22. Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of the species we make: instance in that of man.
There are creatures
in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst
us that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is
said, (sit fides penes authorem, but there appears no contradiction that there should be such), that, with language
and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards,
and others where the females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species? it is plain,
the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or the
complex idea signified by the name, agrees, are men, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the
supposed real essence; and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically
different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific idea: only we have reason
to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the
same. But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire;
whilst our measures of species be, as they are, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal
constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different
internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and
speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species
between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is
fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.