Introduction
An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding
1. An Inquiry into the understanding, pleasant and useful.
Since it is the understanding that sets man above the
rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a
subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes
us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and
make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps
us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance
we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in
directing our thoughts in the search of other things.
2. Design.
This, therefore, being my purpose--to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human
knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent;--I shall not at present meddle
with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what
motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in
our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the
design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they
are employed about the objects which they have to do with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed
myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of
the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have; and can set down any
measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst
men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance
and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the
same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness
wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at
all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.
3. Method.
It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by
what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate
our persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:--
First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a
man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to
be furnished with them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty,
evidence, and extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion: whereby I mean that assent
which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall
have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.
4. Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.
If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can
discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where
they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with
things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet
ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should
not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex
ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we
cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we
have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has
faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with
what is attainable by us in this state.
5. Our capacity suited to our state and concerns.
For though the comprehension of our understandings comes
exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of
our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the
inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them,
since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) πὲντα πρόσ ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatsoever is necessary for the
conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable
provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an
universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light
enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter
sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly
quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not
big enough to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we
will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable. And it will be an
unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to
improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It
will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that
he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. The
discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings right, when we
entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they
are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand
certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will
disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much what as wisely as he who
would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
6. Knowledge of our capacity a cure of scepticism and idleness.
When we know our own strength, we shall the
better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own
minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not
set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor on the other side, question everything, and
disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the
length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long
enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running
upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct.
If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may
and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other
things escape our knowledge.
7. Occasion of this essay.
This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I
thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to
take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till
that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure
possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of Being; as if all
that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was
nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond
their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no
wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper
only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the
capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon
found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is and what is not
comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and
employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.
8. What idea stand for.
Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the
occasion of this Inquiry into human understanding. But,
before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject,
I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader
for the frequent use of the word idea, which he will find in
the following treatise. It being that term which, I think,
serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the
understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or
whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and
I could not avoid frequently using it. I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas in men's minds: every one is conscious of them in
himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that
they are in others.
Our first inquiry then shall be, how they come into the
mind.