Syllogism does not discover ideas, or their connexions.
To infer, is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid
down as true, to draw in another as true, i.e., to see or suppose such a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred
proposition. V.g. Let this be the proposition laid down, "Men shall be punished in another world," and from
thence be inferred this other, "Then men can determine themselves." The question now is, to know whether the
mind has made this inference right or no: if it has made it by finding out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view
of the connexion of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference: if it has
done it without such a view, it has not so much made an inference that will hold, or an inference of right reason,
as shown a willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither case is it syllogism that discovered those
ideas, or showed the connexion of them; for they must be both found out, and the connexion everywhere
perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in syllogism: unless it can be said, that any idea, without
considering what connexion it hath with the two other, whose agreement should be shown by it, will do well
enough in a syllogism, and may be taken at a venture for the medius terminus, to prove any conclusion. But this
nobody will say; because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that
the extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate idea must be such as in the whole chain hath
a visible connexion with those two it has been placed between, or else thereby the conclusion cannot be inferred
or drawn in: for wherever any link of the chain is loose and without connexion, there the whole strength of it is
lost, and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything. In the instance above mentioned, what is it shows the force
of the inference, and consequently the reasonableness of it, but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate
ideas that draw in the conclusion, or proposition inferred? V.g. "Men shall be punished"; "God the punisher";
"Just punishment"; "The punished guilty"; "Could have done otherwise"; "Freedom"; "Self-determination"; by
which chain of ideas thus visibly linked together in train, i.e., each intermediate idea agreeing on each side with
those two it is immediately placed between, the ideas of men and self-determination appear to be connected, i.e.,
this proposition "men can determine themselves" is drawn in or inferred from this, "that they shall be punished in
the other world." For here the mind, seeing the connexion there is between the idea of men's punishment in the
other world and the idea of God punishing; between God punishing and the justice of the punishment; between
justice of punishment and guilt; between guilt and a power to do otherwise; between a power to do otherwise and
freedom; and between freedom and self-determination, sees the connexion between men and self-determination.
