as most analogous to the principle observed
in electing the other branches of the Natl.
Govt.; the first branch being chosen by the people of
the States, & the 2d. by the Legislatures of the States,
he did not see any objection agst. letting the Executive
be appointed by the Executives of the States.
He supposed the Executives would be most likely to
select the fittest men, and that it would be their
interest to support the man of their own choice.

Mr. Randolph, urged strongly the inexpediency of
Mr. Gerry's mode of appointing the Natl Executive.
The confidence of the people would not be secured
by it to the Natl. magistrate. The small States
would lose all chance of an appointmt. from within
themselves. Bad appointments would be made;
the Executives of the States being little conversant
with characters not within their own small spheres.
The State Executives too notwithstanding their constitutional
independence, being in fact dependent on

the State Legislatures will generally be guided by
the views of the latter, and prefer either favorites
within the States, or such as it may be expected will
be most partial to the interests of the State. A
Natl. Executive thus chosen will not be likely to
defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the National
rights agst. State encroachments. Vacancies
also must happen. How can these be filled? He
could not suppose either that the Executives would
feel the interest in supporting the Natl. Executive
which had been imagined. They will not cherish
the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry
shrubs.

On the question for referring the appointment of
the Natl. Executive to the State Executives as propd.
by Mr. Gerry Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no.
N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. drvd. Md. no. Va. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no.[65]

Mr. Patterson moves that the Committee resume
the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Natl
Legislature.

Mr. Brearly[66] seconds him. He was sorry he said
that any question on this point was brought into
view. It had been much agitated in Congs. at the

time of forming the Confederation, and was then
rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State
an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must
have been destroyed instead of being saved. The
substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness
on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was
unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the
States by the quota of Congs., Virga. would have 16
votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to
the others will make the whole number ninety.
There will be 3 large states, and 10 small ones. The
large States by which he meant Massts. Pena. & Virga.
will carry every thing before them. It had been
admitted, and was known to him from facts within
N. Jersey that where large & small counties were
united into a district for electing representatives for
the district, the large counties always carried their
point, and Consequently that the large States would
do so. Virga. with her sixteen votes will be a solid column
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia
with her Solitary vote, and the other little States will
be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the
scale of some large one, in order to have any weight
at all. He had come to the convention with a view
of being as useful as he could in giving energy and
stability to the federal Government. When the
proposition for destroying the equality of votes came
forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it
fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have
an equal vote with Virga.? He would not say it was.
What remedy then? One only, that a map of the
U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries
be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be
made into 13 equal parts.

Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a
proportional representation as striking at the existence
of the lesser States. He wd. premise however to
an investigation of this question some remarks on
the nature structure and powers of the Convention.
The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of
an Act of Congs. that this act was recited in several
of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. which
he required to be read: that the amendment of the
Confederacy was the object of all the laws and Commissions
on the subject: that the articles of the Confederation
were therefore the proper basis of all the
proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep
within its limits, or we should be charged by our
Constituents with usurpation, that the people of
America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived.
But the Commissions under which we acted were
not only the measure of our power, they denoted also
the sentiments of the States on the subject of our
deliberation. The idea of a National Govt. as contradistinguished
from a federal one, never entered
into the mind of any of them, and to the public
mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have
no power to go beyond the federal Scheme, and if we
had the people are not ripe for any other. We must
follow the people; the people will not follow us.—
The proposition could not be maintained whether
considered in reference to us as a nation, or as a confederacy.

A confederacy supposes sovereignty in
the members composing it & sovereignty supposes
equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all
State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must
be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division
is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation.
He held up Virga. Massts. & Pa. as the
three large States, and the other ten as small ones;
repeating the calculations of Mr. Brearly, as to the
disparity of votes which wd. take place, and affirming
that the small States would never agree to it. He
said there was no more reason that a great individual
State contributing much, should have more votes
than a small one contributing little, than that a rich
individual citizen should have more votes than an
indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to
that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have
40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle
would never be admitted, and if it were admitted
would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has
more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute
more for the common protection. The same
may be said of a large State wch. has more to be protected
than a small one. Give the large States an
influence in proportion to their magnitude, and what
will be the consequence? Their ambition will be
proportionally increased, and the small States will
have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by
Galloway & some others that America should be
represented in the British Parlt. and then be bound
by its laws. America could not have been entitled
to more than 1/3 of the no. of Representatives which
would fall to the share of G. B. Would American
rights & interests have been safe under an authority
thus constituted? It has been said that if a Natl.
Govt. is to be formed so as to operate on the people,
and not on the States, the representatives ought to
be drawn from the people. But why so? May not
a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures operate
on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or
may not a practicable coercion be found. He admitted
that there was none such in the existing
System.—He was attached strongly to the plan of
the existing Confederacy, in which the people chuse
their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures
their federal representatives. No other amendments
were wanting than to mark the orbits of the
States with due precision, and provide for the use of
coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to
the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson of the
necessity to which the large States might be reduced
of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of
the others to concur. Let them unite if they please,
but let them remember that they have no authority
to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will never
confederate on the plan before the Committee. She
would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a
monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would
not only oppose the plan here but on his return home
do every thing in his power to defeat it there.

Mr. Wilson, hoped if the Confederacy should be
dissolved, that a majority, that a minority of the

States would unite for their safety. He entered
elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation,
stating for his first position that as all
authority was derived from the people, equal numbers
of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives,
and different numbers of people different
numbers of representatives. This principle had been
improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to
the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case
of A. & B. stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed that
in districts as large as the States, the number of
people was the best measure of their comparative
wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were
to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr. P. admitted
persons, not property to be the measure of
suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pena. equal to those
of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to
balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different
districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion
to each other, as their respective Constituents
hold to each other. If the small States will not
confederate on this plan, Pena. & he presumed some
other States, would not confederate on any other.
We have been told that each State being sovereign,
all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign
over himself, and all men are therefore naturally
equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes
a member of Civil Government. He can not. As
little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a
member of a federal governt. If N. J. will not part
with her sovereignty it is vain to talk of Govt. A new
partition of the States is desirable, but evidently &
totally impracticable.

Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison
of the different States, to Counties of different
sizes within the same State; observing that proportional
representation was admitted to be just in the
latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested
in the former.

The Question being about to be put Mr. Patterson
hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be
thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow,
which was done, nem. con.

The Come. rose & the House adjourned.

Monday, June 11th. Mr. Abraham Baldwin from
Georgia took his seat. In Committee of the Whole.

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the
Natl. Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.

Mr. Sharman proposed that the proportion of
suffrage in the 1st. branch should be according to the
respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in
the second branch or Senate, each State should have
one vote and no more. He said as the States would
remain possessed of certain individual rights, each
State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a
few large States will rule the rest. The House of
Lords in England he observed had certain particular
rights under the Constitution, and hence they
have an equal vote with the House of Commons that
they may be able to defend their rights.

Mr. Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage
in the 1st. branch should be according to the
quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he
said could not be contested. Mr. Butler urged the
same idea: adding that money was power; and that
the States ought to have weight in the Govt. in proportion
to their wealth.

Mr. King & Mr. Wilson,[67] in order to bring the question
to a point moved "that the right of suffrage in
the first branch of the national Legislature ought not
to be according [to] the rule established in the articles
of Confederation, but according to some equitable
ratio of representation." The clause so far as it
related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed
in order to consider this motion.

Mr. Dickenson contended for the actual contributions
of the States as the rule of their representation
& suffrage in the first branch. By thus connecting
the interests of the States with their duty, the latter
would be sure to be performed.

Mr. King remarked that it was uncertain what
mode might be used in levying a National revenue;
but that it was probable, imposts would be one
source of it. If the actual contributions were to be
the rule the non-importing States, as Cont. & N.
Jersey, wd. be in a bad situation indeed. It might so
happen that they wd. have no representation. This
situation of particular States had been always one
powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per Ct. impost.

The question being abt. to be put Docr. Franklin
sd. he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper
wch. Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the words
following—Mr. Chairman

It has given me great pleasure to observe that till
this point, the proportion of representation, came
before us, our debates were carried on with great
coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind,
has on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not be
repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend,
with each other; and declarations of a fixed
opinion, and of determined resolution, never to
change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness
and warmth on one side, naturally beget
their like on the other; and tend to create and augment
discord & division in a great concern, wherein
harmony & Union are extremely necessary to give
weight to our Councils, and render them effectual in
promoting & securing the common good.

I must own that I was originally of opinion it
would be better if every member of Congress, or our
national Council, were to consider himself rather as
a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for
the interests of a particular State; in which case the
proportion of members for each State would be of
less consequence, & it would not be very material
whether they voted by States or individually. But
as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the
number of Representatives should bear some proportion
to the number of the Represented; and that
the decisions shd. be by the majority of members, not

by the majority of the States. This is objected to
from an apprehension that the greater States would
then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present
clearly see what advantage the greater States could
propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller,
and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt
it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century,
When the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms,
England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of
fears, that unless they had an equal number of Representatives
in Parliament, they should be ruined by
the superiority of the English. They finally agreed
however that the different proportions of importance
in the Union, of the two Nations should be
attended to, whereby they were to have only forty
members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen
in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of
numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect
that any thing has been done in the Parliament of
Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever
looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil &
Military of that nation will find I believe that the
North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of
emolument.

But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States,
it is equally in the power of the lesser States to
swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically
demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller
States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6
larger to have one with another 6 members; and that
upon a question, two members of each smaller State

should be in the affirmative and one in the Negative,
they would make

     

Affirmatives	14	Negatives	7
And that all the larger States should be unanimously in the Negative, they would make		Negatives	36
In all			43

It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question
against the 43. and the minority overpowers the majority,
contrary to the common practice of Assemblies
in all Countries and Ages.

The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to
have their property left in the disposition of the
smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition
of the greater. An honorable gentleman
has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of
equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable
one, and I should, for my own part, not be
against such a measure, if it might be found practicable.
Formerly, indeed, when almost every province
had a different Constitution, some with greater
others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to
the borderers when their boundaries were contested,
whether by running the division lines, they were
placed on one side or the other. At present when
such differences are done away, it is less material.
The Interest of a State is made up of the interests
of its individual members. If they are not injured,
the State is not injured. Small States are

more easily well & happily governed than large
ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should
be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I
should not be averse to the giving a part of it to N.
Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there
would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting
such a division; and however equally made
at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation
of inhabitants in some States, and their
fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent
occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose
for the consideration of the Committee another mode,
which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily
carried into practice, and more permanent in its
nature.

Let the weakest State say what proportion of
money or force it is able and willing to furnish for
the general purposes of the Union.

Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish
each an equal proportion.

The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely
in the disposition of Congress.

The Congress in this case to be composed of an
equal number of Delegates from each State.

And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual
members voting.

If these joint and equal supplies should on particular
occasions not be sufficient, Let Congress make
requisitions on the richer and more powerful States
for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving
to each State the right of considering the necessity

and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or
less as it should be found proper.

This mode is not new. it was formerly practised
with success by the British Government with respect
to Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes
gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept; and in the last war carried on while we
were united, they gave us back in 5 years a million
Sterling. We should probably have continued such
voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions
appeared to require them for the common good of
the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us,
and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary
contributions that we refused & resisted.
Those contributions however were to be disposed
of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had
no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that
they will not be refused to one in which the Representation
shall be equal.

My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already
mentioned that the present method of voting by
States, was submitted to originally by Congress,
under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality,
and injustice. This appears in the words of their
Resolution. It is of Sepr. 6. 1774. The words
are

"Resolved that in determining questions in this
Congs. each Colony or province shall have one vote:
The Congs. not being possessed of or at present able
to procure materials for ascertaining the importance
of each Colony."

On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and
Mr. Wilsons motion it passed in the affirmative

Massts. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

It was then moved by Mr. Rutlidge, 2ded. by Mr.
Butler to add to the words "equitable ratio of representation
"at the end of the motion just agreed to,
the words "according to the quotas of contribution."
On motion of Mr. Wilson seconded by Mr. Pinkney,
this was postponed; in order to add, after the words
"equitable ratio of representation" the words following:"
in proportion to the whole number of white
& other free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex
& condition including those bound to servitude for
a term of years and three fifths of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians not paying taxes, in each State," this
being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by
eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue
on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5,
7, or 10 years.

Mr. Gerry thought property not the rule of representation.
Why then shd. the blacks, who were
property in the South, be in the rule of representation
more than the Cattle & horses of the North.[68]

On the question,—Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryd.

Virga. N. C. S. C. & Geo: were in the affirmative:
N. J. & Del: in the negative.

Mr. Sharman moved that a question be taken
whether each State shall have one vote in the 2d.
branch. Every thing he said depended on this.
The smaller States would never agree to the plan
on any other principle than an equality of suffrage
in this branch. Mr. Elsworth[69] seconded the motion.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in
the 2d. branch,

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Hamilton moved that the right
of suffrage in the 2d. branch ought to be according to
the same rule as in the 1st branch. On this question
for making the ratio of representation the same in
the 2d. as in the 1st. branch it passed in the affirmative;

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Govt.
& territory to each State, being considered—the
words "or partition," were, on motion of Mr. Madison

added, after the words "voluntary junction;"

Mas. N. Y. P. Va. N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J.
Del: Md. no.

Mr. Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory.
It abetted the idea of distinct States wch.
would be a perpetual source of discord. There can
be no cure for this evil but in doing away States
altogether and uniting them all into one great Society.

Alterations having been made in the Resolution,
making it read, "that a Republican Constitution &
its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each
State by the U. States,"the whole was agreed to
nem. con.[70]

Resolution 13. for amending the national Constitution
hereafter without consent of the Natl. Legislature
being considered, Several members did not
see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the
propriety of making the consent of the Natl. Legisl.
unnecessary.

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision.
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective,
as the Confederation has been found on trial to
be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and
it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
and Constitutional way than to trust to chance
and violence. It would be improper to require the
consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may

abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that
very account. The opportunity for such an abuse,
may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendmt.

Mr. Randolph enforced these arguments.

The words, "without requiring the consent of the
Natl. Legislature" were postponed. The other provision
in the clause passed nem. con.

Resolution 14. requiring oaths from the members
of the State Govts. to observe the Natl. Constitution
& laws, being considered,[71]

Mr. Sharman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding
into the State jurisdictions.

Mr. Randolph considered it necessary to prevent
that competition between the National Constitution
& laws & those of the particular States, which had
already been felt. The officers of the States are
already under oath to the States. To preserve a
due impartiality they ought to be equally bound to
the Natl. Govt. The Natl. authority needs every support
we can give it. The Executive & Judiciary of
the States, notwithstanding their nominal independence
on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent
on them, that unless they be brought under
some tie to the Natl. System, they will always lean
too much to the State systems, whenever a contest
arises between the two.

Mr. Gerry did not like the clause. He thought

there was as much reason for requiring an oath of
fidelity to the States from Natl officers, as vice versa.

Mr. Luther Martin moved to strike out the words
requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz
"within the several States," observing that if the
new oath should be contrary to that already taken
by them it would be improper; if coincident the
oaths already taken will be sufficient.

On the question for striking out as proposed by
Mr. L. Martin

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Question on whole Resolution as proposed by
Mr. Randolph;

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Come. rose & House Adjd.

Tuesday June 12th. in Committee of Whole

The Question taken on the Resolution 15, to wit,
referring the new system to the people of the
States for ratification it passed in the affirmative
Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.[72] ay.
Del. divd. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Sharman & Mr. Elseworth moved to fill the
blank left in the 4th. Resolution for the periods of
electing the members of the first branch with the
words, "every year;" Mr. Sharman observing that
he did it in order to bring on some question.

Mr. Rutlidge proposed "every two years."

Mr. Jennifer[73] propd., "every three years," observing
that the too great frequency of elections rendered
the people indifferent to them, and made the
best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a
service.

Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years.
Instability is one of the great vices of our republics,
to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a
Government so extensive, for members to form any
knowledge of the various interests of the States to
which they do not belong, and of which they can
know but little from the situation and affairs of their
own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing
for and travelling to & from the seat of national
business.

Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will
never give up the point of annual elections, they
know of the transition made in England from triennial

to septennial elections, and will consider such
an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation.
He considered annual elections as the only
defence of the people agst. tyranny. He was as much
agst. a triennial House as agst. a hereditary Executive.

Mr. Madison, observed that if the opinions of the
people were to be our guide, it wd. be difficult to say
what course we ought to take. No member of the
Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents
were at this time; much less could he say
what they would think if possessed of the information
& lights possessed by the members here; & still
less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12
months hence. We ought to consider what was
right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a
proper Governmt. A plan adjusted to this idea will
recommend itself—The respectability of this convention
will give weight to their recommendation of it.
Experience will be constantly urging the adoption
of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable
citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short
of the necessary & proper point, this influential class
of Citizens, will be turned against the plan, and little
support in opposition to them can be gained to it
from the unreflecting multitude.

Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary
to consider what the people would approve.
This had been the policy of all Legislators. If the
reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed
a limited Monarchy the best form in itself, we
ought to recommend it, tho' the genius of the people

was decidedly adverse to it, and having no hereditary
distinctions among us, we were destitute of the
essential materials for such an innovation.

On the question for the triennial election of the
1st. branch

Mass. no. (Mr. King ay.) Mr. Ghorum wavering.
Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The words requiring members of ye. 1st. branch to
be of the age of——— years were struck out Maryland
alone no The words "liberal compensation for
members," being considd. Mr. Madison moves to
insert the words, "& fixt." He observed that it
would be improper to leave the members of the Natl.
legislature to be provided for by the State Legisls.,
because it would create an improper dependence;
and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was
an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous
one. He thought wheat or some other article
of which the average price throughout a reasonable
period preceding might be settled in some convenient
mode, would form a proper standard.

Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it
would be improper for other reasons to leave the
wages to be regulated by the States. 1. the different
States would make different provision for their representatives,
and an inequality would be felt among
them, whereas he thought they ought to be in all
respects equal. 2. the parsimony of the States might
reduce the provision so low that as had already happened
in choosing delegates to Congress, the question

would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but
who were most willing to serve.

On the question for inserting the words, "and
fixt"

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. ay.

Docr Franklyn said he approved of the amendment
just made for rendering the salaries as fixed
as possible; but disliked the word "liberal." He
would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary
to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency
of abuses in every case, to grow of themselves when
once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression
in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first
departure from the gratuitous provision for the
Apostles, to the establishment of the papal system.
The word "liberal" was struck out nem con.

On the motion of Mr. Pierce, that the wages should
be paid out of the National Treasury, Massts. ay. Ct.
no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.

Question on the clause relating to term of service
& compensation of 1st. branch,

Massts. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of
members of the Natl. Legis: to State offices,"

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

On the question for agreeing to the clause as
amended,

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

On a question for making members of the Natl.
Legislature ineligible to any office under the Nat
Govt. for the term of 3 years after ceasing to be
members,

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

On the question for such ineligibility for one year,
Massts. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking
out "incapable of re-election into 1st. branch of the
Natl. Legisl. for——— years, and subject to recall"
agd. to nem. con.

On question for striking out from the Resol:
5 the words requiring members of the Senatorial
branch to be of the age of——— years at least

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C.
no. Geo. divd.

On the question for rilling the blank with 30
years as the qualification; it was agreed to,

Massts. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Mr. Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration

of the appointmts. to the 2d. branch of the National
Legislature with the words" 7 years.

Mr. Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He
grounded his opposition he said on the principle that
if they did their duty well, they would be reelected.
And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity
should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred
5 years which wd. be between the terms of the
1st. branch & of the executive

Mr. Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise
an alarm. Great mischiefs had arisen in England
from their septennial Act which was reprobated by
most of their patriotic Statesmen.

Mr. Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The
democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures
proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object
of this 2d. branch is to controul the democratic branch
of the Natl. Legislature. If it be not a firm body,
the other branch being more numerous, and coming
immediately from the people, will overwhelm it.
The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles
had been scarcely able to stem the popular
torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the
concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure,
of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary.
A firmness & independence may be the more necessary
also in this branch, as it ought to guard the
Constitution agst. encroachments of the Executive
who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues
of the popular branch.

Mr. Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no

means too long. What we wished was to give to
the Govt. that stability which was every where called
for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form
alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was
not afraid of giving too much stability by the term
of Seven years. His fear was that the popular
branch would still be too great an overmatch for it.
It was to be much lamented that we had so little
direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of
Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy
to this part of the plan. In no instance had the
Senate of Maryd. created just suspicions of danger
from it. In some instances perhaps it may have
erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every
instance of their opposition to the measures of the
H. of D. they had had with them the suffrages of
the most enlightened and impartial people of the
other States as well as of their own. In the States
where the Senates, were chosen in the same manner
as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held
their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to
be no check whatever agst. the instabilities of the
other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance
that a stable & firm Govt., organized in the
republican form should be held out to the people.
If this be not done, and the people be left to judge
of this species of Govt. by ye. operations of the defective
systems under which they now live, it is
much to be feared the time is not distant when, in
universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing
which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and
be ready for any change that may be proposed to
them.

On the question for "seven years" as the term for
the 2d. branch Massts divided. (Mr. King, Mr. Ghorum
ay, Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, no) Cont. no. N. Y. divd.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Butler and Mr. Rutlidge proposed that the
members of the 2d branch should be entitled to no
salary or compensation for their services. On the
question,[74] —

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P.
no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting
the stipends & ineligibility of the 2d. branch
be the same as, of the 1st branch:—Con: disagreeing
to the ineligibility.

It was moved & 2ded. to alter the Resol: 9. so as
to read "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal
shall be to hear & determine in the dernier
resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."

It was moved & 2ded. to strike out "all piracies &
felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.

It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures
from an enemy."

It was moved & agreed to strike out "other

States" and insert "two distinct States of the
Union"

It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration
of the Resolution 9, relating to the Judiciary:

The Come. then rose & the House Adjourned

Wednesday June 13.[75] in Committee of the
whole

Resol: 9 being resumed

The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction
of the Natl. tribunals, was struck out nem.
con in order to leave full room for their organization.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, then moved the following
resolution respecting a National Judiciary,

viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary
shall extend to cases, which respect the collection
of the national revenue, impeachments of any
national officers, and questions which involve the
national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Sherman moved to insert after
the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the
Judges of which to be appointed by the National
Legislature."

Mr. Madison, objected to an appt.. by the whole
Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges
of the requisite qualifications. They were too much
influenced by their partialities. The candidate
who was present, who had displayed a talent for
business in the legislative field, who had perhaps
assisted ignorant members in business of their own,

or of their Constituents, or used other winning means,
would without any of the essential qualifications for
an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor
not having these recommendations, but possessed of
every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that
the appointment should be made by the Senate,
which as a less numerous & more select body, would
be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently
numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

Mr. Sharman & Mr. Pinkney withdrew their
motion, and the appt. by the Senate was agd. to nem.
con.

Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch
from originating money bills. The other branch was
more immediately the representatives of the people,
and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold
the Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed
to originate such bills, they wd. repeat the experiment,
till chance should furnish a sett of representatives
in the other branch who will fall into their
snares.

Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination.
We were always following the British Constitution
when the reason of it did not apply. There
was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the
body proposed to be established. If the Senate
should be degraded by any such discriminations, the
best men would be apt to decline serving in it in
favor of the other branch. And it will lead the
latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to
money bills.

Mr. Madison observed that the Comentators on
the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of
the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain
it was there could be no similar reason in the
case before us. The Senate would be the representatives
of the people as well as the 1st. branch. If
they sd. have any dangerous influence over it, they
would easily prevail on some member of the latter
to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As
the Senate would be generally a more capable sett
of men, it wd. be wrong to disable them from any preparation
of the business, especially of that which was
most important, and in our republics, worse prepared
than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of
his principle ought to carry the restraint to the
amendment, as well as the originating of money
bills, since, an addition of a given sum wd. be equivalent
to a distinct proposition of it.

Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred
in the objections to the proposition.

Mr. Read favored the proposition, but would not
extend the restraint to the case of amendments.

Mr. Pinkney thinks the question premature. If
the Senate shd. be formed on the same proportional
representation as it stands at present, they sd. have
equal power, otherwise if a different principle sd.
be introduced.

Mr. Sherman. As both branches must concur,
there can be no danger whichever way the Senate
be formed. We establish two branches in order to
get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in

the finance business—The Senate bear their share
of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the
people. What a man does by another, he does by
himself is a maxim. In Cont. both branches can
originate in all cases, and it has been found safe &
convenient. Whatever might have been the reason
of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no
good arises from it now even there.

Genl. Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S.
C. and has been a source of pernicious disputes
between ye. 2 branches. The Constitution is now
evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed
from ye. Senate to the other House.

Mr. Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to
prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have
one advantage, it will oblige some member in the
lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.

On the question for excepting money bills, as
propd. by Mr. Gerry, Mass. no. Cont. no. N. Y.
ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.[76]

Committee rose & Mr. Ghorum made report,
which was postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity
for other plans to be proposed, the report
was in the words following:

Report of the Committee of Whole on Mr. Randolph's
propositions.

1.

• Resd. that it is the opinion of this Committee
  

  ---

  161

  
  
  
  that a National Governmt. ought to be established,
  consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive &
  Judiciary.

2.

• Resold. that the National Legislature ought to
  consist of two branches.

3.

• Resd. that the members of the first branch of
  the National Legislature ought to be elected by the
  people of the several States for the term of three
  years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may
  be compensated for the devotion of their time to
  public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury:
  to be ineligible to any office established by a
  particular State, or under the authority of the U.
  States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the
  functions of the first branch), during the term of
  service, and under the national Government for the
  Space of one year after its expiration.

4.

• Resd. that the members of the second branch
  of the Natl. Legislature ought to be chosen by the
  individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30 years
  at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to
  ensure their independency, namely, seven years, to
  receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated
  for the devotion of their time to public service
  to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be
  ineligible to any office established by a particular
  State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except
  those peculiarly belonging to the functions of
  the second branch) during the term of service, and
  under the Natl. Govt. for the space of one year after
  its expiration.

---

162





5.

• Resd. that each branch ought to possess the
  right of originating Acts

6.

• Resd. that the Natl. Legislature ought to be
  empowered to enjoy the Legislative rights vested in
  Congs. by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate
  in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent;
  or in which the harmony of the U. S.
  may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
  legislation; to negative all laws passed by the
  several States contravening in the opinion of the
  National Legislature the articles of Union, or any
  treaties subsisting under the authority of the
  Union.

7.

• Resd. that the rights of suffrage in the 1st. branch
  of the National Legislature, ought not to be according
  to the rule established in the articles of confederation
  but according to some equitable ratio of
  representation, namely, in proportion to the whole
  number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants,
  of every age sex and condition, including those
  bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths
  of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing
  description, except Indians not paying taxes
  in each State.

8.

• Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2d.
  branch of the National Legislature ought to be according
  to the rule established for the first.

9.

• Resolved that a National Executive be instituted
  to consist of a single person, to be chosen by
  the Natl. Legislature for the term of seven years,
  with power to carry into execution the national laws,
  

  ---

  163

  
  
  
  to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided
  for—to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable
  on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or
  neglect of duty—to receive a fixed stipend by which
  he may be compensated for the devotion of his time
  to public service to be paid out of the national
  Treasury.

10.

• Resold. that the Natl. Executive shall have a
  right to negative any Legislative Act, which shall
  not be afterwards passed unless by two thirds of
  each branch of the National Legislature.

11.

• Resold. that a Natl. Judiciary be established,
  to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges of
  which to be appointed by the 2d. branch of the Natl.
  Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour,
  & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
  compensation for their services, in which no increase
  or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons
  actually in office at the time of such increase or
  diminution.

12.

• Resold. that the Natl. Legislature be empowered
  to appoint inferior Tribunals.

13.

• Resd. that the jurisdiction of the Natl. Judiciary
  shall extend to all cases which respect the collection
  of the Natl. revenue, impeachments of any
  Natl. Officers, and questions which involve the national
  peace & harmony.

14.

• Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
  admission of States lawfully arising within the limits
  of the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction
  of Government & territory or otherwise, with the
  

  ---

  164

  
  
  
  consent of a number of voices in the Natl. Legislature
  less than the whole,

15.

• Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
  continuance of Congress and their authorities and
  privileges untill a given day after the reform of the
  articles of Union shall be adopted and for the completion
  of all their engagements.

16.

• Resd. that a Republican Constitution & its
  existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State
  by the U. States.

17.

• Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
  amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it
  shall seem necessary.

18.

• Resd. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary
  powers within the several States ought to be
  bound by oath to support the articles of Union.

19.

• Resd. that the amendments which shall be
  offered to the confederation by the Convention ought
  at a proper time or times after the approbation of
  Congs. to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies
  recommended by the several Legislatures to be
  expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide
  thereon.

Thursday June 14. In Convention.

Mr. Patterson, observed to the Convention that
it was the wish of several deputations, particularly
that of N. Jersey, that further time might be allowed
them to contemplate the plan reported from the
Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely

federal, and contradistinguished from the reported
plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready
by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And
the Convention adjourned that leisure might be
given for the purpose.

Friday June 15th. 1787

Mr. Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan
which he said several of the deputations wished to
be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr. Randolph.
After some little discussion of the most
proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was
agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of
the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans
in due comparison, the other should be recommitted.
At the earnest request of Mr. Lansing[77] & some other
gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention
should not go into Com̃ittee of the whole on the
subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of
the plan proposed by Mr. Patterson wd. be better
prepared to explain & support it, and all would have
an opportuy. of taking copies.[78]

The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr.
Patterson were in the words following.

1.

• Resd. that the articles of Confederation ought
  to be so revised, corrected, & enlarged, as to render
  the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies
  of Government, & the preservation of the Union.

2.

• Resd. that in addition to the powers vested in
  the U. States in Congress, by the present existing
  articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass
  acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or
  

  ---

  167

  
  
  
  duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth
  or manufacture, imported into any part of the U.
  States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment,
  and by a postage on all letters or packages passing
  through the general post-office, to be applied to such
  federal purposes as they shall deem proper & expedient;
  to make rules & regulations for the collection
  thereof; and the same from time to time, to
  alter & amend in such manner as they shall think
  proper, to pass Acts for the regulation of trade &
  commerce as well with foreign Nations as with each
  other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures
  & penalties to be incurred for contravening
  such acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by
  the Common law Judiciaries of the State in which
  any Offence contrary to the true intent & meaning
  of such Acts rules & regulations shall have been committed
  or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing
  in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for
  that purpose in the Superior Common law Judiciary
  in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction
  of all errors, both in law & fact in rendering
  Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the
  U. States.

3.

• Resd. that whenever requisitions shall be necessary,
  instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned
  in the articles of Confederation, the United
  States in Congs. be authorized to make such requisitions
  in proportion to the whole number of white &
  other free citizens & inhabitants of every age Sex
  and condition including those bound to servitude for
  

  ---

  168

  
  
  
  a term of years & three fifths of all other persons not
  comprehended in the foregoing description, except
  Indians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions
  be not complied with, in the time specified therein,
  to direct the collection thereof in the non complying
  States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts
  directing & authorizing the same; provided that
  none of the powers hereby vested in the U. States in
  Congs. shall be exercised without the consent of at
  least——— States, and in that proportion if the
  number of Confederated States should hereafter be
  increased or diminished.

4.

• Resd. that the U. States in Congs. be authorized
  to elect a federal Executive to consist of——— persons,
  to continue in office for the term of———
  years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
  compensation for their services, in which no increase
  nor diminution shall be made so as to affect
  the persons composing the Executive at the time
  of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the
  federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any
  other office or appointment during their time of service
  and for——— years thereafter: to be ineligible
  a second time, & removeable by Congs. on application
  by a majority of the Executives of the several
  States; that the Executives besides their general
  authority to execute the federal acts ought to appoint
  all federal officers not otherwise provided for,
  & to direct all military operations; provided that
  none of the persons composing the federal Executive
  shall on any occasion take command of any troops,
  

  ---

  169

  
  
  
  so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General
  or in any other capacity.

5.

• Resd. that a federal Judiciary be established to
  consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which
  to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their
  offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually
  at stated times a fixed compensation for their services
  in which no increase nor diminution shall be
  made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at
  the time of such increase or diminution: that the
  Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear
  & determine in the first instance on all impeachments
  of federal Officers, & by way of appeal in the
  dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors,
  in all cases of captures from an enemy, in
  all cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all
  cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the
  construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may
  arise on any of the Acts for the regulation of trade,
  or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none
  of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain
  in office be capable of receiving or holding any other
  office or appointment during their term of service, or
  for——— thereafter.

6.

• Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs.
  made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby
  & by the Articles of Confederation vested in them,
  and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority
  of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective
  States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties
  shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and
  

  ---

  170

  
  
  
  that the Judiciary of the several States shall be
  bound thereby in their decisions any thing in the respective
  laws of the Individual States to the Contrary
  notwithstanding: and that if any State, or any
  body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent
  ye. carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the
  federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth
  ye. power of the Confederated States, or so much
  thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel
  an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such
  Treaties.

7.

• Resd. that provision be made for the admission
  of new States into the Union.

8.

• Resd. that the rule for naturalization ought to
  be same in every State.

9.

• Resd. that a Citizen of one State committing
  an offence in another State of the Union, shall be
  deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had been
  committed by a Citizen of the State in which the
  offence was committed.[79]

Adjourned.

Saturday June 16. in Committee of the Whole

on Resolutions proposd. by Mr. P. & Mr. R

Mr. Lansing called for the reading of the 1st: resolution
of each plan, which he considered as involving
principles directly in contrast; that of Mr. Patterson
says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it: the
latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular
States; the former, only certain general
powers for the general good. The plan of Mr. R. in
short absorbs all power except what may be exercised
in the little local matters of the States which
are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance.
He grounded his preference of Mr. P's plan, chiefly
on two objections agst. that of Mr. R. 1. want of
power in the Convention to discuss & propose it.
2 the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He
was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention
was restrained to amendments of a federal
nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy
in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts
of the States, the Com̃issions produced by the several
deputations all proved this. And this limitation of
the power to an amendment of the Confederacy,
marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary
& improper to go farther. He was sure
that this was the case with his State. N. York

would never have concurred in sending deputies to
the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations
were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a
National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt
& ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized
us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several
Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue
proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the
Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they
then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed
to have already taken place. To rely on any
change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments
of the people would be trusting to too great
an uncertainty. We know only what their present
sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what
will not accord with these. The States will never
feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government
to give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is
itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be
found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress
will be readily approved by them.

Mr. Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion
given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr.
R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as
possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed
by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1.
with the powers of the Convention, 2 with the sentiments
of the people. If the confederacy was radically

wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain
larger powers, not assume them ourselves. I came
here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments
of those who sent me. Our object is not
such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such
a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare,
and as they will approve. If we argue the
matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at
present exists, it can not be denied that all the States
stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore
must concur before any can be bound. If a
proportional representation be right, why do we not
vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal
compact actually exists, and consult the articles of
it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of
it. He reads the 5th. art: of Confederation giving
each State a vote—& the 13th. declaring that no
alteration shall be made without unanimous consent.
This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone.
It was observed (by Mr. Wilson) that the larger
State gave up the point, not because it was right,
but because the circumstances of the moment urged
the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason
at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume
his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that
will sacrifice the lesser States. The larger States
acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the
small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N.
Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former
objecting to the want of power in Congress over
trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate
the vacant territory to the benefit of the
whole.—If the sovereignty of the States is to be
maintained, the Representatives must be drawn
immediately from the States, not from the people:
and we have no power to vary the idea of equal
sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the
difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot.
To say that this is impracticable, will not
make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether
the Citizens of Massts. Pena. & Va. accede to it. It will
be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But
will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its
efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected,
not on its being drawn from the States, or
from the individuals; and according to his plan it
may be exerted on individuals as well as according
that of Mr. R. A distinct executive & Judiciary
also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged
that two branches in the Legislature are necessary.
Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason
of the precaution is not applicable to this case.
Within a particular State, where party heats prevail,
such a check may be necessary. In such a body as
Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations
of the different States are checks on each
other. Do the people at large complain of Congs.?
No, what they wish is that Congs. may have more
power. If the power now proposed be not eno',
the people hereafter will make additions to it. With
proper powers Congs. will act with more energy &
wisdom than the proposed Natl. Legislature; being
fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by
the mode of election. The plan of Mr. R. will also
be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del.
two representatives each in the popular branch the
aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add
to it half as many for the other branch and you have
270, coming once at least a year from the most distant
as well as the most central parts of the republic.
In the present deranged State of our finances can so
expensive a System be seriously thought of? By
enlarging the powers of Congs. the greatest part of
this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be
answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal
points of the two plans so far he said as there had
been time to examine the one last proposed. These
points were 1. in the Virga. plan there are 2 & in some
degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan
from N. J. there is to be a single legislature only—
2. Representation of the people at large is the basis
of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the
other—3. proportional representation prevails in
one;—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single
Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:—a
plurality is held out in the other.—5. in the one
the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:
—in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the
Natl. Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which
the separate States are incompetent &:—in place of

this Congs. are to have additional power in a few
cases only—7. A negative on the laws of the States:
—in place of this coertion to be substituted—8.
The Executive to be removable on impeachment &
conviction;—in one plan: in the other to be removable
at the instance of a majority of the Executives
of the States—9. Revision of the laws provided for
in one:—no such check in the other—10. inferior
national tribunals in one:—none such in the other.
11. In one ye. jurisdiction of Natl. tribunals to extend
&c—; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in
the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to
all cases affecting the Nationl. peace & harmony;
there a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally
ye. ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:
—in that by the legislative authorities according
to the 13 art: of the Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he
conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but
to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this particular
he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived
it difficult to know precisely what they are.
Those of the particular circle in which one moved,
were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He
could not persuade himself that the State Govts. &
Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people,
nor a Natl. Govt. so obnoxious to them, as some supposed.
Why sd. a Natl. Govt. be unpopular? Has
it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less

liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Deleware be
degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United
States? Where do the people look at present for
relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it
from an internal reform of their Govts. no, Sir. It
is from the Natl. Councils that relief is expected. For
these reasons he did not fear, that the people would
not follow us into a National Govt. and it will be a
further recommendation of Mr. R's. plan that it is to
be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for
ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1st. point on which he had
contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious
as he was for some augmentation of the federal
powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed
that he could ever consent to give powers to Congs.
he had two reasons either of wch. was sufficient, 1.
Congs. as a Legislative body does not stand on the
people. 2. it is a single body. 1. He would not repeat
the remarks he had formerly made on the principles
of Representation, he would only say that an
inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating
every branch of Govt. In G. Britain where this poison
has had a full operation, the security of private
rights is owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals
of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed
nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty
of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation
is at the mercy of its rulers. He means
not to insinuate that there is any parallel between
the situation of that Country & ours at present. But

it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the
smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt.
Every other source of influence must also be
stronger in small that large bodies of men. When
Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch
provinces had been seduced into the views of France,
he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but
one of the smallest of them. There are facts among
ourselves which are known to all. Passing over
others, he will only remark that the Impost, so
anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not
by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress
is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on
Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive,
sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no
danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice
both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority
be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor
stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing
it within itself, into distinct and independent
branches. In a single House there is no check, but
the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of
those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally
favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of
the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a
single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested
them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative
authority, you must divide it. In order to
controul the Executive you must unite it. One man
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend

among themselves till one becomes the master
of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first
Cæsar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth.
The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove
also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive
Magistracy. Having already taken up so
much time he wd. not he sd., proceed to any of the
other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are
sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of
them, the fate of the others will depend.

Mr. Pinkney,[80] the whole comes to this, as he conceived.
Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will
dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl. system.
He thought the Convention authorized to go any
length in recommending, which they found necessary
to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.

Mr. Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive
form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the
subject, "that the Legislative power of the U. S.
should remain in Congs." This was not seconded,
though it seemed better calculated for the purpose
than the 1st. proposition of Mr. Patterson in place of
which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.

Mr. Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of
power. When the Salvation of the Republic was at
stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose
what we found necessary. He painted in
strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy,
& the danger of delaying a substantial

reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the
sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts
relating to the Convention and the objects of their
deliberation, he observed that as each State acted
separately in the case, it would have been indecent
for it to have charged the existing Constitution with
all the vices which it might have perceived in it.
The first State that set on foot this experiment would
not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it
was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must
have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue
to the experiment. There are certainly reasons of
a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must
be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them.
He wd. not as far as depended on him leave any thing
that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment
is favorable, and is probably the last that will
offer.

The true question is whether we shall adhere to
the federal plan, or introduce the national plan.
The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed
by the trial already made. There are but
two modes, by which the end of a Genl. Govt. can be
attained: the 1st. is by coercion as proposed by Mr.
P's plan 2. by real legislation as propd. by the other
plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable,
expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate
the instruments of it to shed the blood &
not in the Spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently
trained them up for the service of Ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National Legislation

over individuals, for which Congs. are unfit. To vest
such power in them, would be blending the Legislative
with the Executive, contrary to the recd. maxim
on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore
in Congs. has been safe, it has been owing to
the general impotency of that body. Congs. are
moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures
who retain even a power of recall. They
have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere
diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the
views of the States, who are always encroaching on
the authority of the U. States. A provision for
harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization
&.—for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear
its crest—and for certain other general benefits, must
be made. The powers for these purposes can never
be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in
point of representation, elected in the mode in which
they are, and possessing no more confidence than
they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to
the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that
a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed.
A Natl. Govt. alone, properly constituted,
will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered
that the present is the last moment for establ̃ing
one. After this select experiment, the people
will yield to despair.

The Committee rose & the House adjourned.

Monday June 18. in Committee of the whole

on the propositions of Mr. Patterson & Mr. Randolph

On motion of Mr. Dickinson to postpone the 1st
Resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take
up the following viz—"that the Articles of Confederation
ought to be revised and amended, so as to
render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the
exigencies, the preservation and the prosperity of
the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10
States, Pen: divided.

Mr. Hamilton,[81] had been hitherto silent on the
business before the Convention, partly from respect
to others whose superior abilities age & experience
rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar
to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation
with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments
as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no
means accede. This crisis however which now
marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any
scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public
safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to
declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was
particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation,
leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On
the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged

by the amazing extent of Country in expecting
the desired blessings from any general sovereignty
that could be substituted.—As to the powers of the
Convention, he thought the doubts started on that
subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings
too subtle. A federal Govt. he conceived to mean an
association of independent Communities into one.
Different Confederacies have different powers, and
exercise them in different ways. In some instances
the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in
others over individuals, as in the German Diet—&
among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude
therefore must be given to the signification of the
term. The plan last proposed departs itself from
the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is
to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed
moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va. (Mr.
R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on this
emergency whatever we should deem essential to its
happiness. The States sent us here to provide for
the exigencies of the Union. To rely on & propose
any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely
because it was not clearly within our powers, would
be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be
said that the States cannot ratify a plan not within
the purview of the article of the Confederation providing
for alterations & amendments. But may not
the States themselves in which no constitutional
authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures,
have had in view a reference to the people
at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was
moved, that no act of the Convention should be
binding untill it should be referred to the people &
ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice
only, the reason assigned agst. it being, that it might
possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.

The great question is what provision shall we
make for the happiness of our Country? He would
first make a comparative examination of the two
plans—prove that there were essential defects in
both—and point out such changes as might render
a national one, efficacious.—The great & essential
principles necessary for the support of Government
are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it.
This principle does not exist in the States in favor
of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high
degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue
internal interests adverse to those of the whole.
They have their particular debts—their particular
plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably
prevail over the requisitions & plans of
Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power.
The same remarks are applicable to this principle.
The States have constantly shewn a disposition
rather to regain the powers delegated by them than
to part with more, or to give effect to what they had
parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the controul of the Genl. Government.
It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not
that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl.
Govt. as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the
latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave

HAMILTON'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)

the purposes of Govt. attainable to a considerable
degree. Consider what such a State as Virga. will
be in a few years, a few compared with the life of
nations. How strongly will it feel its importance and
self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the
people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of
the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately
enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive
justice, and all those acts which familiarize &
endear a Govt. to a people, are dispensed to them.
4. Force by which may be understood a coercion of
laws or coercion of arms. Congs. have not the former
except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion
is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military
force is absolutely necessary in large communities.
Massts. is now feeling this necessity & making provision
for it. But how can this force be exerted on
the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts
to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also
will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the
confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the
Union will ensue. 5. Influence, he did not mean corruption,
but a dispensation of those regular honors
& emoluments, which produce an attachment to the
Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side
of the States; and must continue so as long as the
States continue to exist. All the passions then we
see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern
most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the
current of the States, and do not flow into the stream
of the Genl Govt. The former therefore will generally
be an overmatch for the Genl. Govt. and render
any confederacy, in its very nature precarious.
Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience.
The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample
powers for general purposes. It had in particular
the power of fining and using force agst. delinquent
members. What was the consequence. Their decrees
were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is
a striking example of it. Philip at length taking
advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself
into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes.
The German Confederacy affords another
lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to
be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal
chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties,
soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments,
which reduced the imperial authority to a
nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded,
which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great
authority independently of his imperial attributes, is
a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated
Governments. Other examples instruct us in
the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any
union at all, and have been more than once at war
with one another.—How then are all these evils to
be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in
the General Govermt. as will turn all the strong principles
& passions abovementioned on its side. Does
the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does
it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the
contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect
of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of
others. It gives a direct revenue to Congs. but this
will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied
by requisitions: which experience proves cannot
be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the
mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the
supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve
or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will
invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too
must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce
the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland
with Russia; France or Engd. with other countries
of Europe, Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond
with the relative value of land. Take numbers of
inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison
of different countries, and you will find it to be
equally unjust. The different degrees of industry
and improvement in different Countries render the
first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on situation. Cont. N. Jersey & N.
Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing
to the wealth of the Commercial ones, can never
bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion.
They will & must fail in their duty, their
example will be followed, and the union itself be dissolved.
Whence then is the national revenue to be
drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which
notwithstanding the com̃on opinion are fit objects
of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These
tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another
destructive ingredient in the plan, is that
equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the
small States. It is not in human nature that Va. &
the large States should consent to it, or if they did
that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much
all ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad
principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in their operation,
and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has
been raised whether Congs. at present have a right
to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans
to the negative. Mr. P's. plan provides no remedy.
—If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization
of Congs. is such that they could never be
properly & effectually exercised. The members of
Congs. being chosen by the States & subject to recall,
represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers
be found effectual, they will from time to time be
heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established.
The general power whatever be its form if
it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers.
Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is
agst. all the principles of a good Government to vest
the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two
Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits.
Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate in a bad
Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore
will not do. What then is to be done? Here
he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to
be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a
general Govt. was also formidable; unless there were
such a diminution of expence on the side of the State
Govts. as the case would admit. If they were extinguished,
he was persuaded that great œconomy
might be obtained by substituting a general Govt.
He did not mean however to shock the public opinion
by proposing such a measure. On the other hand
he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce,
revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities
he was aware would be necessary. There
must be district tribunals; corporations for local
purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus
now appertaining to the States. The only
difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him,
was that of drawing representatives from the extremes
to the centre of the Community. What inducements
can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1st branch would only be a
bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts
he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate
he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by
certain undertakers who wish for particular offices
under the Govt. This view of the subject almost led
him to despair that a Republican Govt. could be
established over so great an extent. He was sensible
at the same time that it would be unwise to
propose one of any other form. In his private opinion
he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he
was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good,
that the British Govt. was the best in the world: and
that he doubted much whether any thing short of it
would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different
opinions would bear with him in this, and
begged them to recollect the change of opinion on
this subject which had taken place and was still
going on. It was once thought that the power of
Congs. was amply sufficient to secure the end of their
institution. The error was now seen by every one.
The members most tenacious of republicanism, he
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the
vices of democracy. This progress of the public
mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as
well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by
Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that
it is the only Govt. in the world "which unites public
strength with individual security."—In every Com̃unity
where industry is encouraged, there will be a
division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate
interests will arise. There will be debtors &
Creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will
oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they
will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to
have the power, that each may defend itself agst. the
other. To the want of this check we owe our paper
money, instalment laws &c To the proper adjustment
of it the British owe the excellence of their
Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble
institution. Having nothing to hope for by a
change, and a sufficient interest by means of their
property, in being faithful to the national interest,
they form a permanent barrier agst. every pernicious
innovation, whether attempted on the part of the
Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate
will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The
Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much
appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had
the people been unamimous & eager in the late appeal
to them on the subject of a paper emission they
would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing
in such an appeal is a proof of it.—Gentlemen
differ in their opinions concerning the necessary
checks, from the different estimates they form of the
human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient
period to give the senate an adequate firmness,
from not duly considering the amazing violence &
turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great
object of Govt. is pursued, which seizes the popular
passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable.
He appealed to the gentlemen from the
N. England States whether experience had not there
verified the remark.—As to the Executive, it seemed
to be admitted that no good one could be established
on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up
the merits of the question; for can there be a good
Govt. without a good Executive. The English Model
was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary
interest of the King was so interwoven with
that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so
great, that he was placed above the danger of being
corrupted from abroad—and at the same time
was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently
controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at
home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their
being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men
of little character, acquiring great power become
easily the tools of intermeddling Neibours. Sweden
was a striking instance. The French & English had
each their parties during the late Revolution which
was effected by the predominant influence of the
former.—What is the inference from all these observations?
That we ought to go as far in order to
attain stability and permanency, as republican principles
will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature
hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour.
Let the Executive also be for life. He
appealed to the feelings of the members present
whether a term of seven years, would induce the
sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of
public trust would require, so as to ensure the services
of the best Citizens. On this plan we should
have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest,
which would answer essential purposes. But
is this a Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if
all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are
filled, by the people, or a process of election originating
with the people. He was sensible that an Executive
constituted as he proposed would have in
fact but little of the power and independence that
might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing
him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought
to have but little power. He would be ambitious,
with the means of making creatures, and as the
object of his ambition wd. be to prolong his power, it
is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself
of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation
from his place. An Executive for life has not
this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore
be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an
elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults
which characterize that form of Govt. He wd. reply
that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks
not either the degree or duration of power. If this
Executive Magistrate wd. be a monarch for life—
the other propd. by the Report from the Com̃ittee of
the whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years. The
circumstance of being elective was also applicable to
both. It had been observed by judicious writers
that elective monarchies wd. be the best if they could
be guarded agst. the tumults excited by the ambition
and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that
tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought
this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken
rather from particular cases than from general principles.
The election of Roman Emperors was made
by the Army. In Poland the election is made by
great rival princes within dependent power, and ample
means, of raising commotions. In the German
Empire, The appointment is made by the Electors
& Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting
cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of
election be devised among ourselves as will defend
the community agst. these effects in any dangerous
degree? Having made these observations he would
read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he
shd. prefer to either of those under consideration. He
was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of
doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt
the other plan? At present they will adopt neither.
But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved
—he sees evils operating in the States which must
soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies
—he sees that a great progress has been already
made & is still going on in the public mind. He
thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled
from their prejudices; and whenever that
happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at
stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd. place them,
but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He
did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as
a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only
to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest
the amendments which he should probably propose
to the plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its
future discussion. He read his sketch in the words
following; to wit

I.

• "The supreme Legislative power of the United
  States of America to be vested in two different bodies
  of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the
  other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature
  of the United States with power to pass all
  laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter
  mentioned.

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II.

• The Assembly to consist of persons elected by
  the people to serve for three years.

III.

• The Senate to consist of persons elected to
  serve during good behaviour; their election to be
  made by electors chosen for that purpose by the
  people: in order to this the States to be divided into
  election districts. On the death, removal or resignation
  of any Senator his place to be filled out of
  the district from which he came.

IV.

• The supreme Executive authority of the
  United States to be vested in a Governour to be
  elected to serve during good behaviour—the election
  to be made by Electors chosen by the people in
  the Election Districts aforesaid—The authorities &
  functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have
  a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
  execution of all laws passed; to have the direction
  of war when authorized or begun; to have with the
  advice and approbation of the Senate the power of
  making all treaties; to have the sole appointment
  of the heads or chief officers of the departments of
  Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination
  of all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign
  Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection
  of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning
  all offences except Treason; which he shall not
  pardon without the approbation of the Senate.

V.

• On the death resignation or removal of the
  Governour his authorities to be exercised by the
  President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.

VI.

• The Senate to have the sole power of
  

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  declaring war, the power of advising and approving
  all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all
  appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of
  the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.

VII.

• The supreme Judicial authority to be vested
  in——— Judges to hold their offices during good
  behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries.
  This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes
  of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all
  causes in which the revenues of the General Government
  or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.

VIII.

• The Legislature of the United States to
  have power to institute Courts in each State for the
  determination of all matters of general concern.

IX.

• The Governour Senators and all officers of
  the United States to be liable to impeachment for
  mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to
  be removed from office, & disqualified for holding
  any place of trust or profit—All impeachments to be
  tried by a Court to consist of the Chief——— or
  Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State,
  provided such Judge shall hold his place during good
  behavior, and have a permanent salary.

X.

• All laws of the particular States contrary to the
  Constitution or laws of the United States to be
  utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws
  being passed, the Governour or president of each
  State shall be appointed by the General Government
  and shall have a Negative upon the laws about
  to be passed in the State of which he is the Governour
  or President.

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XI.

• No State to have any forces land or Naval; and
  the militia of all the States to be under the sole and
  exclusive direction of the United States, the officers
  of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory
observations corresponding with the principles
of his introductory reasoning.[82]

Comittee rose & the House Adjourned.

Tuesday June 19th in Committee of Whole on
the Propositions of Mr. Patterson,—[84]

The substitute offered yesterday by Mr. Dickenson

being rejected by a vote now taken on it; Con.
N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. Mass. Pa. V. N. C. S. C. Geo. no
Maryd. divided Mr. Patterson's plan was again at
large before the Committee

Mr. Madison. Much stress has been laid by some

gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention
to propose any other than a federal plan. To what
had been answered by others, he would only add,
that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal
plan would support this objection. One characteristic,
was that in a federal Government, the
power was exercised not on the people individually;
but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet
in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the
existing Confederacy, and in many instances the
amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must
operate immediately on individuals. The other
characteristic was, that a federal Govt. derived its
appointments not immediately from the people, but
from the States which they respectively composed.
Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the
States, Connectt. & Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs.
were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the
people at large; and the plan of Mr. P. intended no
change in this particular.

It had been alledged (by Mr. Patterson), that the
Confederation having been formed by unanimous

consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent
only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of
compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation
in the articles of Confederation? If we consider
the federal Union as analagous to the fundamental
compact by which individuals compose one Society,
and which must in its theoretic origin at
least, have been the unanimous act of the component
members, it cannot be said that no dissolution
of the compact can be effected without unanimous
consent. A breach of the fundamental principles
of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly
absolve the other part from their obligations
to it. If the breach of any article by any of the
parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because,
the contrary is implied in the compact itself,
and particularly by that law of it, which gives an
indefinite authority to the majority to bind the
whole in all cases. This latter circumstance shews
that we are not to consider the federal Union as
analagous to the social compact of individuals: for
if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind
the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for
the whole, which the Gentln. from N. Jersey would
be among the last to admit. If we consider the
federal Union as analagous not to the Social compacts
among individual men: but to the conventions
among individual States, What is the doctrine resulting
from these conventions? Clearly, according
to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a
breach of any one article by any one party, leaves
all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole
convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather
to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach.
In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated
that a violation of particular articles shall not have
this consequence, and even that particular articles
shall remain in force during war, which in general is
understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But
are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles
of Confederation? So far from it that there is not
even an express stipulation that force shall be used
to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge
its duty. He observed that the violations of
the federal articles had been numerous & notorious.
Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey
herself; by which she expressly refused to comply
with a Constitutional requisition of Congs. and
yielded no farther to the expostulations of their
deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal
without passing any positive act of compliance. He
did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from
these observations. He thought it proper however
that the true nature of the existing confederacy
should be investigated, and he was not anxious to
strengthen the foundations on which it now stands.

Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patterson's
plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold.
1. to preserve the Union. 2. to provide a Governmt.
that will remedy the evils felt by the States
both in their united and individual capacities. Examine
Mr. P's. plan, & say whether it promises satisfaction
in these respects.

1.

• Will it prevent the violations of the law of
  nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must
  involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The
  

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  tendency of the States to these violations has been
  manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs.
  contain complaints already, from almost every
  Nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto
  indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot
  be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A
  rupture with other powers is among the greatest of
  national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually
  provided that no part of a nation shall have
  it in its power to bring them on the whole. The
  existing Confederacy does not sufficiently provide
  against this evil. The proposed amendment to it
  does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of
  the States as uncontrouled as ever.

2.

• Will it prevent encroachments on the federal
  authority? A tendency to such encroachments has
  been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as
  well as in every other confederated republic antient
  and modern. By the federal articles, transactions
  with the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in several
  instances, the States have entered into treaties &
  wars with them. In like manner no two or more
  States can form among themselves any treaties &c.
  without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga. & Maryd.
  in one instance—Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have
  entered into compacts, without previous application
  or subsequent apology. No State again can of right
  raise troops in time of peace without the like consent.
  Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the
  most scrupulous observance. Has not Massts, notwithstanding,
  the most powerful member of the
  

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  213

  
  
  
  Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she not
  now augmenting them, without having even deigned
  to apprise Congs. of Her intention? In fine—Have
  we not seen the public land dealt out to Cont. to
  bribe her acquiescence in the decree constitutionally
  awarded agst. her claim on the territory of Pena.: for no
  other possible motive can account for the policy of
  Congs. in that measure?—If we recur to the examples
  of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them
  the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the
  authority of the whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic
  & Achæan confederacies among the
  antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among
  the moderns, tracing their analogy to the U. States
  in the constitution and extent of their federal
  authorities—in the tendency of the particular members
  to usurp on these authorities, and to bring confusion
  & ruin on the whole.—He observed that the
  plan of Mr. Pat[er]son, besides omitting a controul
  over the States as a general defence of the federal
  prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its
  provisions. 1. Its ratification was not to be by the
  people at large, but by the legislatures. It could not
  therefore render the acts of Congs. in pursuance of
  their powers, even legally paramount to the acts of
  the States. 2. It gave to the federal Tribunal an
  appellate jurisdiction only—even in the criminal
  cases enumerated. The necessity of any such provision
  supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the
  State tribunals, of what avail cd. an appellate tribunal
  be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not
  

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  all of the States, the Executives have by their respective
  Constitutions, the right of pardg. How could
  this be taken from them by a legislative ratification
  only?

3.

• Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each
  other? Of these enough has been already seen. He
  instanced Acts of Virga. & Maryland which gave a
  preference to their own Citizens in cases where the
  Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of
  privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered
  the emissions of paper money & other kindred
  measures as also aggressions. The States
  relatively to one another being each of them either
  Debtor or Creditor; The creditor States must suffer
  unjustly from every emission by the debtor States.
  We have seen retaliating Acts on the subject which
  threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the
  tranquility of the Union. The plan of Mr. Paterson,
  not giving even a negative on the Acts of the States,
  left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their
  unrighteous projects agst. each other.

4.

• Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the
  States themselves? The insurrections in Massts. admonished
  all the States of the danger to which they
  were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. P. contained no
  provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation
  on this point. According to the Republican
  theory indeed, Right & power being both vested
  in the majority, are held to be synonymous. According
  to fact & experience, a minority may in an
  appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority.
  

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  215

  
  
  
  1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess
  the skill & habits of military life, with such as
  possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may
  conquer the remaining two thirds. 2. one third of
  those who participate in the choice of rulers may be
  rendered a majority by the accession of those whose
  poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who
  for obvious reasons may be more ready to join the
  standard of sedition than that of established Government.
  3. where slavery exists, the Republican
  Theory becomes still more fallacious.

5.

• Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration
  to the particular States? In developing
  the evils which vitiate the political system of
  the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which
  prevail within the States individually as well as
  those which affect them collectively: Since the former
  indirectly affect the whole; and there is great
  reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full
  share in the motives which produced the present
  Convention. Under this head he enumerated and
  animadverted on 1. the multiplicity of the laws
  passed by the several States. 2. the mutability of
  their laws. 3. the injustice of them. 4. the impotence
  of them: observing that Mr. Patterson's plan contained
  no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and
  could not therefore be received as an adequate provision
  for the exigencies of the Community.

6.

• Will it secure the Union agst. the influence of
  foreign powers over its members. He pretended
  not to say that any such influence had yet been
  

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  216

  
  
  
  tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions
  would produce it. As lessons which claimed
  particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised
  among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the
  Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of
  Macedon: Among the Achæans, first by Macedon &
  afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among the Swiss
  by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers:
  among the members of the Germanic Body by France.
  England, Spain & Russia—And in the Belgic Republic,
  by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan
  of Mr. Patterson, not giving to the general Councils
  any negative on the will of the particular States, left
  the door open for the like pernicious Machinations
  among ourselves.

7.

• He begged the smaller States which were most
  attached to Mr. Patterson's plan to consider the
  situation in which it would leave them. In the first
  place they would continue to bear the whole expence
  of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It
  ought not to be said that if they were willing to bear
  this burthen, no others had a right to complain. As
  far as it led the small States to forbear keeping
  up a representation, by which the public business
  was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common
  concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress
  would satisfy every one that the public business
  had been frequently delayed by this cause; and
  that the States most frequently unrepresented in
  Congs. were not the larger States. He reminded the
  Convention of another consequence of leaving on a
  

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  217

  
  
  
  small State the burden of maintaining a Representation
  in Congs. During a considerable period of
  the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware,
  in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation
  the entire vote of that State and after that
  event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a
  Citizen & Resident of Pena. and held an office in his
  own State incompatible with an appointment from
  it to Congs. During another period, the same State
  was represented by three delegates two of whom
  were citizens of Penna. and the third a Citizen of
  New Jersey. These expedients must have been intended
  to avoid the burden of supporting Delegates
  from their own State. But whatever might have
  been ye. cause, was not in effect the vote of one State
  doubled, and the influence of another increased by
  it? In the 2d. place the coercion, on which the efficacy
  of the plan depends, can never be exerted but
  on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable,
  the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.
  He illustrated the position by the history of the
  Amphyctionic confederates: and the ban of the German
  Empire. It was the cobweb Wch. could entangle
  the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.

8.

• He begged them to consider the situation in
  which they would remain in case their pertinacious
  adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent
  the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of
  such an event was painful; but it would be prudent
  to submit to the task of examining it at a distance,
  that the means of escaping it might be the more
  

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  218

  
  
  
  readily embraced. Let the Union of the States be
  dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen.
  Either the States must remain individually
  independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies
  must be formed among them. In the first
  event would the small States be more secure agst. the
  ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than
  they would be under a General Government pervading
  with equal energy every part of the Empire, and
  having an equal interest in protecting every part
  agst. every other part? In the second, can the smaller
  expect that their larger neighbours would confederate
  with them on the principle of the present
  Confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal
  suffrage; or that they would exact less severe concessions
  from the smaller States, than are proposed
  in the scheme of Mr. Randolph?

The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation;
and if this could be adjusted, all others would
be surmountable. It was admitted by both the
gentlemen from N. Jersey, (Mr. Brearly and Mr.
Patterson) that it would not be just to allow Virga.
which was 16 times as large as Delaware an equal
vote only. Their language was that it would not
be safe for Delaware to allow Virga. 16 times as many
votes. The expedient proposed by them was that
all the States should be thrown into one mass and
a new partition be made into 13 equal parts. Would
such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities
existing in the rules of property, as well as in the
manners, habits and prejudices of the different

States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt.
It had been found impossible for the power of one
of the most absolute princes in Europe (K. of France)
directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened
and patriotic Ministers (Mr. Neckar) that any
age has produced, to equalize in some points only
the different usages & regulations of the different
provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation
and repartition of the States to be practicable, and
the danger apprehended by the smaller States from
a proportional representation to be real; would not
a particular and voluntary coalition of these with
their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole
community, and equally effectual for their own
safety. If N. Jersey or Delaware conceived that an
advantage would accrue to them from an equalization
of the States, in which case they would necessary
form a junction with their neighbours, why
might not this end be attained by leaving them at
liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction
whenever they pleased? And why should they wish
to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when
it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would
be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither
the inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient
to themselves, would be lessened by confining
it to themselves.—The prospect of many new States
to the Westward was another consideration of importance.
If they should come into the Union at
all, they would come when they contained but few
inhabitants. If they shd. be entitled to vote according
to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be
right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and
a more objectionable minority than ever might give
law to the whole.[85]

On a question for postponing generally the 1st
proposition of Mr. Patterson's plan, it was agreed
to: N. Y. & N. J. only being no.

On the question moved by Mr. King whether the
Com̃itee should rise & Mr. Randolph's proposition
be reported without alteration, which was in fact
a question whether Mr. R's should be adhered to as
preferable to those of Mr. Patterson;

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del.
no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Copy of the Resolns. of Mr. R. as altered in Come.
and reported to the House.

(Of Mr. Randolph's plan as reported from the
Com̃ittee)—the 1. propos: "that a Natl. Govt. ought
to be established consisting &c." being taken up
in the House.

Mr. Wilson observed that by a Nat1. Govt. he did
not mean one that would swallow up the State Govts.
as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He
was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter.
He thought, contrary to the opinion of (Col. Hamilton)
that they might not only subsist but subsist
on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely

necessary for certain purposes which the
former could not reach. All large Governments
must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As
Examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly
the divisions & subdivisions of England by
Alfred.

Col. Hamilton coincided with the proposition as
it stood in the Report. He had not been understood
yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he
meant that no boundary could be drawn between
the National & State Legislatures; that the former
must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were
limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually
subvert it. Even as Corporations the extent
of some of them as Va. Massts &c would be formidable.
As States, he thought they ought to be
abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving
in them, subordinate jurisdictions. The examples
of Persia & the Roman Empire, cited by
(Mr. Wilson) were he thought in favor of his doctrine:
the great powers delegated to the Satraps &
proconsuls having frequently produced revolts, and
schemes of independence.

Mr. King wished as every thing depended on this
proposition, that no objections might be improperly
indulged agst. the phraseology of it. He conceived
that the import of the term "States" "Sovereignty"
"national" "federal," had been often used & applied
in the discussions inaccurately & delusively.
The States were not "Sovereigns" in the sense contended
for by some. They did not possess the

peculiar features of sovereignty, they could not make
war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties. Considering
them as political Beings, they were dumb, for
they could not speak to any forẽgn Sovereign whatever.
They were deaf, for they could not hear any
propositions from such Sovereign. They had not
even the organs or faculties of defence or offence, for
they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip
vessels, for war. On the other side, if the Union of
the States comprises the idea of a confederation, it
comprises that also of consolidation. A Union of
the States is a Union of the men composing them,
from whence a national character results to the whole.
Congs. can act alone without the States—they can
act & their acts will be binding agst.the Instructions
of the States. If they declare war: war is de jure
declared—captures made in pursuance of it are lawful
—no Acts of the States can vary the situation,
or prevent the judicial consequences. If the States
therefore retained some portion of their sovereignty,
they had certainly divested themselves of essential
portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in
some respects—they formed a Nation in others. The
Convention could clearly deliberate on & propose
any alterations that Congs. could have done under
ye. federal articles, and Could not Congs. propose
by virtue of the last article, a change in any article
whatever; and as well that relating to the equality
of suffrage, as any other. He made these remarks
to obviate some scruples which had been expressed.
He doubted much the practicability of annihilating
the States; but thought that much of their power
ought to be taken from them.[86]

Mr. Martin.[87] said he considered that the separation
from G. B. placed the 13 States in a state of Nature
towards each other; that they would have remained
in that state till this time, but for the confederation;
that they entered into the Confederation on the footing
of equality; that they met now to amend it on
the same footing; and that he could never accede
to a plan that would introduce an inequality and
lay 10 States at the mercy of Va. Massts. and Penna.

Mr. Wilson. could not admit the doctrine that
when the Colonies became independent of G. Britain,
they became independent also of each other. He
read the declaration of Independence, observing

thereon that the United Colonies were declared to
be free & independent States; and inferring that
they were independent, not individually but Unitedly
and that they were confederated as they were independent,
States.

Col. Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr.
Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States
were thrown into a State of Nature He was not
yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy,
could be dissolved by partial infractions of it.
He admitted that the States met now on an equal
footing but could see no inference from that against
concerting a change of the system in this particular.
He took this occasion of observing for the purpose
of appeasing the fears of the small States, that two
circumstances would render them secure under a
National Govt. in which they might lose the equality
of rank they now held: one was the local situation
of the 3 largest States Virga. Massts. & Pa. They were
separated from each other by distance of place, and
equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish
the interests of one State from those of another. No
combination therefore could be dreaded. In the
second place, as there was a gradation in the States
from Va. the largest down to Delaware the smallest,
it would always happen that ambitious combinations
among a few States might & wd. be counteracted
by defensive combinations of greater extent
among the rest. No combination has been seen
among the large Counties merely as such, agst. lesser
Counties. The more close the Union of the States,

and the more compleat the authority of the whole:
the less opportunity will be allowed to the stronger
States to injure the weaker.

Adjd.

Wednesday June 20. 1787. In Convention.

Mr. William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1st propos: of the Report of Come. of the whole,
before the House

Mr. Elseworth 2ded. by Mr. Gorham, moves to alter
it so as to run "that the Government of the United
States ought to consist of a supreme legislative,
Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said
would drop the word national, and retain the proper
title "the United States." He could not admit the
doctrine that a breach of any of the federal articles
could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous
not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting.
He wished also the plan of the Convention
to go forth as an amendment of the articles of the
Confederation, since under this idea the authority
of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling,
the people will be so too. If the plan goes
forth to the people for ratification several succeeding
Conventions within the States would be unavoidable.
He did not like these conventions. They
were better fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions.

Mr. Randolph. did not object to the change of
expression, but apprised the gentleman who wished
for it that he did not admit it for the reasons assigned;

particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the
people for ratification. The motion of Mr. Elsewth
was acquiesced in nem: con:

The 2d. Resol: "that the National Legislature
ought to consist of two branches "taken up, the
word "national" struck out as of course.

Mr. Lansing. observed that the true question here
was, whether the Convention would adhere to or
depart from the foundation of the present Confederacy;
and moved instead of the 2d. Resolution,
"that the powers of Legislation be vested in the U.
States in Congress." He had already assigned two
reasons agst. such an innovation as was proposed:
1. the want of competent powers in the Convention.
—2. the state of the public mind. It had been observed
by (Mr. Madison) in discussing the first point,
that in two States the Delegates to Congs. were chosen
by the people. Notwithstanding the first appearance
of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the
Delegates however chosen, did not represent the
people merely as so many individuals; but as forming
a Sovereign State. (Mr. Randolph) put it, he
said, on its true footing namely that the public safety
superseded the scruple arising from the review of
our powers. But in order to feel the force of this
consideration, the same impression must be had of
the public danger. He had not himself the same
impression, and could not therefore dismiss his
scruple. (Mr. Wilson) contended that as the Convention
were only to recommend, they might recommend
what they pleased. He differed much from

him. Any act whatever of so respectable a body
must have a great effect, and if it does not succeed,
will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted
that there was no certain criterion of the Public
mind on the subject. He therefore recurred to the
evidence of it given by the opposition in the States
to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected
that those possessing Sovereignty could ever
voluntarily part with it. It was not to be expected
from any one State, much less from thirteen. He
proceeded to make some observations on the plan
itself and the argumts. urged in support of it. The
point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the
boroughs did not proceed from their comparative
smallness; but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants,
some of them not having more than one
or two. A great inequality existed in the Counties
of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption
in the small ones had not been made. It
had been said that Congress represent the State
Prejudices: will not any other body whether chosen
by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent
their prejudices? It had been asserted by
his colleague (Col. Hamilton) that there was no coincidence
of interests among the large States that
ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller.
If it were true that such a uniformity of interests
existed among the States, there was equal safety for
all of them, whether the representation remained as
heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed.
It is proposed that the Genl. Legislature shall have a
negative on the laws of the States. Is it conceivable
that there will be leisure for such a task? There
will on the most moderate calculation, be as many
Acts sent up from the States as there are days in
the year. Will the members of the General Legislature
be competent Judges? Will a gentleman
from Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law
which is to operate in N. Hampshire. Such a Negative
would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National
Govt. must have the influence arising from the grant
of offices and honors. In order to render such a
Government effectual he believed such an influence
to be necessary. But if the States will not agree to
it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the
proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the
States must be entirely abolished. Will any one
say this would ever be agreed to? He doubted
whether any Genl. Government equally beneficial
to all can be attained. That now under consideration
he is sure, must be utterly unattainable. He
had another objection. The system was too novel &
complex. No man could foresee what its operation
will be either with respect to the Genl. Govt. or the
State Govts. One or other it has been surmised must
absorb the whole.

Col. Mason. did not expect this point would have
been reagitated. The essential differences between
the two plans, had been clearly stated. The principal
objections agst. that of Mr. R. were the want of

power & the want of practicability. There can be no
weight in the first as the fiat is not to be here, but in
the people. He thought with his colleague Mr. R.
that there were besides certain crisises, in which
all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity.
He gave as an example, the eventual Treaty
with G. B. in forming which the Com̃srs of the U. S.
had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of
Congs. had given to their Country an honorable &
happy peace, and instead of being censured for the
transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves
a monument more durable than brass. The
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence he
thought was still more groundless. (Mr. Lansing)
had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement
of their powers, and had inferred from
the miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness
of the plan which he (Mr. L) opposed. He thought
a very different inference ought to have been drawn;
viz that the plan which (Mr. L) espoused, and which
proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never
could be expected to succeed. He meant not to
throw any reflections on Congs. as a body, much less
on any particular members of it. He meant however
to speak his sentiments without reserve on this
subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps the only
compensation which nature had given for, the privation
of so many other enjoyments: and he should
not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be thought
that the people of America, so watchful over their
interests; so jealous of their liberties, will give up
their all, will surrender both the sword and the
purse, to the same body, and that too not chosen immediately
by themselves? They never will. They
never ought. Will they trust such a body, with the
regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their
taxes; with all the other great powers, which are in
contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence
to a secret Journal—to the intrigues—to the
factions which in the nature of things appertain to
such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence
of these characters of Congress, let him consult
their Journals for the years 78, 79, & 80.—It will be
said, that if the people are averse to parting with
power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to
a National Legislature. The proper answer is that
in this case they do not part with power: they only
transfer it from one sett of immediate Representatives
to another sett.—Much has been said of the
unsettled state of the mind of the people, he believed
the mind of the people of America, as elsewhere,
was unsettled as to some points; but settled
as to others. In two points he was sure it was well
settled. 1. in an attachment to Republican Government.
2. in an attachment to more than one branch
in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they
seem almost to have been preconcerted. This must
either have been a miracle, or have resulted from the
genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishmt. of two branches in the Legislatures are
the State of Pa. & Congs. and the latter the only
single one not chosen by the people themselves.
What has been the consequence? The people have
been constantly averse to giving that Body further
powers—It was acknowledged by (Mr. Patterson)
that his plan could not be enforced without military
coercion. Does he consider the force of this concession.
The most jarring elements of Nature; fire &
water themselves are not more incompatible that[n]
such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution.
Will the militia march from one State to
another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from
the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they
maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the
Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till
they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union altogether.
Rebellion is the only case, in which the
military force of the State can be properly exerted
agst. its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck
with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedierit.
To punish the non-payment of taxes with
death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism
itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy
compared to a military collection of revenue, in
which the bayonet could make no discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty. He took this
occasion to repeat, that notwithstanding his solicitude
to establish a national Government, he never
would agree to abolish the State Govts. or render
them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary
as the Genl. Govt. and he would be equally
careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but
hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention,
tho' comprising so many distinguished characters,
could not be expected to make a faultless Govt.
And he would prefer trusting to Posterity the
amendment of its defects, rather than to push the experiment
too far.

Mr. Luther Martin agreed with (Col Mason) as to
the importance of the State Govts. he would support
them at the expence of the Genl. Govt. which was
instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw
no necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress
might be organized into two. He considered
Congs as representing the people, being chosen by
the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At
any rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and
it was the Legislatures not the people who refused
to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule of voting
have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten
of the States must always have been ready, to place
further confidence in Congs. The causes of repugnance
must therefore be looked for elsewhere.—At
the separation from the British Empire, the people
of America preferred the establishment of themselves
into thirteen separate sovereignties instead of
incorporating themselves into one: to these they
look up for the security of their lives, liberties &
properties: to these they must look up. The federal
Govt. they formed, to defend the whole agst. foreign
nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser
States agst. the ambition of the larger: they are

afraid of granting power unnecessarily, lest they
should defeat the original end of the Union; lest
the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties
of the particular States which the Union
was meant to support; and expose the lesser to
being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived
also that the people of the States having already
vested their powers in their respective Legislatures,
could not resume them without a dissolution of their
Governments. He was agst. Conventions in the
States: was not agst. assisting States agst. rebellious
subjects; thought the federal plan of Mr. Patterson
did not require coercion more than the National one,
as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its
revenues on requisitions & quotas, and that a national
Judiciary extended into the States would be
ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.

Mr. Sherman 2ded & supported Mr. Lansings motion.
He admitted two branches to be necessary
in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity for
them in a Confederacy of States. The examples
were all, of a single Council. Congs. carried us thro'
the war, and perhaps as well as any Govt. could have
done. The complaints at present are not that the
views of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful; but that
their powers are insufficient for the execution of
their views. The national debt & the want of
power somewhere to draw forth the National resources,
are the great matters that press. All the
States were sensible of the defect of power in

Congs. He thought much might be said in apology
for the failure of the State Legislatures to comply
with the Confederation. They were afraid of leaning
too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no
constitutional rule had been or could be observed in
the quotas—the Accounts also were unsettled &
every State supposed itself in advance, rather than
in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to
a due amount had not been drawn from trade which
was the most convenient resource. As almost all
the States had agreed to the recommendation of
Congs. on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly
that they were willing to trust Congs. with power to
draw a revenue from Trade. There is no weight
therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of
Congs. for money matters being the most important
of all, if the people will trust them with power
as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Congs. indeed by the confederation
have in fact the right of saying how much the
people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be
applied: and this right was granted to them in the
expectation that it would in all cases have its effect.
If another branch were to be added to Congs. to be
chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass.
The people would not much interest themselves in
the elections, a few designing men in the large districts
would carry their points, and the people would
have no more confidence in their new representatives
than in Congs. He saw no reason why the
State Legislatures should be unfriendly as had been
suggested, to Congs. If they appoint Congs. and
approve of their measures, they would be rather
favourable and partial to them. The disparity of
the States in point of size he perceived was the
main difficulty. But the large States had not yet
suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the
small ones. In all great and general points, the
interests of all the States were the same. The State
of Virga. notwithstanding the equality of votes,
ratified the Confederation without, or even proposing,
any alteration. Massts. also ratified without any
material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications
is the want of two branches noticed or complained
of. To consolidate the States as some had proposed
would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations,
which had been formed with us, as Confederated
States. He did not however suppose that the creation
of two branches in the Legislature would have
such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he
would agree to have two branches, and a proportional
representation in one of them, provided each
State had an equal voice in the other. This was
necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States;
otherwise three or four of the large States would rule
the others as they please. Each State like each individual
had its peculiar habits usages and manners,
which constituted its happiness. It would not
therefore give to others a power over this happiness,
any more than an individual would do, when he
could avoid it.

Mr. Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches;
observed that if a proper model were not to be found
in other Confederacies it was not to be wondered at.
The number of them was small & the duration of
some at least short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan
were formed in the infancy of political Science; and
appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies
were held together not by any vital principle of
energy but by the incumbent pressure of formidable
neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance
to the influence of the H. of Austria. He
appealed to our own experience for the defects of
our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12
since the commencement of the Revolution, a member
of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He
appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had
not been obstructed by the small members of the
Union. The success of the Revolution was owing
to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress.
In many instances it went on even agst. the difficulties
arising from Congs. themselves. He admitted
that the large States did accede as had been stated,
to the Confederation in its present form. But it
was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are
other instances of their yielding from the same motive
to the unreasonable measures of the small
States. The situation of things is now a little altered.
He insisted that a jealousy would exist between
the State Legislatures & the General Legislature:

observing that the members of the former would
have views & feelings very distinct in this respect
from their constituents. A private Citizen of
a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by
the Genl. or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised
most for his happiness. His representative has
an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National
Legisl: with the eye of a jealous rival. He
observed that the addresses of Congs. to the people
at large, had always been better received & produced
greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures.

On the question for postponing in order to take
up Mr. Lansing's proposition "to vest the powers of
legislation in Congs."

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
no. Geo. no.

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the
question on the 2d. Resolution in the Report from
the Committee of the whole was postponed till tomorrow.

Adjd.

Thursday June 21. In Convention.

Mr. Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.[88]

Docr. Johnson.[89] On a comparison of the two plans
which had been proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey,
it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized
the latter was its being calculated to preserve
the individuality of the States. The plan from Va.
did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether,
but was charged with such a tendency. One
Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions
on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively
contended for an abolition of the State Govts. Mr.
Wilson & the gentleman from Virga. who also were
adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different
language. They wished to leave the States in possession
of a considerable, tho' a subordinate jurisdiction.
They had not yet however shewn how this cd.
consist with, or be secured agst. the general sovereignty
& jurisdiction, which they proposed to give
to the National Government. If this could be shewn
in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.

Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the
States would not be endangered, many of their objections
would no doubt be removed. If this could
not be shewn their objections would have their full
force. He wished it therefore to be well considered
whether in case the States, as was proposed, shd. retain
some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion
could be preserved, without allowing them to
participate effectually in the Genl. Govt., without giving
them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose
of defending themselves in the general Councils.

Mr. Wilson's respect for Docr. Johnson, added to
the importance of the subject led him to attempt,
unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which
had been started. It was asked how the Genl.
Govt. and individuality of the particular States could
be reconciled to each other; and how the latter could
be secured agst the former? Might it not, on the
other side be asked how the former was to be secured
agst. the latter? It was generally admitted that a
jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the Genl.
& particular Govts. As the plan now stood, tho' indeed
contrary to his opinion, one branch of the
Genl. Govt. (the Senate or second branch) was to be
appointed by the State Legislatures. The State
Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the
Genl. Govt. would have an opportunity of defending
their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to
be given to the Genl. Govt. of defending itself by having
an appointment of some one constituent branch
of the State Govts. If a security be necessary on one

side, it wd. seem reasonable to demand it on the other.
But taking the matter in a more general view, he
saw no danger to the States from the Genl. Govt. In
case a combination should be made by the large ones
it wd. produce a general alarm among the rest; and
the project wd. be frustrated. But there was no
temptation to such a project. The States having in
general a similar interest, in case of any propositions
in the National Legislature to encroach on the State
Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wd. take
place in the National Legislature itself, that it would
communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and wd.
finally spread among the people at large. The Genl.
Govt. will be as ready to preserve the rights of the
States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals;
all the members of the former, having a
common interest, as representatives of all the people
of the latter, to leave the State Govts. in possession
of what the people wish them to retain. He could
not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the
side from which it was apprehended. On the contrary,
he conceived that in spite of every precaution
the General Govt. would be in perpetual danger of
encroachments from the State Govts.

Mr. Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less
danger of encroachment from the Genl. Govt. than
from the State Govts. 2. that the mischief from encroachments
would be less fatal if made by the
former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the
examples of other confederacies prove the greater
tendency in such systems to anarchy than to

tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than
usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience
had fully illustrated this tendency.—But it will
be said that the proposed change in the principles
& form of the Union will vary the tendency; that
the Genl. Govt. will have real & greater powers, and
will be derived in one branch at least from the people,
not from the Govts. of the States. To give full force
to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment
that indefinite power should be given to the Genl.
Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations
dependent on the Genl. Legislature; Why shd. it follow
that the Genl. Govt. wd. take from the States any
branch of their power as far as its operation was
beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the
people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut,
all the Townships are incorporated, and
have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives
of the people of the Townships in the
Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil
the Townships of any part of their local authority?
As far as this local authority is convenient to the
people they are attached to it; and their representatives
chosen by & amenable to them, naturally respect
their attachment to this, as much as their
attachment to any other right or interest. The relation
of a General Govt. to State Govts. is parallel.
2. Guards were more necessary agst. encroachments
of the State Govts. on the Genl. Govt. than of the latter
on the former. The great objection made agst.
an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Genl.
Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute
objects which fall under the cognizance of the local
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not agst.
the probable abuse of the general power, but agst. the
imperfect use that could be made of it throughout
so great an extent of country, and over so great a
variety of objects. As far as its operation would be
practicable it could not in this view be improper;
as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency
of the Genl. Govt. itself would concur with that of the
people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments.
Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to
extend its care to every requisite object without the
cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not
be less free as members of one great Republic than
as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of
Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia:
nor would either be more free than a Citizen
of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the
Genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal
consequence could result. Taking the reverse as
the supposition, that a tendency should be left in
the State Govts. towards an independence on the
General Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not
be pointed out. The imagination of them, must
have suggested to the States the experiment we are
now making to prevent the calamity, and must have
formed the chief motive with those present to undertake
the arduous task.

On the question for resolving "that the Legislature
ought to consist of two Branches "

Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no.
Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

The third resolution of the Report taken into
consideration.

Genl. Pinkney moved "that the 1st. branch, instead
of being elected by the people, shd. be elected in such
manner as the Legislature of each State should direct."
He urged 1. that this liberty would give
more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then
accommodate the mode to the conveniency & opinions
of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue
influence of large Counties which would prevail if
the elections were to be made in districts as must be
the mode intended by the Report of the Committee.
3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred
to the General Legislature which would be attended
with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant
parts of the Republic.

Mr. L. Martin seconded the Motion.[90]

Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended
manifestly to transfer the election from the people
to the State Legislatures, which would essentially
vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence
which could not be too watchfully guarded
agst. All too must admit the possibility, in case the
Genl. Govt. shd. maintain itself, that the State Govts.

might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system
therefore shd. not be engrafted on what might possibly
fail.

Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the
election by the people. Whatever inconveniency
may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate
one part of the Govt. It is the only security for
the rights of the people.

Mr. Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures
best, but is content with the plan as it stands.

Mr Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the
distinction between a mediate & immediate election
by the people. It was the same thing to act by
oneself, and to act by another. An election by
the Legislature would be more refined than an election
immediately by the people: and would be more
likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community.
If this Convention had been chosen by the
people in districts it is not to be supposed that such
proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Congs. he thought had also been fitter
men than would have been appointed by the people
at large.

Mr. Wilson considered the election of the 1st. branch
by the people not only as the Corner Stone, but as
the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference
between a mediate & immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of
notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are
actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people;
but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the

Genl. Govt. and perhaps to that of the people themselves.

Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He
supposed the Legislatures wd. constantly choose men
subservient to their own views as contrasted to the
general interest; and that they might even devise
modes of election that wd. be subversive of the end in
view. He remarked several instances in which the
views of a State might be at variance with those of
the Genl. Govt.: and mentioned particularly a competition
between the National & State debts, for the
most certain & productive funds.

Genl. Pinkney was for making the State Govts. a
part of the General System. If they were to be
abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina & other
States would have but a small share of the benefits
of Govt.

On the question for Genl. Pinkney motion to substitute
election of the 1st branch in such mode as the
Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being
elected by the people"

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.

General Pinkney then moved that the 1st. branch
be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures
should direct; but waived it on its being hinted
that such a provision might be more properly tried
in the detail of the plan.

On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by
the people"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Election of the 1st. branch "for the term of three
years," considered

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out, "three years"
and insert "two years"—he was sensible that annual
elections were a source of great mischiefs in the
States, yet it was the want of such checks agst. the
popular intemperence as were now proposed, that
rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred
annual to biennial, but for the extent of the
U. S. and the inconveniency which would result
from them to the representatives of the extreme
parts of the Empire. The people were attached to
frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the
States except that of S. Carolina, had established
annual elections.

Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was
borrowed from the antient Usage of England, a
country much less extensive than ours. He supposed
biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial,
and in order to prevent the inconveniency
of an entire change of the whole number at the same
moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election
of one third.

Mr. Elseworth was opposed to three years, supposing
that even one year was preferable to two
years. The people were fond of frequent elections
and might be safely indulged in one branch of the
Legislature. He moved for 1 year.

Mr. Strong[91] seconded & supported the motion.

Mr. Wilson being for making the 1st. branch an
effectual representation of the people at large, preferred
an annual election of it. This frequency was
most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would
not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial
elections, as the people in all the States have annual
meetings with which the election of the National
representatives might be made to co-incide. He
did not conceive that it would be necessary for the
Natl. Leigsl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half—
perhaps not one fourth of the year.

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections
would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive
that biennial would be too much so: he did not
mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives.
They would have to travel seven or
eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the
Union; and would probably not be allowed even a
reimbursement of their expences. Besides, none of
those who wished to be re-elected would remain at
the seat of Governmt.; confiding that their absence
would not affect them. The members of Congs. had
done this with few instances of disappointment.
But as the choice was here to be made by the people
themselves who would be much less complaisant to
individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions

from the presence of a Rival candidate, it must
be supposed that the members from the most distant
States would travel backwards & forwards at least
as often as the elections should be repeated. Much
was to be said also on the time requisite for new
Members who would always form a large proportion,
to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States
in general without which their trust could not be
usefully discharged.

Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would
be content with biennial. He thought the Representatives
ought to return home and mix with the
people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they
would acquire the habits of the place which might
differ from those of their Constituents.

Col. Mason observed that the States being differently
situated such a rule ought to be formed as
would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If
elections were annual the middle States would have
a great advantage over the extreme ones. He
wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in
that case they would coincide with the periodical
elections of S. Carolina as well of the other States.

Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years. there
ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence,
on the popular sentiments. The checks in the
other branches of the Governt. would be but feeble,
and would need every auxiliary principle that could
be interwoven. The British House of Commons
were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit
of ye. Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of

elections tended to make the people listless to them;
and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This
evil was complained of in all the States. In Virga. it
had been lately found necessary to force the attendance
& voting of the people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out "three years"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. divd. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The motion for "two years" was then inserted
nem. con.

Adjd.

Friday June 22. in Convention

The clause in Resol. 3 "to receive fixed stipends to
be paid out of the Nationl. Treasury" considered.

Mr. Elseworth, moved to substitute payment by
the States out of their own Treasurys: observing
that the manners of different States were very different
in the stile of living and in the profits accruing
from the exercise of like talents. What would be
deemed therefore a reasonable compensation in some
States, in others would be very unpopular, and
might impede the system of which it made a part.

Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded
the House of the prospect of new States to the Westward.
They would be too poor—would pay little
into the common Treasury—and would have a different
interest from the old States. He did not
think therefore that the latter ought to pay the

expences of men who would be employed in thwarting
their measures & interests.

Mr. Ghorum[92] wished not to refer the matter to the
State Legislatures who were always paring down
salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices
men most capable of executing the functions of
them. He thought also it would be wrong to fix
the compensations by the constitution, because we
could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought
to be without exciting an enmity agst. the whole plan.
Let the Natl. Legisl: provide for their own wages
from time to time; as the State Legislatures do. He
had not seen this part of their power abused, nor
did he apprehend an abuse of it.

Mr. Randolph said he feared we were going too
far, in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever respect
might be due to them, in lesser matters, or in
cases where they formed the permanent character
of the people, he thought it neither incumbent on
nor honorable for the Convention, to sacrifice right
& justice to that consideration. If the States were
to pay the members of the Nat1. Legislature, a dependence
would be created that would vitiate the

whole System. The whole nation has an interest in
the attendance & services of the members. The
Nationl. Treasury therefore is the proper fund for
supporting them.

Mr. King, urged the danger of creating a dependence
on the States by leavg. to them the payment of
the members of the Natl. Legislature. He supposed
it wd. be best to be explicit as to the compensation
to be allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference
to the Natl. Legislature of the quantum, would
excite greater opposition than any sum that would
be actually necessary or proper.

Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the quantum
and the payment of it to the State Legislatures.

Mr. Wilson was agst. fixing the compensation as
circumstances would change and call for a change
of the amount. He thought it of great moment
that the members of the Natl. Govt. should be left
as independent as possible of the State Govts. in all
respects.

Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving
the compensations for the Natl. Govt. independent
on the State Govts. but at the same time approved
of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be
done by taking a standard which wd. not vary with
circumstances. He disliked particularly the policy
suggested by Mr. Wiliamson of leaving the members
from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the
precarious & parsimonious support of their constituents.
If the Western States hereafter arising
should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be

considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives
were to be associated in the Common
Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions
should be made as would invite the most
capable and respectable characters into the service.

Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconveniency from fixing
the wages. He was strenuous agst. making the
National Council dependent on the Legislative rewards
of the States. Those who pay are the masters
of those who are paid. Payment by the States
would be unequal as the distant States would have
to pay for the same term of attendance and more
days in travelling to & from the seat of the Govt.
He expatiated emphatically on the difference between
the feelings & views of the people—& the
Governments of the States arising from the personal
interest & official inducements which must render
the latter unfriendly to the Genl. Govt.

Mr. Wilson moved that the Salaries of the 1st.
branch "be ascertained by the National Legislature,"
and be paid out of the Natl. Treasury.

Mr. Madison, thought the members of the Legisl.
too much interested to ascertain their own compensation.
It wd. be indecent to put their hands into
the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.

On this question Mass. no. Cont. no. N. Y. divd.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. divd.

On the question for striking out "Natl. Treasury"
as moved by Mr. Elseworth

Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He

pressed the distinction between the State Govts. &
the people. The former wd. be the rivals of the
Genl. Govt. The State legislatures ought not therefore
to be the paymasters of the latter.

Mr. Elseworth. If we are jealous of the State
Grovts. they will be so of us. If on going home I tell
them we gave the Gen: Govt. such powers because
we cd. not trust you. Will they adopt it, and witht
yr. approbation it is a nullity.[93]

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. no.
Pena. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. divd.[94]

On a question for substituting "adequate compensation"
in place of "fixt stipends" it was agreed
to nem. con. the friends of the latter being willing
that the practicability of fixing the compensation
should be considered hereafter in forming the details.

It was then moved by Mr. Butler that a question
be taken on both points jointly; to wit "adequate
compensation to be paid out of the Natl. Treasury."
It was objected to as out of order, the parts having
been separately decided on. The Presidt. referd. the
question of order to the House, and it was determined

to be in order. Con. N. J. Del. Md. N. C.
S. C.—ay—N. Y. Pa. Va. Geo." no — Mass. divided.
The question on the sentence was then postponed
by S. Carolina in right of the State.

Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty-five years of age
as a qualification for the members of the 1st. branch."
He thought it absurd that a man today should not
be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage
the affairs of a great nation. It was more extraordinary
as every man carried with him in his own
experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of
young politicians; since he would if interrogated be
obliged to declare that his political opinions at the
age of 21. were too crude & erroneous to merit an influence
on public measures. It had been said that
Congs. had proved a good school for our young men.
It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were,
he chose that they should bear the expence of their
own education.

Mr. Wilson was agst. abridging the rights of election
in any shape. It was the same thing whether this
were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or
the persons chusing. The motion tended to damp
the efforts of genius, and of laudable ambition.
There was no more reason for incapacitating youth
than age, where the requisite qualifications were
found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal
services rendered in high stations to the public
before the age of 25: The present Mr. Pitt and Lord
Bolingbroke were striking instances.

On the question for inserting "25 years of age"
Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa.no.

Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Mr. Ghorum moved to strike out the last member
of the 3 Resol: concerning ineligibility of members
of the 1st branch to office during the term of their
membership & for one year after. He considered it
as unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had
been displayed in G. B. but no one cd. say how far
they might have contributed to preserve the due influence
of the Govt. nor what might have ensued in
case the contrary theory had been tried.

Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution agst. intrigue
was necessary. He appealed to the example of G. B.
where men got into Parlt. that they might get offices
for themselves or their friends. This was the source
of the corruption that ruined their Govt.

Mr. King, thought we were refining too much. Such
a restriction on the members would discourage merit.
It would also give a pretext to the Executive for bad
appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar
to the choice he wished to have made.

Mr. Wilson was agst. fettering elections, and discouraging
merit. He suggested also the fatal consequence
in time of war, of rendering perhaps the best
Commanders ineligible; appealing to our situation
during the late war, and indirectly leading to a
recollection of the appointment of the Com̃ander in
Chief out of Congress.[95]

Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events
agst. corruption. He enlarged on the venality and
abuses in this particular in G. Britain: and alluded
to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Congs.
The disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in
the fabric.

Col. Hamilton, there are inconveniences on both
sides. We must take man as we find him, and if we

expect him to serve the public must interest his passions
in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had
been the source of many of our errors. He thought
the remark of Mr. Ghorum a just one. It was impossible
to say what wd. be the effect in G. B. of such
a reform as had been urged. It was known that one
of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced
all that influence on the side of the crown, which
went under the name of corruption, an essential part
of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of
the Constitution.

On Mr. Ghorum's Motion for striking out "ineligibility,"

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa.
divd. Del. divd. Mard. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Ga. ay.

Adjd.

Saturday June 23. In Convention

The 3d. Resol: resumed.

On Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for
agreeing to the whole sentence "for allowing an
adequate compensation to be paid out of the Treasury
of the U. States"

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pena.
ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. divided. So the question was lost, & the sentence
not inserted:

Genl. Pinkney moves to strike out the ineligibility
of members of the 1st. branch to offices established
"by a particular State." He argued from the inconveniency
to which such a restriction would expose
both the members of the 1st. branch, and the States
wishing for their services; & from the smallness of
the object to be attained by the restriction.

It wd. seem from the ideas of some that we are
erecting a Kingdom to be divided agst. itself,[96] he
disapproved such a fetter on the Legislature.

Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. It wd. seem that
we are erecting a Kingdom at war with itself. The
Legislature ought not to [be] fettered in such a case.
On the question

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Md. divd. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison renewed his motion yesterday made
& waved to render the members of the 1st. branch
"ineligible during their term of service, & for one
year after—to such offices only as should be established,
or the emoluments thereof augmented, by the
Legislature of the U. States during the time of their
being members." He supposed that the unnecessary
creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the
evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut
agst. them: it might properly be left open for the appointt.
of members to other offices as an encouragemt.

to the Legislative service.

Mr. Alex: Martin[97] seconded the Motion.

Mr. Butler. The amendt. does not go far eno. &
wd. be easily evaded

Mr. Rutlidge, was for preserving the Legislature
as pure as possible, by shutting the door against

appointments of its own members to offices, which
was one source of its corruption.

Mr. Mason.[98] The motion of my colleague is but a
partial remedy for the evil. He appealed to him as a
witness of the shameful partiality of the Legislature
of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the

abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, connected
with the appointment of its members. He
cd. not suppose that a sufficient number of Citizens
could not be found who would be ready, without the
inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake the
Legislative service. Genius & virtue it may be said,
ought to be encouraged. Genius, for aught he knew,
might, but that virtue should be encouraged by such
a species of venality, was an idea, that at least had
the merit of being new.

Mr. King remarked that we were refining too much
in this business; and that the idea of preventing
intrigue and solicitation of offices was chimerical.
You say that no member shall himself be eligible to
any office. Will this restrain him from availing himself
of the same means which would gain appointments
for himself, to gain them for his son, his
brother, or any other object of his partiality. We
were losing therefore the advantages on one side,
without avoiding the evils on the other.

Mr. Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure
he said for corruption in the Legislature was to take
from it the power of appointing to offices. One
branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of
creating unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary
salaries, and for that the amendment would be a
proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety
of stigmatizing with the name of venality the
laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices
of the Government; an ambition most likely to be
felt in the early & most incorrupt period of life, &

which all wise & free Govts. had deemed it sound
policy, to cherish, not to check. The members of the
Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least profitable
task of any who engage in the service of the state.
Ought this merit to be made a disqualification?

Mr. Sherman, observed that the motion did not go
far enough. It might be evaded by the creation of
a new office, the translation to it of a person from
another office, and the appointment of a member of
the Legislature to the latter. A new Embassy
might be established to a new Court, & an ambassador
taken from another, in order to create a vacancy
for a favorite member. He admitted that inconveniences
lay on both sides. He hoped there wd.
be sufficient inducements to the public service without
resorting to the prospect of desirable offices, and
on the whole was rather agst. the motion of Mr.
Madison.

Mr. Gerry[99] thought there was great weight in the
objection of Mr. Sherman. He added as another objection
agst admitting the eligibility of members in
any case that it would produce intrigues of ambitious
men for displacing proper officers, in order

to create vacancies for themselves. In answer to
Mr. King he observed that although members, if
disqualified themselves might still intrigue & cabal
for their sons, brothers &c., yet as their own interests
would be dearer to them, than those of their nearest
connections, it might be expected they would go
greater lengths to promote it.

Mr. Madison had been led to this motion as a
middle ground between an eligibility in all cases, and
an absolute disqualification. He admitted the probable
abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices
particularly within the gift of the Legislature He
had witnessed the partiality of such bodies to their
own members, as had been remarked of the Virginia
Assembly by his colleague (Col. Mason). He appealed
however to him, in turn to vouch another fact
not less notorious in Virginia, that the backwardness
of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative service
gave but too great success to unfit characters.
The question was not to be viewed on one side only.
The advantages & disadvantages on both ought to
be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at
were to fill all offices with the fittest characters, &
to draw the wisest & most worthy citizens into the
Legislative service. If on one hand, public bodies
were partial to their own members; on the other they
were as apt to be misled by taking characters on
report, or the authority of patrons and dependents.
All who had been concerned in the appointment of
strangers on those recommendations must be sensible
of this truth. Nor wd. the partialities of such

Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their own members.
Candidates for office would hover round the
seat of Govt. or be found among the residents there,
and practise all the means of courting the favor of
the members. A great proportion of the appointments
made by the States were evidently brought
about in this way. In the General Govt. the evil
must be still greater, the characters of distant states,
being much less known throughout the U. States
than those of the distant parts of the same State.
The elections by Congress had generally turned on
men living at the seat of the fedl Govt. or in its
neighbourhood.—As to the next object, the impulse
to the Legislative service, was evinced by experience
to be in general too feeble with those best qualified
for it. This inconveniency wd. also be more felt in
the Natl. Govt. than in the State Govts. as the Sacrifices
reqd. from the distant members, wd. be much
greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably,
more disproportionate. It wd. therefore be impolitic
to add fresh objections to the Legislative service by
an absolute disqualification of its members. The
point in question was whether this would be an
objection with the most capable citizens. Arguing
from experience he concluded that it would. The
Legislature of Virga. would probably have been without
many of its best members, if in that situation,
they had been ineligible to Congs. to the Govt. &
other honorable offices of the State.

Mr. Butler thought Characters fit for office wd.
never be unknown.

Col. Mason. If the members of the Legislature
are disqualified, still the honors of the State will induce
those who aspire to them to enter that service,
as the field in which they can best display & improve
their talents, & lay the train for their subsequent
advancement.

Mr. Jenifer remarked that in Maryland, the Senators
chosen for five years, cd. hold no other office
& that this circumstance gained them the greatest
confidence of the people.

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr.
Madison,

Massts. divd. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Sherman movd. to insert the words "and incapable
of holding" after the words "eligible to
offices" wch. was agreed to without opposition.

The word "established" & the words "Natl. Govt."
were struck out of the Resolution 3d.

Mr. Spaight called for a division of the question, in
consequence of which it was so put, as that it turned
in the first member of it, "on the ineligibility of members
during the term for which they were elected"—
whereon the States were,

Massts. divd. Ct. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md.ay. Va.ay. N.C.ay. S.C.ay. Geo. no.

On the 2d. member of the sentence extending ineligibility
of members to one year after the term for
which they were elected Col. Mason thought this
essential to guard agst. evasions by resignations, and

stipulations for office to be filled at the expiration
of the legislative term. Mr. Gerry, had known such
a case. Mr Hamilton. Evasions cd. not be prevented
—as by proxies—by friends holding for a
year, & then opening the way &c. Mr. Rutlidge
admitted the possibility of evasions, but was for
contracting them as possible. Mass. no. Ct. no.
N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. ay. Mard. ay.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no

Adjd.

Monday, June 25. in Convention.

Resolution 4. being taken up.

Mr. Pinkney spoke as follows—[100] The efficacy of
the System will depend on this article. In order
to form a right judgmt. in the case, it will be
proper to examine the situation of this Country
more accurately than it has yet been done. The
people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular
of any we are acquainted with. Among them
there are fewer distinctions of fortune & less of rank,
than among the inhabitants of any other nation.
Every freeman has a right to the same protection
& security; and a very moderate share of property
entitles them to the possession of all the honors and
privileges the Public can bestow: hence arises a
greater equality, than is to be found among the people
of any other Country, and an equality which is

more likely to continue—I say this equality is likely
to continue, because in a new Country, possessing
immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every
temptation is offered to emigration & where industry
must be rewarded with competency, there will be
few poor, and few dependent—Every member of the
Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving
at the supreme offices & consequently of directing
the strength & sentiments of the whole Community.
None will be excluded by birth, & few by fortune,
from voting for proper persons to fill the offices of
Government—the whole community will enjoy in
the fullest sense that kind of political liberty which
consists in the power the members of the State
reserve to themselves, of arriving at the Public
offices, or at least, of having votes in the nomination
of those who fill them.

If this State of things is true & the prospect of its
continuing probable, it is perhaps not politic to
endeavour too close an imitation of a Government
calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose
views ought to be extremely different

Much has been said of the Constitution of G.
Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the
best Constitution in existence; but at the same time
I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be
introduced into this Country, for many centuries.—
If it were proper to go here into a historical dissertation
on the British Constitution, it might easily be
shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing
feature of that Governmt. cannot possibly be introduced

into our System—that its balance between
the Crown & the people cannot be made a part of
our Constitution,—that we neither have nor can
have the members to compose it, nor the rights,
privileges & properties of so distinct a class of Citizens
to guard,—that the materials for forming this
balance or check do not exist, nor is there a necessity
for having so permanent a part of our Legislative,
until the Executive power is so constituted as to have
something fixed & dangerous in its principle—By this
I mean a sole, hereditary, though limited Executive.

That we cannot have a proper body for forming
a Legislative balance between the inordinate power
of the Executive and the people, is evident from a
review of the accidents & circumstances which gave
rise to the peerage of Great Britain—I believe it is
well ascertained that the parts which compose the
British Constitution arose immediately from the
forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment
of Nobility is by no means clearly defined.
Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted
by the titles of dux et comes, was derived from
the old Roman to the German Empire; while others
are of the opinion that they existed among the Germans
long before the Romans were acquainted with
them. The institution however of Nobility is immemorial
among the Nations who may properly be
termed the ancestors of Britain.—At the time they
were summoned in England to become a part of the
National Council, the circumstances which contributed
to make them a Constituent part of that

constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen
who have had industry & curiosity enough to investigate
the subject—The Nobles with their possessions
& dependents composed a body permanent
in their nature and formidable in point of power.
They had a distinct interest both from the King
and the people; an interest which could only be
represented by themselves, and the guardianship
could not be safely intrusted to others.—At the
time they were originally called to form a part of the
National Council, necessity perhaps as much as other
cause, induced the Monarch to look up to them. It
was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in
personal & pecuniary services. The power and possessions
of the Nobility would not permit taxation
from any Assembly of which they were not a part:
& the blending the Deputies of the Commons with
them, & thus forming what they called their parlerment
was perhaps as much the effect of chance as of
any thing else. The Commons were at that time
compleatly subordinate to the nobles, whose consequence
& influence seem to have been the only reasons
for their superiority; a superiority so degrading
to the Commons that in the first summons we find
the peers are called upon to consult the commons to
consent. From this time the peers have composed
a part of the British Legislature, and notwithstanding
their power and influence have diminished &
those of the Commons have increased, yet still they
have always formed an excellent balance agst. either
the encroachments of the Crown or the people.

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this
Country for ages, and that untill the situation of our
people is exceedingly changed no necessity will exist
for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To
illustrate this I have remarked that the people of
the United States are more equal in their circumstances
than the people of any other Country—that
they have very few rich men among them,—by rich
men I mean those whose riches may have a dangerous
influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Europe
—perhaps there are not one hundred such on the
Continent; that it is not probable this number will
be greatly increased; that the genius of the people
their mediocrity of situation & the prospects which
are afforded their industry in a Country which must
be a new one for centuries are unfavorable to the
rapid distinction of ranks. The destruction of the
right of primogeniture & the equal division of
the property of Intestates will also have an effect to
preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect
the manners of a people. On the other hand that
vast extent of unpeopled territory which opens to
the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency
& independence will effectually prevent for a considerable
time the increase of the poor or discontented,
and be the means of preserving that equality
of condition which so eminently distinguishes us.

If equality is as I contend the leading feature of
the U. States, where then are the riches & wealth
whose representation & protection is the peculiar
province of this Permanent body. Are they in the

hands of the few who may be called rich; in the
possession of less than a hundred citizens? Certainly
not. They are in the great body of the people,
among whom there are no men of wealth, and very
few of real poverty.—Is it probable that a change
will be created, and that a new order of men will
arise? If under the British Government, for a century
no such change was probable, I think it may
be fairly concluded it will not take place while even
the semblance of Republicanism remains.—How is
this change to be effected? Where are the sources
from whence it is to flow? From the landed interest?
No. That is too unproductive & too much divided
in most of the States. From the Monied interest?
If such exists at present, little is to be apprehended
from that source. Is it to spring from commerce?
I believe it would be the first instance in which a
nobility sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend
that on this point the policy of the U. States
has been much mistaken. We have unwisely considered
ourselves as the inhabitants of an old instead
of a new country. We have adopted the maxims
of a State full of people & manufactures & established
in credit. We have deserted our true interest, and
instead of applying closely to those improvements in
domestic policy which would have ensured the future
importance of our commerce, we have rashly & prematurely
engaged in schemes as extensive as they are
imprudent. This however is an error which daily
corrects itself & I have no doubt that a few more
severe trials will convince us, that very different
commercial principles ought to govern the conduct
of these States.

The people of this Country are not only very different
from the inhabitants of any State we are
acquainted with in the modern world; but I assert
that their situation is distinct from either the people
of Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted
with among the antients.—Can the orders introduced
by the institution of Solon, can they be found in the
United States? Can the military habits & manners
of Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners?
Are the distinction of Patrician & Plebeian known
among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies,
or can the unwieldy, unmeaning body called
the Germanic Empire, can they be said to possess
either the same or a situation like ours? I apprehend
not.—They are perfectly different, in their distinctions
of rank, their Constitutions, their manners &
their policy.

Our true situation appears to me to be this,—a
new extensive Country containing within itself the
materials for forming a Government capable of extending
to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil &
religious liberty—capable of making them happy at
home. This is the great end of Republican Establishments.
We mistake the object of our Government,
if we hope or wish that it is to make us
respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among
other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object
of republican Systems. If they are sufficiently
active & energetic to rescue us from contempt &

preserve our domestic happiness & security, it is all
we can expect from them,—it is more than almost
any other Government ensures to its citizens.

I believe this observation will be found generally
true:—that no two people are so exactly alike in
their situation or circumstances as to admit the exercise
of the same Government with equal benefit;
that a system must be suited to the habits & genius
of the People it is to govern, and must grow out of
them.

The people of the U. S. may be divided into three
classes—Professional men who must from their particular
pursuits always have a considerable weight
in the Government while it remains popular—Commercial
men, who may or may not have weight as a
wise or injudicious commercial policy is pursued.—
If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive
to be the true one, the merchants of this
Country will not or ought not for a considerable
time to have much weight in the political scale.—
The third is the landed interest, the owners and cultivators
of the soil, who are and ought ever to be
the governing spring in the system.—These three
classes, however distinct in their pursuits are individually
equal in the political scale, and may be
easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence
of each on the other is mutual. The
merchant depends on the planter. Both must in
private as well as public affairs be connected with
the professional men; who in their turn must in
some measure depend on them. Hence it is clear

from this manifest connection, & the equality which
I before stated exists, & must for the reasons then
assign, continue, that after all there is one, but
one great & equal body of Citizens composing the
inhabitants of this Country among whom there are
no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of
fortune.

For a people thus circumstanced are we then to
form a Government & the question is what sort of
Government is best suited to them.

Will it be the British Govt.? No. Why? Because
G. Britain contains three orders of people
distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles.—These orders combined form the great
body of the Nation. And as in national expences
the wealth of the whole community must contribute,
so ought each component part to be properly & duly
represented.—No other combination of power could
form this due representation, but the one that exists.
—Neither the peers or the people could represent the
royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people form
a proper representation for the Peers.—Each therefore
must of necessity be represented by itself, or
the sign of itself; and this accidental mixture has
certainly formed a Government admirably well
balanced.

But the U. States contain but one order that can
be assimilated to the British Nation,—this is the
order of Commons. They will not surely then attempt
to form a Government consisting of three
branches, two of which shall have nothing to

represent. They will not have an Executive &
Senate (hereditary) because the King & Lords of
England are so. The same reasons do not exist and
therefore the same provisions are not necessary.

We must as has been observed suit our Governmt.
to the people it is to direct. These are I believe as
active, intelligent & susceptible of good Governmt.
as any people in the world. The Confusion which
has produced the present relaxed State is not owing
to them. It is owing to the weakness & (defects)
of a Govt. incapable of combining the various interests
it is intended to unite, and destitute of
energy.—All that we have to do then is to distribute
the powers of Govt. in such a manner, and for such
limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree of
permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the
people, the right of election they will not or ought
not frequently to part with.—I am of opinion that
this may easily be done; and that with some amendments
the propositions before the Committee will
fully answer this end.

No position appears to me more true than this;
that the General Govt. cannot effectually exist without
reserving to the States the possession of their
local rights. They are the instruments upon which
the Union must frequently depend for the support
& execution of their powers, however immediately
operating upon the people, and not upon the
States.

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing
the distinction of State Governments, & having

but one general System. Suffer me for a moment
to examine this question.[101]

The mode of constituting the 2d. branch being
under consideration.

The word "national" was struck out, and "United
States" inserted.

Mr. Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the
rule of proportion. He thought there was some
weight in the objections of the small States. If Va.
should have 16. votes & Delre. with several other States
together 16, those from Virga. would be more likely
to unite than the others, and would therefore have an
undue influence. This remark was applicable not
only to States, but to Counties or other districts of
the same State. Accordingly the Constitution of
Massts. had provided that the representatives of the
larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to
their numbers, and experience he thought had
shewn the provision to be expedient.

Mr. Read. The States have heretofore been in
a sort of partnership. They ought to adjust their
old affairs before they open a new account. He
brought into view the appropriation of the com̃on
interest in the Western lands, to the use of particular
States. Let justice be done on this head; let the
fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge
of the general debt, and the smaller States who had
been injured; would listen then perhaps to those
ideas of just representation which had been held
out.

Mr. Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could
interpose in the case. Errors he allowed had been
committed on the subject. But Congs. were now
using their endeavours to rectify them. The best
remedy would be such a Government as would have
vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was
certainly the best chance that could be afforded to
the smaller States.

Mr. Wilson, the question is shall the members of
the 2d. branch be chosen by the Legislatures of the
States? When he considered the amazing extent of
Country—the immense population which is to fill
it, the influence which the Govt. we are to form will
have, not only on the present generation of our
people & their multiplied posterity, but on the whole
Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object.
The project of Henry the 4th. & his Statesmen was but
the picture in miniature of the great portrait to be
exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the
State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was

necessary to observe the twofold relation in which
the people would stand, 1 as Citizens of the Genl.
Govt. 2. as Citizens of their particular State. The
Genl. Govt. was meant for them in the first capacity:
the State Govts. in the second. Both Govts. were
derived from the people—both meant for the people
—both therefore ought to be regulated on the same
principles. The same train of ideas which belonged
to the relation of the Citizens to their State Govts.
were applicable to their relation to the Genl. Govt.
and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the
State Govts. With respect to the province & object
of the Genl. Govt. they should be considered as having
no existence. The election of the 2d. branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests
& local prejudices. The Genl. Govt. is not an assemblage
of States, but of individuals for certain political
purposes—it is not meant for the States; but for the
individuals composing them; the individuals therefore
not the States, ought to be represented in it:
A proportion in this representation can be preserved
in the 2d. as well as in the 1st. branch; and the election
can be made by electors chosen by the people for
that purpose. He moved an amendment to that
effect which was not seconded.

Mr. Elseworth saw no reason for departing from
the mode contained in the Report. Whoever
chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State
he is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act
the same part whether he be appointed by the people

or the Legislature. Every State has its particular
views & prejudices, which will find their way
into the general Councils, through whatever channel
they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics
which it was in contemplation to give the second
branch. Would not more of it issue from the
Legislatures; than from an immediate election by
the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining
the existence, & agency of the States. Without
their co-operation it would be impossible to support
a Republican Govt. over so great an extent of Country.
An army could scarcely render it practicable. The
largest States are the worst Governed. Virga. is
obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her
Govt. to Kentuckey. Massts. cannot keep the peace
one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming
an army for its support. How long Pena. may be
free from a like situation cannot be foreseen. If the
principles & materials of our Govt. are not adequate
to the extent of these single States; how can it be
imagined that they can support a single Govt.
throughout the U. States. The only chance of supporting
a Genl. Govt. lies in grafting it on that of the
individual States.

Docr. Johnson urged the necessity of preserving
the State Govts. which would be at the mercy of the
Genl. Govt. on Mr. Wilson's plan.

Mr. Madison thought it wd. obviate difficulty if the
present resol: were postponed, & the 8th. taken up,
which is to fix the right of suffrage in the 2d. branch.

Docr. Williamson professed himself a friend to such

a system as would secure the existence of the State
Govts. The happiness of the people depended on it.
He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate
untill he knew the number of its members. In order
to ascertain this, he moved to insert these words
after "2d. branch of the Natl. Legislature"—"who
shall bear such proportion to the no. of the 1st. branch
as 1 to—." He was not seconded.

Mr. Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that
an efficient Govt. is necessary that to render it such
it ought to have the faculty of self defence, that to
render its different branches effectual each of them
ought to have the same power of self defence. He
did not wonder that such an agreement should have
prevailed in these points. He only wondered that
there should be any disagreement about the necessity
of allowing the State Govts. the same self-defence.
If they are to be preserved as he conceived to be
essential, they certainly ought to have this power.
And the only mode left of giving it to them, was by
allowing them to appoint the 2d. branch of the Natl.
Legislature.

Mr. Butler observing that we were put to difficulties
at every step by the uncertainty whether an
equality or a ratio of representation wd. prevail finally
in the 2d. branch, moved to postpone the 4th. Resol:
& to proceed to the Resol: on that point. Mr. Madison
seconded him

On the question

Massts. no. Cont. no N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va.ay. N. C.no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7
Resol: ays, Maryd. Va. N. C. S. C. Geo;—Noes, Mass,
Ct. N. Y. N. J. Pa. Del:

On the question to agree "that the members of
the 2d. branch be chosen by the indivl. Legislatures"
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.[102]

On a question on the clause requiring the age of
30 years at least,—it was agreed to unanimously:

On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient
to ensure their independency" after the word
"term" it was agreed to.

That the 2d. branch hold their offices for a term of
seven years, considered

Mr. Ghorum suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be
elected every year.

Mr Randolph, supported the idea of rotation, as
favorable to the wisdom & stability of the Corps,
which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding
the Executive.

And moves after "7 years," to add, "to go out in
fixt proportion" which was agreed to.

Mr. Williamson suggests "6 years," as more convenient
for Rotation than 7 years.

Mr. Sherman seconds him.

Mr. Reed proposed that they sd hold their offices
"during good behaviour. Mr. R. Morris seconds
him.

Genl. Pinkney, proposed "4 years." A longer term
wd. fix them at the seat of Govt. They wd. acquire
an interest there, perhaps transfer their property &
lose sight of the States they represent. Under these
circumstances the distant States wd. labour under
great disadvantages.[103]

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out "7 years "in
order to take questions on the several propositions.

On the question to strike out "seven"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

On the question to insert "6 years ", which failed
5 Sts. being ay. 5 no, & 1 divided

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. no.

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5
agst. it & 1 divided,—Con. N. J. Pa. Del. Va. ay.
Massts. N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo: no. Maryd. divided.

On the question for "5 years" it was lost.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Adjd.

Tuesday, June 26. in Convention

The duration of the 2d. branch under consideration.
Mr. Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six
years," one third of the members to go out every
second year.

Mr. Wilson 2ded. the motion.

Genl. Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four
years. The States he said had different interests.
Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina in particular
were different from the Northern. If the Senators
should be appointed for a long term, they wd. settle
in the State where they exercised their functions;
and would in a little time be rather the representatives
of that than of the State appointg them.

Mr. Reed movd. that the term be nine years. This
wd. admit of a very convenient rotation, one third
going out triennially. He wd. still prefer "during
good behaviour," but being little supported in that
idea, he was willing to take the longest term that
could be obtained.

Mr. Broome 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be
given to this institution, it will be proper to take a
view of the ends to be served by it. These were
first to protect the people agst. their rulers; secondly

to protect the people agst. the transient impressions
into which they themselves might be led. A people
deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the
experience of other nations before them, on the plan
of Govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would
first be aware, that those chargd. with the public
happiness might betray their trust. An obvious
precaution agst. this danger wd. be to divide the trust
between different bodies of men, who might watch
& check each other. In this they wd. be governed
by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing
the subordinate departments of Govt., where
all business liable to abuses is made to pass thro'
separate hands, the one being a check on the other.
It wd. next occur to such people, that they themselves
were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of
information as to their true interest, and that men
chosen for a short term, & employed but a small
portion of that in public affairs, might err from the
same cause. This reflection wd. naturally suggest
that the Govt. be so constituted as that one of its
branches might have an oppy. of acquiring a competent
knowledge of the public interests. Another
reflection equally becoming a people on such an
occasion, wd. be that they themselves, as well as a
numerous body of Representatives, were liable to
err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary
fence agst. this danger would be to select a portion of
enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and
firmness might seasonably interpose agst. impetuous
councils. It ought finally to occur to a people
deliberating on a Govt. for themselves, that as different
interests necessarily result from the liberty meant
to be secured, the major interest might under sudden
impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the
minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall
into different classes havg. a real or supposed difference
of interests. There will be creditors & debtors;
farmers, merchts. & manufacturers. There will be
particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was
true as had been observd. (by Mr. Pinkney) we had
not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the
ancient Govts. as well as the modern States of
Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty
which characterize the latter. We cannot however
be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous
mass, in which every thing that affects a part will
affect in the same manner the whole. In framing
a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd. not
lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.
An increase of population will of necessity increase
the proportion of those who will labour under all
the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal
distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber
those who are placed above the feelings of
indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage,
the power will slide into the hands of the former.
No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this
Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we
have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain
quarters, to give notice of the future danger.
How is this danger to be guarded agst. on the republican
principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be
guarded agst.? Among other means by the establishment
of a body in the Govt. sufficiently respectable
for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies,
the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight
into that scale. Such being the objects of the
second branch in the proposed Govt. he thought a
considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did
not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten
any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas
on the subject, he should require that the long term
allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till
such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification
to be re-elected little inconvenient either
in a public or private view. He observed that as it
was more than probable we were now digesting a plan
which in its operation wd. decide for ever the fate of
Republican Govt. we ought not only to provide every
guard to liberty that its preservation cd. require, but
be equally careful to supply the defects which our
own experience had particularly pointed out.

Mr. Sherman. Govt. is instituted for those who
live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted
as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The
more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the
good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give
permanency to the Government, by preserving that
good behavior, because it ensures their re-election.

In Connecticut elections have been very frequent,
yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons
& measures have been experienced from its original
establishmt. to the present time; a period of more
than a 130 years. He wished to have provision
made for steadiness & wisdom in the system to be
adopted; but he thought six or four years would be
sufficient. He shd. be content with either.

Mr. Read wished it to be considered by the small
States that it was their interest that we should become
one people as much as possible; that State
attachments shd. be extinguished as much as possible;
that the Senate shd. be so constituted as to have
the feelings of Citizens of the whole.

Mr. Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly
into the subject. He concurred with Mr. Madison
in thinking we were now to decide forever the
fate of Republican Government; and that if we did
not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it
would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced
& lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged
himself not to think favorably of Republican
Government; but addressed his remarks to those
who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail
on them to tone their Government as high as possible.
He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate
for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted
he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed
as to the form in which it was most eligible.—
He concurred also in the general observations of
(Mr. Madison) on the subject, which might be supported

by others if it were necessary. It was certainly
true that nothing like an equality of property
existed; that an inequality would exist as long as
liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result
from that very liberty itself. This inequality of
property constituted the great & fundamental distinction
in Society. When the Tribunitial power
had levelled the boundary between the patricians
& plebeians, what followed? The distinction between
rich & poor was substituted. He meant
not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose
principally to remark that (Mr. Sherman) seemed
not to recollect that one branch of the proposed
Govt. was so formed, as to render it particularly the
guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to
have adverted to the true causes of the stability
which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the
great powers appertaining to Govt. particularly all
those relating to foreign Nations were not in the
hands of the Govt. there. Their internal affairs also
were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes
many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of
late the Governmt. had entirely given way to the
people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary
functions in order to prevent those turbulent
scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. S.
whether the State at this time dare impose & collect
a tax on ye. people? To these causes & not to the
frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed
ought to be chiefly ascribed.

Mr. Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas
concerning a permanent Govt. All aim at the same
end, but there are great differences as to the means.
One circumstance He thought should be carefully
attended to. There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow
citizens who were not agst. every approach towards
Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which
seems to make such an approach. The Convention
ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold
out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed
will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect
to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from
an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan
should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent
opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion
will ensue, and it is even possible that we may
become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny
the position of Mr. Madison, that the majority will
generally violate justice when they have an interest
in so doing: But did not think there was any such
temptation in this Country. Our situation was different
from that of G. Britain; and the great body
of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very
much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the
symptoms of injustice which had marked many of
our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far
as not to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient
sense of justice & virtue for the purpose of Govt.
He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of
elections; and would agree to give the Senate a
duration of four or five years. A longer term would

defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the
people.

Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen
from others, but wd. add an observation or two which
he believed had not yet been suggested. Every
nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its
own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore
not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has
wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The
Senate will probably be the depository of the powers
concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to
be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations.
The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened
to a commercial treaty with us has been, because
she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of
our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide
these desirable qualities; and give our Govt an
advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In
a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper
of the man. In such a body, the personal character
will be lost in the political. He wd add another
observation. The popular objection agst. appointing
any public body for a long term was that it might
by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a
body for life, and finally become a hereditary one.
It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection
that as 1/3 would go out triennially, there would be
always three divisions holding their places for unequal
times, and consequently acting under the influence
of different views, and different impulses.—
On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

On the question for 6 years,[104] 1/3 to go out biennially

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be
compensated for their services" considered.

General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should
be allowed." As this (the Senatorial) branch was
meant to represent the wealth of the Country, it
ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if
no allowance was to be made the wealthy alone
would undertake the service. He moved to strike
out the clause.

Doctr. Franklin seconded the motion. He wished
the Convention to stand fair with the people. There
were in it a number of young men who would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments
should be recommended we might be chargeable
with having carved out places for ourselves.
On the question,—Masts. Connecticut[105] Pa. Md. S.
Carolina ay. N. Y. N. J. Del. Virga. N. C. Geo. no.

Mr. Williamson moved to change the expression
into these words to wit "to receive a compensation

for the devotion of their time to the public service."
The motion was seconded by Mr. Elseworth, and
agreed to by all the States except S. Carola. It
seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word
"fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the
provision on this point.

Mr. Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid
out of the Natil. Treasury" and insert "to be paid
by their respective States." If the Senate was meant
to strengthen the Govt. it ought to have the confidence
of the States. The States will have an interest
in keeping up a representation, and will make such
provision for supporting the members as will ensure
their attendance.

Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from a
fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended
by allowing the Senate a duration of 6 years.
They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold
their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of
the State Legislatures. One great end of the institution
was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body,
it might not only give stability to the Genl Govt. in
its operations on individuals, but hold an even
balance among different States. The motion would
make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents &
Advocates of State interests & views, instead of
being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice
and the general Good. Congs. had lately by the establishment
of a board with full powers to decide on
the mutual claims between the U. States & the
individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves

to be unfit for discharging this part of the business
referred to them by the Confederation.

Mr. Dayton[106] considered the payment of the Senate
by the States as fatal to their independence, he
was decided for paying them out of the Natl. Treasury.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be
left to the States as moved by Mr. Elseworth.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion,
but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for
consideration. One important object in constituting
the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To
give them weight & firmness for this purpose, a
considerable duration in office was thought necessãy.
But a longer term than 6 years, would be of
no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be
appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety of
annexing to the office a qualification of property.
He thought this would be very practicable; as the
rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring
the degree of wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken whether the words
"to be paid out of the public treasury," should
stand.

Massts. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of
Senators to State offices.

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[107]

Mr. Wilson remarked the additional dependance
this wd create in the Senators on the States. The
longer the time he observed allotted to the Officer,
the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists
at all.[108]

Genl. Pinkney was for making the States as much
as could be conveniently done, a part of the Genl.
Govt. If the Senate was to be appointed by the
States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be
paid by the States: and the States ought not to be
barred from the opportunity of calling members of
it into offices at home. Such a restriction would
also discourage the ablest men from going into the
Senate.

Mr. Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to
admit of the two following questions, 1. whether the

members of the Senate should be ineligible to &
incapable of holding offices under the U. States

2. Whether &c. under the particular States.

On the Question to postpone in order to consider
Williamson's Resoln. Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y.
no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry & Mr. Madison move to add to Mr. Williamson's
1. Quest: "and for 1 year thereafter."
On this amendt.

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

On Mr. Will[iam]son's 1 Question as amended. vz,
inelig: & incapable &c. &c. for 1 year &c. agd. to
unãmously.

On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State
offices,

Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right
of originating acts," was agreed to nem. con.

Adjd.

Wednesday June 27. in Convention.

Mr. Rutlidge moved to postpone the 6th. Resolution,
defining the powers of Congs. in order to take up the
7 & 8 which involved the most fundamental points;
the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was
agreed to nem. con.

A question being proposed on the Resol: 7; declaring
that the suffrage in the first branch shd. be
according to an equitable ratio.

Mr. L. Martin[109] contended at great length and with
great eagerness that the General Govt. was meant
merely to preserve the State Governts., not to govern
individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within
narrow limits: that if too little power was given to
it, more might be added; but that if too much, it
could never be resumed: that individuals as such
have little to do but with their own States; that the
Genl. Govt. has no more to apprehend from the States
composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures,
that Govt. over individuals has to apprehend
from its subjects: that to resort to the Citizens at
large for their sanction to a new Governt. will be
throwing them back into a state of Nature; that the
dissolution of the State Govts. is involved in the
nature of the process; that the people have no right
to do this without the consent of those to whom
they have delegated their power for State purposes:
through their tongues only they can speak, through
their ears, only can hear: that the States have
shewn a good disposition to comply with the Acts
of Congs, weak, contemptibly weak as that body
has been; and have failed through inability alone to
comply: that the heaviness of the private debts,

and the waste of property during the war, were the
chief causes of this inability; that he did not conceive
the instances mentioned by Mr. Madison of compacts
between Va. & Md. between Pa. & N. J. or of
troops raised by Massts. for defence against the
Rebels, to be violations of the articles of confederation
—that an equal vote in each State was essential
to the federal idea, and was founded in justice &
freedom, not merely in policy: that tho' the States
may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had
not, and ought not: that the States like individuals
were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free.
In order to prove that individuals in a State of Nature
are equally free & independent he read passages from
Locke, Vattel, Lord Summers—Priestly. To prove
that the case is the same with States till they surrender
their equal sovereignty, he read other passages
in Locke & Vattel, and also Rutherford: that
the States being equal cannot treat or confederate
so as to give up an equality of votes without giving
up their liberty: that the propositions on the table
were a system of slavery for 10 States: that as Va.
Massts. & Pa. have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they
please without a miraculous Union of the other ten:
that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over
one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the
rest; that they can then appoint an Execute. &
Judiciary & legislate for them as they please: that
there was & would continue a natural predilection
& partiality in men for their own States; that the
States, particularly the smaller, would never allow
a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no
State in Ratifying the Confederation had objected
to the equality of votes; that the complaints at present
run not agst. this equality but the want of power:
that 16 members from Va. would be more likely to
act in concert than a like number formed of members
from different States: that instead of a junction of
the small States as a remedy, he thought a division
of the large States would be more eligible.—This was
the substance of a speech which was continued more
than three hours. He was too much exhausted he
said to finish his remarks, and reminded the House
that he should tomorrow, resume them.

Adjd.

Thursday June 28th. in Convention

Mr. L. Martin resumed his discourse,[110] contending
that the Genl. Govt. ought to be formed for the States,
not for individuals: that if the States were to have

votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it
would be the same thing whether their representatives
were chosen by the Legislatures or the people;
the smaller States would be equally enslaved; that
if the large States have the same interest with the
smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in
giving them an equal vote; they would not injure
themselves, and they could not injure the large ones
on that supposition without injuring themselves and
if the interests, were not the same, the inequality of
suffrage wd. be dangerous to the smaller States: that
it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the
rulers of the States, whose influence over the people
will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the
large States were weak at present in proportion to
their extent; & could only be made formidable to
the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in
case a dissolution of the Union should take place,
the small States would have nothing to fear from
their power; that if in such a case the three great
States should league themselves together, the other
ten could do so too; & that he had rather see partial
Confederacies take place, than the plan on the table.
This was the substance of the residue of his discourse
which was delivered with much diffuseness
& considerable vehemence.

Mr. Lansing & Mr. Dayton moved to strike out
"not," so that the 7 art. might read that the rights
of suffrage in the 1st. branch ought to be according to
the rule established by the Confederation."

Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question
might not be put till tomorrow; Governr. Livingston
being kept away by indisposition, and the
representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.

Mr. Williamson, thought that if any political truth
could be grounded on mathematical demonstration,
it was that if the States were equally sovereign
now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty,
that they would remain equally sovereign. He
could not comprehend how the smaller States would
be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman
would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that
the small States, if they had a plurality of votes
would have an interest in throwing the burdens off
their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He
begged that the expected addition of new States
from the Westward might be kept in view. They
would be small States, they would be poor States,
they would be unable to pay in proportion to their
numbers; their distance from market rendering the
produce of their labour less valuable; they would
consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose
of laying burdens on com̃erce & consumption

which would fall with greatest weight on the old
States.

Mr. Madison, sd. he was much disposed to concur in
any expedient not inconsistent with fundamental
principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning
the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just,
nor necessary for the safety of the small States agst.
the large States. That it was not just, had been
conceded by Mr. Breerly & Mr. Paterson themselves.
The expedient proposed by them was a new
partition of the territory of the U. States. The
fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of
Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay
in confounding together mere Treaties, in which
were specified certain duties to which the parties
were to be bound, and certain rules by which their
subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their
intercourse, with a compact by which an authority
was created paramount to the parties, & making
laws for the government of them. If France, England
& Spain were to enter into a Treaty for the
regulation of commerce &c with the Prince of Monacho
& 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of
Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals,
and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal.
Wd. the case be the same, if a Council were to be
formed of deputies from each with authority and discretion,
to raise money, levy troops, determine the
value of coin &c?. Would 30 or 40, million of people
submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands?

If they did it would only prove that they
expected more from the terror of their superior force,
than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the Same States
represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it
because the representatives are chosen by the people
themselves? So will be the representatives in the
Nationl. Legislature. Is it because, the larger have
more at stake than the smaller? The Case will be
the same with the larger & smaller States. Is it
because the laws are to operate immediately on their
persons & properties? The same is the case in some
degree as the articles of confederation stand; the
same will be the case in a far greater degree, under
the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of
captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army,
the property & persons of individuals depend on the
laws of Congs. By the plan proposed a compleat
power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy
is proposed to be vested in the National Govt.
Many other powers are added which assimilate it to
the Govt. of individual States. The negative proposed
on the State laws, will make it an essential
branch of the State Legislatures & of course will
require that it should be exercised by a body established
on like principles with the other branches of
those Legislatures.—That it is not necessãy to
secure the small States agst. the large ones he conceived
to be equally obvious: Was a combination
of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either
from some interest common to Va. Massts. & Pa. &
distinguishing them from the other States, or from
the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any
such common interest exist? In point of situation
they could not have been more effectually separated
from each other by the most jealous citizen of the
most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion,
and the other circumstances which sometimes beget
affection between different communities, they were
not more assimilated than the other States—In point
of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as
any three other States in the Union. The Staple of
Massts. was fish, of Pa. flower, of Va. Tobo. Was a Combination
to be apprehended from the mere circumstance
of equality of size? Experience suggested no
such danger. The journals of Congs. did not present
any peculiar association of these States in the votes
recorded. It had never been seen that different
Counties in the same State, conformable in extent,
but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a
propensity to such combinations. Experience rather
taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of
superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships
were much more frequent than coalitions. Among
independent Nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours,
the same remark was verified. Carthage &
Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting
their forces to devour the weaker nations of the
Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile
as long as they remained the greatest powers of
Europe. England & France have succeeded to the
pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we
owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those
powers would have been fatal to us. Among the
principal members of antient & Modern confederacies,
we find the same effect from the same cause.
The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens
& Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of
the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions,
not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted
& oppressed the German empire. Were the
large States formidable singly to their smaller neighbours?
On this supposition the latter ought to wish
for such a General Govt. as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more
lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to
avail themselves of their superior force. Here again
Experience was an instructive monitor. What is ye.
situation of the weak compared with the strong in
those stages of civilization in which the violence of
individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government?
The Heroic period of Antient Greece the
feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe,
the existing condition of the American Savages, answer
this question. What is the situation of the
minor sovereigns in the great society of independent
nations, in which the more powerful are under no
controul but the nominal authority of the law of
Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in
proportion to their weakness. But there are cases
still more in point. What was the condition of the
weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy.
Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it
happened but too often that the strongest cities corrupted
& awed the weaker, and that Judgment went
in favor of the more powerful party. What is the
condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy?
We all know that they are exceedingly
trampled upon; and that they owe their safety as
far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves,
under the rival banners of the pre-eminent
members, partly to alliances with neighbouring
Princes which the Constitution of the Empire does
not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax
system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains
about 1/2 the People, supplies about 1/2 of the
money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly
governs the whole republic. In a word; the two
extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect
incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case
they would be independent nations subject to no law,
but the law of nations. In the last, they would be
mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one
common law. In the first case the smaller States
would have every thing to fear from the larger. In
the last they would have nothing to fear. The true
policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting
those principles & that form of Govt. which will
most approximate the States to the condition of
counties. Another consideration may be added. If
the Genl. Govt. be feeble, the large States distrusting
its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance
& security may depend on their own size & strength,
will never submit to a partition. Give to the Genl.
Govt. sufficient energy & permanency, & you remove
the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, &
junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and
time may effect that equalization, which is wished
for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished
at once.

Mr. Wilson. The leading argument of those who
contend for equality of votes among the States is
that the States as such being equal, and being represented
not as districts of individuals, but in their
political & corporate capacities, are entitled to an
equality of suffrage. According to this mode of
reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engld̃
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten
part of the Constitution, is perfectly right & proper.
They are like the States represented in their corporate
capacity like the States therefore they are
entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as
London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto
to be done to London, the true ground of Complaint
lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which
is her proper share, sends four representatives to
Parliament.[111]

Mr. Sherman. The question is not what rights
naturally belong to man; but how they may be most

equally & effectually guarded in Society. And if
some give up more than others in order to obtain
this end, there can be no room for complaint. To
do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all,
if it would create danger to the rights of some, would
be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man
who enters into Society along with the poor man,
gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal
vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes
than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake
the rights of the poor man would immediately cease
to be secure. This consideration prevailed when
the articles of Confederation were formed.[112]

The determination of the question from striking
out the word "not" was put off till tomorrow at the
request of the Deputies of N. York.

Docr Franklin. Mr. President

The small progress we have made after 4 or five
weeks close attendance & continual reasonings with
each other—our different sentiments on almost every
question, several of the last producing as many noes
as ays, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection
of the Human Understanding. We indeed
seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since
we have been running about in search of it. We

have gone back to ancient history for models of Government,
and examined the different forms of those
Republics which having been formed with the seeds
of their own dissolution now no longer exist. And
we have viewed Modern States all round Europe, but
find none of their Constitutions suitable to our
circumstances.

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it
were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce
able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has
it happened; Sir, that we have not hitherto once
thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights
to illuminate our understandings? In the beginning
of the Contest with G. Britain, when we were sensible
of danger we had daily prayer in this room for
the divine protection.—Our prayers, Sir, were heard,
& they were graciously answered. All of us who
were engaged in the struggle must have observed
frequent instances of a superintending providence in
our favor. To that kind providence we owe this
happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the
means of establishing our future national felicity.
And have we now forgotten that powerful friend?
or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance?
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer
I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth
—that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a
sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice,
is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid?
We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings
that "except the Lord build the House they labour

in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and I
also believe that without his concurring aid we shall
succeed in this political building no better than the
Builders of Babel: We shall be divided by our little
partial local interests; our projects will be confounded,
and we ourselves shall become a reproach
and bye word down to future ages. And what is
worse, mankind may hereafter from this unfortunate
instance, despair of establishing Governments by
Human wisdom and leave it to chance, war and
conquest.

I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth
prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its
blessings on our deliberations, be held in this Assembly
every morning before we proceed to business, and
that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested
to officiate in that Service—

Mr. Sharman seconded the motion.

Mr. Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions
that however proper such a resolution
might have been at the beginning of the convention,
it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable
animadversions, & 2. lead the public to
believe that the embarrassments and dissensions
within the Convention, had suggested this measure.
It was answered by Docr. F. Mr. Sherman & others,
that the past omission of a duty could not justify a
further omission—that the rejection of such a proposition
would expose the Convention to more unpleasant
animadversions than the adoption of it: and
that the alarm out of doors that might be excited for

the state of things within, would at least be as likely
to do good as ill.

Mr. Williamson, observed that the true cause of the
omission could not be mistaken. The Convention
had no funds.

Mr. Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable
aspect to ye. measure, that a sermon be preached at
the request of the convention on 4th of July, the
anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward
prayers be used in ye. Convention every morning.
Dr. Frankn. 2ded. this motion. After several unsuccessful
attempts for silently postponing this matter
by adjourng. the adjournment was at length carried,
without any vote on the motion.

Friday June 29th. in Convention.

Docr. Johnson. The controversy must be endless
whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments;
Those on one side considering the States as
districts of people composing one political Society;
those on the other considering them as so many political
societies. The fact is that the States do exist as
political Societies, and a Govt. is to be formed for
them in their political capacity, as well as for the
individuals composing them. Does it not seem to
follow, that if the States as such are to exist they
must be armed with some power of self-defence.
This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have
looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the

aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have
the means of defending themselves, the States have
their interests as such, and are equally entitled to
like means. On the whole he thought that as in
some respects the States are to be considered in their
political capacity, and in others as districts of individual
citizens the two ideas embraced on different
sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought
to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought
to be represented, in the other the States.

Mr. Ghoram. The States as now confederated have
no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or to
be formed into any new system. But he wished the
small States which seemed most ready to object, to
consider which are to give up most, they or the
larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the
Union wd. be an event unhappy for all, but surely
the large States would be least unable to take care of
themselves, and to make connections with one another.
The weak therefore were most interested in
establishing some general system for maintaining
order. If among individuals, composed partly of
weak, and partly of strong, the former most need the
protection of law & Government, the case is exactly
the same with weak & powerful States. What would
be the situation of Delaware (for these things he
found must be spoken out, & it might as well be
done at first as last) what wd. be the situation of Delaware
in case of a separation of the States? Would
she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? would not
her true interest lie in being consolidated with her,

and ought she not now to wish for such a union with
Pa. under one Govt. as will put it out of the power
of Pena. to oppress her? Nothing can be more ideal
than the danger apprehended by the States from
their being formed into one nation. Massts. was originally
three colonies, viz old Massts. Plymouth—&
the province of Mayne. These apprehensions existed
then. An incorporation took place; all parties
were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now
forgotten. The case was similar with Connecticut
& New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal;
the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory.
In like manner N. Jersey has been made one
society out of two parts. Should a separation of the
States take place, the fate of N. Jersey wd. be worst
of all. She has no foreign commerce & can have but
little. Pa. & N. York will continue to levy taxes on
her consumption. If she consults her interest she
wd. beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions
of the small States ought to be appeased
by another reflection. Massts. will be divided. The
province of Maine is already considered as approaching
the term of its annexation to it; and Pa. will
probably not increase, considering the present state
of her population, & other events that may happen.
On the whole he considered a Union of the States as
necessary to their happiness, & a firm Genl. Govt. as
necessary to their Union. He shd. consider it as his
duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the same
light he did to stay here as long as any other State
would remain with them, in order to agree on some
plan that could with propriety be recommended to
the people.

Mr. Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted
that some good plan of Govt. wd. be devised & adopted.

Mr. Read. He shd. have no objection to the system
if it were truly national, but it has too much of a
federal mixture in it. The little States he thought
had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Genl.
Govt. to supply the defect. Massts. was evidently
labouring under her weakness and he believed Delaware
wd. not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.
Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he
flattered himself wd. continue to do so. He was not
however so selfish as not to wish for a good Genl.
Govt. In order to obtain one the whole States must
be incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives
of the large ones will stick together, and
carry everything before them. The Executive also
will be chosen under the influence of this partiality,
and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies
are inseparable from the scheme of leaving
the States in existence. They must be done away.
The ungranted lands also which have been assumed
by particular States must also be given up. He
repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr. Hamilton,
& wished it to be substituted in the place of that on
the table.

Mr. Madison agreed with Docr. Johnson, that the
mixed nature of the Govt. ought to be kept in view:
but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of

the States as political societies. There was a gradation,
he observed from the smallest corporation, with
the most limited powers, to the largest empire with
the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the
limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now
confederated their laws in relation to the paramount
law of the Confederacy were analagous to
that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State;
Under the proposed Govt. the powers of the States
will be much farther reduced. According to the
views of every member, the Genl. Govt. will have
powers far beyond those exercised by the British
Parliament, when the States were part of the British
Empire. It will in particular have the power, without
the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy
money directly on the people themselves; and
therefore not to divest such unequal portions of the
people as composed the several States, of an equal
voice, would subject the system to the reproaches
& evils which have resulted from the vicious representation
in G. B.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small
States to renounce a principle wch. was confessedly
unjust, which cd. never be admitted, & if admitted
must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we
wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder
well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy
to go to pieces. It had been sd. that the want of
energy in the large states wd. be a security to the
small. It was forgotten that this want of energy
proceeded from the supposed security of the States

agst. all external danger. Let each state depend on
itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of
danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring
States, & the languishing condition of all the
States, large as well as small, wd. soon be transformed
into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was
that their Govts. wd. then have too much energy, that
these might not only be formidable in the large to the
small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all.
The same causes which have rendered the old world
the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished
liberty from the face of it, wd. soon produce the same
effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small
States wd. quickly introduce some regular military
force agst. sudden danger from their powerful neighbours.
The example wd. be followed by others, and
wd. soon become universal. In time of actual war,
great discretionary powers are constantly given to
the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension
of war, has the same tendency to render the head
too large for the body. A standing military force,
with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe
companions to liberty. The means of defence agst.
foreign danger, have been always the instruments of
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a
standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt
was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the
armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have
enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable,
whether the best concerted system of absolute power
in Europe cd. maintain itself, in a situation, where no
alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to the
domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain
was the principal cause of her being an exception to
the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less
defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence
wch. cd. not be used for the purpose of oppression.—
These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended
whether the States should run into a total
separation from each other, or shd. enter into partial
confederacies. Either event wd. be truly deplorable; &
those who might be accessary to either, could never
be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.

[113] Mr. Hamilton observed that individuals forming
political Societies modify their rights differently with
regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all
the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived
of the right altogether, not having the requisite
qualification of property. In some of the States
the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and
refused in others. To vote for a member in one
branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for
a member in another branch of the Legislature, a
higher quantum of property is required. In like
manner States may modify their right of suffrage
differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller
a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection
of individual men which ought we to respect
most, the rights of the people composing them, or of
the artificial beings resulting from the composition.
Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than

to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been
sd. that if the smaller States renounce their equality,
they renounce at the same time their liberty. The
truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty.
Will the men composing the small States be less free
than those composing the larger. The State of
Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she
has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pa. having 400,000:
but will the people of Del: be less free, if each
citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa.
He admitted that common residence within the same
State would produce a certain degree of attachment;
and that this principle might have a certain influence
in public affairs. He thought however that this
might by some precautions be in a great measure
excluded: and that no material inconvenience could
result from it, as there could not be any ground for
combination among the States whose influence was
most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of
interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying
States, which divides instead of uniting the largest
States. No considerable inconvenience had been
found from the division of the State of N. York into
different districts of different sizes.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the
Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies,
had been pointed out. He would add another
of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately
be formed with different rival & hostile nations of
Europes, who will foment disturbances among ourselves,
and make us parties to all their own quarrels.

Foreign Nations having American dominion are &
must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray
the utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of
this meeting, which must have an essential influence
on it.—It had been said that respectability in the
eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which
we aimed; that the proper object of republican
Government was domestic tranquillity & happiness.
This was an ideal distinction. No Government
could give us tranquillity & happiness at home,
which did not possess sufficient stability and strength
to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical
moment for forming such a Government. We should
run every risk in trusting to future amendments.
As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak
& sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the
motives will become feebler, and the difficulties
greater. It is a miracle that we were now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the
subject. It would be madness to trust to future
miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction
of them.

Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under
the Confederation as the great source of the public
difficulties. The members of Congs. were advocates
for local advantages. State distinctions must be
sacrificed as far as the general good required, but
without destroying the States. Tho' from a small
State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.

Mr. Gerry, urged that we never were independent
States, were not such now, & never could be even

on the principles of the Confederation. The States
& the advocates for them were intoxicated with the
idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of Congress
at the time the federal articles were formed.
The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote
was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was
agst. his Judgment, and under the pressure of public
danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The
present Confederation he considered as dissolving.
The fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention.
If they do not agree on something, few
delegates will probably be appointed to Congs. If
they do Congs. will probably be kept up till the new
System should be adopted. He lamented that instead
of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging
to the same family, we seemed to have
brought with us the spirit of political negotiators.

Mr. L. Martin remarked that the language of the
States being sovereign & independent, was once
familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the
articles of Confederation, which describe them in
that language.

On the question as moved by Mr. Lansing. Shall
the word "not" be struck out.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del.ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported,
"that the rule of suffrage in the 1st. branch ought
not to be according to that established by the Articles
of the Confederation

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Docr. Johnson & Mr. Elseworth moved to postpone
the residue of the clause, & take up ye. 8 Resol:

On question

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that the rule of suffrage in
the 2d. branch be the same with that established by
the articles of Confederation. "He was not sorry
on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had
determined against this rule in the first branch. He
hoped it would become a ground of compromise
with regard to the 2d. branch. We were partly
national; partly federal. The proportional representation
in the first branch was conformable to the
national principle & would secure the large States
agst. the small. An equality of voices was conformable
to the federal principle and was necessary to
secure the Small States agst. the large. He trusted
that on this middle ground a compromise would take
place. He did not see that it could on any other.
And if no compromise should take place, our meeting
would not only be in vain but worse than in vain.
To the Eastward he was sure Massts. was the only
State that would listen to a proposition for excluding
the States as equal political Societies, from an equal
voice in both branches. The others would risk every
consequence rather than part with so dear a right.

An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting
the body of America in two, and as he supposed
would be the case, somewhere about this part of it.
The large States he conceived would notwithstanding
the equality of votes, have an influence that
would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had
been admitted (by Mr. Madison) had, notwithstanding
a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing
influence in the public measures. The power
of self defence was essential to the small States.
Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the
creation. He could never admit that there was no
danger of combinations among the large States.
They will like individuals find out and avail themselves
of the advantage to be gained by it. It was
true the danger would be greater if they were
contiguous and had a more immediate common
interest. A defensive combination of the small
States was rendered more difficult by their great
number. He would mention another consideration
of great weight. The existing confederation was
founded on the equality of the States in the article
of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard to this
antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a
Judiciary & Legislative power be created, but Let
not too much be attempted; by which all may be
lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he
preferred doing half the good we could, rather than
do nothing at all. The other half may be added,
when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.[114]

Mr. Baldwin[115] could have wished that the powers
of the General Legislature had been defined, before
the mode of constituting it had been agitated. He
should vote against the motion of Mr. Elseworth,
tho. he did not like the Resolution as it stood in the
Report of the Comittee of the whole. He thought
the second branch ought to be the representation of
property, and that in forming it therefore some reference
ought to be had to the relative wealth of their
Constituents, and to the principles on which the
Senate of Massts. was constituted. He concurred
with those who thought it wd. be impossible for the
Genl. Legislature to extend its cares to the local
matters of the States.[116] Adjd.

Saturday June 30. 1787. in Convention

Mr. Brearly moved that the Presidt. write to the
Executive of N. Hampshire, informing it that the
business depending before the Convention was of
such a nature as to require the immediate attendance
of the deputies of that State. In support of his
motion he observed that the difficulties of the subject
and the diversity of opinions called for all the
assistance we could possibly obtain. (it was well
understood that the object was to add N. Hampshire
to the no. of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional
representation, which it was presumed
from her relative size she must be adverse to).

Mr. Patterson seconded the motion.

Mr. Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor
propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprized
of the meeting, and can attend if they choose.
Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send
deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the
deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the
great points would be adjusted before the letter
could produce its effect.

Mr. King, said he had written more than once as
a private correspondent, & the answers gave him
every reason to expect that State would be represented
very shortly, if it shd. be so at all. Circumstances
of a personal nature had hitherto prevented
it. A letter cd. have no effect.

Mr. Wilson wished to know whether it would be
consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to
communicate to N. Hampshire that the business was
of such a nature as the motion described. It wd.
spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety
of soliciting any State on the subject; the
meeting being merely voluntary—on motion of Mr.
Brearly Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. not on ye. floor. Del. not on floor. Md. divd.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.

The motion of Mr. Elseworth resumed for allowing
each State an equal vote in ye 2d. branch.

Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the
establishment of ye. contrary principle in the 1st.
branch; and considering the reasons which would
oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed
in the 1st branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut

(Mr. Elseworth) had pronounced that if the motion
should not be acceded to, of all the States North of
Pena. one only would agree to any Genl. Government.
He entertained more favorable hopes of Connt. and
of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms
exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon
a Country to which they were bound by so many
strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored
event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments
nor his duty. If the minority of the people
of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on
just and proper principles, if a separation must take
place, it could never happen on better grounds. The
votes of yesterday agst. the just principle of representation,
were as 22 to 90 of the people of America.
Taking the opinions to be the same on this point,
and he was sure if there was any room for change,
it could not be on the side of the majority, the question
will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw
themselves from the Union; or shall more than
3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable
rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of
States. If issue must be joined, it was on this
point he would chuse to join it. The Gentleman
from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy
secured to the majority in the 1st branch had removed
the objections to an equality of votes in the
2d. branch for the security of the minority, narrowed
the case extremely. Such an equality will enable
the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the
sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven
States will controul six: Seven States, according to
the estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of
the whole people. It would be in the power then of
less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should
happen to divide the States in that manner. Can
we forget for whom we are forming a Government?
Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied
with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought
they to be satisfied with being told, that the one-third
compose the greater number of States? The
rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the
same in the 2d. as in the 1st. branch. If the Government
be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither
solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local,
confined & temporary. This will expand with the
expansion, and grow with the growth of the U.
States.—Much has been said of an imaginary combination
of three States. Sometimes a danger of
monarchy, sometimes of aristocrary has been charged
on it. No explanation however of the danger has
been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both
from reason & history that rivalships would be more
probable than coalitions; and that there are no
coinciding interests that could produce the latter.
No answer has yet been given to the observations of
(Mr. Madison) on this subject. Should the Executive
Magistrate be taken from one of the large States
would not the other two be thereby thrown into the
scale with the other States? Whence then the danger
of monarchy? Are the people of the three large
States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their
influence? It is all a mere illusion of names. We
talk of States, till we forget what they are composed
of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed
of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this
species of Govt. or rather of tyranny, that the smaller
number governs the greater. It is true that a majority
of States in the 2d. branch cannot carry a law
agst. a majority of the people in the 1st. But this
removes half only of the objection. Bad Governts.
are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 2.
that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression.
Under which of these evils do the U. States at present
groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of
its Governt. To remedy this weakness we have been
sent to this Convention. If the motion should be
agreed to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely
as heretofore; with the additional mortification of
seeing the good purposes of ye. fair representation of
the people in the 1st. branch, defeated in the 2d.
Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented
that such a disagreement should prevail on the point
of representation, as he did not foresee that it would
happen on the other point most contested, the
boundary between the Genl. & the local authorities.
He thought the States necessary & valuable parts
of a good system.

Mr. Elseworth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson,
"that the minority will rule the majority" is not

true. The power is given to the few to save them
from being destroyed by the many. If an equality
of votes had been given to them in both branches,
the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel
thing that the few should have a check on the many?
Is it not the case in the British Constitution the
wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in
applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who
form so small a proportion of the nation a negative
on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar
rights agst. the encroachmts. of the Commons. No
instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an
equality of voices has not been exercised by the
members of it. We are running from one extreme
to another. We are razing the foundations of the
building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority
of the States, to favor it. If security be all that the
great States wish for the 1st. branch secures them.
The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be
foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be
sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive
cases in which they might result from such
combinations. Suppose that in pursuance of some
commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four
free ports & no more were to be established would
not combinations be formed in favor of Boston—
Philada. & some port of the Chesapeak? A like concert
might be formed in the appointment of the
Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations
of the federal pact which was still in force, and
which had been entered into with so much solemnity;
persuading himself that some regard would still
be paid to the plighted faith under which each State
small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage
in the general Councils. His remarks were not the
result of partial or local views. The State he represented
(Connecticut) held a middle rank.

Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning
of Mr. E. but must observe that it did not always
accord with itself. On another occasion, the large
States were described by him as the Aristocratic
States, ready to oppress the small. Now the Small
are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend
them agst. the more numerous Commons. Mr. E. had
also erred in saying that no instance had existed
in which confederated States had not retained to
themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing
over the German system in which the K. of Prussia
has nine voices, he reminded Mr. E. of the Lycian
Confederacy, in which the component members had
votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for
that form of Government. Had the fact been as
stated by Mr. E. it would have been of little avail to
him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments
agst. him; the History & fate of the several
confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating
some radical vice in their structure. In
reply to the appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in
the existing federal compact, he remarked that the

party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself
of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut
was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides
the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts
from which no State was free, the Legislature of
that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively
refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions
of Congs., and had transmitted a copy of the
vote to Congs. It was urged, he said, continually
that an equality of votes in the 2d. branch was not
only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in
the 1st. branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding
this apparent defence, the majority
of States might still injure the majority of people.
1. they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the
majority. 2. they could extort measures repugnant
to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3. they
could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2d.
branch will probl̃y exercise some great powers, in
which the 1st. will not participate. He admitted
that every peculiar interest whether in any class of
Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be
secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger
of attack there ought to be given a Constitutional
power of defence. But he contended that the
States were divided into different interests not by
their difference of size, but by other circumstances;
the most material of which resulted partly from climate,
but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred
in forming the great division of interests in the U.
States. It did not lie between the large & small
States: It lay between the Northern & Southern.
And if any defensive power were necessary, it ought
to be mutually given to these two interests. He was
so strongly impressed with this important truth that
he had been casting about in his mind for some
expedient that would answer the purpose. The one
which had occurred was that instead of proportioning
the votes of the States in both branches, to their
respective numbers of inhabitants computing the
slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented
in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants
only; and in the other according to the
whole no. counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement
the Southern Scale would have the advantage
in one House, and the Northern in the other.
He had been restrained from proposing this expedient
by two considerations: one was his unwillingness to
urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where
it is but too apt to arise of itself—the other was, the
inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which wd. destroy the equilibrium of
interests.

Mr. Elseworth assured the House that whatever
might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut
the State was entirely federal in her disposition.
He appealed to her great exertions during
the war, in supplying both men & money. The
muster rolls would show she had more troops in the

field than Virga. If she had been Delinquent, it had
been from inability, and not more so than other
States.

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison had animadverted on
the delinquency of the States, when his object required
him to prove that the Constitution of Congs.
was faulty. Congs. is not to blame for the faults of
the States. Their measures have been right, and the
only thing wanting has been, a further power in
Congs. to render them effectual.

Mr. Davy was much embarrassed and wished for
explanations. The Report of the Committee allowing
the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it,
seemed to be impracticable. There will according
to this rule be ninety members in the outset, and
the number will increase as new States are added.
It was impossible that so numerous a body could
possess the activity and other qualities required in
it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the
report as it stood, and the amendment, he should
be constrained to prefer the latter. The appointment
of the Senate by electors chosen by the people
for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts
thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail
over the smaller Counties or Districts, and merit
in the latter would be excluded altogether. The
report therefore seemed to be right in referring the
appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in
the general System did not appear to him objectionable

as it did to some others. The fact was that the
local prejudices & interests which could not be
denied to exist, would find their way into the
national Councils whether the Representatives
should be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people
themselves. On the other hand if a proportional
representation was attended with insuperable difficulties,
the making the Senate the Representative
of the States, looked like bringing us back to Congs.
again, and shutting out all the advantages expected
from it. Under this view of the subject he could
not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed.
He thought that in general there were extremes on
both sides. We were partly federal, partly national
in our Union, and he did not see why the Govt.
might not in some respects operate on the States,
in others on the people.

Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the
number of Senators, to be embarrassing. If the
smallest States be allowed one, and the others in
proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous.
He looked forward to the time when the
smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least.
Let there be then one Senator in each for every
100,000 souls and let the States not having that
no. of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing
himself to submit to this temporary concession to
the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground
of compromise.

Docr. Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on
two points. If a proportional representation takes

place, the small States contend that their liberties
will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be
put in its place, the large States say their money will
be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and
the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little
from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner
here both sides must part with some of their demands,
in order that they may join in some accommodating
proposition. He had prepared one which he would
read, that it might lie on the table for consideration.
The proposition was in the words following

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall
choose & send an equal number of Delegates,
namely—who are to compose the 2d.
branch of the General Legislature—

That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty
of individual States may be affected, or
whereby their authority over their own Citizens
may be diminished, or the authority of the General
Government within the several States augmented,
each State shall have equal suffrage.

That in the appointment of all Civil officers of ye.
Genl. Govt. in the election of whom the 2d. branch
may by the Constitution have part, each State shall
have equal suffrage.
That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and
in all allowances for public services, and generally
in all appropriations & dispositions of money to be
drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws
for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the
several States shall have suffrage in proportion to

the Sums which their respective States do actually
contribute to the Treasury." Where a ship had
many owners this was the rule of deciding on her
expedition. He had been one of the Ministers from
this Country to France during the joint war and wd.
have been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing
the money to carry it on.

Mr. King observed that the simple question was
whether each State should have an equal vote in
the 2d. branch; that it must be apparent to those
Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this
equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report
was as susceptible of melioration as the motion;
that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only
if we should make another Congress of the proposed
Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of votes
was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact
cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our
eyes against it: that he was however filled with
astonishment that if we were convinced that every
man in America was secured in all his rights, we
should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good
to the Phantom of State sovereignty: that his feelings
were more harrowed & his fears more agitated
for his Country than he could express, that he conceived
this to be the last opportunity of providing
for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore
but repeat his amazement that when a just
governt. founded on a fair representation of the
people of America was within our reach, we should

renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the
ideal freedom & importance of States: that should
this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind
was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down
under a Govt. founded in a vicious principle of
representation, and which must be as short lived as
it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself
to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted
by Mr. Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality
of votes as proposed in the motion.

Mr. Dayton, When assertion is given for proof,
and terror substituted for argument, he presumed
they would have no effect however eloquently spoken.
It should have been shewn that the evils we
have experienced have proceeded from the equality
now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution
for the State Governments are not sown in the Genl.
Government. He considered the system on the table
as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded
that it never would be recd. by the people.
Mr. Martin wd. never confederate if it could not be
done on just principles.

Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession
hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence
should be given to the Senate. The plan
in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent
on the States. The Senate therefore is only
another edition of Congs. He knew the faults of
that Body & had used a bold language agst. it. Still
he would preserve the State rights, as carefully as
the trials by jury.

Mr. Bedford, contended that there was no middle
way between a perfect consolidation and a mere
confederacy of the States. The first is out of the
question, and in the latter they must continue if
not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political
Societies possess ambition avarice, and all the other
passions which render them formidable to each
other, ought we not to view them in this light here?
Will not the same motives operate in America as
elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look
at the votes. Have they not been dictated by
interest, by ambition? Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the small? They think no doubt that
they have right on their side, but interest had blinded
their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State
at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon
being a great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by
present interest & future prospects. She hopes too
to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions.
N. Carolina has the same motives of present &
future interest. Virga. follows. Maryd. is not on that
side of the Question. Pena. has a direct and future
interest. Massts. has a decided and palpable interest in
the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small
States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look
at G. Britain. Is the Representation there less unequal?
But we shall be told again that that is the
rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs
however held fast their constitutional rights?
And are we to act with greater purity than the rest

of mankind. An exact proportion in the Representation
is not preserved in any one of the States. Will
it be said that an inequality of power will not result
from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity,
and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole
History of mankind proves it. The three large
States have a common interest to bind them together
in commerce. But whether a combination
as we suppose, or a competition as others suppose,
shall take place among them, in either case, the small
States must be ruined. We must like Solon make
such a Governt. as the people will approve. Will
the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation
of them. It is not true that the people will
not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congs.
The language of the people has been that Congs.
ought to have the power of collecting an impost,
and of coercing the States where it may be necessary.
On The first point they have been explicit &, in
a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And
must they not agree to this & similar measures if
they ever mean to discharge their engagements.
The little States are willing to observe their engagements,
but will meet the large ones on no ground but
that of the Confederation. We have been told with
a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a
fair trial in favor of a Good Governmt. It will be
the last indeed if the propositions reported from the
Gommittee go forth to the people. He was under
no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve
the Confederation. If they do the small ones
will find some foreign ally of more honor and good
faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or
alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought
to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not
annihilating the federal system. This is what the
people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more
efficient Govt. and why not make such an one as they
desire.

Mr. Elseworth. Under a National Govt. he should
participate in the National Security, as remarked
by (Mr. King) but that was all. What he wanted was
domestic happiness. The Natl. Govt. could not descend
to the local objects on which this depended.
It could only embrace objects of a general nature.
He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of
his rights to the State Govts. From these alone he
could derive the greatest happiness he expects in
this life. His happiness depends on their existence,
as much as a new born infant on its mother for
nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory,
he had nothing to add that could be so.

Mr. King was for preserving the States in a subordinate
degree, and as far as they could be necessary
for the purposes stated by Mr. Elsew̃h. He did
not think a full answer had been given to those who
apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their
jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he
conceived that would give them all the security the
nature of things would admit of. In the establishmt.
of Societies the Contstitution was to the Legislature

what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental
rights of individuals are secured by express
provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not
a like security be provided for the Rights of States
in the National Constitution. The articles of Union
between Engld. & Scotland furnish an example of
such a provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland.
When that Union was in agitation, the same
language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch
patriots. The articles however have not been violated
and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity
& happiness. He was aware that this will be
called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient
answer to say that if fundamental articles of
compact, are no sufficient defence against physical
power, neither will there be any safety agst. it if there
be no compact. He could not sit down, without
taking some notice of the language of the honorable
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not
he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This
intemperance had marked the honorabl Gentleman
himself. It was not he who with a vehemence unprecedented
in that House, had declared himself
ready to turn his hopes from our common Country, and
court the protection of some foreign hand. This too
was the language of the Honbl member himself. He
was grieved that such a thought had entered into his
heart. He was more grieved that such an expression
had dropped from his lips. The gentleman cd. only
excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For
himself whatever might be his distress, he wd. never
court relief from a foreign power.

Adjourned

Monday July 2d. in Convention.

On the question for allowing each State one vote
in the second branch as moved by Mr. Elseworth,
Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Mr. Jenifer being not present Mr.
Martin alone voted Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. divd. Mr. Houston no. Mr. Baldwin ay.

Mr. Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the
2d. branch inadmissible. At the same time candor
obliged him to admit that the large States would
feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them
a preference, in appointments: that they might also
find some common points in their Commercial interests,
and promote treaties favorable to them. There
is a real distinction [between] the Northern & Southn.
interests. N. Carola. S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice
& Indigo had a peculiar interest which might be
sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented
from administering the Genl. Govt. as they
please, without being themselves unduly subjected
to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some
but not a full, proportion. He was extremely
anxious that something should be done, considering
this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.
Congs. have failed in almost every effort for an
amendment of the federal System. Nothing has

prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointmt. of
this Convention; & he could not express his alarms
for the consequence of such an event. He read his
motion, to form the States into classes, with an apportionment
of Senators among them (see Art: 4, of
his plan).

General Pinkney. was willing the motion might
be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He
liked better the motion of Docr. Franklin (which see
Saturday June 30). Some Compromise seemed to
be necessary, the States being exactly divided on the
question for an equality of votes in the 2d. branch.
He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member
from each State should be appointed to devise &
report some compromise.

Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a commitment,
but no modifications whatever could reconcile the
Smaller States to the least diminution of their equal
Sovereignty.

Mr. Sharman. We are now at a full stop, and nobody
he supposed meant that we shd. break up without
doing something. A committee he thought
most likely to hit on some expedient.

[117] Mr. Govr. Morris, thought a Come. adviseable as the
Convention had been equally divided. He had a
stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the
2d. branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of
it. What is this object? To check the precipitation,
changeableness, and excesses of the first branch.

Every man of observation had seen in the democratic
branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation—
in Congress changeableness, in every department
excesses agst. personal liberty private property &
personal safety. What qualities are necessary to
constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue,
are equally necessary in both branches. Something
more then is now wanted, 1. the checking
branch must have a personal interest in checking the
other branch, one interest must be opposed to another
interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned
agst. each other. 2. It must have great personal
property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it
must love to lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the
great principle that actuates both the poor & the
rich. It is this principle which in the former resists,
in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent.
In Religion the Creature is apt to forget
its Creator. That it is otherwise in Political Affairs,
the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The
aristocratic body, should be as independent & as
firm as the democratic. If the members of it are to
revert to a dependence on the democratic choice,
the democratic scale will preponderate. All the
guards contrived by America have not restrained
the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a
servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2d.
branch is to be dependent we are better without it.
To make it independent, it should be for life. It
will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so;
He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their
dominion & enslave the rest. They always did.
They always will. The proper security agst them is
to form them into a separate interest. The two
forces will then controul each other. Let the rich
mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country,
they will establish an Oligarchy. Take away commerce,
and the democracy will triumph. Thus it
has been all the world over. So it will be among us.
Reason tells us we are but men: and we are not to
expect any particular interference of Heaven in our
favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the
aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be
combined agst. it. There will be a mutual check and
mutual security. 4. An independence for life, involves
the necessary permanency. If we change
our measures nobody will trust us: and how avoid a
change of measures, but by avoiding a change of
men. Ask any man if he confides in Congs. if he
confides in the State of Pena. if he will lend his money
or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He
sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If
G. B. were to explain her refusal to treat with us,
the same reasoning would be employed.—He disliked
the exclusion of the 2d. branch from holding
offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent
exclusion of the military officers during the war,
from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive
of the principal source of influence. If danger be
apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed
way is this of obviating it? If the son, the brother
or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be
even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can
then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not
possess. Besides shall the best, the most able, the
most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold
offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also
agst. paying the Senators. They will pay themselves
if they can. If they can not they will be rich and
can do without it. Of such the 2d. branch ought to
consist; and none but such can compose it if they
are not to be paid—He contended that the Executive
should appoint the Senate & fill up vacancies. This
gets rid of the difficulty in the present question.
You may begin with any ratio you please; it will
come to the same thing. The members being independt.
& for life, may be taken as well from one
place as from another.—It should be considered too
how the scheme could be carried through the States.
He hoped there was strength of mind eno' in this
House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate
therefore to say that loaves & fishes must bribe the
Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher
offices under the general than the State Govts. A
Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such
captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose
& defeat the plan. He perceived that the 1st.
branch was to be chosen by the people of the States;
the 2d. by those chosen by the people. Is not here a
Govt. by the States, a Governt. by Compact between
Virga. in the 1st. & 2d. branch, Massts. in the 1st & 2d.
branch &c. This is going back to mere treaty. It
it no Govt. at all. It is altogether dependent on the
States, and will act over again the part which Congs
has acted. A firm Governt. alone can protect our
liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They
will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do
not by such a Govt. keep them within their proper
sphere. We should remember that the people never
act from reason alone. The Rich will take the
advantage of their passions & make these the instruments
for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest
will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent
despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored
by the extent of the Country. The people in such
distant parts cannot communicate & act in concert.
They will be the dupes of those who have more
knowledge & intercourse. The only security agst.
encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of
men, instituted to watch agst. them on all sides. He
meant only to hint these observations, without
grounding any motion on them.

Mr. Randolph favored the commitment though he
did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He
animadverted on the warm & rash language of Mr.
Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States
that if the large States should combine some danger
of which he did not deny there would be a check in
the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated
that in order to render this still more effectual,
he would agree that in the choice of an Executive
each State should have an equal vote. He was persuaded
that two such opposite bodies as Mr. Morris
had planned, could never long co-exist. Dissentions

would arise, as has been seen even between
the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals
would be made to the people; and in a little time
commotions would be the result—He was far from
thinking the large States could subsist of themselves
any more than the small; an avulsion would involve
the whole in ruin, and he was determined to pursue
such a scheme of Government as would secure us
agst. such a calamity.

Mr. Strong was for the com̃itment; and hoped
the mode of constituting both branches would
be referred. If they should be established on
different principles, contentions would prevail, and
there would never be a concurrence in necessary
measures.

Docr. Williamson. If we do not concede on both
sides, our business must soon be at an end. He approved
of the com̃itment, supposing that as the Come.
wd. be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued
with more coolness.

Mr. Wilson objected to the Committee, because it
would decide according to that very rule of voting
which was opposed on one side. Experience in
Congs. had also proved the inutility of Committees
consisting of members from each State.

Mr. Lansing wd. not oppose the commitment, though
expecting little advantage from it.

Mr. Madison opposed the Com̃itment. He had
rarely seen any other effect than delay from
such Committees in Congs. Any scheme of compromise
that could be proposed in the Committee

might as easily be proposed in the House; and
the report of the Committee where it contained
merely the opinion of the Come. would neither
shorten the discussion, nor influence the decision of
the House.

Mr. Gerry was for the commitmt. Something must
be done, or we shall disappoint not only America,
but the whole world. He suggested a consideration
of the State we should be thrown into by the failure
of the Union. We should be without an Umpire to
decide controversies and must be at the mercy of
events. What too is to become of our treaties—
what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic?
We must make concessions on both sides. Without
these the Constitutions of the several States would
never have been formed.

On the question "for com̃iting," generally:
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N J. no. P. ay.
Del.no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

On the question for com̃iting it "to a member
from each State,"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

The Com̃ittee elected by ballot, were Mr. Gerry,
Mr. Elseworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. Franklin,
Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, Mr. Davy, Mr.
Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.

That time might be given to the Com̃ittee, and to
such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the

anniversary of Independence, the Convention adjourned
till Thursday.[118]

Thursday July 5th. in Convention

Mr. Gerry delivered in from the Committee appointed
on Monday last the following Report.

"The Committee to whom was referred the 8th.
Resol. of the Report from the Committee of the
Whole House, and so much of the 7th. as has not been

decided on, submit the following Report: That the
subsequent propositions be recommended to the
Convention on condition that both shall be generally
adopted. I. that in the 1st. branch of the Legislature
each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed
1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description
reported in the 7th. Resolution of the Come.
of the whole House: that each State not containing
that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all
bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of the Governt. of the
U. States shall originate in the 1st. branch of the
Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by
the 2d. branch; and that no money shall be drawn
from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations
to be originated in the 1st. branch.
"II. That in the 2d. branch each State shall have an
equal vote."[119]

Mr. Ghoram observed that as the report consisted
of propositions mutually conditional he wished to

hear some explanations touching the grounds on
which the conditions were estimated.

Mr. Gerry. The Committee were of different
opinions as well as the Deputations from which the
Come. were taken, and agreed to the Report merely
in order that some ground of accommodation might
be proposed. Those opposed to the equality of
votes have only assented conditionally; and if the
other side do not generally agree will not be under
any obligation to support the Report.

Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded
their powers.

Mr. Martin was for taking the question on the
whole report.

Mr. Wilson was for a division of the question;
otherwise it wd. be a leap in the dark.

Mr. Madison could not regard the privilege of originating
money bills as any concession on the side of
the small States. Experience proved that it had no
effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished
a bill to be originated, they might surely find some
member from some of the same States in the lower
branch who would originate it. The restriction as
to amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments
could be handed privately by the Senate to
members in the other house. Bills could be negatived
that they might be sent up in the desired shape.
If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the 1st.
branch the use of that body as a check would be lost.
If the 1st. branch should yield to that of the Senate,
the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had

also shewn both in G. B. and the States having a
similar regulation that it was a source of frequent
& obstinate altercations. These considerations had
produced a rejection of a like motion on a former
occasion when judged by its own merits. It could
not therefore be deemed any concession on the
present, and left in force all the objections which had
prevailed agst. allowing each State an equal voice.
He conceived that the Convention was reduced to
the alternative of either departing from justice in
order to conciliate the smaller States, and the minority
of the people of the U. S. or of displeasing
these by justly gratifying the larger States and the
majority of the people. He could not himself hesitate
as to the option he ought to make. The Convention
with justice & the majority of the people on
their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice and
the minority on their side they had every thing to
fear. It was in vain to purchase concord in the
Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord
among their Constituents. The Convention
ought to pursue a plan which would bear the test of
examination, which would be espoused & supported
by the enlightened and impartial part of America, &
which they could themselves vindicate and urge.
It should be considered that altho' at first many may
judge of the system recom̃ended, by their opinion of
the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention
by the System. The merits of the System
alone can finally & effectually obtain the public
suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people
of the small States would obstinately refuse to accede
to a Govt. founded on just principles, and promising
them substantial protection. He could not
suspect that Delaware would brave the consequences
of seeking her fortunes apart from the other States,
rather than submit to such a Govt.; much less could
he suspect that she would pursue the rash policy of
courting foreign support, which the warmth of one
of her representatives (Mr. Bedford) had suggested,
or if she shd., that any foreign nation wd. be so rash as
to hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect
that the people of N. Jersey notwithstanding
the decided tone of the gentlemen from that State,
would choose rather to stand on their own legs, and
bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an
establishment founded on principles the justice of
which they could not dispute, and absolutely necessary
to redeem them from the exactions levied on
them by the com̃erce of the neighbouring States.
A review of other States would prove that there was
as little reason to apprehend an inflexible opposition
elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention was no
doubt much to be desired. Satisfaction to all the
States, in the first instance still more so. But if
the principal States comprehending a majority of the
people of the U. S. should concur in a just & judicious
plan, he had the firmest hopes, that all the other
States would by degrees accede to it.[120]

Mr. Butler said he could not let down his idea of
the people, of America so far as to believe they would
from mere respect to the Convention adopt a plan
evidently unjust. He did not consider the privilege
concerning money bills as of any consequence. He
urged that the 2d. branch ought to represent the
States according to their property.

Mr. Govr. Morris, thought the form as well as the
matter of the Report objectionable. It seemed in
the first place to render amendments impracticable.
In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to
agree to the 2d. part if the 1st. shd. be agreed to. He
conceived the whole aspect of it to be wrong. He
came here as a Representative of America; he flattered
himself he came here in some degree as a Representative
of the whole human race; for the whole
human race will be affected by the proceedings of
this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend
their views beyond the present moment of time; beyond
the narrow limits of place from which they
derive their political origin. If he were to believe
some things which he had heard, he should suppose
that we were assembled to truck and bargain for our
particular States. He can not descend to think that
any gentlemen are really actuated by these views.
We must look forward to the effects of what we do.
These alone ought to guide us. Much has been said
of the sentiments of the people. They were unknown.
They could not be known. All that we can
infer is that if the plan we recommend be reasonable
& right; all Who have reasonable minds and sound

intentions will embrace it, notwithstanding what had
been said by some gentlemen. Let us suppose that
the larger States shall agree; and that the smaller
refuse; and let us trace the consequences. The opponents
of the system in the smaller States will no
doubt make a party, and a noise for a time, but
the ties of interest, of kindred & of common habits
which connect them with other States will be too
strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly
he was sure a great many would follow the sentiments
of Pena. & N. York. This Country must be
united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword
will. He begged that this consideration might have
its due weight. The scenes of horror attending
Civil commotion cannot be described, and the conclusion
of them will be worse than the term of their
continuance. The stronger party will then make
traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter
will finish the work of the sword. How far foreign
powers would be ready to take part in the confusions
he would not say. Threats that they will be invited
have it seems been thrown out. He drew the melancholy
picture of foreign intrusions as exhibited in the
History of Germany, & urged it as a standing lesson
to other nations. He trusted that the Gentlemen
who may have hazarded such expressions, did not
entertain them till they reached their own lips. But
returning to the Report he could not think it in any
respect calculated for the Public good. As the 2d.
branch is now constituted, there will be constant
disputes & appeals to the States which will undermine
the Genl. Government & controul & annihilate
the 1st. branch. Suppose that the delegates from
Massts. & Rho I. in the Upper House disagree, and
that the former are outvoted. What Results? they
will immediately declare that their State will not
abide by the decision, and make such representations
as will produce that effect. The same may
happen as to Virga. & other States. Of what avail
then will be what is on paper. State attachments,
and State importance have been the bane of this
Country. We can not annihilate; but we may perhaps
take out the teeth of the serpents. He wished
our ideas to be enlarged to the true interest of man,
instead of being circumscribed within the narrow
compass of a particular Spot. And after all how little
can be the motive yielded by selfishness for such
a policy. Who can say whether he himself, much
less whether his children, will the next year be an
inhabitant of this or that State.

Mr. Bedford. He found that what he had said as
to the small States being taken by the hand, had
been misunderstood; and he rose to explain. He did
not mean that the small States would court the aid
& interposition of foreign powers. He meant that
they would not consider the federal compact as
dissolved untill it should be so by the Acts of the
large States. In this case The consequences of the
breach of faith on their part, and the readiness
of the small States to fulfill their engagements, would
be that foreign Nations having demands on this
Country would find it their interest to take the small

States by the hand, in order to do themselves justice.
This was what he meant. But no man can foresee
to what extremities the small States may be driven
by oppression. He observed also in apology that
some allowance ought to be made for the habits of
his profession in which warmth was natural & sometimes
necessary. But is there not an apology in
what was said by (Mr. Govr. Morris) that the sword
is to unite: by Mr. Ghorum that Delaware must be
annexed to Penna. and N. Jersey divided between
Pena. and N. York. To hear such language without
emotion, would be to renounce the feelings of
a man and the duty of a Citizen—As to the propositions
of the Committee, the lesser States have
thought it necessary to have a security somewhere.
This has been thought necessary for the Executive
Magistrate of the proposed Govt. who has a
sort of negative on the laws; and is it not of more
importance that the States should be protected,
than that the Executive branch of the Govt. shd. be
protected. In order to obtain this, the smaller
States have conceded as to the constitution of the
first branch, and as to money bills. If they be
not gratified by correspondent concessions as to
the 2d. branch is it to be supposed they will ever
accede to the plan; and what will be the consequence
if nothing should be done? The condition
of the U. States requires that something should
be immediately done. It will be better that a defective
plan should be adopted, than that none
should be recommended. He saw no reason why
defects might not be supplied with meetings 10, 15,
or 20 years hence.

Mr. Elseworth said he had not attended the proceedings
of the Committee, but was ready to accede
to the compromise they had reported. Some compromise
was necessary; and he saw none more convenient
or reasonable.

Mr. Williamson hoped that the expressions of individuals
would not be taken for the sense of their
colleagues, much less of their States which was not
& could not be known. He hoped also that the
meaning of those expressions would not be misconstrued
or exaggerated. He did not conceive that
(Mr. Govr. Morris) meant that the sword ought to be
drawn agst. the smaller States. He only pointed out
the probable consequences of anarchy in the U. S.
A similar exposition ought to be given of the expressions
of (Mr. Ghorum). He was ready to hear the
Report discussed; but thought the propositions contained
in it, the most objectionable of any he had yet
heard.

Mr. Patterson said that he had when the Report
was agreed to in the Come. reserved to himself the
right of freely discussing it. He acknowledged that
the warmth complained of was improper; but he
thought the Sword & the Gallows little calculated to
produce conviction. He complained of the manner
in which Mr. M and Mr. Govr. Morris had treated the
small States.

Mr. Gerry. Tho' he had assented to the Report in
the Committee, he had very material objections to

it. We were however in a peculiar situation. We
were neither the same Nation nor different Nations.
We ought not therefore to pursue the one or the
other of these ideas too closely. If no compromise
should take place what will be the consequence. A
secession he foresaw would take place; for some
gentlemen seem decided on it: two different plans
will be proposed; and the result no man could foresee.
If we do not come to some agreement among
ourselves some foreign sword will probably do the
work for us.

Mr. Mason. The Report was meant not as specific
propositions to be adopted; but merely as a general
ground of accommodation. There must be some
accommodation on this point, or we shall make little
further progress in the work. Accommodation was
the object of the House in the appointment of the
Committee; and of the Committee in the Report they
had made. And however liable the Report might be
to objections, he thought it preferable to an appeal to
the world by the different sides, as had been talked of
by some Gentlemen. It could not be more inconvenient
to any gentleman to remain absent from his
private affairs, than it was for him; but he would
bury his bones in this City rather than expose his
Country to the Consequences of a dissolution of the
Convention without any thing being done.

The 1st. proposition in the report for fixing the
representation in the 1st. branch, "one member for
every 40,000 inhabitants," being taken up.

Mr. Govr. Morris objected to that scale of apportionment.

He thought property ought to be taken into
the estimate as well as the number of inhabitants.
Life & liberty were generally said to be of more value
than property. An accurate view of the matter
would nevertheless prove that property was the
main object of Society. The Savage State was more
favorable to liberty than the Civilized; and sufficiently
so to life. It was preferred by all men
who had not acquired a taste for property; it was
only renounced for the sake of property which could
only be secured by the restraints of regular Government.
These ideas might appear to some new, but
they were nevertheless just. If property then was
the main object of Govt. certainly it ought to be one
measure of the influence due to those who were to
be affected by the Governt. He looked forward also
to that range of New States which wd. soon be formed
in the West. He thought the rule of representation
ought to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic
States a prevalence in the National Councils. The
new States will know less of the public interest than
these, will have an interest in many respects different,
in particular will be little scrupulous of involving the
Community in wars the burdens & operations of
which would fall chiefly on the maritime States.
Provision ought therefore to be made to prevent the
maritime States from being hereafter outvoted by
them. He thought this might be easily done by
irrevocably fixing the number of representatives
which the Atlantic States should respectively have,
and the number which each new State will have.
This wd. not be unjust, as the Western settlers wd.
previously know the conditions on which they were
to possess their lands. It would be politic as it
would recom̃end the plan to the present as well as
future interest of the States which must decide the
fate of it.

Mr. Rutlidge. The gentleman last up had spoken
some of his sentiments precisely. Property was certainly
the principal object of Society. If numbers
should be made the rule of representation, the Atlantic
States will be subjected to the Western.
He moved that the first proposition in the report be
postponed in order to take up the following viz "that
the suffrages of the several States be regulated and
proportioned according to the sums to be paid towards
the general revenue by the inhabitants of each State
respectively: that an apportionment of suffrages,
according to the ratio aforesaid shall be made and
regulated at the end of—years from the 1st. meeting
of the Legislature of the U.S., and at the end of
every—years but that for the present, and until
the period above mentioned, the suffrages shall be
for N. Hampshire—for Massachts.—&c.

Col. Mason said the case of new States was not unnoticed
in the Committee; but it was thought and
he was himself decidedly of opinion that if they made
a part of the Union, they ought to be subject to
no unfavorable discriminations. Obvious considerations
required it.

Mr. Randolph concurred with Col. Mason.

On Question on Mr. Rutlidges motion,

Masts. no. Cont. no. N.Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Maryd. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. not on floor.

Friday July 6th. in Convention

Mr. Govt. Morris moved to commit so much of the
Report as relates to "1 member for every 40,000
inhabitants." His view was that they might absolutely
fix the number for each State in the first
instance; leaving the Legislature at liberty to provide
for changes in the relative importance of the
States, and for the case of new States.

Mr. Wilson 2ded. the motion; but with a view of
leaving the Committee under no implied shackles.

Mr. Ghorum apprehended great inconveniency
from fixing directly the number of Representatives
to be allowed to each State. He thought the number
of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps
some departure might be expedient from the full
proportion. The States also would vary in their
relative extent by separations of parts of the largest
States. A part of Virga. is now on the point of a
separation. In the province of Mayne a Convention
is at this time deliberating on a separation from
Masts. In such events the number of representatives
ought certainly to be reduced. He hoped to
see all the States made small by proper divisions,
instead of their becoming formidable as was apprehended,
to the Small States. He conceived that let the
Genl. Government be modified as it might, there would

be a constant tendency in the State Governmts. to
encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore
that the extent of the States shd. be reduced as much
& as fast as possible. The stronger the Govt. shall
be made in the first instance the more easily will
these divisions be effected; as it will be of less consequence
in the opinion of the States whether they
be of great or small extent.

Mr. Gerry did not think with his Colleague that the
large States ought to be cut up. This policy has
been inculcated by the middling and smaller States,
ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the Confederation.
Ambitious men will be apt to solicit
needless divisions, till the States be reduced to the
size of Counties. If this policy should still actuate
the small States, the large ones cou'd not confederate
safely with them; but would be obliged to consult
their safety by confederating only with one another.
He favored the commitment and thought that Representation
ought to be in the Combined ratio of numbers
of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either
singly.

Mr. King wished the clause to be committed,
chiefly in order to detach it from the Report with
which it had no connection. He thought also that
the Ratio of Representation proposed could not
be safely fixed, since in a century & a half our
computed increase of population would carry the
number of representatives to an enormous excess;
that ye number of inhabitants was not the proper
index of ability & wealth; that property was the

primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio
this ought not to be excluded from the estimate.—
With regard to new States, he observed that there
was something peculiar in the business which had
not been noticed. The U. S. were now admitted to
be proprietors of the Country N. West of the Ohio.
Congs. by one of their ordinances have impoliticly
laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental
article of compact with those who may become
settlers, that as soon as the number in any
one state shall equal that of the smallest of the 13
original States, it may claim admission into the
Union. Delaware does not contain it is computed
more than 35,000 souls, and for obvious reasons will
not increase much for a considerable time. It is
possible then that if this plan be persisted in by
Congs. 10 new votes may be added, without a greater
addition of inhabitants than are represented by the
single vote of Pena. The plan as it respects one of
the new States is already irrevocable, the sale of the
lands having commenced, and the purchasers &
settlers will immediately become entitled to all the
privileges of the compact.

Mr. Butler agreed to the Commitment if the Committee
were to be left at liberty. He was persuaded
that the more the subject was examined, the less it
would appear that the number of inhabitants would
be a proper rule of proportion. If there were no
other objection the changeableness of the standard
would be sufficient. He concurred with those who
thought some balance was necessary between the old

& the new States. He contended strenuously that
property was the only just measure of representation.
This was the great object of Governt; the
great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on.

Mr. Pinkney saw no good reason for committing.
The value of land had been found on full investigation
to be an impracticable rule. The contributions
of revenue including imports & exports must be too
changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted;
and too injurious to the non-commercial
States. The number of inhabitants appeared to him
the only just & practicable rule. He thought the
blacks ought to stand on an equality with the
whites: But wd. agree to the ratio settled by Congs.
He contended that Congs. had no right under the
articles of Confederation to authorize the admission
of new States; no such case having been provided
for.

Mr. Davy was for committing the clause in order
to get at the merits of the question arising on the
Report. He seemed to think that wealth or property
ought to be represented in the 2d. branch; and
numbers in the 1st branch.

On the Motion for committing as made by Mr.
Govr. Morris,

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The members appd. by Ballot were Mr. Govr. Morris,
Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. King.

Mr. Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to

the com̃itmt. was that the Come might consider the
propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established
by the Constitution of Massts. which wd. give
an advantage to ye. small States without substantially
departing from the rule of proportion.

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Mason moved to postpone the
clause relating to money bills in order to take up the
clause relating to an equality of votes in the Second
branch.

On the question Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The clause relating to equality of votes being under
consideration.

Docr. Franklin observed that this question could
not be properly put by itself, the Com̃ittee having
reported several propositions as mutual conditions of
each other. He could not vote for it if separately
taken, but should vote for the whole together.

Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a
reference of the rest of the Report to ye. Committee
just appointed, that the whole might be brought
into one view.

Mr. Randolph disliked ye. reference to that Committee,
as it consisted of members from States
opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and
could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.

Mr. Martin & Mr. Jenifer moved to postpone the
clause till the Come. last appointed shd. report.

Mr. Madison observed that if the uncommitted part
of the Report was connected with the part just

committed, it ought also to be committed; if not
connected, it need not be postponed till report
should be made.

On the question for postponing, moved by Mr.
Martin & Mr. Jenifer,—Cont. N. J. Del. Md. Va. Geo.
ay Pa. N. C. S. C. no Mass. N. Y. divided.

The 1st. clause relating to the originating of money
bills was then resumed.

Mr. Governr. Morris was opposed to a restriction of
this right in either branch, considered merely in
itself and as unconnected with the point of representation
in the 2d. branch. It will disable the 2d.
branch from proposing its own money plans, and
giving the people an opportunity of judging by comparison
of the merits of those proposed by the 1st.
branch.

Mr. Wilson could see nothing like a concession
here on the part of the smaller States. If both
branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence
which should say yes or no first, which last.
If either was indiscriminately to have the right of
originating, the reverse of the Report, would he
thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that
the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation;
the most numerous for decision. He observed
that this discrimination had been transcribed from
the British into several American constitutions.
But he was persuaded that on examination of the
American experiments it would be found to be a
trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the
advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G.

Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage in
the privilege, that it would be pointed out.

Mr. Williamson thought that if the privilege were
not common to both branches it ought rather to be
confined to the 2d. as the bills in that case would be
more narrowly watched, than if they originated with
the branch having most of the popular confidence.

Mr. Mason. The consideration which weighed with
the Committee was that the 1st. branch would be the
immediate representatives of the people, the 2d.
would not. Should the latter have the power of
giving away the people's money, they might soon
forget the source from whence they received it. We
might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much
concerned at the principles which had been advanced
by some gentlemen, but had the satisfaction to find
they did not generally prevail. He was a friend to
proportional representation in both branches; but
supposed that some points must be yielded for the
sake of accomodation.

Mr. Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2d. branch
should have an independent disposal of public money,
the observations of (Col. Mason) would have been a
satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther
from what he had said. His question was how is the
power of the 1st. branch increased or that of the 2d
diminished by giving the proposed privilege to the
former? Where is the difference, in which branch it
begins, if both must concur, in the end?

Mr. Gerry would not say that the concession was
a sufficient one on the part of the small States. But

he could not but regard it in the light of a concession.
It wd. make it a constitutional principle that the 2d.
branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the
people in money matters, which wd. lessen their
weight & influence. In the next place if the 2d.
branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they wd.
be deprived of the opportunity which their continuance
in office 3 times as long as the 1st. branch would
give them of making three successive essays in favor
of a particular point.

Mr. Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession
was wholly on one side, that of the large States, the
privilege of originating money bills being of no
account.

Mr. Govr. Morris had waited to hear the good effects
of the restriction. As to the alarm sounded, of an
aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor
ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.
His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible
from doing mischief. The restriction if it has
any real operation, will deprive us of the services of
the 2d. branch in digesting & proposing money bills
of which it will be more capable than the 1st. branch.
It will take away the responsibility of the 2d. branch,
the great security for good behavior. It will always
leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it
was disliked, but could not be constitutionally
amended; nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous
source of disputes between the two Houses. We
should either take the British Constitution altogether
or make one for ourselves. The Executive there

has dissolved two Houses as the only cure for such
disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such
a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes
money out of the pockets of the people. Again
What use may be made of such a privilege in case of
great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door,
and money instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling
him, may not the popular branch avail itself
of this duress, to extort concessions from the Senate
destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated
this danger by the example of the Long Parliament's
expedts. for subverting the H. of Lords; concluding
on the whole that the restriction would be either useless
or pernicious.

Docr. Franklin did not mean to go into a justification
of the Report, but as it had been asked what
would be the use of restraining the 2d. branch from
medling with money bills, he could not but remark
that it was always of importance that the people
should know who had disposed of their money, &
how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that
those who feel, can best judge. This end would, he
thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to
be confined to the immediate representatives of the
people. This was his inducement to concur in the
report. As to the danger or difficulty that might
arise from a Negative in the 2d. where the people
wd. not be proportionately represented, it might
easily be got over by declaring that there should
be no such negative; or if that will not do, by
declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.

Mr. Martin said that it was understood in the Committee
that the difficulties and disputes which had
been apprehended, should be guarded agst. in the
detailing of the plan.

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase
with the attempts to define & obviate them.
Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliamt. in
order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes
between the two Houses. Had it not been for the
mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the
result would have been. The point is still sub judice
in England. He approved of the principles laid
down by the Honble President (Doctr. Franklin) his
Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people
informed of their money affairs. But thought they
would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one
way as in the other.

Genl. Pinkney was astonished that this point
should have been considered as a concession He remarked
that the restriction to money bills had been
rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States
agst. 3. and that the very States which now called it
a concession, were then agst. it as nugatory or improper
in itself.

On the Question whether the clause relating to
money bills in the Report of the Come. consisting of a
member from each State, shd. stand as part of the
Report

Massts. dividd. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. divd.

A Question was then raised whether the question
was carried in the affirmative; there being but 5
ays out of 11. States present. The words of the rule
are (see May 28).

On this question: Mas. Cont. N. J. Pa. Del. Md.
N. C. S. C. Geo. ay N. Y. Va. no

(In several preceding instances like votes had sub
silentio been entered as decided in the affirmative.)

Adjourned

Saturday, July 7. in Convention.

"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in
the 2d. branch, stand as part of the Report,"? being
taken up—

Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He had
rather agree to it than have no accommodation. A
Governt. short of a proper national plan, if generally
acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one
which if it could be carried at all, would operate on
discontented States. He thought it would be best
to suspend the question till the Comme. yesterday appointed,
should make report.

Mr. Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of
every one that some Genl. Govt. should be established.
An equal vote in the 2d. branch would, he thought,
be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The
small States have more vigor in their Govts. than the
large ones, the more influence therefore the large
ones have, the weaker will be the Govt. In the

large States it will be most difficult to collect the real
& fair sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influence
will be practised with most success; and improper
men will most easily get into office. If they
vote by States in the 2d. branch, and each State has
an equal vote, there must be always a majority of
States as well as a majority of the people on the
side of public measures, & the Govt. will have decision
and efficacy. If this be not the case in
the 2d. branch there may be a majority of States agst.
public measures, and the difficulty of compelling
them to abide by the public determination, will
render the Government feebler than it has ever yet
been.

Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating
temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher
obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this
instance. It was pursued here rather among the
Representatives, than among the Constituents; and
it wd. be of little consequence if not established
among the latter; and there could be little hope of
its being established among them if the foundation
should not be laid in justice and right.

On Question shall the words stand as part of the
Report?

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. divd.

(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative
or were divd. because another final question
was to be taken on the whole report.)

Mr. Gerry[121] thought it would be proper to proceed
to enumerate & define the powers to be vested in
the Genl. Govt. before a question on the report should
be taken as to the rule of representation in the 2d.
branch.

Mr. Madison, observed that it wd. be impossible
to say what powers could be safely & properly vested

in the Govt. before it was known, in what manner
the States were to be represented in it. He was
apprehensive that if a just representation were not
the basis of the Govt. is would happen, as it did when
the Articles of Confederation were depending, that
every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or
withheld, and the New Govt. wd. be rendered as impotent
and as shortlived as the old.

Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the privilege
concerning money bills were a valuable consideration
or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1st. branch as fully so;
and that after the establishment of that point, the
small States would never be able to defend themselves
without an equality of votes in the 2d. branch.
There was no other ground of accommodation. His
resolution was fixt. He would meet the large States
on that ground and no other. For himself he should
vote agst. the Report, because it yielded too much.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He had no resolution unalterably
fixed except to do what should finally appear to him
right. He was agst. the Report because it maintained
the improper constitution of the 2d. branch. It
made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It
had been sd. (by Mr. Gerry) that the new Governt.
would be partly national, partly federal; that it
ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in
the second, the States. But in what quality was it
to protect the aggregate interest of the whole.
Among the many provisions which had been urged,
he had seen none for supporting the dignity and

splendor of the American Empire. It had been one
of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of
the nation had been sacrificed constantly to local
views; in like manner as the general interests of
States had been sacrificed to those of the Counties.
What is to be the check in the Senate? none; unless
it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring
particular States. But particular States
ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the
people, in case their conduct should deserve it.
Suppose they should insist on claims evidently unjust,
and pursue them in a manner detrimental to
the whole body. Suppose they should give themselves
up to foreign influence. Ought they to be
protected in such cases. They were originally nothing
more than colonial corporations. On the declaration
of Independence, a Governmt. was to be formed.
The small States aware of the necessity of preventing
anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment,
extorted from the large ones an equality of votes.
Standing now on that ground, they demand under
the new system greater rights as men, than their
fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper
answer to them is that the same necessity of which
they formerly took advantage, does not now exist,
and that the large States are at liberty now to consider
what is right, rather than what may be expedient.
We must have an efficient Govt. and if
there be an efficiency in the local Govts. the former is
impossible. Germany alone proves it. Notwithstanding
their common diet, notwithstanding the
great prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the
Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign of his
particular dominions, no union is maintained; foreign
influence disturbs every internal operation, & there
is no energy whatever in the General Governmt.
Whence does this proceed? From the energy of the
local authorities; from its being considered of more
consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than
the Happiness of the people of Germany. Do
Gentlemen wish this to be ye. case here. Good God,
Sir, is it possible they can so delude themselves.
What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the
States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues
into the Ocean. What would it be to the
happiness of America. And will not this be the
case here if we pursue the train in wch. the business
lies. We shall establish an Aulic Council without an
Emperor to execute its decrees. The same circumstances
which unite the people here, unite them in
Germany. They have there a common language, a
common law, common usages and manners, and a
common interest in being united; Yet their local
jurisdictions destroy every tie. The case was the
same in the Grecian States. The United Netherlands
are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments
which must necessarily produce the same
effects. It is of no consequence from what districts the
2d. branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to
yield an asylum agst. these evils. As it is now constituted
he must be agst. its being drawn from the States
in equal portions. But still he was ready to join in
devising such an amendment of the plan, as will be
most likely to secure our liberty & happiness.

Mr. Sherman & Mr. Elseworth moved to postpone
the Question on the Report from the Committee of
a member from each State, in order to wait for the
Report from the Come. of 5 last appointed,

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Maryland ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Adjd.

Monday July 9th. in Convention.

Mr. Daniel Carroll, from Maryland took his seat.

Mr. Govr. Morris delivered a report from the Come. of
5 members to whom was committed the clause in the
Report of the Come. consisting of a member from each
State, stating the proper ratio of Representatives in
the 1st. branch, to be as 1 to every 40,000 inhabitants,
as follows viz

"The Committee to whom was referred the 1st.
clause of the 1st. proposition reported from the grand
Committee, beg leave to report:

I. that in the 1st. meeting of the Legislature the
1st branch thereof consist of 56. members of which
Number N. Hampshire shall have 2, Massts. 7, R. Id.
1, Cont. 4, N. Y. 5, N. J. 3, Pa. 8, Del. 1, Md. 4, Va. 9,
N. C. 5, S. C. 5, Geo. 2.

II. But as the present situation of the States may
probably alter as well in point of wealth as in the

number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature be
authorized from time to time to augment ye. number
of Representatives. And in case any of the
States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or more
States united, or any new States created within the
limits of the United States, the Legislature shall
possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives
in any of the foregoing cases, upon the
principles of their wealth and number of inhabitants."

Mr. Sherman wished to know on what principles or
calculations the Report was founded. It did not
appear to correspond with any rule of numbers, or
of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congs.

Mr. Gorham. Some provision of this sort was
necessary in the outset. The number of blacks &
whites with some regard to supposed wealth was the
general guide. Fractions could not be observed.
The Legislre. is to make alterations from time to
time as justice & propriety may require. Two
objections prevailed agst. the rate of 1 member for
every 40,000 inhts. The 1st. was that the Representation
would soon be too numerous: the 2d. that the
Westn. States who may have a different interest,
might if admitted on that principle by degrees,
outvote the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed.
The number will be small in the first instance
and may be continued so. And the Atlantic
States having ye. Govt. in their own hands, may take
care of their own interest, by dealing out the right of
Representation in safe proportions to the Western
States. These were the views of the Committee.

Mr. L. Martin wished to know whether the Come.
were guided in the ratio, by the wealth or number
of inhabitants, of the States, or by both; noting its
variations from former apportionments by Congs.

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Rutlidge moved to postpone
the 1st. paragraph relating to the number of
members to be allowed each State in the first instance,
and to take up the 2d. paragraph authorizing
the Legisrlre. to alter the number from time to time
according to wealth & inhabitants. The motion was
agreed to nem. con.

On Question on the 2d. paragh. taken without any
debate

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Sherman moved to refer the 1st. part apportioning
the Representatives, to a Comme. of a member
from each State.

Mr. Govr. Morris seconded the motion; observing
that this was the only case in which such committees
were useful.

Mr. Williamson thought it would be necessary to
return to the rule of numbers, but that the Western
States stood on different footing. If their property
shall be rated as high as that of the Atlantic States,
then their representation ought to hold a like proportion.
Otherwise if their property was not to be
equally rated.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The Report is little more than a
guess. Wealth was not altogether disregarded by

the Come. Where it was apparently in favor of one
State, whose nos. were superior to the numbers of
another, by a fraction only, a member extraordinary
was allowed to the former: and so vice
versa. The Committee meant little more than to
bring the matter to a point for the consideration of
the House.

Mr. Reed asked why Georgia was allowed 2 members,
when her number of inhabitants had stood
below that of Delaware.

Mr. Govr. Morris. Such is the rapidity of the population
of that State, that before the plan takes effect,
it will probably be entitled to 2 Representatives.

Mr. Randolph, disliked the Report of the Come.
but had been unwilling to object to it. He was
apprehensive that as the number was not be changed,
till the Natl. Legislature should please, a pretext
would never be wanting to postpone alterations, and
keep the power in the hands of those possessed of it.
He was in favor of the Commitmt. to a member from
each State.

Mr. Patterson considered the proposed estimate
for the future according to the combined rules of
numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason
N. Jersey was agst. it. He could regard negroes
slaves in no light but as property. They are no free
agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of
acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves
property, & like other property entirely at
the will of the Master. Has a man in Virga. a number
of votes in proportion to the number of his slaves?

And if negroes are not represented in the States to
which they belong, why should they be represented
in the Genl. Govt. What is the true principle of
Representation? It is an expedient by which an
assembly of certain individls. chosen by the people
is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of
the people themselves. If such a meeting of the people
was actually to take place, would the slaves vote?
They would not. Why then shd. they be represented.
He was also agst. such an indirect encouragemt. of
the slave trade; observing that Congs. in their act
relating to the change of the 8 art: of Confedn. had
been ashamed to use the term "slaves" & had substituted
a description.

Mr. Madison reminded Mr. Patterson that his doctrine
of Representation which was in its principle the
genuine one, must forever silence the pretensions of
the small States to an equality of votes with the
large ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion
in which their Citizens would do, if the people
of all the States were collectively met. He suggested
as a proper ground of compromise, that in the first
branch the States should be represented according
to their number of free inhabitants; And in the 2d.
which had for one of its primary objects the guardianship
of property, according to the whole number,
including slaves.

Mr. Butler urged warmly the justice & necessity
of regarding wealth in the apportionment of Representation.

Mr. King had always expected that as the Southern

States are the richest, they would not league themselves
with the Northn. unless some respect were paid
to their superior wealth. If the latter expect those
preferential distinctions in Commerce, & other advantages
which they will derive from the connexion
they must not expect to receive them without
allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of
13 of the States had agreed to consider Slaves in
the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and
Representation ought to go together.

On the question for committing the first paragraph
of the Report to a member from each State

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. ay.

The Come. appointed were Mr. King, Mr. Sherman,
Mr. Yates, Mr. Brearly, Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr.
Reed, Mr. Carrol, Mr. Madison, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Rutlidge,
Mr. Houston.

Adjd.

Tuesday, July 10. in Convention.

Mr. King reported from the Come. yesterday appointed
that the States at the 1st. meeting of the
General Legislature, should be represented by 65
members, in the following proportions, to wit N.
Hamshire by 3, Massts. 8, R. Isd. 1, Cont. 5, N. Y. 6,
N. J. 4, Pa. 8, Del. 1, Md. 6, Va. 10, N. C. 5, S. C. 5,
Georgia 3.

Mr. Rutlidge moved that N. Hampshire be reduced

from 3 to 2. members. Her numbers did not entitle
her to 3 and it was a poor State.

Genl. Pinkney seconds the motion.

Mr. King. N. Hamshire has probably more than
120,000 Inhabts. and has an extensive Country of
tolerable fertility. Its inhabts therefore may be expected
to increase fast. He remarked that the four
Eastern States, having 800,000 souls, have 1/3 fewer
representatives than the four Southern States, having
not more than 700,000 souls, rating the blacks as 5
for 3. The Eastern people will advert to these circumstances,
and be dissatisfied. He believed them
to be very desirous of uniting with their Southern
brethern, but did not think it prudent to rely so far
on that disposition as to subject them to any gross inequality.
He was fully convinced that the question
concerning a difference of interests did not lie where
it had hitherto been discussed, between the great
& small States; but between the Southern & Eastern.
For this reason he had been ready to yield
something in the proportion of representatives for
the security of the Southern. No principle would
justify the giving them a majority. They were
brought as near an equality as was possible. He
was not averse to giving them a still greater security,
but did not see how it could be done.

Genl. Pinkney. The Report before it was committed
was more favorable to the S. States than as
it now stands. If they are to form so considerable
a minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given
to the Genl. Government, they will be nothing more

than overseers for the Northern States. He did not
expect the S. States to be raised to a majority of
representatives, but wished them to have something
like an equality. At present by the alterations
of the Come. in favor of the N. States they are removed
farther from it than they were before. One
member indeed had been added to Virga. which he
was glad of as he considered her as a Southern State.
He was glad also that the members of Georgia were
increased.

Mr. Williamson was not for reducing N. Hampshire
from 3 to 2, but for reducing some others. The
Southn. Interest must be extremely endangered by
the present arrangement. The Northn. States are to
have a majority in the first instance and the means
of perpetuating it.

Mr. Dayton observed that the line between Northn.
& Southern interest had been improperly drawn;
that Pa. was the dividing State, there being six on
each side of her.

Genl. Pinkney urged the reduction, dwelt on the
superior wealth of the Southern States, and insisted
on its having its due weight in the Government.

Mr. Govt. Morris regretted the turn of the debate.
The States he found had many Representatives on
the floor. Few he fears were to be deemed the
Representatives of America. He thought the Southern
States have by the report more than their share
of representation. Property ought to have its
weight, but not all the weight. If the Southn. States
are to supply money. The Northn. States are to spill

their blood. Besides, the probable Revenue to be
expected from the S. States has been greatly overrated.
He was agst. reducing N. Hampshire.

Mr. Randolph was opposed to a reduction of N.
Hampshire, not because she had a full title to three
members; but because it was in his contemplation
1. to make it the duty instead of leaving it in the
discretion of the Legislature to regulate the representation
by a periodical census. 2. to require more
than a bare majority of votes in the Legislature in
certain cases & particularly in commercial cases.

On the question for reducing N. Hampshire from
3 to 2 Represents. it passed in the negative

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[122]

Genl. Pinkney and Mr. Alexr. Martin moved that 6
Reps. instead of 5 be allowed to N. Carolina.

On the Question, it passed in the negative

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Genl. Pinkney & Mr. Butler made the same motion
in favor of S. Carolina

On the Question it passed in the negative

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Genl. Pinckney & Mr. Houston moved that Georgia
be allowed 4 instead of 3 Reps. urging the unexampled
celerity of its population. On the Question,
it passed in the negative

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Madison, moved that the number allowed to
each State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of 65
members, was too small a number to represent the
whole inhabitants of the U. States; They would not
possess enough of the confidence of the people, and
wd. be too sparsely taken from the people, to bring
with them all the local information which would be
frequently wanted. Double the number will not
be too great, even with the future additions from
New States. The additional expence was too inconsiderable
to be regarded in so important a case.
And as far as the augmentation might be unpopular
on that score, the objection was overbalanced by its
effect on the hopes of a greater number of the popular
candidates.

Mr. Elseworth urged the objection of expence, &
that the greater the number, the more slowly would
the business proceed; and the less probably be
decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number
of Representatives too great in most of the State
Legislatures; and that a large number was less necessary
in the Genl. Legislature than in those of the
States, as its business would relate to a few great
national Objects only.

Mr. Sherman would have preferred 50 to 65. The
great distance they will have to travel will render
their attendance precarious and will make it difficult
to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men to

undertake the service. He observed that the expected
increase from new States also deserved consideration.

Mr. Gerry was for increasing the number beyond
65. The larger the number, the less the danger of
their being corrupted. The people are accustomed
to & fond of a numerous representation, and will
consider their rights as better secured by it. The
danger of excess in the number may be guarded
agst. by fixing a point within which the number shall
always be kept.

Col. Mason admitted that the objection drawn from
the consideration of expence, had weight both in
itself, and as the people might be affected by it.
But he thought it outweighed by the objections agst.
the smallness of the number. 38, will he supposes,
as being a majority of 65. form a quorum. 20 will
be a majority of 38. This was certainly too small
a number to make laws for America. They would
neither bring with them all the necessary information
relative to various local interests, nor possess
the necessary confidence of the people. After
doubling the number, the laws might still be made
by so few as almost to be objectionable on that account.

Mr. Read was in favor of the Motion. Two of the
States (Del. & R. I.) would have but a single member
if the aggregate number should remain at 65. and in
case of accident to either of these one State wd. have
no representative present to give explanations or
informations of its interests or wishes. The people

would not place their confidence in so small a number.
He hoped the objects of the Genl. Govt. would be
much more numerous than seemed to be expected
by some gentlemen, and that they would become
more & more so. As to New States the highest
number of Reps. for the whole might be limited, and
all danger of excess thereby prevented.

Mr. Rutlidge opposed the motion. The Representatives
were too numerous in all the States. The full
number allotted to the States may be expected to attend,
& the lowest possible quorum shd. not therefore
be considered. The interests of their Constituents
will urge their attendance too strongly for it to be
omitted: and he supposed the Genl. Legislature would
not sit more than 6 or 8 weeks in the year.

On the Question for doubling the number, it passed
in the negative

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

On the question for agreeing to the apportionment
of Reps. as amended by the last committee, it
passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Broom gave notice to the House that he had
concurred with a reserve to himself of an intention
to claim for his State an equal voice in the 2d. branch;
which he thought could not be denied after this concession
of the small States as to the first branch.

Mr. Randolph moved as an amendment to the
report of the Comme. of five "that in order to ascertain
the alterations in the population & wealth of the
several States the Legislature should be required to
cause a census, and estimate to be taken within one
year after its first meeting; and every——— years
thereafter, and that the Legislre. arrange the Representation
accordingly."

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed it as fettering the Legislature
too much. Advantage may be taken of it
in time of war or the apprehension of it, by new
States to extort particular favors. If the mode was
to be fixed for taking a Census, it might certainly be
extremely inconvenient: if unfixt the Legislature
may use such a mode as will defeat the object: and
perpetuate the inequality. He was always agst. such
shackles on the Legislre. They had been found very
pernicious in most of the State Constitutions. He
dwelt much on the danger of throwing such a preponderancy
into the Western Scale, suggesting that
in time the Western people wd. outnumber the Atlantic
States. He wished therefore to put it in the
power of the latter to keep a majority of votes in
their own hands. It was objected he said that if
the Legislre. are left at liberty, they will never readjust
the Representation. He admitted that this was
possible; but he did not think it probable unless the
reasons agst. a revision of it were very urgent & in
this case, it ought not to be done.

It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr.
Randolph in order to take up the following, viz.

"that the Committee of Eleven, to whom was referred
the report of the Committee of five on the
subject of Representation, be requested to furnish
the Convention with the principles on which they
grounded the Report," which was disagreed to;
S. C. alone voting in the affirmative.

Adjourned

Wednesday July 11. In Convention.

Mr. Randolph's motion requiring the Legislre. to
take a periodical census for the purpose of redressing
inequalities in the Representation was resumed.

Mr. Sherman was agst. Shackling the Legislature
too much. We ought to choose wise & good men,
and then confide in them.

Mr. Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in
fixing a proper rule of Representation, the more
unwilling ought we to be, to throw the task from
ourselves on the Genl. Legistre. He did not object to
the conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the
outset; but considered a Revision from time to time
according to some permanent & precise standard as
essential to ye. fair representation required in the
1st. branch. According to the present population of
America, the Northn. part of it had a right to preponderate,
and he could not deny it. But he wished
it not to preponderate hereafter when the reason
no longer continued. From the nature of man we
may be sure that those who have power in their
hands will not give it up while they can retain it.

On the contrary we know that they will always when
they can rather increase it. If the S. States therefore
should have 3/4 of the people of America within
their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority
of Representatives. 1/4 will govern the 3/4. The S.
States will complain; but they may complain from
generation to generation without redress. Unless
some principle therefore which will do justice to
them hereafter shall be inserted in the Constitution,
disagreable as the declaration was to him, he
must declare he could neither vote for the system
here, nor support it, in his State. Strong objections
had been drawn from the danger to the Atlantic
interests from new Western States. Ought
we to sacrifice what we know to be right in itself,
lest it should prove favorable to States which are
not yet in existence. If the Western States are
to be admitted into the Union, as they arise, they
must, he wd. repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected
to no degrading discriminations. They will
have the same pride & other passions which we have
and will either not unite with or will speedily revolt
from the Union, if they are not in all respects placed
on an equal footing with their brethern. It has been
said they will be poor, and unable to make equal
contributions to the general Treasury. He did not
know but that in time they would be both more
numerous & more wealthy than their Atlantic
brethren. The extent & fertility of their soil,
made this probable; and though Spain might for a
time deprive them of the natural outlet for their

productions, yet she will, because she must, finally
yield to their demands. He urged that numbers of
inhabitants; though not always a precise standard
of wealth was sufficiently so for every substantial
purpose.

Mr. Williamson was for making it a duty of the
Legislature to do what was right & not leaving it at
liberty to do or not to do it. He moved that Mr.
Randolph's propositions be postpond. in order to consider
the following "that in order to ascertain the
alterations that may happen in the population &
wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken
of the free white inhabitants and 3/5ths. of those of
other descriptions on the 1st. year after this Government
shall have been adopted and every——— year
thereafter; and that the Representation be regulated
accordingly."

Mr. Randolph agreed that Mr. Williamson's proposition
should stand in the place of his. He observed
that the ratio fixt for the 1st. meeting was a mere conjecture,
that it placed the power in the hands of that
part of America, which could not always be entitled
to it, that this power would not be voluntarily renounced;
and that it was consequently the duty of
the Convention to secure its renunciation when justice
might so require; by some constitutional provisions.
If equality between great & small States be inadmissible,
because in that case unequal numbers of
Constituents wd. be represented by equal number of
votes; was it not equally inadmissible that a larger
& more populous district of America should hereafter

have less representation, than a smaller & less populous
district. If a fair representation of the people
be not secured, the injustice of the Govt. will shake
it to its foundations. What relates to suffrage is
justly stated by the celebrated Montesquieu, as a
fundamental article in Republican Govt. If the
danger suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris be real, of advantage
being taken of the Legislature in pressing
moments, it was an additional reason, for tying their
hands in such a manner that they could not sacrifice
their trust to momentary considerations. Congs.
have pledged the public faith to New States, that
they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never
would or ought to accede on any other. The census
must be taken under the direction of the General
Legislature. The States will be too much interested
to take an impartial one for themselves.

Mr. Butler & Genl. Pinkney insisted that blacks
be included in the rule of Representation equally
with the whites; and for that purpose moved that
the words "three-fifths" be struck out.

Mr. Gerry thought that 3/5 of them was to say the
least the full proportion that could be admitted.

Mr. Ghorum. This ratio was fixed by Congs. as a
rule of taxation. Then it was urged by the Delegates
representing the States having slaves that
the blacks were still more inferior to freemen. At
present when the ratio of representation is to be
established, we are assured that they are equal to
freemen. The arguments on ye. former occasion
convinced him that 3/5 was pretty near the just

proportion and he should vote according to the same
opinion now.

Mr. Butler insisted that the labour of a slave in
S. Carola. was as productive & valuable as that of a
freeman in Massts., that as wealth was the great means
of defence and utility to the Nation they were equally
valuable to it with freemen; and that consequently
an equal representation ought to be allowed for them
in a Government which was instituted principally
for the protection of property, and was itself to be
supported by property.

Mr. Mason could not agree to the motion, notwithstanding
it was favorable to Virga. because he thought
it unjust. It was certain that the slaves were valuable,
as they raised the value of land, increased the
exports & imports, and of course the revenue, would
supply the means of feeding & supporting an army,
and might in cases of emergency become themselves
soldiers. As in these important respects they were
useful to the Community at large, they ought not
to be excluded from the estimate of Representation.
He could not however regard them as equal to freemen
and could not vote for them as such. He
added as worthy of remark, that the Southern States
have this peculiar species of property over & above
the other species of property common to all the
States.

Mr. Williamson reminded Mr. Ghorum that if the
Southn. States contended for the inferiority of blacks
to whites when taxation was in view, the Eastern
States on the same occasion contended for their

equality. He did not however either then or now
concur in either extreme, but approved of the ratio
of 3/5.

On Mr. Butler's motion for considering blacks as
equal to Whites in the apportionmt. of Representation

Massts. no. Cont. no. (N. Y. not on floor). N. J.
no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Govr. Morris said he had several objections
to the proposition of Mr. Williamson. 1. It fettered
the Legislature too much. 2. it would exclude some
States altogether who would not have a sufficient
number to entitle them to a single Representative.
3. it will not consist with the Resolution passed on
Saturday last authorizing the Legislature to adjust
the Representation from time to time on the principles
of population & wealth or with the principles
of equity. If slaves were to be considered as
inhabitants, not as wealth then the sd. Resolution
would not be pursued. If as wealth, then why is
no other wealth but slaves included? These objections
may perhaps be removed by amendments.
His great objection was that the number of inhabitants
was not a proper standard of wealth. The
amazing difference between the comparative numbers
& wealth of different countries, rendered all
reasoning superfluous on the subject. Numbers
might with greater propriety be deemed a measure
of strength, than of wealth, yet the late defence made
by G. Britain, agst. her numerous enemies proved in

the clearest manner, that it is entirely fallacious even
in this respect.

Mr. King thought there was great force in the objections
of Mr. Govr. Morris: he would however accede
to the proposition for the sake of doing something.

Mr. Rutlidge contended for the admission of
wealth in the estimate by which Representation
should be regulated. The Western States will not
be able to contribute in proportion to their numbers;
they shd. not therefore be represented in that proportion.
The Atlantic States will not concur in
such a plan. He moved that "at the end of———
years after the 1st. meeting of the Legislature, and
of every——— years thereafter, the Legislature shall
proportion the Representation according to the principles
of wealth & population."

Mr. Sherman thought the number of people alone
the best rule for measuring wealth as well as representation;
and that if the Legislature were to be
governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate
it by numbers. He was at first for leaving the
matter wholly to the discretion of the Legislature;
but he had been convinced by the observation of
(Mr. Randolph & Mr. Mason), that the periods & the
rule, of revising the Representation ought to be fixt
by the Constitution.

Mr. Reed thought the Legislature ought not to
be too much shackled. It would make the Constitution
like Religious Creeds, embarrassing to those
bound to conform to them & more likely to produce
dissatisfaction and scism, than harmony and union.

Mr. Mason objected to Mr. Rutlidge's motion, as
requiring of the Legislature something too indefinite
& impracticable, and leaving them a pretext for
doing nothing.

Mr. Wilson had himself no objection to leaving
the Legislature entirely at liberty. But considered
wealth as an impracticable rule.

Mr. Ghorum. If the Convention who are comparatively
so little biassed by local views are so
much perplexed, How can it be expected that the
Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those
views, will be able to settle a standard. He was
convinced by the arguments of others & his own
reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some
standard or other.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The argts. of others & his own
reflections had led him to a very different conclusion.
If we can't agree on a rule that will be just at
this time, how can we expect to find one that will
be just in all times to come. Surely those who
come after us will judge better of things present,
than we can of things future. He could not persuade
himself that numbers would be a just rule at any
time. The remarks of (Mr. Mason) relative to the
Western Country had not changed his opinion on that
head. Among other objections it must be apparent
they would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened,
to share in the administration of our common
interests. The Busy haunts of men not the
remote wilderness, was the proper school of political
Talents. If the Western people get the power into

their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests.
The Back members are always most averse to the
best measures. He mentioned the case of Pena.
formerly. The lower part of the State had ye. power
in the first instance. They kept it in yr. own hands
& the country was ye. better for it. Another objection
with him agst. admitting the blacks into the
census, was that the people of Pena. would revolt
at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves.
They would reject any plan that was to have such
an effect. Two objections had been raised agst.
leaving the adjustment of the Representation from
time, to time, to the discretion of the Legislature.
The 1. was, they would be unwilling to revise it at
all. The 2 that by referring, to wealth they would
be bound by a rule which if willing, they would be
unable to execute. The 1st. objn. distrusts their
fidelity. But if their duty, their honor & their oaths
will not bind them, let us not put into their hands
our liberty, and all our other great interests; let us
have no Govt. at all. 2. If these ties will bind them,
we need not distrust the practicability of the rule.
It was followed in part by the Come. in the apportionment
of Representatives yesterday reported to the
House. The best course that could be taken would
be to leave the interests of the people to the Representatives
of the people.

Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this
implicit confidence urged by a member who on all
occasions, had inculcated so strongly, the political
depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one

vice and interest by opposing to them another vice
& interest. If the Representatives of the people
would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what
need was there of a Senate? What of a Revisionary
power? But his reasoning was not only inconsistent
with his former reasoning, but with itself. At
the same time that he recommended this implicit
confidence to the Southern States in the Northern
majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting all
to a jealousy of a Western Majority. To reconcile
the gentln. with himself, it must be imagined
that he determined the human character by the
points of the compass. The truth was that all men
having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree.
The case of Pena. had been mentioned where
it was admitted that those who were possessed of
the power in the original settlement, never admitted
the new settlemts. to a due share of it. England
was a still more striking example. The power
there had long been in the hands of the boroughs,
of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every
reform which had been attempted. Virga. was in
a lesser degree another example. With regard to
the Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion,
that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible
either in point of justice or policy. He thought
also that the hope of contributions to the Treasy.
from them had been much underrated. Future
contributions it seemed to be understood on all
hands, would be principally levied on imports &
exports. The extent and fertility of the Western
Soil would for a long time give to agriculture a
preference over manufactures. Trials would be
repeated till some articles could be raised from it
that would bear a transportation to places where
they could be exchanged for imported manufactures.
Whenever the Mississpi should be opened to them,
which would of necessity be ye. case as soon as their
population would subject them to any considerable
share of the Public burden, imposts on their trade
could be collected with less expence & greater
certainty, than on that of the Atlantic States. In
the mean time, as their supplies must pass through
the Atlantic States, their contributions would be
levied in the same manner with those of the Atlantic
States. He could not agree that any substantial
objection lay agst. fixg. numbers for the perpetual
standard of Representation. It was said that Representation
& taxation were to go together; that
taxation and wealth ought to go together, that
population & wealth were not measures of each other.
He admitted that in different climates, under different
forms of Govt. and in different stages of civilization
the inference was perfectly just. He would
admit that in no situation, numbers of inhabitants
were an accurate measure of wealth. He contended
however that in the U. States it was sufficiently so
for the object in contemplation. Altho' their climate
varied considerably, yet as the Govts. the laws,
and the manners of all were nearly the same, and
the intercourse between different parts perfectly
free, population, industry, arts, and the value of
labour, would constantly tend to equalize themselves.
The value of labour might be considered as
the principal criterion of wealth and ability to support
taxes; and this would find its level in different
places where the intercourse should be easy & free,
with as much certainty as the value of money or any
other thing. Wherever labour would yield most,
people would resort, till the competition should
destroy the inequality. Hence it is that the people
are constantly swarming from the more to the less
populous places—from Europe to Ama.—from the
Northn. & Middle parts of the U. S. to the Southern
& Western. They go where land is cheaper, because
there labour is dearer. If it be true that the same
quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio
is of less value, than on the Delaware, it is also true
that the same labor will raise twice or thrice, the
quantity in the former, that it will raise in the latter
situation.

Col. Mason. Agreed with Mr. Govr. Morris that
we ought to leave the interests of the people to the
Representatives of the people; but the objection
was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives
of the people. It would continue so
no longer than the States now containing a majority
of the people should retain that majority. As soon
as the Southern & Western population should predominate,
which must happen in a few years, the
power wd. be in the hands of the minority, and would
never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for
by the Constitution.

On the Question for postponing Mr. Williamson's
motion, in order to consider that of Mr. Rutlidge,
it passed in the negative, Massts. ay. Cont. no.
N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question on the first clause of Mr. Williamson's
motion as to taking a census of the free inhabitants,
it passed in the affirmative; Massts. ay. Cont.
ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

the next clause as to 3/5 of the negroes considered

Mr. King being much opposed to fixing numbers
as the rule of representation, was particularly so
on account of the blacks. He thought the admission
of them along with Whites at all, would excite great
discontents among the States having no slaves.
He had never said as to any particular point that
he would in no event acquiesce in & support it;
but he wd. say that if any in case such a declaration
was to be made by him, it would be in this. He
remarked that in the temporary allotment of Representatives
made by the Committee, the Southern
States had received more than the number of their
white & Three fifths of their black inhabitants entitled
them to.

Mr. Sherman. S. Carola. had not more beyond her
proportion than N. York & N. Hampshire, nor
either of them more than was necessary in order to
avoid fractions or reducing them below their proportions.
Georgia had more; but the rapid growth
of that State seemed to justify it. In general the

allotment might not be just, but considering all
circumstances, he was satisfied with it.

Mr. Ghorum. supported the propriety of establishing
numbers as the rule. He said that in Massts. estimates
had been taken in the different towns, and
that persons had been curious enough to compare
these estimates with the respective numbers of
people; and it had been found even including Boston,
that the most exact proportion prevailed between
numbers & property. He was aware that
there might be some weight in what had fallen from
his colleague, as to the umbrage which might be taken
by the people of the Eastern States. But he recollected
that when the proposition of Congs. for
changing the 8th. art: of the Confedn. was before the
Legislature of Massts. the only difficulty then was to
satisfy them that the negroes ought not to have
been counted equally with whites instead of being
counted in ratio of three-fifths only.[123]

Mr. Wilson did not well see on what principle the
admission of blacks in the proportion of three fifths
could be explained. Are they admitted as Citizens?
then why are they not admitted on an equality
with White Citizens? are they admitted as property?
then why is not other property admitted into
the computation? These were difficulties however
which he thought must be overruled by the necessity
of compromise. He had some apprehensions also
from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with

the whites, to give disgust to the people of Pena.,
as had been intimated by his Colleague (Mr. Govr.
Morris). But he differed from him in thinking
numbers of inhabts. so incorrect a measure of wealth.
He had seen the Western settlemts. of Pa. and on a
comparison of them with the City of Philada. could
discover little other difference, than that property
was more unequally divided among individuals here
than there. Taking the same number in the aggregate
in the two situations he believed there would
be little difference in their wealth and ability to
contribute to the public wants.

Mr. Govr. Morris was compelled to declare himself
reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the
Southern States or to human nature, and he must
therefore do it to the former. For he could never
agree to give such encouragement to the Slave Trade
as would be given by allowing them a representation
for their negroes, and he did not believe those States
would ever confederate on terms that would deprive
them of that trade.

On Question for agreeing to include 3/5 of the blacks
Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Mard[124] no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On the question as to taking census "the first
year after the meeting of the Legislature"

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. ay. Geo. no

On filling the blank for the periodical census,
with 15 years. Agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Madison moved to add, after "15 years," the
words "at least" that the Legislature might anticipate
when circumstances were likely to render a
particular year inconvenient.

On this motion for adding "at least," it passed
in the negative the States being equally divided.
Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

A Change of the phraseology of the other clause
so as to read, "and the Legislature shall alter or augment
the representation accordingly," was agreed to
nem. con.

On the question on the whole resolution of Mr.
Williamson as amended,

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Del. no. Md. no.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Thursday, July 12. In Convention.

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to add to the clause empowering
the Legislature to vary the Representation
according to the principles of wealth & numbers of
inhabts. a "proviso that taxation shall be in proportion
to Representation."

Mr. Butler contended again that Representation
sd. be according to the full number of inhabts. including
all the blacks; admitting the justice of
Mr. Govr. Morris's motion.

Mr. Mason also admitted the justice of the principle,

but was afraid embarrassments might be occasioned
to the Legislature by it. It might drive the
Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.

Mr. Govr. Morris, admitted that some objections
lay agst. his Motion, but supposed they would be
removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation.
With regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports
& on consumption the rule would be inapplicable.
Notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary
he was persuaded that the imports & consumption
were pretty nearly equal throughout the
Union.

General Pinkney liked the idea. He thought it
so just that it could not be objected to. But foresaw
that if the revision of the census was left to the
discretion of the Legislature, it would never be
carried into execution. The rule must be fixed,
and the execution of it enforced by the Constitution.
He was alarmed at what was said[125] yesterday, concerning
the Negroes. He was now again alarmed
at what had been thrown out concerning the taxing
of exports. S. Carola. has in one year exported to
the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which was
the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be
represented in proportion to this amount? She will
not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax
on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in
the system, restraining the Legislature from taxing
Exports.

Mr. Wilson approved the principle, but could not

see how it could be carried into execution; unless
restrained to direct taxation.

Mr. Govr. Morris having so varied his Motion by
inserting the word "direct." It passd. nem. con. as
follows—"provided always that direct taxation
ought to be proportioned to representation."

Mr. Davie said it was high time now to speak out.
He saw that it was meant by some gentlemen to deprive
the Southern States of any share of Representation
for their blacks. He was sure that N. Carola.
would never confederate on any terms that did not
rate them at least as 3/5. If the Eastern States meant
therefore to exclude them altogether the business
was at an end.

Dr. Johnson, thought that wealth and population
were the true, equitable rule of representation; but
he conceived that these two principles resolved
themselves into one; population being the best
measure of wealth. He concluded therefore that
ye. number of people ought to be established as the
rule, and that all descriptions including blacks
equally with the Whites, ought to fall within the
computation. As various opinions had been expressed
on the subject, he would move that a Committee
might be appointed to take them into
consideration and report thereon.

Mr. Govr. Morris. It has been said that it is high
time to speak out, as one member, he would candidly
do so. He came here to form a compact for
the good of America. He was ready to do so with
all the States. He hoped & believed that all would

enter into such a Compact. If they would not he
was ready to join with any States that would. But
as the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain
for the Eastern States to insist on what the Southn.
States will never agree to. It is equally vain for
the latter to require what the other States can never
admit; and he verily believed the people of Pena.
will never agree to a representation of Negroes.
What can be desired by these States more than has
been already proposed; that the Legislature shall
from time to time regulate Representation according
to population & wealth.

Genl. Pinkney desired that the rule of wealth
should be ascertained and not left to the pleasure of
the Legislature; and that property in slaves should
not be exposed to danger under a Govt. instituted for
the protection of property.

The first clause in the Report of the first Grand
Committee was postponed

Mr. Elseworth. In order to carry into effect the
principle established, moved that to add to the last
clause adopted by the House the words following,
"and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation
for the support of the Government of the U. States
shall be the number of white inhabitants, and
three fifths of every other description in the several
States, until some other rule that shall more accurately
ascertain the wealth of the several States can
be devised and adopted by the Legislature."

Mr. Butler seconded the motion in order that it
might be committed.

Mr. Randolph was not satisfied with the motion.
The danger will be revived that the ingenuity of the
Legislature may evade or pervert the rule so as to
perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in the
first instance. He proposed in lieu of Mr. Elseworth's
motion, "that in order to ascertain the alterations
in Representation that may be required
from time to time by changes in the relative circumstances
of the States, a Census shall be taken within
two years from the 1st. meeting of the Genl. Legislature
of the U. S. and once within the term of every
———year afterwards, of all the inhabitants in the
manner & according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their resolution of the 18th. day of Apl.
1783, (rating the blacks at 3/5 of their number) and
that the Legislature of the U. S. shall arrange the
Representation accordingly." He urged strenuously
that express security ought to be provided for
including slaves in the ratio of Representation. He
lamented that such a species of property existed.
But as it did exist the holders of it would require this
security. It was perceived that the design was entertained
by some of excluding slaves altogether; the
Legislature therefore ought not to be left at liberty.

Mr. Elseworth withdraws his motion & seconds
that of Mr. Randolph.

Mr. Wilson observed that less umbrage would perhaps
be taken agst. an admission of the slaves into the
Rule of representation, if it should be so expressed as
to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the
rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule

of taxation; and as representation was to be according
to taxation, the end would be equally attained.
He accordingly moved & was 2ded. so to
alter the last clause adopted by the House, that together
with the amendment proposed the whole
should read as follows—provided always that the
representation ought to be proportioned according
to direct taxation, and in order to ascertain the
alterations in the direct taxation which may be required
from time to time by the changes in the relative
circumstances of the States, Resolved that a
census be taken within two years from the first meeting
of the Legislature of the U. States, and once
within the term of every——— years afterwards of all
the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner and according
to the ratio recommended by Congress in
their Resolution of April 18. 1783; and that the
Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the direct
taxation accordingly.

Mr. King. Altho' this amendment varies the aspect
somewhat, he had still two powerful objections
agst. tying down the Legislature to the rule of numbers,
1. they were at this time an uncertain index of
the relative wealth of the States. 2. if they were a
just index at this time it can not be supposed always
to continue so. He was far from wishing to retain
any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the
Republic. If justice was not the basis of the connection
it could not be of long duration. He must
be shortsighted indeed who does not foresee that
whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous

than the Northern, they can & will hold a language
that will awe them into justice. If they
threaten to separate now in case injury shall be done
them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual,
when force shall back their demands. Even in the
intervening period, there will be no point of time at
which they will not be able to say, do us justice or we
will separate. He urged the necessity of placing
confidence to a certain degree in every Govt. and did
not conceive that the proposed confidence as to a
periodical readjustment of the representation exceeded
that degree.

Mr. Pinkney moved to amend Mr. Randolph's motion
so as to make "blacks equal to the whites in the
ratio of representation." This he urged was nothing
more than justice. The blacks are the labourers,
the peasants of the Southern States: they are as
productive of pecuniary resources as those of the
Northern States. They add equally to the wealth,
and considering money as the sinew of war, to the
strength of the nation. It will also be politic with
regard to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep
pace with Representation.

Genl. Pinkney moves to insert 6 years instead of
two, as the period computing from the 1st. meeting of
ye. Legise. within which the first census should be
taken. On this question for inserting six, instead
of "two" in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed
in the affirmative

Massts. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. divd.
Mayd. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On a question for filling the blank for ye. periodical
census with 20 years, it passed in the negative

Massts. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On a question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On Mr. Pinkney's motion for rating blacks as equal
to Whites instead of as 3/5.

Mass. no. Cont. no. (Dr. Johnson ay) N. J. no.
Pa. no. (3 agst. 2.) Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. ay. Geo—ay.

Mr. Randolph's proposition as varied by Mr. Wilson
being read for question on the whole—

Mr. Gerry, urged that the principle of it could not
be carried into execution as the States were not to be
taxed as States. With regard to taxes in imposts,
he conceived they would be more productive Where
there were no slaves than where there were; the consumption
being greater—

Mr. Elseworth. In case of a poll tax there wd. be no
difficulty. But there wd. probably be none. The
sum allotted to a State may be levied without difficulty
according to the plan used by the State in
raising its own supplies. On the question of ye.
whole proposition; as proportioning representation
to direct taxation & both to the white & 3/5 of black
inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years—
& within every ten years afterwards.

Mass, divd. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geo. ay.

Friday, July 13. In Convention.

It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report
of the Committee of Eleven as to the originating
of money bills in the first branch, in order to take up
the following—"that in the 2d. branch each State
shall have an equal voice,"

Mr. Gerry, moved to add as an amendment, to the
last clause agreed to by the House, "that from the
first meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. till a census
shall be taken all monies to be raised for supplying
the public Treasury by direct taxation shall be
assessed on the inhabitants of the several States
according to the number of their Representatives
respectively in the 1st. branch." He said this would
be as just before as after the Census; according
to the general principle that taxation & Representation
ought to go together.

Mr. Williamson feared that N. Hamshire will have
reason to complain. 3 members were allotted to her
as a liberal allowance, for this reason among others,
that she might not suppose any advantage to have
been taken of her absence. As she was still absent,
and had no opportunity of deciding whether she
would chuse to retain the number on the condition,
of her being taxed in proportion to it, he thought
the number ought to be reduced from three to two,
before the question was taken on Mr. G's motion.

Mr. Read could not approve of the proposition. He
had observed he said in the Committee a backwardness
in some of the members from the large States,
to take their full proportion of Representatives. He
did not then see the motive. He now suspects it
was to avoid their due share of taxation. He had no
objection to a just & accurate adjustment of Representation
& taxation to each other.

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Madison answered that
the charge itself involved an acquittal; since notwithstanding
the augmentation of the number of
members allotted to Massts. & Va. the motion for proportioning
the burdens thereto was made by a member
from the former State & was approved by Mr.
M. from the latter who was on the Come.. Mr. Govr.
Morris said that he thought Pa. had her due share in
8 members; and he could not in candor ask for
more. Mr. M. said that having always conceived
that the difference of interest in the U. States lay not
between the large & small, but the N. & Southn.
States, and finding that the number of members
allotted to the N. States was greatly superior, he
should have preferred, an addition of two members
to the S. States, to wit one to N. & 1 to S. Carla.
rather than of one member to Virga. He liked the
present motion, because it tended to moderate the
views both of the opponents & advocates for rating
very high, the negroes.

Mr. Elseworth hoped the proposition would be
withdrawn. It entered too much into detail. The
general principle was already sufficiently settled.

As fractions can not be regarded in apportioning the
N°. of representatives, the rule will be unjust, until an
actual census shall be made. After that taxation
may be precisely proportioned according to the principle
established, to the number of inhabitants.

Mr. Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn.
If it shd. it will be made from another
quarter. The rule will be as reasonable & just before,
as after a Census. As to fractional numbers,
the Census will not destroy, but ascertain them.
And they will have the same effect after as before
the Census; for as he understands the rule, it is to be
adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of
Representatives.

Mr. Sherman opposed the motion. He thought the
Legislature ought to be left at liberty: in which case
they would probably conform to the principles observed
by Congs.

Mr. Mason did not know that Virga. would be a loser
by the proposed regulation, but had some scruple as
to the justice of it. He doubted much whether the
conjectural rule which was to precede the Census,
would be as just, as it would be rendered by an
actual census.

Mr. Elseworth & Mr. Sherman moved to postpone
the motion of Mr Gerry. On ye. question, it passed
in the negative. Mass. no. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Question on Mr. Gerry's motion, it passed in the
negative, the States being equally divided.

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry finding that the loss of the question had
proceeded from an objection with some, to the proposed
assessment of direct taxes on the inhabitants of
the States, which might restrain the Legislature to a
poll tax, moved his proposition again, but so varied
as to authorize the assessment on the States, which
leaves the mode to the Legislature, viz "that from
the 1st. meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. untill a
census shall be taken, all monies for supplying the
public Treasury by direct taxation shall be raised
from the said several States according to the number
of their representatives respectively in the 1st.
branch."

On this varied question, it passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. pa. divd Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the motion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Saturday
last authorizing the Legislre. to adjust from time
to time, the representation upon the principles of
wealth & numbers of inhabitants, was reconsidered
by common consent in order to strike out "Wealth"
and adjust the resolution to that requiring periodical
revisions, according to the number of whites & three
fifths of the blacks: the motion was in the words
following:—"But as the present situation of the
States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants,
that the Legislature of the U. S. be authorized
from time to time to apportion the number

of representatives; and in case any of the States
shall hereafter be divided or any two or more States
united or new States created within the limits of
the U. S. the Legislature of U. S. shall possess authority
to regulate the number of Representatives in
any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of
their number of inhabitants; according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned."

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed the alteration as leaving
still incoherence. If Negroes were to be viewed as
inhabitants, and the revision was to proceed on the
principle of numbers of inhabts. they ought to be added
in their entire number, and not in the proportion of
3/5. If as property, the word wealth was right, and
striking it out would produce the very inconsistency
which it was meant to get rid of.—The train of business
& the late turn which it had taken, had led him
he said, into deep meditation on it, and He wd. candidly
state the result. A distinction had been set up
& urged, between the Nn. and Southn. States. He
had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical.
He still thought the distinction groundless. He sees
however that it is persisted in, and the Southn. Gentlemen
will not be satisfied unless they see the way
open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils.
The consequence of such a transfer of power
from the maritime to the interior & landed interest
will he foresees be such an oppression of commerce
that he shall be obliged to vote for ye. vicious principle
of equality in the 2d. branch in order to provide
some defence for the N. States agst. it. But to come

more to the point; either this distinction is fictitious
or real; if fictitious let it be dismissed & let us proceed
with due confidence. If it be real, instead of
attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at
once take a friendly leave of each other. There can
be no end of demands for security if every particular
interest is to be entitled to it. The Eastern States
may claim it for their fishery, and for other objects,
as the Southn. States claim it for their peculiar objects.
In this struggle between the two ends of the
Union, what part ought the middle States in point of
policy to take: to join their Eastern brethren according
to his ideas. If the Southn. States get the
power into their hands, and be joined as they will be
with the interior Country, they will inevitably bring
on a war with Spain for the Mississippi. This language
is already held. The interior Country having
no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be
little affected by such a war. He wished to know
what security, the Northn. & middle States will have
agst. this danger. It has been said that N. C. S. C.,
and Georgia only will in a little time have a majority
of the people of America. They must in that case
include the great interior Country, and every thing
was to be apprehended from their getting the power
into their hands.

Mr. Butler. The security the Southn. States want
is that their negroes may not be taken from them,
which some gentlemen within or without doors, have
a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that
N. C. S. C. & Geo. would have more people than all

the other States, but many more relatively to the
other States than they now have. The people &
strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly
& S. westwdly..

Mr. Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy
any gentleman he had no indisposition to declare
his sentiments. Conceiving that all men wherever
placed have equal rights and are equally entitled
to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the
period when a few States should contain the superior
number of people. The majority of people wherever
found ought in all questions to govern the minority.
If the interior Country should acquire this majority,
it will not only have the right, but will avail itself of
it whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the
policy of G. Britain with regard to America. The
fatal maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies
were growing too fast, and that their growth must be
stinted in time. What were the consequences?,
first, enmity on our part, then actual separation.
Like consequences will result on the part of the interior
settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pursued
on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper
rule, why is not some better rule pointed out. No
one has yet ventured to attempt it. Congs. have
never been able to discover a better. No State as
far as he had heard, had suggested any other. In
1783, after elaborate discussion of a measure of
wealth all were satisfied then as they are now that
the rule of numbers, does not differ much from the
combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he

could not agree that property was the sole or primary
object of Govt. & society. The cultivation &
improvement of the human mind was the most noble
object. With respect to this object, as well as to
other personal rights, numbers were surely the natural
& precise measure of Representation. And
with respect to property, they could not vary much
from the precise measure. In no point of view however
could the establishmt. of numbers as the rule of
representation in the 1st. branch vary his opinion as
to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle into
the 2d. branch.—On the Question to strike out Wealth,
& to make the change as moved by Mr. Randolph, it
passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del divd.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Reed moved to insert after the word "divided,"
"or enlarged by addition of territory" which was
agreed to nem con. (his object probably was to provide
for such cases as an enlargemt. of Delaware by
annexing to it the Peninsula on the East side of the
Chesapeak.)

Adjourned.

Saturday, July 14. In Convention.

Mr. L. Martin called for the question on the whole
report, including the parts relating to the origination
of money bills, and the equality of votes in the 2d.
branch.

Mr. Gerry, wished before the question should be

put, that the attention of the House might be turned
to the dangers apprehended from Western States.
He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not
for putting ourselves in their hands. They will if
they acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will
oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the
Western Country. To guard agst. these consequences,
he thought it necessary to limit the number of new
States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner,
that they should never be able to outnumber
the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that
in order to secure the liberties of the States already
confederated, the number of Representatives in the
1st. branch, of the States which shall hereafter be established,
shall never exceed in number, the Representatives
from such of the States as shall accede
to this Confederation.

Mr. King, seconded the motion.

Mr. Sherman, thought there was no probability that
the number of future States would exceed that of the
Existing States. If the event should ever happen,
it was too remote to be taken into consideration at
this time. Besides We are providing for our posterity,
for our children & our grand Children; who
would be as likely to be citizens of new Western
States, as of the old States. On this consideration
alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as
was proposed by the motion.

Mr. Gerry. If some of our children should remove,
others will stay behind, and he thought it incumbent
on us to provide for their interests. There was a

rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the
Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining
behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants. Besides
foreigners are resorting to that Country, and it
is uncertain what turn things may take there.—On
the question for agreeing to the Motion of Mr. Gerry,
it passed in the negative.

Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Rutlidge proposed to reconsider the two propositions
touching the originating of money bills in
the first & the equality of votes in the second branch.

Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole at
once. It was he said a conciliatory plan, it had been
considered in all its parts, a great deal of time had
been spent upon it, and if any part should now be
altered, it would be necessary to go over the whole
ground again.

Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He
did not like many parts of it. He did not like having
two branches, nor the inequality of votes in the 1st.
branch. He was willing however to make trial of the
plan, rather than do nothing.

Mr. Wilson traced the progress of the report
through its several stages, remarking yt. when on the
question concerning an equality of votes, the House
was divided, our Constituents had they voted as
their representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 agst.
the equality, and 1/3 only in favor of it. This fact
would ere long be known, and it will appear that this
fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 agst. 2/3.

What hopes will our Constituents entertain when
they find that the essential principles of justice have
been violated in the outset of the Governmt. As to
the privilege of originating money bills, it was not
considered by any as of much moment, and by many
as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses wd. be
reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of
such critical importance, that every opportunity
ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting
the mind of the Convention upon it.

Mr. L. Martin denies that there were 2/3 agst. the
equality of votes. The States that please to call
themselves large, are the weekest in the Union. Look
at Masts. Look at Virga. Are they efficient States?
He was for letting a separation take place if they desired
it. He had rather there should be two Confederacies,
than one founded on any other principle
than an equality of votes in the 2d. branch at least.

Mr. Wilson was not surprised that those who say
that a minority is more than a majority should say
the minority is stronger than the majority. He supposed
the next assertion will be that they are richer
also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted
in when the States shall be called on for taxes
& troops.

Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martins remarks
on the weakness of Masts. He favored the reconsideration
with a view not of destroying the
equality of votes; but of providing that the States
should vote per Capita, which he said would prevent
the delays & inconveniences that had been experienced

in Congs. and would give a national aspect &
Spirit to the management of business. He did not
approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to
money bills. It was of great consequence. It was
the corner stone of the accommodation. If any
member of the Convention had the exclusive privilege
of making propositions, would any one say that it
would give him no advantage over other members.
The Report was not altogether to his mind. But he
would agree to it as it stood rather than throw it out
altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to

Mr. Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of
votes, the States should be represented in the 2d.
branch as follows: N. H. by 2 members. Mass. 4.
R. I. 1. Cont. 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. Pa. 4. Del. 1; Md.
3. Virga. 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the
whole 36.

Mr. Wilson seconds the motion

Mr. Dayton. The smaller States can never give up
their equality. For himself he would in no event
yield that security for their rights.

Mr. Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so
much as a Security for the small States; as for the
State Govts. which could not be preserved unless they
were represented & had a negative in the Genl. Government.
He had no objection to the members in
the 2d. b. voting per capita, as had been suggested by
(Mr. Gerry).

Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinkney
as a reasonable compromise.

Mr. Gerry said he should like the motion, but could
see no hope of success. An accommodation must
take place, and it was apparent from what had been
seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion.
He was utterly against a partial confederacy,
leaving other States to accede or not accede, as had
been intimated.

Mr. King said it was always with regret that he
differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to
differ from (Mr. Gerry) on this occasion. He considered
the proposed Government as substantially
and formally, a General and National Government
over the people of America. There never will be a
case in which it will act as a federal Government on
the States and not on the individual Citizens. And
is it not a clear principle that in a free Govt. those
who are to be the objects of a Govt. ought to influence
the operations of it? What reason can be assigned
why the same rule of representation sd. not prevail in
the 2d. branch as in the 1st? He could conceive none.
On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented
itself, seemed to require it. Two objections
had been raised agst. it, drawn 1. from the terms of the
existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the
smaller States.—As to the first objection he thought
it inapplicable. According to the existing Confederation,
the rule by which the public burdens is to be
apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the
proposed Governt. it cannot be fixed, because indirect
taxation is to be substituted. The Legislature
therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in

such modes & proportions as they may judge expedient.
As to the 2d. objection, he thought it of as
little weight. The Genl. Governt. can never wish to intrude
on the State Governts. There could be no temptation.
None had been pointed out. In order to
prevent the interference of measures which seemed
most likely to happen, he would have no objection to
throwing all the State debts into the federal debt,
making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of
dollars, and leaving it to be discharged by the Genl.
Govt. According to the idea of securing the State
Govts. there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 2d. was admitted to be necessary, and
was actually meant, to check the 1st. branch, to give
more wisdom, system, & stability to the Govt. and
ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to
be proportioned to them. For the third purpose of
securing the States, there ought then to be a 3d. branch,
representing the States as such, and guarding by
equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not
pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate
Constituents as his colleagues, but it was his
firm belief that Masts. would never be prevailed on to
yield to an equality of votes. In N. York, (he was
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that
State in the absence of its representatives, but the
occasion required it), in N. York he had seen that the
most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents
to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was
pointed agst. the vicious constitution of Congs. with
regard to representation & suffrage. He was sure
that no Govt. could last that was not founded on just
principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an
allowance of an equal vote to all the States. It
would be better he thought to submit to a little more
confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an
evil. It was difficult to say what the views of different
Gentlemen might be. Perhaps there might be
some who thought no Governmt. co-extensive with
the U. States could be established with a hope of its
answering the purpose. Perhaps there might be
other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we
are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid
that Gentlemen should speak out that we might
understand one another.

Mr. Strong. The Convention had been much divided
in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences
of it, an accommodation had been proposed.
A Committee had been appointed: and though some
of the members of it were averse to an equality of
votes, a Report had been made in favor of it. It is
agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an
end. If no Accommodation takes place, the Union
itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested
that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a Scheme
of Government. But will the small States in that
case ever accede it. Is it probable that the large
States themselves will under such circumstances embrace
and ratify it. He thought the small States
had made a considerable concession in the article of
money bills, and that they might naturally expect

some concessions on the other side. From this view
of the matter he was compelled to give his vote for
the Report taken altogether.

Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the
proper foundation of Governmt. was destroyed, by
substituting an equality in place of a proportional
Representation, no proper superstructure would be
raised. If the small States really wish for a Government
armed with the powers necessary to secure
their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger
members as well as themselves he could not help
thinking them extremely mistaken in their means.
He reminded them of the consequences of laying the
existing Confederation on improper principles. All
the principal parties to its compilation joined immediately
in mutilating & fettering the Governmt. in
such a manner that it has disappointed every hope
placed in it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments
used by themselves on a former occasion. It
had been very properly observed by (Mr. Patterson)
that Representation was an expedient by which the
meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary;
And that the representatives ought
therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which
their constituents if convened would respectively
have Was not this remark as applicable to one
branch of the Representation as to the other? But
it had been said that the Governt. would in its operation
be partly federal, partly national; that altho' in
the latter respect the Representatives of the people
ought to be in proportion to the people; yet in the

former it ought to be according to the number of
States. If there was any solidity in this distinction
he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it
ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Genl.
Governmt is to act on the people, let the people be
represented and the votes be proportional. In all
cases where the Governt. is to act on the States as
such in like manner as Congs. now acts on them, let
the States be represented & the votes be equal.
This was the true ground of compromise if there was
any ground at all. But he denied that there was any
ground. He called for a single instance in which the
Genl. Govt. was not to operate on the people individually.
The practicability of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had
been exploded on all hands. He observed that the
people of the large States would in some way or
other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to
the importance accruing from their superior numbers.
If they could not effect it by a proportional representation
in the Govt. they would probably accede to
no Govt. which did not in a great measure depend for
its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation; in which
case they would indirectly secure their object. The
existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of
the Genl. Govt. were to be executed by the particular
Govts. the latter had a weight in proportion to their
importance. No one would say that either in Congs.
or out of Congs. Delaware had equal weight with
Pennsylva. If the latter was to supply ten times as
much money as the former, and no compulsion could
be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she
should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch
confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal.
But Holland which supplies about half the money,
governed the whole republic. He enumerated the
objections agst. an equality of votes in the 2d. branch,
notwithstanding the proportional representation in
the first, 1. the minority could negative the will of
the majority of the people. 2. they could extort
measures by making them a condition of their assent
to other necessary measures. 3. they could
obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the
peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate.
4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would increase
with every new State that should be admitted,
as they must all be admitted on the principle of
equality. 5. the perpetuity it would give to the
preponderance of the Northn. agst. the Southn. Scale
was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be
pretty well understood that the real difference of interests
lay, not between the large & small but between
the N. & Southn. States. The institution of
slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination.
There were 5 States on the South, 8 on
the Northn. side of this line. Should a proport1. representation
take place it was true, the N. side would still
outnumber the other; but not in the same degree, at
this time; and every day would tend towards an
equilibrium.

Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If equality
in the 2d. branch was an error that time would

correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it being
sensible that perfection was unattainable in any
plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual
error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in
the Representation, like an error in the first concoction,
must be followed by disease, convulsions,
and finally death itself. The justice of the general
principle of proportional representation has not in
argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is
said that a departure from it so far as to give the
States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature
is essential to their preservation. He had considered
this position maturely, but could not see its application.
That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.
But does it follow that an equality of votes
is necessary for the purpose? Is there any reason to
suppose that if their preservation should depend
more on the large than on the small States the security
of the States agst. the Genl. Government would be
diminished? Are the large States less attached to
their existence more likely to commit suicide, than
the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as
far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections
to this insuperable one: The great fault of
the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has
never been a complaint agst. Congs. that they governed
over much. The complaint has been that they
have governed too little. To remedy this defect we
were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing
an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this
very equality carries us directly to Congress; to the
system which it is our duty to rectify. The small
States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality,
but they may controul the Govt. as they have done
in Congs. This very measure is here prosecuted by a
minority of the people of America. Is then the object
of the Convention likely to be accomplished in
this way? Will not our Constituents say? we sent
you to form an efficient Govt. and you have given
us one more complex indeed, but having all the
weakness of the former governt. He was anxious
for uniting all the States under one Governt. He
knew there were some respectable men who preferred
three confederacies, united by offensive & defensive
alliances. Many things may be plausibly
said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such
a project. He could not however concur in it himself;
but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad
first principles.

Mr. Elseworth asked two questions, one of Mr. Wilson,
whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in
Congs. for want of a majority of States in its favor?
He had himself never known such an instance: the
other of Mr. Madison whether a negative lodged with
the majority of the States even the smallest, could
be more dangerous than the qualified negative proposed
to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate,
who must be taken from some one State?

Mr. Sherman, signified that his expectation was
that the Genl. Legislature would in some cases act on
the federal principle, of requiring quotas. But he
thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own

plans into execution, if the States should fail to
supply their respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinkney's motion
for allowing N. H. 2. Mas. 4. &c—it passed in
the negative,

Mass. no. Mr. King ay. Mr. Ghorum absent. Cont.
no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Adjourned.[126]

Monday, July 16. In Convention.

On the question for agreeing to the whole Report
as amended & including the equality of votes in the
2d. branch, it passed in the affirmative.

Mass. divided Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong. ay. Mr. King,
Mr. Ghorum no. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. no. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. Mr. Spraight no S.
C. no Geo. no.

The whole thus passed is in the words following,
viz. "Resolved, that in the orginal formation of the
Legislature of the U. S. the first branch thereof
shall consist of sixty five members, of which number
N. Hampshire shall send 3. Massts. 8. Rh. I. 1.
Connt. 5. N. Y. 6. N. J. 4. Pena. 8. Del. 1.
Maryd. 6. Virga. 10. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Geo. 3.—
But as the present situation of the States may probably
alter in the number of their inhabitants, the
Legislature of the U. S. shall be authorized from time
to time to apportion the number of Reps: and in case
any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged
by addition of territory, or any two or more
States united, or any new States created within the
limits of the U. S. the Legislature of the U. S. shall
possess authority to regulate the number of Reps. in
any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their
number of inhabitants, according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned namely—provided always that
representation ought to be proportioned according
to direct taxation; and in order to ascertain the
alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required

from time to time by the changeś in the relative
circumstances of the States—

Resolved, that a Census be taken within six years
from the 1st. meeting of the Legislature of the U. S.,
and once within the term of every 10 years afterwards
of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner
and according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their Resolution of April 18. 1783, and
that the Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the
direct taxation accordingly—

Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of officers of the
Govt. of the U. S. shall originate in the first branch
of the Legislature of the U. S. and shall not be altered
or amended in the 2d. branch: and that no money
shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance
of appropriations to be originated in the 1st.
branch.

Resolvd., that in the 2d. branch of the Legislature
of the U. S., each State shall have an equal
vote.

The 6th. Resol: in the Report from the Come. of the
whole House, which had been postponed in order to
consider the 7 & 8th Resolns.; was now resumed. see
the Resoln.:

The 1st. member "That the Natl. Legislature ought
to possess the Legislative Rights vested in Congs. by
the Confederation" was agreed to nem. con.

The next, "And moreover to legislate in all cases to
which the separate States are incompetent; or in
which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted

by the exercise of individual legislation," being read
for a question

Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the extent
of this power; particularly of the word incompetent.
The vagueness of the terms rendered it impossible
for any precise judgment to be formed.

Mr. Ghorum. The vagueness of the terms constitutes
the propriety of them. We are now establishing
general principles, to be extended hereafter
into details which will be precise & explicit.

Mr. Rutlidge, urged the objection started by Mr.
Butler and moved that the clause should be committed
to the end that a specification of the powers
comprised in the general terms, might be reported.

On the question for commitment, the States were
equally divided

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay: So
it was lost.

Mr. Randolph. The vote of this morning (involving
an equality of suffrage in 2d. branch) had embarrassed
the business extremely. All the powers
given in the Report from the Come. of the whole, were
founded on the supposition that a Proportional representation
was to prevail in both branches of the
Legislature. When he came here this morning his
purpose was to have offered some propositions that
might if possible have united a great majority of
votes, and particularly might provide agst. the danger
suspected on the part of the smaller States, by enumerating
the cases in which it might lie, and allowing

an equality of votes in such cases.[127] But finding from
the Preceding vote that they persist in demanding
an equal vote in all cases, that they have succeeded
in obtaining it, and that N. York, if present would
probably be on the same side, he could not but think
we were unprepared to discuss this subject further.
It will probably be in vain to come to any final decision
with a bare majority on either side. For these
reasons he wished the Convention might adjourn, that
the large States might consider the steps proper to
be taken in the present solemn crisis of the business,
and that the small States might also deliberate on
the means of conciliation.

Mr. Patterson, thought with Mr. R. that it was high
time for the Convention to adjourn that the rule of
secrecy ought to be rescinded, and that our Constituents
should be consulted. No conciliation could
be admissible on the part of the smaller States on any
other ground than that of an equality of votes in the
2d. branch. If Mr. Randolph would reduce to form
his motion for an adjournment sine die, he would
second it with all his heart.

Genl. Pinkney wished to know of Mr. R. whether he
meant an adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment
for the day. If the former was meant, it differed
much from his idea. He could not think of going to
S. Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides
it was chimerical to suppose that the States if consulted
would ever accord separately, and beforehand.

Mr. Randolph, had never entertained an idea of an
adjournment sine die; & was sorry that his meaning
had been so readily & strangely misinterpreted. He
had in view merely an adjournment till to-morrow,
in order that some conciliatory experiment might if
possible be devised, and that in case the smaller
States should continue to hold back, the larger might
then take such measures, he would not say what, as
might be necessary.

Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till tomorrow,
as an opportunity seemed to be wished by
the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory
expedients.

On the question for adjourning till tomorrow, the
States were equally divided,

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no, so it
was lost.

Mr. Broome thought it his duty to declare his
opinion agst. an adjournment sine die, as had been
urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure he thought
would be fatal. Something must be done by the
Convention, tho' it should be by a bare majority.

Mr. Gerry observed that Masts. was opposed to an
adjournment, because they saw no new ground of
compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion of
so many States that a trial shd. be made, the State
would now concur in the adjournmt.

Mr. Rutlidge could see no need of an adjournt. because
he could see no chance of a compromise. The
little States were fixt. They had repeatedly &

solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the
large States then had to do was to decide whether
they would yield or not. For his part he conceived
that altho' we could not do what we thought best, in
itself, we ought to do something. Had we not better
keep the Govt. up a little longer, hoping that another
Convention will supply our omissions, than abandon
every thing to hazard. Our Constituents will be very
little satisfied with us if we take the latter course.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. King renewed the motion to
adjourn till tomorrow.

On the question. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay.
Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. divd.

Adjourned

On the morning following before the hour of the
Convention a number of the members from the larger
States, by common agreement met for the purpose
of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence
of the vote in favor of an equal Representation
in the 2d. branch, and the apparent inflexibility
of the smaller States on that point. Several members
from the latter States also attended. The time
was wasted in vague conversation on the subject,
without any specific proposition or agreement. It
appeared indeed that the opinions of the members
who disliked the equality of votes differed much as
to the importance of that point, and as to the policy
of risking a failure of any general act of the Convention
by inflexibly opposing it. Several of them

supposing that no good Governmt. could or would be
built on that foundation, and that as a division of the
convention into two opinions was unavoidable; it
would be better that the side comprising the principal
States, and a majority of the people of America,
should propose a scheme of Govt. to the States, than
that a scheme should be proposed on the other side,
would have concurred in a firm opposition to the
smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if
eventually necessary. Others seemed inclined to
yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an
Act however imperfect & exceptionable, as might be
agreed on by the Convention as a body, tho' decided
by a bare majority of States and by a minority of the
people of the U. States. It is probable that the result
of this consultation satisfied the smaller States
that they had nothing to apprehend from a Union of
the larger, in any plan whatever agst. the equality of
votes in the 2d. branch.

Tuesday July 17. in Convention.

Mr. Governr. Morris, moved to reconsider the whole
Resolution agreed to yesterday concerning the constitution
of the 2 branches of the Legislature. His
object was to bring the House to a consideration in
the abstract of the powers necessary to be vested in
the general Government. It had been said, Let us
know how the Govt. is to be modelled, and then we
can determine what powers can be properly given to
it. He thought the most eligible course was, first

to determine on the necessary powers, and then so to
modify the Governt. as that it might be justly & properly
enabled to administer them. He feared if we
proceeded to a consideration of the powers, whilst
the vote of yesterday including an equality of the
States in the 2d. branch, remained in force, a reference
to it, either mental or expressed, would mix itself
with the merits of every question concerning the
powers.—This motion was not seconded. (It was
probably approved by several members who either
despaired of success, or were apprehensive that the
attempt would inflame the jealousies of the smaller
States.)

The 6th. Resoln. in the Report of the Come. of the
Whole relating to the powers, which had been postponed
in order to consider the 7 & 8th. relating to
the constitution of the Natl. Legislature, was now
resumed.

Mr. Sherman observed that it would be difficult to
draw the line between the powers of the Genl. Legislature,
and those to be left with the States; that he
did not like the definition contained in the Resolution,
and proposed in place of the words "individual legislation"
line 4. inclusive, to insert "to make laws
binding on the people of the United States in all cases
which may concern the common interests of the
Union; but not to interfere with the Government of
the individual States in any matters of internal
police which respect the Govt. of such States only,
and wherein the general welfare of the U. States is
not concerned."

Mr. Wilson 2ded. the amendment as better expressing
the general principle.

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed it. The internal police,
as it would be called & understood by the States
ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of
paper money & other tricks by which Citizens of
other States may be affected.

Mr. Sherman, in explanation of his idea read an
enumeration of powers, including the power of levying
taxes on trade, but not the power of direct
taxation.

Mr. Govr. Morris remarked the omission, and inferred
that for the deficiencies of taxes on consumption,
it must have been the meaning of Mr. Sherman,
that the Genl. Govt. should recur to quotas & requisitions,
which are subversive of the idea of Govt.

Mr. Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration
did not include direct taxation. Some provision he
supposed must be made for supplying the deficiency
of other taxation, but he had not formed any.

On Question on Mr. Sherman's motion it passed in
the negative

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Bedford moved that the 2d. member of Resolution
6. be so altered as to read, "and moreover
to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in those to which the States are
severally incompetent, "or in which the harmony
of the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise
of individual Legislation."

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ds. the motion

Mr. Randolph. This is a formidable idea indeed.
It involves the power of violating all the laws and
constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling with
their police. The last member of the sentence is
also superfluous, being included in the first.

Mr. Bedford. It is not more extensive or formidable
than the clause as it stands: no State being
separately competent to legislate for the general
interest of the Union.

On question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's motion it
passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the
affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The next. "To negative all laws passed by the
several States contravening in the opinion of the
Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties
subsisting under the authority of ye. Union."

Mr. Govr. Morris opposed this power as likely to be
terrible to the States, and not necessary, if sufficient
Legislative authority should be given to the Genl.
Government.

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary; as the Courts
of the States would not consider as valid any law
contravening the Authority of the Union, and which
the legislature would wish to be negatived.

Mr. L. Martin considered the powèr as improper &

inadmissible. Shall all the laws of the States be sent
up to the Genl. Legislature before they shall be permitted
to operate?

Mr. Madison, considered the negative on the laws
of the States as essential to the efficacy & security
of the Genl. Govt. The necessity of a general Govt.
proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue
their particular interests in opposition to the general
interest. This propensity will continue to disturb
the system, unless effectually controuled. Nothing
short of a negative on their laws will controul it.
They will pass laws which will accomplish their injurious
objects before they can be repealed by the
Genl. Legislre. or be set aside by the National Tribunals.
Confidence can not be put in the State Tribunals
as guardians of the National authority and
interests. In all the States these are more or less dependt.
on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed
annually by the Legislature. In R. Island
the Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional
law were displaced, and others substituted, by
the Legislature who would be the willing instruments
of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A
power of negativing the improper laws of the States
is at once the most mild & certain means of preserving
the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently
displayed in the British system. Nothing
could maintain the harmony & subordination of the
various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by
which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of
every part tending to discord or encroachment. It

is true the prerogative is sometimes misapplied thro'
ignorance or a partiality to one particular part of ye.
empire; but we have not the same reason to fear such
misapplications in our System. As to the sending
all laws up to the Natl. Legisl: that might be rendered
unnecessary by some emanation of the power
into the States, so far at least as to give a temporary
effect to laws of immediate necessity.

Mr. Govr. Morris was more & more opposed to the
negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the
States. A law that ought to be negatived will be set
aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security
should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.

Mr. Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong
principle, to wit, that a law of a State contrary to the
articles of the Union would if not negatived, be valid
& operative.

Mr. Pinkney urged the necessity of the Negative.

On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing
laws of States &c. it passed in the negative.

Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. Luther Martin moved the following resolution
"that the Legislative acts of the U. S. made by virtue
& in pursuance of the articles of Union, and all
Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the
U. S. shall be the supreme law of the respective
States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to
the said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants—&
that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the

respective laws of the individual States to the contrary
notwithstanding" which was agreed to nem:
con:

9th. Resol: "that Natl. Executive consist of a
single person," Agd. to nem. con.

"To be chosen by the National Legisl:"

Mr. Governr. Morris was pointedly agst. his being so
chosen. He will be the mere creature of the Legisl:
if appointed & impeachable by that body. He
ought to be elected by the people at large, by the
freeholders of the Country. That difficulties attend
this mode, he admits. But they have been found
superable in N. Y. & in Cont. and would he believed
be found so, in the case of an Executive for the U.
States. If the people should elect, they will never
fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or
services; some man, if he might so speak, of continental
reputation. If the Legislature elect, it will
be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it
will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of
cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the
appointment. He moved to strike out "National
Legislature," & insert "citizens of the U. S."

Mr. Sherman thought that the sense of the Nation
would be better expressed by the Legislature, than
by the people at large. The latter will never be
sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will
never give a majority of votes to any one man. They
will generally vote for some man in their own State,
and the largest State will have the best chance for
the appointment. If the choice be made by the

Legislre. a majority of voices may be made necessary
to constitute an election.

Mr. Wilson. Two arguments have been urged
agst. an election of the Executive Magistrate by the
people. 1 the example of Poland where an Election
of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the most
dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were
totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources
& dependants which enable them to appear in force,
and to threaten the Republic as well as each other.
In the next place the electors all assemble in one
place; which would not be the case with us. The
2d. argt. is that a majority of the people would never
concur. It might be answered that the concurrence
of a majority of the people is not a necessary principle
of election, nor required as such in any of the
States. But allowing the objection all its force, it
may be obviated by the expedient used in Massts.,
where the Legislature by majority of voices, decide
in case a majority of people do not concur in
favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain
the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent
in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular
objection with him agst. an absolute election by
the Legislre. was that the Exec: in that case would be
too dependent to stand the mediator between the
intrigues & sinister views of the Representatives and
the general liberties & interests of the people.

Mr. Pinkney did not expect this question would
again have been brought forward: An Election by
the people being liable to the most obvious & striking

objections. They will be led by a few active & designing
men. The most populous States by combining
in favor of the same individual will be able to
carry their points. The Natl. Legislature being most
immediately interested in the laws made by themselves,
will be most attentive to the choice of a fit
man to carry them properly into execution.

Mr. Govr. Morris. It is said that in case of an election
by the people the populous States will combine
& elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The
people of such States cannot combine. If there be
any combination it must be among their representatives
in the Legislature. It is said the people will be
led by a few designing men. This might happen in
a small district. It can never happen throughout
the continent. In the election of a Govr. of N. York,
it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the
activity & intrigues of little partizans are successful,
but the general voice of the State is never influenced
by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be
uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of
what passed in the Legislative Conclave, if the election
were to be made there; but they will not be uninformed
of those great & illustrious characters which
have merited their esteem & confidence. If the
Executive be chosen by the Nat1. Legislature, he will
not be independent on it; and if not independent,
usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature
will be the consequence. This was the case in England
in the last Century. It has been the case in
Holland where their Senates have engrossed all

power. It has been the case every where. He was
surprised that an election by the people at large
should ever have been likened to the polish election
of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature
will bear a real likeness to the election by the
Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in
both cases, and the corruption & cabal wch. are known
to characterize the one would soon find their way
into the other. Appointments made by numerous
bodies, are always worse than those made by
single responsible individuals, or by the people at
large.

Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different
language held at different times. At one moment
we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough
confidence, and to indefinite power. At another,
that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption,
and cannot be trusted at all. But not to dwell
on this inconsistency he would observe that a Government
which is to last ought at least to be practicable.
Would this be the case if the proposed election
should be left to the people at large. He conceived
it would be as unnatural to refer the choice
of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the
people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a
blind man. The extent of the Country renders it
impossible that the people can have the requisite
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the
Candidates.

Mr. Wilson, could not see the contrariety stated (by
Col. Mason.) The Legislre. might deserve confidence

in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts
which were to affect them & yr. Constituents precisely
alike confidence was due. In others jealousy
was warranted. The appointment to great offices,
where the Legislre. might feel many motives, not common
to the public confidence was surely misplaced.
This branch of business it was notorious, was the
most corruptly managed of any that had been committed
to legislative bodies.

Mr. Williamson, conceived that there was the same
difference between an election in this case, by the
people and by the legislature, as between an appt. by
lot, and by choice. There are at present distinguished
characters, who are known perhaps to almost every
man. This will not always be the case. The people
will be sure to vote for some man in their own State,
and the largest State will be sure to succeed. This
will not be Virga. however. Her slaves will have no
suffrage. As the Salary of the Executive will be
fixed, and he will not be eligible a 2d. time, there will
not be such a dependence on the Legislature as has
been imagined.

Question on an election by the people instead of
the Legislature, which passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen
by Electors appointed by the several Legislatures
of the individual States.

Mr. Broome 2ds. On the Question, it passed in the
negative

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question on the words, "to be ehosen by
the Nationl. Legislature" it passed unanimously in
the affirmative

"For the term of seven years "—postponed nem.
con. on motion of Mr. Houston and Gov. Morris

"to carry into execution the nationl. laws"—
agreed to nem. con.

"to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided
for,"—agreed to nem. con.

"to be ineligible a second time"—Mr. Houston
moved to strike out this clause.

Mr. Sherman 2ds. the motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility
proposed by the clause as it stood tended
to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the
hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was
saying to him, make hay while the sun shines.

On the question for striking out, as moved by Mr.
Houston, it passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo, ay.

"For the term of 7 years," resumed.

Mr. Broom was for a shorter term since the Executive
Magistrate was now to be re-eligible. Had he
remained ineligible a 2d. time, he should have preferred
a longer term.

Docr. McClurg moved[128] to strike out 7 years, and

insert "during good behavior." By striking out the
words declaring him not re-eligible, he was put into a
situation that would keep him dependent forever on
the Legislature; and he conceived the independence
of the Executive to be equally essential with that of
the Judiciary department.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion. He expressed
great pleasure in hearing it. This was the way to
get a good Government. His fear that so valuable
an ingredient would not be attained had led him to
take the part he had done. He was indifferent how
the Executive should be chosen, provided he held
his place by this tenure.

Mr. Broome highly approved the motion. It obviated
all his difficulties

Mr. Sherman considered such a tenure as by no
means safe or admissible. As the Executive Magistrate
is now re-eligible, he will be on good behavior
as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well he
will be continued; if otherwise, displaced, on a
succeeding election.

Mr. Madison.[129] If it be essential to the preservation
of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary
powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance
of the separation, that they should be independent of

each other. The Executive could not be independent
of the Legislure, if dependent on the pleasure of
that branch for a re-appointment. Why was it
determined that the Judges should not hold their
places by such a tenure? Because they might be
tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue
complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the
virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws. In
like manner a dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as
the maker of laws; & then according to the observation
of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made
that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner.
There was an analogy between the Executive &
Judiciary departments in several respects. The latter
executed the laws in certain cases as the former
did in others. The former expounded & applied
them for certain purposes, as the latter did for
others. The difference between them seemed to
consist chiefly in two circumstances—1. the collective
interest & security were much more in the power
belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary
department. 2. in the administration of the former
much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion
than in the administration of the latter. But
if the 2d. consideration proves that it will be more
difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for
trying the Execut: than the Judges, & forms an objection
to the same tenure of office, both considerations
prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer
a Union between the Executive & Legisl: powers,
than between the Judiciary & Legislative powers.
He conceived it to be absolutely necessary to a well
constituted Republic that the two first shd. be kept
distinct & independent of each other. Whether the
plan proposed by the motion was a proper one was
another question, as it depended on the practicability
of instituting a tribunal for impeachmts. as certain &
as adequate in the one case as in the other. On the
other hand, respect for the mover entitled his proposition
to a fair hearing & discussion, until a less
objectionable expedient should be applied for guarding
agst. a dangerous union of the Legislative & Executive
departments.

Col. Mason. This motion was made some time ago
& negatived by a very large majority. He trusted
that it wd. be again negatived. It wd. be impossible
to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as to
subject it to a proper trial; and perhaps still more
impossible to compel so high an offender holding his
office by such a tenure to submit to a trial. He considered
an Executive during good behavior as a
softer name only for an Executive for life. And that
the next would be an easy step to hereditary Monarchy.
If the motion should finally succeed, he
might himself live to see such a Revolution. If he
did not it was probable his children or grand children
would. He trusted there were few men in that
House who wished for it. No state he was sure had
so far revolted from Republican principles as to have
the least bias in its favor.

Mr. Madison, was not apprehensive of being thought

to favor any step towards monarchy. The real
object with him was to prevent its introduction.
Experience had proved a tendency in our governments
to throw all power into the Legislative vortex.
The Executives of the States are in general little
more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent.
lf no effectual check be devised for restraining the
instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution
of some kind or other would be inevitable. The
preservation of Republican Govt. therefore required
some expedient for the purpose, but required evidently
at the same time that in devising it, the
genuine principles of that form should be kept in
view.

Mr. Govr. Morris was as little a friend to monarchy
as any gentleman. He concurred in the opinion that
the way to keep out monarchical Govt. was to establish
such a Repub. Govt. as wd. make the people happy
and prevent a desire of change.

Docr. McClurg was not so much afraid of the shadow
of monarchy as to be unwilling to approach it; nor
so wedded to Republican Govt. as not to be sensible
of the tyrannies that had been & may be exercised
under that form. It was an essential object with
him to make the Executive independent of the Legislature;
and the only mode left for effecting it, after
the vote destroying his ineligibility a second time,
was to appoint him during good behavior.

On the question for inserting "during good behavior"
in place of '7 years (with a re-eligibility)'
it passed in the negative,

Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[130]

On the motion "to strike out seven years" it
passed in the negative,

Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.[131]

It was now unanimously agreed that the vote
which had struck out the words "to be ineligible a
second time" should be reconsidered to-morrow.

Adjd.

Wednesday July 18. In Convention.

On motion of Mr. L. Martin to fix tomorrow for reconsidering
the vote concerning "eligibility of the
Exective. a 2d. time" it passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. absent. Pa. ay. Del.

ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
absent.

The residue of the Resol. 9. concerning the Executive
was postpd. till tomorrow.

Resol. 10. that Executive sh1. have a right to negative
legislative acts not afterwards passed by 2/3 of
each branch, agreed to nem. con.

Resol. 11. "that a Nat1. Judiciary shall be estabd. to
consist of one supreme tribunal," agd. to nem. con.

"The judges of which to be appointd. by the 2d.
branch of the Natl. Legislature,"

Mr. Ghorum, wd. prefer an appointment by the 2d.
branch to an appointmt. by the whole Legislature;
but he thought even that branch too numerous, and
too little personally responsible, to ensure a good
choice. He suggested that the Judges be appointed
by the Execuve. with the advice & consent of the 2d.
branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of
Masts. This mode had been long practised in that
country, & was found to answer perfectly well.

Mr. Wilson, still wd. prefer an appointmt. by the Executive;
but if that could not be attained, wd. prefer in
the next place, the mode suggested by Mr. Ghorum.
He thought it his duty however to move in the first
instance "that the Judges be appointed by the
Executive." Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion.

Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appt. by the 2d.
branch. Being taken from all the States it wd. be
best informed of characters & most capable of making
a fit choice.

Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr.

Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused,
which would be more likely to be attended to by the
2d. branch, than by the Executive.

Mr. Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges
may depend in some degree on the mode of trying
impeachments of the Executive. If the Judges
were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely
ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There
were insuperable objections besides agst. referring the
appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as
one, that as the Seat of Govt. must be in some one
State, and as the Executive would remain in office
for a considerable time, for 4. 5. or 6 years at least, he
would insensibly form local & personal attachments
within the particular State that would deprive equal
merit elsewhere, of an equal chance of promotion.

Mr. Ghorum. As the Executive will be responsible
in point of character at least, for a judicious and
faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to
look through all the States for proper characters.
The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments
at the seat of Govt. where they reside, as the
Executive. If they cannot get the man of the particular
State to which they may respectively belong,
they will be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies
feel no personal responsibility, and give full play to
intrigue & cabal. Rh. Island is a full illustration of
the insensibility to character produced by a participation
of numbers in dishonorable measures, and of
the length to which a Public body may carry wickedness
& cabal.

Mr. Govr. Morris supposed it would be improper for
an impeachmt. of the Executive to be tried before the
Judges. The latter would in such case be drawn
into intrigues with the Legislature and an impartial
trial would be frustrated. As they wd. be much
about the Seat of Govt. they might even be previously
consulted & arrangements might be made for
a prosecution of the Executive, He thought therefore
that no argument could be drawn from the probability
of such a plan of impeachments agst. the
motion before the House.

Mr. Madison suggested that the Judges might be
appointed by the Executive, with the concurrence
of 1/3 at least, of the 2d. branch. This would unite the
advantage of responsibility in the Executive with
the security afforded in the 2d. branch agst. any incautious
or corrupt nomination by the Executive.

Mr. Sherman, was clearly for an election by the
Senate. It would be composed of men nearly equal
to the Executive, and would of course have on the
whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations
a more diffusive knowledge of characters.
It would be less easy for candidates to intrigue with
them, than with the Executive Magistrate. For these
reasons he thought there would be a better security for
a proper choice in the Senate than in the Executive.

Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appt. of
the Judges was vested in the 2d. branch an equality
of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had
rather leave the appointmt. there than give it to the
Executive. He thought the advantage of personal

responsibility might be gained in the Senate by requiring
the respective votes of the members to be entered
on the Journal. He thought too that the hope
of receiving appts. would be more diffusive if they
depended on the Senate, the members of which wd.
be diffusively known, than if they depended on a
single man who could not be personally known to a
very great extent; and consequently that opposition
to the System, would be so far weakened.

Mr. Bedford thought there were solid reasons agst.
leaving the appointment to the Executive. He
must trust more to information than the Senate. It
would put it in his power to gain over the larger
States, by gratifying them with a preference of their
Citizens. The responsibility of the Executive so
much talked of was chimerical. He could not be
punished for mistakes.

Mr. Ghorum remarked that the Senate could have
no better information than the Executive. They
must like him, trust to information from the members
belonging to the particular State where the candidate
resided. The Executive would certainly be
more answerable for a good appointment, as the
whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone.
He did not mean that he would be answerable under
any other penalty than that of public censure, which
with honorable minds was a sufficient one.

On the question for referring the appointment of
the Judges to the Executive, instead of the 2d. branch

Mas. ay. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. absent.

Mr. Ghorum moved "that the Judges be nominated
and appointed by the Executive, by & with the
advice & consent of the 2d. branch & every such nomination
shall be made at least—days prior to such
appointment." This mode he said had been ratified
by the experience of a 140 years in Massachusts.. If
the appt. should be left to either branch of the Legislature,
it will be a mere piece of jobbing.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. & supported the motion.

Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an
absolute appointment by the Executive; but disliked
it, as too much fettering the Senate.

Question on Mr. Ghorum's motion

Mas. ay. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. absent.

Mr. Madison moved that the Judges should be
nominated by the Executive & such nomination
should become an appointment if not disagreed to
within—days by 2/3 of the 2d. branch.

Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion. By com̃on consent
the consideration of it was postponed till tomorrow.

"To hold their offices during good behavior" &
" to receive fixed salaries" agreed to nem: con:.

"In which (salaries of Judges) no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
at the time in office."

Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "or increase."
He thought the Legislature ought to be at liberty to
increase salaries as circumstances might require, and
that this would not create any improper dependence
in the Judges.

Docr. Franklin was in favor of the motion. Money
may not only become plentier, but the business of the
department may increase as the Country becomes
more populous.

Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the
increase alone should be permitted, but it will be improper
even so far to permit a dependence. Whenever
an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be
in agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance
in the former may be felt towards the latter. If at
such a crisis there should be in Court suits to which
leading members of the Legislature may be parties,
the Judges will be in a situation which ought not to
be suffered, if it can be prevented. The variations
in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by taking
for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent
value. The increase of business will be provided
for by an increase of the number who are to do
it. An increase of salaries may easily be so contrived
as not to affect persons in office.

Mr. Govr. Morris. The value of money may not
only alter but the State of Society may alter. In
this event the same quantity of wheat, the same
value would not be the same compensation. The
Amount of salaries must always be regulated by the
manners & the style of living in a Country. The increase
of business can not be provided for in the supreme
tribunal in the way that has been mentioned.
All the business of a certain description whether
more or less must be done in that single tribunal.
Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for

additional business. Additional compensation therefore
ought not to be prohibited.

On the question for striking out "or increase"

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. absent

The whole clause as amended was then agreed to
nem: con:

12. Resol: "that Nat1. Legislature be empowered
to appoint inferior tribunals"

Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals.
The State Tribunals might do the business.

Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies
& oppositions in the State tribunals, with the
jurisdiction of which they will interfere.

Mr. Ghorum. There are in the States already federal
Courts with jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c.
committed on the Seas. No complaints have been
made by the States or the Courts of the States. Inferior
tribunals are essential to render the authority
of the Nat1. Legislature effectual.

Mr. Randolph observed that the Courts of the States
can not be trusted with the administration of the National
laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as
will often place the General & local policy at variance.

Mr. Govr. Morris urged also the necessity of such a
provision.

Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the
Legislature but wished them to make use of the
State Tribunals whenever it could be done with
safety to the general interest.

Col. Mason thought many circumstances might

arise not now to be foreseen, which might render
such a power absolutely necessary.

On question for agreeing to 12. Resol: empowering
the National Legislature to appoint "inferior
tribunals," Agd. to nem. con.

"Impeachments of national officers," were struck
out on motion for the purpose.

13. Resol:" The jurisdiction of the Natl. Judiciary."
Several criticisms having been made on the definition;
it was proposed by Mr. Madison so to alter it as
to read thus—"that the jurisdiction shall extend to
all cases arising under the Nat1. laws; And to such
other questions as may involve the Nat1. peace &
harmony," which was agreed to, nem. con.

Resol. 14. providing for the admission of new
States agreed to, nem. con.

Resol. 15. that provision ought to be made for the
continuance of Congs. &c. & for the completion of
their engagements."

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the assumption of their
engagements might as well be omitted; and that
Congs. ought not to be continued till all the States
should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient
to give effect to it whenever a certain number
of States shall adopt it.

Mr. Madison the clause can mean nothing more
than that provision ought to be made for preventing
an interregnum; which must exist in the interval
between the adoption of the New Govt. and the commencement
of its operation, if the old Govt. should
cease on the first of these events.

Mr. Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner
in which the clause relating to the engagements of
Congs. was expressed; but he thought some provision
on the subject would be proper in order to prevent
any suspicion that the obligations of the
Confederacy might be dissolved along with the
Governt. under which they were contracted.

On the question on the 1st. part—relating to the
continuance of Congs.

Mas. no. Cont. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.[132] ay. Geo. no.

The 2d. part as to completion of their engagements,
disagd. to, nem. con.

Resol. 16. "That a Republican Constitution &
its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each
State by the U. States."

Mr. Govr. Morris, thought the Resol: very objectionable.
He should be very unwilling that such laws as
exist in R. Island should be guaranteed.

Mr. Wilson. The object is merely to secure the
States agst. dangerous commotions, insurrections and
rebellions.

Col. Mason. If the Genl. Govt. should have no
right to suppress rebellions agst. particular States, it
will be in a bad situation indeed. As Rebellions agst.
itself originate in & agst. individual States, it must
remain a passive Spectator of its own subversion.

Mr. Randolph. The Resoln. has 2. objects. 1. to
secure a Republican Government. 2. to suppress

domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of
both these provisions.

Mr. Madison moved to substitute "that the Constitutional
authority of the States shall be guaranteed
to them respectively agst. domestic as well as
foreign violence."

Docr. McClurg seconded the motion.

Mr. Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing
Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia
was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised
& amended. It may also be difficult for the Genl.
Govt. to decide between contending parties each of
which claim the sanction of the Constitution.

Mr. L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress
Rebellions themselves.

Mr. Ghorum thought it strange that a Rebellion
should be known to exist in the Empire, and the
Genl. Govt. shd. be restrained from interposing to subdue
it. At this rate an enterprising Citizen might
erect the standard of Monarchy in a particular State,
might gather together partizans from all quarters,
might extend his views from State to State, and
threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole & the
Genl. Govt. be compelled to remain an inactive witness
of its own destruction. With regard to different
parties in a State; as long as they confine their
disputes to words, they will be harmless to the Genl.
Govt. & to each other. If they appeal to the sword,
it will then be necessary for the Genl. Govt., however
difficult it may be to decide on the merits of their
contest, to interpose & put an end to it.

Mr. Carrol. Some such provision is essential.
Every State ought to wish for it. It has been
doubted whether it is a casus federis at present.
And no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.

Mr. Randolph moved to add as an amendt. to the
motion; "and that no State be at liberty to form any
other than a Republican Govt. "Mr. Madison seconded
the motion.

Mr. Rutlidge thought it unnecessary to insert any
guarantee. No doubt could be entertained but that
Congs. had the authority if they had the means to
co-operate with any State in subduing a rebellion.
It was & would be involved in the nature of the
thing.

Mr. Wilson moved as a better expression of the
idea, "that a Republican form of Governmt. shall be
guaranteed to each State & that each State shall be
protected agst. foreign & domestic violence.

This seeming to be well received, Mr. Madison &
Mr. Randolph withdrew their propositions & on the
Question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's motion, it
passed nem. con.

Adjd.