The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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Wednesday June 20. 1787. In Convention. |
 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
Wednesday June 20. 1787. In Convention.
Mr. William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1st propos: of the Report of Come. of the whole,
before the House
Mr. Elseworth 2ded. by Mr. Gorham, moves to alter
it so as to run "that the Government of the United
States ought to consist of a supreme legislative,
Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said
would drop the word national, and retain the proper
title "the United States." He could not admit the
doctrine that a breach of any of the federal articles
could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous
not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting.
He wished also the plan of the Convention
to go forth as an amendment of the articles of the
Confederation, since under this idea the authority
of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling,
the people will be so too. If the plan goes
forth to the people for ratification several succeeding
Conventions within the States would be unavoidable.
He did not like these conventions. They
were better fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions.
Mr. Randolph. did not object to the change of
expression, but apprised the gentleman who wished
for it that he did not admit it for the reasons assigned;
people for ratification. The motion of Mr. Elsewth
was acquiesced in nem: con:
The 2d. Resol: "that the National Legislature
ought to consist of two branches "taken up, the
word "national" struck out as of course.
Mr. Lansing. observed that the true question here
was, whether the Convention would adhere to or
depart from the foundation of the present Confederacy;
and moved instead of the 2d. Resolution,
"that the powers of Legislation be vested in the U.
States in Congress." He had already assigned two
reasons agst. such an innovation as was proposed:
1. the want of competent powers in the Convention.
—2. the state of the public mind. It had been observed
by (Mr. Madison) in discussing the first point,
that in two States the Delegates to Congs. were chosen
by the people. Notwithstanding the first appearance
of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the
Delegates however chosen, did not represent the
people merely as so many individuals; but as forming
a Sovereign State. (Mr. Randolph) put it, he
said, on its true footing namely that the public safety
superseded the scruple arising from the review of
our powers. But in order to feel the force of this
consideration, the same impression must be had of
the public danger. He had not himself the same
impression, and could not therefore dismiss his
scruple. (Mr. Wilson) contended that as the Convention
were only to recommend, they might recommend
what they pleased. He differed much from
must have a great effect, and if it does not succeed,
will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted
that there was no certain criterion of the Public
mind on the subject. He therefore recurred to the
evidence of it given by the opposition in the States
to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected
that those possessing Sovereignty could ever
voluntarily part with it. It was not to be expected
from any one State, much less from thirteen. He
proceeded to make some observations on the plan
itself and the argumts. urged in support of it. The
point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the
boroughs did not proceed from their comparative
smallness; but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants,
some of them not having more than one
or two. A great inequality existed in the Counties
of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption
in the small ones had not been made. It
had been said that Congress represent the State
Prejudices: will not any other body whether chosen
by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent
their prejudices? It had been asserted by
his colleague (Col. Hamilton) that there was no coincidence
of interests among the large States that
ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller.
If it were true that such a uniformity of interests
existed among the States, there was equal safety for
all of them, whether the representation remained as
heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed.
negative on the laws of the States. Is it conceivable
that there will be leisure for such a task? There
will on the most moderate calculation, be as many
Acts sent up from the States as there are days in
the year. Will the members of the General Legislature
be competent Judges? Will a gentleman
from Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law
which is to operate in N. Hampshire. Such a Negative
would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National
Govt. must have the influence arising from the grant
of offices and honors. In order to render such a
Government effectual he believed such an influence
to be necessary. But if the States will not agree to
it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the
proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the
States must be entirely abolished. Will any one
say this would ever be agreed to? He doubted
whether any Genl. Government equally beneficial
to all can be attained. That now under consideration
he is sure, must be utterly unattainable. He
had another objection. The system was too novel &
complex. No man could foresee what its operation
will be either with respect to the Genl. Govt. or the
State Govts. One or other it has been surmised must
absorb the whole.
Col. Mason. did not expect this point would have
been reagitated. The essential differences between
the two plans, had been clearly stated. The principal
objections agst. that of Mr. R. were the want of
weight in the first as the fiat is not to be here, but in
the people. He thought with his colleague Mr. R.
that there were besides certain crisises, in which
all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity.
He gave as an example, the eventual Treaty
with G. B. in forming which the Com̃srs of the U. S.
had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of
Congs. had given to their Country an honorable &
happy peace, and instead of being censured for the
transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves
a monument more durable than brass. The
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence he
thought was still more groundless. (Mr. Lansing)
had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement
of their powers, and had inferred from
the miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness
of the plan which he (Mr. L) opposed. He thought
a very different inference ought to have been drawn;
viz that the plan which (Mr. L) espoused, and which
proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never
could be expected to succeed. He meant not to
throw any reflections on Congs. as a body, much less
on any particular members of it. He meant however
to speak his sentiments without reserve on this
subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps the only
compensation which nature had given for, the privation
of so many other enjoyments: and he should
not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be thought
that the people of America, so watchful over their
interests; so jealous of their liberties, will give up
purse, to the same body, and that too not chosen immediately
by themselves? They never will. They
never ought. Will they trust such a body, with the
regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their
taxes; with all the other great powers, which are in
contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence
to a secret Journal—to the intrigues—to the
factions which in the nature of things appertain to
such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence
of these characters of Congress, let him consult
their Journals for the years 78, 79, & 80.—It will be
said, that if the people are averse to parting with
power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to
a National Legislature. The proper answer is that
in this case they do not part with power: they only
transfer it from one sett of immediate Representatives
to another sett.—Much has been said of the
unsettled state of the mind of the people, he believed
the mind of the people of America, as elsewhere,
was unsettled as to some points; but settled
as to others. In two points he was sure it was well
settled. 1. in an attachment to Republican Government.
2. in an attachment to more than one branch
in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they
seem almost to have been preconcerted. This must
either have been a miracle, or have resulted from the
genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishmt. of two branches in the Legislatures are
the State of Pa. & Congs. and the latter the only
What has been the consequence? The people have
been constantly averse to giving that Body further
powers—It was acknowledged by (Mr. Patterson)
that his plan could not be enforced without military
coercion. Does he consider the force of this concession.
The most jarring elements of Nature; fire &
water themselves are not more incompatible that[n]
such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution.
Will the militia march from one State to
another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from
the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they
maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the
Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till
they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union altogether.
Rebellion is the only case, in which the
military force of the State can be properly exerted
agst. its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck
with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedierit.
To punish the non-payment of taxes with
death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism
itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy
compared to a military collection of revenue, in
which the bayonet could make no discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty. He took this
occasion to repeat, that notwithstanding his solicitude
to establish a national Government, he never
would agree to abolish the State Govts. or render
them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary
as the Genl. Govt. and he would be equally
careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention,
tho' comprising so many distinguished characters,
could not be expected to make a faultless Govt.
And he would prefer trusting to Posterity the
amendment of its defects, rather than to push the experiment
too far.
Mr. Luther Martin agreed with (Col Mason) as to
the importance of the State Govts. he would support
them at the expence of the Genl. Govt. which was
instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw
no necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress
might be organized into two. He considered
Congs as representing the people, being chosen by
the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At
any rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and
it was the Legislatures not the people who refused
to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule of voting
have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten
of the States must always have been ready, to place
further confidence in Congs. The causes of repugnance
must therefore be looked for elsewhere.—At
the separation from the British Empire, the people
of America preferred the establishment of themselves
into thirteen separate sovereignties instead of
incorporating themselves into one: to these they
look up for the security of their lives, liberties &
properties: to these they must look up. The federal
Govt. they formed, to defend the whole agst. foreign
nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser
States agst. the ambition of the larger: they are
should defeat the original end of the Union; lest
the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties
of the particular States which the Union
was meant to support; and expose the lesser to
being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived
also that the people of the States having already
vested their powers in their respective Legislatures,
could not resume them without a dissolution of their
Governments. He was agst. Conventions in the
States: was not agst. assisting States agst. rebellious
subjects; thought the federal plan of Mr. Patterson
did not require coercion more than the National one,
as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its
revenues on requisitions & quotas, and that a national
Judiciary extended into the States would be
ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.
Mr. Sherman 2ded & supported Mr. Lansings motion.
He admitted two branches to be necessary
in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity for
them in a Confederacy of States. The examples
were all, of a single Council. Congs. carried us thro'
the war, and perhaps as well as any Govt. could have
done. The complaints at present are not that the
views of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful; but that
their powers are insufficient for the execution of
their views. The national debt & the want of
power somewhere to draw forth the National resources,
are the great matters that press. All the
States were sensible of the defect of power in
for the failure of the State Legislatures to comply
with the Confederation. They were afraid of leaning
too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no
constitutional rule had been or could be observed in
the quotas—the Accounts also were unsettled &
every State supposed itself in advance, rather than
in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to
a due amount had not been drawn from trade which
was the most convenient resource. As almost all
the States had agreed to the recommendation of
Congs. on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly
that they were willing to trust Congs. with power to
draw a revenue from Trade. There is no weight
therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of
Congs. for money matters being the most important
of all, if the people will trust them with power
as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Congs. indeed by the confederation
have in fact the right of saying how much the
people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be
applied: and this right was granted to them in the
expectation that it would in all cases have its effect.
If another branch were to be added to Congs. to be
chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass.
The people would not much interest themselves in
the elections, a few designing men in the large districts
would carry their points, and the people would
have no more confidence in their new representatives
than in Congs. He saw no reason why the
State Legislatures should be unfriendly as had been
approve of their measures, they would be rather
favourable and partial to them. The disparity of
the States in point of size he perceived was the
main difficulty. But the large States had not yet
suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the
small ones. In all great and general points, the
interests of all the States were the same. The State
of Virga. notwithstanding the equality of votes,
ratified the Confederation without, or even proposing,
any alteration. Massts. also ratified without any
material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications
is the want of two branches noticed or complained
of. To consolidate the States as some had proposed
would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations,
which had been formed with us, as Confederated
States. He did not however suppose that the creation
of two branches in the Legislature would have
such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he
would agree to have two branches, and a proportional
representation in one of them, provided each
State had an equal voice in the other. This was
necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States;
otherwise three or four of the large States would rule
the others as they please. Each State like each individual
had its peculiar habits usages and manners,
which constituted its happiness. It would not
therefore give to others a power over this happiness,
any more than an individual would do, when he
could avoid it.
Mr. Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches;
observed that if a proper model were not to be found
in other Confederacies it was not to be wondered at.
The number of them was small & the duration of
some at least short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan
were formed in the infancy of political Science; and
appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies
were held together not by any vital principle of
energy but by the incumbent pressure of formidable
neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance
to the influence of the H. of Austria. He
appealed to our own experience for the defects of
our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12
since the commencement of the Revolution, a member
of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He
appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had
not been obstructed by the small members of the
Union. The success of the Revolution was owing
to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress.
In many instances it went on even agst. the difficulties
arising from Congs. themselves. He admitted
that the large States did accede as had been stated,
to the Confederation in its present form. But it
was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are
other instances of their yielding from the same motive
to the unreasonable measures of the small
States. The situation of things is now a little altered.
He insisted that a jealousy would exist between
the State Legislatures & the General Legislature:
have views & feelings very distinct in this respect
from their constituents. A private Citizen of
a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by
the Genl. or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised
most for his happiness. His representative has
an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National
Legisl: with the eye of a jealous rival. He
observed that the addresses of Congs. to the people
at large, had always been better received & produced
greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take
up Mr. Lansing's proposition "to vest the powers of
legislation in Congs."
Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
no. Geo. no.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the
question on the 2d. Resolution in the Report from
the Committee of the whole was postponed till tomorrow.
Adjd.
| The writings of James Madison, | |