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The writings of James Madison,

comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Friday June 22. in Convention
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Friday June 22. in Convention

The clause in Resol. 3 "to receive fixed stipends to
be paid out of the Nationl. Treasury" considered.

Mr. Elseworth, moved to substitute payment by
the States out of their own Treasurys: observing
that the manners of different States were very different
in the stile of living and in the profits accruing
from the exercise of like talents. What would be
deemed therefore a reasonable compensation in some
States, in others would be very unpopular, and
might impede the system of which it made a part.

Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded
the House of the prospect of new States to the Westward.
They would be too poor—would pay little
into the common Treasury—and would have a different
interest from the old States. He did not
think therefore that the latter ought to pay the


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expences of men who would be employed in thwarting
their measures & interests.

Mr. Ghorum[92] wished not to refer the matter to the
State Legislatures who were always paring down
salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices
men most capable of executing the functions of
them. He thought also it would be wrong to fix
the compensations by the constitution, because we
could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought
to be without exciting an enmity agst. the whole plan.
Let the Natl. Legisl: provide for their own wages
from time to time; as the State Legislatures do. He
had not seen this part of their power abused, nor
did he apprehend an abuse of it.

Mr. Randolph said he feared we were going too
far, in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever respect
might be due to them, in lesser matters, or in
cases where they formed the permanent character
of the people, he thought it neither incumbent on
nor honorable for the Convention, to sacrifice right
& justice to that consideration. If the States were
to pay the members of the Nat1. Legislature, a dependence
would be created that would vitiate the


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whole System. The whole nation has an interest in
the attendance & services of the members. The
Nationl. Treasury therefore is the proper fund for
supporting them.

Mr. King, urged the danger of creating a dependence
on the States by leavg. to them the payment of
the members of the Natl. Legislature. He supposed
it wd. be best to be explicit as to the compensation
to be allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference
to the Natl. Legislature of the quantum, would
excite greater opposition than any sum that would
be actually necessary or proper.

Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the quantum
and the payment of it to the State Legislatures.

Mr. Wilson was agst. fixing the compensation as
circumstances would change and call for a change
of the amount. He thought it of great moment
that the members of the Natl. Govt. should be left
as independent as possible of the State Govts. in all
respects.

Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving
the compensations for the Natl. Govt. independent
on the State Govts. but at the same time approved
of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be
done by taking a standard which wd. not vary with
circumstances. He disliked particularly the policy
suggested by Mr. Wiliamson of leaving the members
from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the
precarious & parsimonious support of their constituents.
If the Western States hereafter arising
should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be


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considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives
were to be associated in the Common
Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions
should be made as would invite the most
capable and respectable characters into the service.

Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconveniency from fixing
the wages. He was strenuous agst. making the
National Council dependent on the Legislative rewards
of the States. Those who pay are the masters
of those who are paid. Payment by the States
would be unequal as the distant States would have
to pay for the same term of attendance and more
days in travelling to & from the seat of the Govt.
He expatiated emphatically on the difference between
the feelings & views of the people—& the
Governments of the States arising from the personal
interest & official inducements which must render
the latter unfriendly to the Genl. Govt.

Mr. Wilson moved that the Salaries of the 1st.
branch "be ascertained by the National Legislature,"
and be paid out of the Natl. Treasury.

Mr. Madison, thought the members of the Legisl.
too much interested to ascertain their own compensation.
It wd. be indecent to put their hands into
the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.

On this question Mass. no. Cont. no. N. Y. divd.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. divd.

On the question for striking out "Natl. Treasury"
as moved by Mr. Elseworth

Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He


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pressed the distinction between the State Govts. &
the people. The former wd. be the rivals of the
Genl. Govt. The State legislatures ought not therefore
to be the paymasters of the latter.

Mr. Elseworth. If we are jealous of the State
Grovts. they will be so of us. If on going home I tell
them we gave the Gen: Govt. such powers because
we cd. not trust you. Will they adopt it, and witht
yr. approbation it is a nullity.[93]

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. no.
Pena. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. divd.[94]

On a question for substituting "adequate compensation"
in place of "fixt stipends" it was agreed
to nem. con. the friends of the latter being willing
that the practicability of fixing the compensation
should be considered hereafter in forming the details.

It was then moved by Mr. Butler that a question
be taken on both points jointly; to wit "adequate
compensation to be paid out of the Natl. Treasury."
It was objected to as out of order, the parts having
been separately decided on. The Presidt. referd. the
question of order to the House, and it was determined


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to be in order. Con. N. J. Del. Md. N. C.
S. C.—ay—N. Y. Pa. Va. Geo." no — Mass. divided.
The question on the sentence was then postponed
by S. Carolina in right of the State.

Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty-five years of age
as a qualification for the members of the 1st. branch."
He thought it absurd that a man today should not
be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage
the affairs of a great nation. It was more extraordinary
as every man carried with him in his own
experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of
young politicians; since he would if interrogated be
obliged to declare that his political opinions at the
age of 21. were too crude & erroneous to merit an influence
on public measures. It had been said that
Congs. had proved a good school for our young men.
It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were,
he chose that they should bear the expence of their
own education.

Mr. Wilson was agst. abridging the rights of election
in any shape. It was the same thing whether this
were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or
the persons chusing. The motion tended to damp
the efforts of genius, and of laudable ambition.
There was no more reason for incapacitating youth
than age, where the requisite qualifications were
found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal
services rendered in high stations to the public
before the age of 25: The present Mr. Pitt and Lord
Bolingbroke were striking instances.


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On the question for inserting "25 years of age"
Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa.no.

Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Mr. Ghorum moved to strike out the last member
of the 3 Resol: concerning ineligibility of members
of the 1st branch to office during the term of their
membership & for one year after. He considered it
as unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had
been displayed in G. B. but no one cd. say how far
they might have contributed to preserve the due influence
of the Govt. nor what might have ensued in
case the contrary theory had been tried.

Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution agst. intrigue
was necessary. He appealed to the example of G. B.
where men got into Parlt. that they might get offices
for themselves or their friends. This was the source
of the corruption that ruined their Govt.

Mr. King, thought we were refining too much. Such
a restriction on the members would discourage merit.
It would also give a pretext to the Executive for bad
appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar
to the choice he wished to have made.

Mr. Wilson was agst. fettering elections, and discouraging
merit. He suggested also the fatal consequence
in time of war, of rendering perhaps the best
Commanders ineligible; appealing to our situation
during the late war, and indirectly leading to a
recollection of the appointment of the Com̃ander in
Chief out of Congress.[95]


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Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events
agst. corruption. He enlarged on the venality and
abuses in this particular in G. Britain: and alluded
to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Congs.
The disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in
the fabric.

Col. Hamilton, there are inconveniences on both
sides. We must take man as we find him, and if we


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expect him to serve the public must interest his passions
in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had
been the source of many of our errors. He thought
the remark of Mr. Ghorum a just one. It was impossible
to say what wd. be the effect in G. B. of such
a reform as had been urged. It was known that one
of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced
all that influence on the side of the crown, which

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went under the name of corruption, an essential part
of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of
the Constitution.

On Mr. Ghorum's Motion for striking out "ineligibility,"

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa.
divd. Del. divd. Mard. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Ga. ay.

Adjd.

 
[92]

"M. Gorham is a merchant in Boston, high in reputation, and
much in the esteem of his country-men. He is a man of very good
sense, but not much improved in his education. He is eloquent and
easy in public debate, but has nothing fashionable or elegant in his
style;—all he aims at is to convince, and where he fails it never is from
his auditory not understanding him, for no man is more perspicuous
and full. He has been President of Congress, and three years a
Member of that Body. Mr. Gorham is about 46 years of age, rather
lusty, and has an agreeable and pleasing manner."—Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.

[93]

According to Yates, Wilson followed Ellsworth:

"Mr. Wilson. I am not for submitting the national government to
the approbation of the state legislatures. I know that they and the
state officers will oppose it. I am for carrying it to the people of each
state."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 153.

[94]

(It appeared that Massts. concurred, not because they thought the
State Treasy. ought to be substituted; but because they thought
nothing should be said on the subject, in which case it wd. silently devolve
on the Nat1. Treasury to support the National Legislature.)—
Madison's Note.

[95]

According to Yates, Madison followed Wilson:
"Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others
too little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause, there may
be danger of creating offices or augmenting the stipends of those already
created, in order to gratify some members if they were not excluded.
Such an instance has fallen within my own observation. I am therefore
of opinion, that no office ought to be open to a member, which
may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 155. Yates gives the rest of the debate as
follows:

"Mr. Mason. It seems as if it was taken for granted, that all
offices will be filled by the executive, while I think many will remain
in the gift of the legislature. In either case, it is necessary to shut the
door against corruption. If otherwise, they may make or multiply
offices, in order to fill them. Are gentlemen in earnest when they
suppose that this exclusion will prevent the first characters from
coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the luxury and venality
which has already crept in among us? If not checked we shall have
ambassadors to every petty state in Europe—the little republic of
St. Marino not excepted. We must in the present system remove the
temptation. I admire many parts of the British constitution and
government, but I detest their corruption.—Why has the power of
the crown so remarkably increased the last century? A stranger, by
reading their laws, would suppose it considerably diminished; and
yet, by the sole power of appointing the increased officers of government,
corruption pervades every town and village in the kingdom.
If such a restriction should abridge the right of election, it is still
necessary, as it will prevent the people from ruining themselves; and
will not the same causes here produce the same effects? I consider
this clause as the corner-stone on which our liberties depend—and if
we strike it out we are erecting a fabric for our destruction.

"Mr. Gorham. The corruption of the English government cannot
be applied to America. This evil exists there in the venality of their
boroughs; but even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives
stability to their government. We do not know what the effect would
be if members of parliament were excluded from offices. The great
bulwark of our liberty is the frequency of elections, and the great
danger is the septennial parliaments.

"Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become the subjects
of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods.
I confess there is danger where men are capable of holding
two offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious—their passions
may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger
of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how
far it was necessary to support a good government. We have taken
up many ideas on trust, and at last, pleased with their own opinions,
establish them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of the British
constitution confirms the remark, that there is always a body of firm
patriots, who often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind
as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. There
may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from
more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind
more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and
interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail
itself of those passions, in order to make them subservient to the
public good—for these ever induce us to action. Perhaps a few men
in a state, may, from patriotic motives, or to display their talents,
or to reap the advantage of public applause, step forward; but if we
adopt the clause, we destroy the motive. I am therefore against all
exclusions and refinements, except only in this case; that when a
member takes his seat, he should vacate every other office. It is
difficult to put any exclusive regulation into effect. We must in
some degree submit to the inconvenience."—Yates, Secret Proceedings,
etc., 155, 156.