The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate
It is an established opinion amongst some men, that
there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some
primary notions, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, characters, as it were stamped
upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very how
first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be
sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of
this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in
the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the
at use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge
they have, without the help of any innate impression ; and
may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions
or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that
it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate
in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to
receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no
less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to
the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we
may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and
certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted
on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to
follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they
lead him ever so little out of the common road , I shall set
down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that
opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which
I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose
themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.