13. Instance in vacuum.
But if another should come and make to himself another idea, different from Descartes's,
of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the same name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by
the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will as easily demonstrate, that
there may be a vacuum or space without a body, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to
which he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and the idea to which he gives the name
body being the complex idea of extension and resistibility or solidity, together in the same subject, these two ideas
are not exactly one and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black,
or as of corporeity and humanity, if I may use those barbarous terms: and therefore the predication of them in our
minds, or in words standing for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another; viz., this
proposition: "Extension or space is not body," is as true and evidently certain as this maxim, It is impossible for
the same thing to be and not to be, can make any proposition.
