71. We can change the agreeableness or disagreeableness in things.
The last inquiry, therefore, concerning this
matter is,--Whether it be in a man's power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any
sort of action? And as to that, it is plain, in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their palates, and give
relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and
like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasingness or
indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due
consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most. Bread or tobacco may be
neglected where they are shown to be useful to health, because of an indifferency or disrelish to them; reason and
consideration at first recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this
is so in virtue too, is very certain. Actions are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or considered as a
means to a greater and more desirable end. The eating of a well-seasoned dish, suited to a man's palate, may move
the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end; to which the
consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add a new
gusto, able to make us swallow an ill-relished potion. In the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less
pleasing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it, or
necessary connexion with it: but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired or increased by use and practice.
Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with aversion; and by repetitions wear us into a
liking of what possibly, in the first essay, displeased us. Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong
attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least
be easy in the omission of, actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this
be very visible, and every one's experience shows him he can do so; yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards
their happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox, if it be said, that men can
make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly
impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions, and
education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains
should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is
necessary or conducive to our happiness. This every one must confess he can do; and when happiness is lost, and
misery overtakes him, he will confess he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it; and I ask every
one, whether he has not often done so?
