University of Virginia Library

Thursday May 31[33]

William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[34]

In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's
propositions.

The 3d. Resolution "that the national Legislature

ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to
without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania,
given probably from complaisance to Docr.
Franklin who was understood to be partial to a
single House of Legislation.

Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the
first branch of the National Legislature ought to be
elected by the people of the several States," being
taken up,

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people,
insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures.
The people he said, immediately should have
as little to do as may be about the Government.
They want information and are constantly liable to
be misled.

Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from
the excess of democracy. The people do not want
virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In
Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience
that they are daily misled into the most baneful
measures and opinions by the false reports circulated
by designing men, and which no one on the spot
can refute. One principal evil arises from the
want of due provision for those employed in the
administration of Governmt. It would seem to
be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants.
He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts.
for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on
that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican
heretofore: he was still however republican,

but had been taught by experience the danger of
the levelling spirit.

Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the
larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand
depository of the democratic principle of the Govt.
It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons—
It ought to know & sympathize with every part of
the community; and ought therefore to be taken
not only from different parts of the whole republic,
but also from different districts of the larger
members of it, which had in several instances particularly
in Virga., different interests and views arising
from difference of produce, of habits &c &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic but
was afraid we sd. incautiously run into the opposite
extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every
class of the people. He had often wondered at the
indifference of the superior classes of society to this
dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however
affluent their circumstances, or elevated their
situations, might be, the course of a few years, not
only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity
throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment,
ought to recommend such a system of policy
as would provide no less carefully for the rights and
happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of
Citizens.

Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the
most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately
from the people. He was for raising the federal

pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that
reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible.
No government could long subsist without the confidence
of the people. In a republican Government
this confidence was peculiarly essential. He
also thought it wrong to increase the weight of
the State Legislatures by making them the electors
of the national Legislature. All interference between
the general and local Governmts. should be
obviated as much as possible. On examination it
would be found that the opposition of States to
federal measures had proceeded much more from
the officers of the States, than from the people at
large.

Mr. Madison considered the popular election of
one branch of the national Legislature as essential
to every plan of free Government. He observed that
in some of the States one branch of the Legislature
was composed of men already removed from the
people by an intervening body of electors. That if
the first branch of the general legislature should be
elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch
elected by the first—the Executive by the second
together with the first; and other appointments
again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive,
the people would be lost sight of altogether;
and the necessary sympathy between them and their
rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate
for the policy of refining the popular appointments
by successive filtrations, but thought it might
be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be

resorted to only in the appointment of the second
branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive &
judiciary branches of the Government. He thought
too that the great fabric to be raised would be more
stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid
foundation of the people themselves, than if it should
stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.

Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people.
The maxims taken from the British Constitution
were often fallacious when applied to our situation
which was extremely different. Experience he said
had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately
from the people did not always possess their
confidence. He had no objection however to an
election by the people if it were so qualified that
men of honor & character might not be unwilling
to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to
think the people might nominate a certain number
out of which the State legislatures should be bound
to choose.[35]

Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an
impracticable mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch
of the national Legislature, by the people,

Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey
no. Pena. ay. Delawr. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Georga. ay.

The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4th relating

to the qualifications of members of the National
Legislature, being pospd. nem. con., as entering too
much into detail for general propositions;

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that
the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National
Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch
out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."

Mr. Spaight contended that the 2d. branch
ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and
moved an amendment to that effect.[36]

Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many
powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed,
tended to destroy all that balance and security
of interests among the States which it was
necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph
the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent
of his ideas, and particularly the number of members
he meant to assign to this second branch.

Mr. Randf. observed that he had at the time of
offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as
the nature of general propositions required; that
details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps
with propriety have been introduced. If he
was to give an opinion as to the number of the second
branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first; so small as to be
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which

numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that
the general object was to provide a cure for the
evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing
these evils to their origin every man had found it in
the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some
check therefore was to be sought for agst. this tendency
of our Governments: and that a good Senate
seemed most likely to answer the purpose.[37]

Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice
of the second branch as proposed (by Mr. Spaight)
viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable,
unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea
of proportion among the States was to be disregarded.
According to this idea, there must be 80
or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice
of one of them.—Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion.

Mr.Wilson opposed both a nomination by the
State Legislatures, and an election by the first
branch of the national Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter, ought to be independent
of both. He thought both branches of the National
Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but
was not prepared with a specific proposition. He
suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York
to wit of uniting several election districts for one
branch, in chusing members for the other branch,
as a good model.

Mr. Madison observed that such a mode would

destroy the influence of the smaller States associated
with larger ones in the same district; as the latter
would chuse from within themselves, altho' better
men might be found in the former. The election
of Senators in Virga. where large & small counties
were often formed into one district for the purpose,
had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality,
would often prefer a resident within the County or
State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out
of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more
known throughout his own State.[38]

Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member
by each of the State Legislatures.[39]

Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination
by the State Legislatures;" on this question.

[40] Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena.

no. Del. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no Georg
no.

On the whole question for electing by the first
branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures,
Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no.
Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C, ay,
Ga. no.

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in
this part of the plan.

The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which
the national Legislature ought to legislate was next
taken into discussion: On the question whether
each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous
affirmative without debate. On the question
for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing
Congs. to this Assembly, there was also a
silent affirmative nem. con.

On the proposition for giving "Legislative power
in all cases to which the State Legislatures were
individually incompetent,"

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Rutledge[41] . objected to the
vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they
could not well decide how to vote until they should

see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended
by this definition.[42]

Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were running
into an extreme in taking away the powers of the
States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent
of his meaning.

Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give
indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring
that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad
on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think
any considerations whatever could ever change his
determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.

Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him

into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an
enumeration and definition of the powers necessary
to be exercised by the national Legislature;
but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability.
His wishes remained unaltered; but his
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion
might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he
should shrink from nothing which should be found
essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide
for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community.
This being the end of all our deliberations,
all the necessary means for attaining it must, however
reluctantly, be submitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to
which the States are not competent—Massts. ay.
Cont. divd. (Sherman no Elseworth ay) N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
Carolina ay. Georga. ay.

The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve
harmony among the States to negative all
State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat.
Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause,
(the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority
of the Union," being added after the words
"contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on
motion of Dr. Franklin) were agreed to witht. debate
or dissent.

The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an
exertion of the force of the whole agst. a delinquent
State came next into consideration.

Mr. Madison, observed that the more he reflected

on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability,
the justice and the efficacy of it when applied
to people collectively and not individually.—A
union of the States containing such an ingredient
seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use
of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration
of war, than an infliction of punishment, and
would probably be considered by the party attacked
as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it
might be bound. He hoped that such a system
would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary,
and moved that the clause be postponed.
This motion was agreed to, nem. con.

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned.[43]