Another cause to doubt whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth.
Secondly, Another reason that makes me doubt whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason, in the
discovery of truth, is, that of whatever use mode and figure is pretended to be in the laying open of fallacy, (which
has been above considered,) those scholastic forms of discourse are not less liable to fallacies than the plainer
ways of argumentation; and for this I appeal to common observation, which has always found these artificial
methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the understanding.
And hence it is that men, even when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastic way, are seldom or never
convinced, and so brought over to the conquering side: they perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be the more
skilful disputant, but rest nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side, and go away, worsted as they are, with
the same opinion they brought with them: which they could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and
conviction with it, and made men see where the truth lay; and therefore syllogism has been thought more proper
for the attaining victory in dispute, than for the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair inquiries. And if it be
certain, that fallacies can be couched in syllogism, as it cannot be denied; it must be something else, and not
syllogism, that must discover them.
I have had experience how ready some men are, when all the use which they have been wont to ascribe to
anything is not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless
imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any helps to the understanding in the attainment of
knowledge. And if men skilled in and used to syllogisms, find them assisting to their reason in the discovery of
truth, I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at, is, that they should not ascribe more to these forms
than belongs to them, and think that men have no use, or not so full an use, of their reasoning faculties without
them. Some eyes want spectacles to see things clearly and distinctly; but let not those that use them therefore say
nobody can see clearly without them: those who do so will be thought, in favour of art (which, perhaps, they are
beholden to,) a little too much to depress and discredit nature. Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong
and exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism. If use of those spectacles has so dimmed its
sight, that it cannot without them see consequences or inconsequences in argumentation, I am not so unreasonable
as to be against the using them. Every one knows what best fits his own sight; but let him not thence conclude all
in the dark, who use not just the same helps that he finds a need of.
