11. What use these general maxims or axioms have.
What shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use?
By no means; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be. But, since doubting in the
least of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against, as overturning
the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth while to consider them with respect to other parts of our
knowledge, and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not.
(1) It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general
self-evident propositions.
(2) It is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built. There is, I
know, a great deal of talk, propagated from scholastic men, of sciences and the maxims on which they are built:
but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any such sciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims,
what is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. And I would be glad to be shown where any
such science, erected upon these or any other general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged to any one who
would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these or any such like maxims, that could not
be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the
same use in the study of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in other sciences? They serve here,
too, to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobody will therefore say, that the Christian
religion is built upon these maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from these principals. It is from
revelation we have received it, and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we
find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation from God to
us by the voice of reason: for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God declares any
truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in
neither of these do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the things themselves afford
it: and we see the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it
immediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity.
(3) They are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown
truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which are so
many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are further advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the
discovery of these, it was not the general maxims, "what is, is;" or, "the whole is bigger than a part," or the like,
that helped him. These were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those
propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations, but by finding out
intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he
demonstrated. This is the greatest exercise and improvement of human understanding in the enlarging of
knowledge, and advancing the sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the
contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims. Would those who have this traditional admiration of these
propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, no stone laid in
the building of the sciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between the method of acquiring
knowledge, and of communicating it; between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching it to others,
as far as it is advanced--they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first
discoverers raised their admirable structures, not the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge.
Though afterwards, when schools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found
out, they often made use of maxims, i.e., laid down certain propositions which were self-evident, or to be received
for true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable verities they on occasion made use
of, to convince them of truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their minds as those general
axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular
instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought
to confirm them: and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help
of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who with attention considers them.
Maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered, and in silencing obstinate wranglers. To come,
therefore, to the use that is made of maxims.
(1) They are of use, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are
advanced: but of little or none in advancing them further.
(2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those contests to some
conclusion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leave to inquire. The
Schools having made disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged
victory to him that kept the field: and he that had the last word was concluded to have the better of the argument,
if not of the cause. But because by this means there was like to be no decision between skilful combatants, whilst
one never failed of a medius terminus to prove any proposition; and the other could as constantly, without or with
a distinction, deny the major or minor; to prevent, as much as could be, running out of disputes into an endless
train of syllogisms, certain general propositions--most of them, indeed, self-evident--were introduced into the
Schools: which being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and
served instead of principles (where the disputants had not lain down any other between them) beyond which there
was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And thus these maxims, getting the name of
principles, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources
from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the sciences were built. Because when in their
disputes they came to any of these, they stopped there, and went no further; the matter was determined. But how
much this is a mistake, hath been already shown.
How maxims came to be so much in vogue. This method of the Schools, which have been thought the fountains of
knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like use of these maxims into a great part of conversation out of the
Schools, to stop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny
these general self-evident principles received by all reasonable men who have once thought of them: but yet their
use herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing: that is already
done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the help of those
maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men
would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes they proposed to themselves the
finding and embracing of truth, and not a contest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their
perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the method of the Schools having allowed and
encouraged men to oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, i.e., till they are reduced to contradict
themselves, or some established principles: it is no wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed
of that which in the Schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz., obstinately to maintain that side of the question
they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way to attain truth
and knowledge: and that which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could scarce
believe should ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion or nature, or introduced into
the seminaries of those who are to propagate the truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant and
unconvinced. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and
love of truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adhering to, I
shall not now inquire. This I think, that, bating those places, which brought the Peripatetick Philosophy into their
schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art of wrangling, these
maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the
advancement of knowledge.
Of great use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of little use to the discovery of truths. As to these general maxims,
therefore, they are, as I have said, of great use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much use to
the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge. For who ever began
to build his knowledge on the general proposition, what is, is; or, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not
to be: and from either of these, as from a principle of science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong
opinions often involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may serve well to show whither
they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are of
very little use for enlightening the understanding: and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from
them in its progress in knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two general
propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a
wrangler's mouth, by showing the absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting
what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to show a man that he is in
an error, and another to put him in possession of truth; and I would fain know what truths these two propositions
are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without
them. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only about identical predications, and influence, if any
at all, none but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as clearly and certainly known
in itself, if attended to, as either of these general ones: only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are
therefore more inculcated and insisted on. As to other less general maxims, many of them are no more than bare
verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another. "The whole is equal
to all its parts": what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what
the signification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itself import? And he that knows that the word whole
stands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all its parts. And,
upon the same ground, I think that this proposition, "A hill is higher than a valley," and several the like, may also
pass for maxims. But yet masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others
in that science, do not without reason place this and some other such maxims at the entrance of their systems; that
their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such
general terms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more general propositions, as formed rules
and sayings, ready to apply to all particular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and
evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the
very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from our custom of using them,
and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence
of the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine
it is quite otherwise; and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular
instance, than by this general proposition, "The whole is equal to all its parts"; and that, if one of these have need
to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular, than the
particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, by degrees, to generals.
Though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into as general
propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the
standards of truth and falsehood. By which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of other
propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from
their conformity to these more general ones, which, in discourse and argumentation, are so frequently urged, and
constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the most
general only have had the title of maxims.
