44. What good is desired, what not.
Though this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper
object of desire in general; yet all good, even seen and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every
particular man's desire; but only that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of
his happiness. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's desires who looks not on
it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, under
this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be
good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without. There is nobody, I think, so senseless as
to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge: and for the pleasures of sense, they have too many followers to let it
be questioned whether men are taken with them or no. Now, let one man place his satisfaction in sensual
pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge: though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in
what the other pursues; yet, neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not
moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys; and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it.
But yet, as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst make him uneasy, he, whose will was never determined to
any pursuit of good cheer, poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the
uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great
indifferency, what wholesome food comes in his way. And, on the other side, the epicure buckles to study, when
shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of
knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in earnest and constant in pursuit of happiness, yet they may have a
clear view of good, great and confessed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they
can make up their happiness without it. Though as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no
uneasiness without being moved. And therefore, being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their
happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they begin to desire it.